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ON RESUMPTION: 19TH AUGUST 1999 - DAY 2
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 ON RESUMPTION: 19TH AUGUST 1999 - DAY 3

CHAIRPERSON: Good morning. We want to start the proceedings. For the record, we are continuing with the amnesty applications of E A de Kock and nine others, in respect of the Nelspruit 4 and Tiso incidents. We were still taking the evidence-in-chief of Mr de Kock.

&#9;Mr de Kock, we accept that you are still capable of continuing.

MR DE KOCK: Yes, that is correct, Chairperson.

CHAIRPERSON: Very well, I will remind you that you are still under oath to speak the truth.

EUGENE ALEXANDER DE KOCK: (s.u.o.)

CHAIRPERSON: Mr Hattingh?

EXAMINATION BY MR HATTINGH: (cont)

&#9;Thank you, Mr Chairman.

&#9;Mr de Kock, yesterday afternoon we were busy dealing with the position of Vlakplaas, after the unbanning of the organisations such as the ANC.

MR DE KOCK: Yes, that is correct.

MR HATTINGH: And may I just ask you to summarise this. How did you regard the ANC and the PAC and other similar organisations during this period after the unbanning, up to and including the incidents which took place at Nelspruit?

MR DE KOCK: Chairperson, the ANC and the PAC, although they adopted a political and negotiative direction, were still involved in a conflict and they were still focused on revolutionary change instead of an evolutionary change. With Vula for example, it was clear that the objective was revolutionary, that it was revolutionary by nature. And that which was presented to the public and the world beyond your border, is not exactly that which took place on ground level.

MR HATTINGH: Chairperson, I assume that you have received the other pages of General Nyanda's evidence.

CHAIRPERSON: Yes, we have, thank you.

MR HATTINGH: And can we then accept that this will form part of Exhibit C and that it will be numbered from 103 onwards?

CHAIRPERSON: Yes, that is correct.

MR HATTINGH: Thank you, Chairperson.

&#9;Mr de Kock, could I take you through that briefly. During cross-examination, General Nyanda, on page 104 was asked by me:

&#9;&#9;"Now the prosecutor had the date wrong because from the minute it would appear that the minute was signed by the parties on the 4th of May, but in any event, the Vula operation continued after 4th of May, is that correct?"

And he says:

&#9;&#9;"It is so."

&#9;&#9;"And had it not been for the fact that people like yourself were arrested, it would have continued up until at least the signing of the Pretoria Minute, not so?"

And he answers:

&#9;&#9;"Probably beyond that."

Do you recall that evidence?

MR DE KOCK: Yes, Chairperson.

MR HATTINGH: And then on page 105 he is also asked - middle of the page:

&#9;&#9;"After the entering into of the Groote Schuur Accord, further arms were introduced into the country, is that correct? Orders were placed for further arms to be brought into the country."

And he says:

&#9;&#9;"It is so."

&#9;&#9;"And the military training of people inside the country continued."

&#9;&#9;"It is so."

And then somewhat lower down in the page I say to him, with reference to a place which was known as 16 Avoca Road:

&#9;&#9;"In any event it is put to you on page 16 ..."

That is a reference to cross-examination by another person at another instance of General Nyanda.

&#9;&#9;"... put to you on page 16, that at Avoca Road two modified petrol tanks were found. Do you remember that?"

&#9;&#9;"It is so."

&#9;&#9;"One was a Mercedes tank and one was a Kwesta ..."

I think that must be a mistake, probably a Conquest tank.

&#9;&#9;"... and you were asked: Can you tell us anything about these tanks? And you initially (I said to him) said no. Then you were asked: 'Well did you know they were there? And you said: Yes, I knew they were there. So what were they used for? Do you want to tell the Court, do you want to tell us what these tanks were all about? And you said they were used for carrying arms. Further down the page it was put to you: They have been modified so that they held a minimal amount of petrol and the rest of what looked like a petrol tank was a space in which arms and explosives could be carried. Is that correct? And you said: Yes. And from which countries were arms carried into South Africa in those petrol tanks? To which you replied: From Botswana.

And then I continue with my examination.

&#9;&#9;"I would just like to ask you some questions about that. There was a military base near the Mozambique border, called Skwamaans(?). Were you aware of the existence of that base?"

&#9;&#9;"No."

&#9;&#9;"Now the police who were manning that base found, if I may show you photostat copies of photographs, I assume the originals can be produced if necessary. Can you I just show you a photostat copy of the photograph of a modified petrol tank and another one indicating the number of AKs that were found to be in that petrol tank. Is that the sort of petrol tank modification that you testified to at the bail application?"

&#9;&#9;"Yes, something like that."

&#9;&#9;"Now is it possible therefore that that method was also employed by the ANC to smuggle arms into the country from places other than Botswana, Mozambique, Swaziland and so on?"

And he says:

&#9;&#9;"I think it is possible."

&#9;&#9;"Because this particular vehicle was stopped in the vicinity of the Mozambique border. Apparently it had come from Mozambique into the country. Do you accept that?"

&#9;&#9;"I accept that it is possible that the ANC could use that."

Then I ask somewhat lower on the page, regarding another matter when weapons were brought in or were found in a vehicle at the Golel border post. And I ask him at line 21:

&#9;&#9;"But it was given wide publicity and it happened, if I remember correctly, after the unbanning of the ANC."

He says:

&#9;&#9;"I think I do recall it."

&#9;&#9;"Can you perhaps put a date to that incident?"

&#9;&#9;"It was 1993 or 1992."

&#9;&#9;"1993, yes. And am I correct in saying that the same method was used to bring firearms into the country on that particular occasion?"

And he says:

&#9;&#9;"No, I think on this particular occasion they used the boot of the vehicle."

&#9;&#9;"Not the tank?"

&#9;&#9;"Not the tank."

You heard that evidence?

MR DE KOCK: Yes.

MR HATTINGH: Is that in line with information that you received after the unbanning of the ANC, regarding activities which you had exposed after the unbanning of the ANC?

MR DE KOCK: Yes. I can mention that especially on the East Rand, especially in the areas such as Daveyton and Duduza, in that vicinity, we picked up information that the Self Defence Units were being provided with ammunition by the ANC, but it was difficult to infiltrate that specific organisation or group. But the information was definite.

MR HATTINGH: You launched an operation which you called 'Operation Ex-calibre'.

MR DE KOCK: That is correct, Chairperson.

MR HATTINGH: And that operation led to the tracing of tremendous amounts of weapons which had been smuggled into the country.

MR DE KOCK: That's correct, Chairperson.

ADV DE JAGER: Please repeat the name of the operation.

MR DE KOCK: It is 'Ex-calibre'.

MR HATTINGH: Did you receive any commendations or awards for the work that you had performed in that regard?

MR DE KOCK: Yes. Commendations were issued in the form of certificates for that work. I must just mention that in the process a total of 28 persons were arrested, 24 went to Court and 4 died, and all of them were Mozambicans, who had been involved among others.

MR HATTINGH: Very well. Did you ever receive any information regarding the possible involvement of ANC members or supporters in robberies and that the booty of such robberies, whether partially or completely, was being channelled to the ANC?

MR DE KOCK: Chairperson, the information existed that robberies were being committed in the name of the ANC and the PAC. I cannot give specific evidence that the money or the booty ended up at these organisations, but that it was done on behalf of the ANC or PAC, was supported by existing information.

MR HATTINGH: Was this information which was received upon a singular occasion or on more than one occasion?

MR DE KOCK: This information was received on more than one occasion. There was an escalation in armed robberies and armed assaults, if I may put it like this, after the unbanning of the ANC and the return of trained members.

ADV DE JAGER: Mr Hattingh, perhaps you could just clear this up right now. I think that it was recognised by the PAC, in submissions before this Committee and other Committees, that they used these robberies. However, I may be mistaken, I stand under correction, I don't believe that it was actually ANC policy as such. Do you have any possible information about that?

MR DE KOCK: Chairperson, yes there was information. I am aware of the fact that it was not ANC policy, but that these robberies did indeed take place. I know, among others, that the Johannesburg Intelligence Services were focused on certain persons, of which one was a senior person.

MR HATTINGH: And when you refer to senior person, in what organisation do you mean?

MR DE KOCK: In the ANC specifically. And I know, as the ANC put it, that it wasn't their policy, but it was also not the policy of the former South African Government to blow up buildings. Nonetheless, it took place. 

&#9;We can observe the example of Khotso House and Cosatu House. It wasn't necessary to cross borders and launch operations abroad, nonetheless we did so. We have examples of attacks in Swaziland and Lesotho. Therefore, what the government and the organisations presented to the voters and the people out there, is not necessarily what really took place on ground level.

MR HATTINGH: Wat was u geloof in die verband, na aanleiding van die inligting wat julle ontvang het? ...(no English interpretation)

MR DE KOCK: Chairperson, I had no doubt that militarily trained persons would be involved. From my objective and from an operational objective, it appeared to be more co-ordinated. These groups were larger, there were fewer arrests and more armed resistance should the police have succeeded in apprehending these persons. And I had no doubt. One probably couldn't blame them because you would find thousands of people returning with no prospects of employment.

MR HATTINGH: But with regard to the booty which was taken from such exercises, do you believe that some of it at least was taken to the ANC?

MR DE KOCK: Yes, it is a global tendency within any organisation. Let us not stigmatise any organisation here, let us refer to a terrorist organisation. The trend is to obtain funding, whether it be by means of blackmail or robbery. If we look at a French organisation, the OS, which came to existence after the fall of Algeria and the Simbese(?) Liberation Army, of which Patti Hurst was such a prominent member and even up until this very day we have liberation movements or terrorist movements who are funding their coffers by means of State exploitation. Even the IRA does this.

MR HATTINGH: Let me take you somewhat further back. Yesterday you mentioned a meeting which was held at Vlakplaas, during which a Commander of the Murder and Robbery Unit was present and during this meeting you were addressed by General Engelbrecht.

MR DE KOCK: Yes.

MR HATTINGH: Did this subject of robberies with the objective of supplementing the funds of terrorist organisations come to discussion at any time during this meeting?

MR DE KOCK: Yes, it did.

MR HATTINGH: And who mentioned it?

MR DE KOCK: It was General Engelbrecht himself. The information surrounding this sort of action was centred at head office and it would have been under his attention and he specifically mentioned that the former conflicting organisations were involved in armed robberies.

MR HATTINGH: And General Engelbrecht at that stage was the overall Commander of C10, is that correct?

MR DE KOCK: Yes, that is correct.

MR HATTINGH: And before that he was for many years connected to the Murder and Robbery Unit?

MR DE KOCK: Yes, that is correct, he was the National Commander of Murder and Robbery.

MR HATTINGH: And just to refer more specifically to this incident, you said that Mr Holtzhausen told you that the information indicated that trained MK members or that a trained MK member would be involved in this armed robbery.

MR DE KOCK: Yes, that is correct.

MR HATTINGH: Did you receive any information regarding what would happen to the booty of this robbery?

MR DE KOCK: Yes, the information was that it would go to the ANC. I cannot say specifically to which unit or wing or the ANC, but I knew that it was on behalf of the ANC.

MR HATTINGH: And this information, did you regard it as confidential?

MR DE KOCK: Yes, I had no reason to doubt it.

MR HATTINGH: Mr van Zyl was also the informer who presented information regarding Carousel?

MR DE KOCK: Yes.

MR HATTINGH: And that attempted robbery on Coin Security did indeed take place, so it appeared as if his information was reliable.

MR DE KOCK: That is correct.

MR HATTINGH: Did you thus believe that you were acting against persons who were acting on behalf of or in support of the ANC in committing these robberies?

MR DE KOCK: Yes.

MR HATTINGH: Let us just get to Exhibit C, that is the document dealing with Vlakplaas. Do you still have it before you? Please page to page 60. That heading, paragraph 2.6:

&#9;&#9;"Actions by Vlakplaas members on own initiate and own discretion."

Let me just ask you a direct question with regard to this incident. Did you obtain authorisation from your direct commander, directly above you, to execute this operation?

MR DE KOCK: Yes, Chairperson, the operation was approved. It was approved that we could travel to Nelspruit, but with regard to the travelling itself, I took the initiative and used my own discretion.

MR HATTINGH: You did not inform your immediate commander regarding the nature and circumstances of the operation?

MR DE KOCK: No.

MR HATTINGH: Did you feel that it was necessary in this case?

MR DE KOCK: No, Chairperson, this operation was no different to for example, the operations which were launched at Piet Retief, where two shooting incidents took place. Among others, at Amsterdam. 

MR HATTINGH: And those operations that you have just mentioned, did they take place with prior permission or approval of the immediate commander?

MR DE KOCK: No.

MR HATTINGH: Now this section of Exhibit C deals with the execution of own discretion. You have heard the evidence of General van der Merwe, when he gave evidence, as quoted here in this section.

MR DE KOCK: Yes, that is correct.

MR HATTINGH: That is was expected of members of the Security Force to apply their own discretion.

MR DE KOCK: Yes, Chairperson.

MR HATTINGH: And it is quoted here, his evidence is quoted rather thoroughly here and he states expressly that it was indeed expected of you not always to run to your commanders to receive orders, but to use your own initiative and discretion when you went over into actions.

MR DE KOCK: Yes, that is correct. And by nature of C1's activities, all members, regardless of whether you were an officer or a junior officer, you had to be able to think for yourself and take the lead. If your senior officer was shot dead in a cross-border operation, the members had to be able to think for themselves in a such a situation.

MR HATTINGH: And when this incident took place you were already a Colonel in the SAP?

MR DE KOCK: Yes, I think I was a full Colonel.

MR HATTINGH: And you had already spent nine years as the Commander of Unit C10?

MR DE KOCK: Yes.

MR HATTINGH: Therefore you were very experienced and you were already a senior officer and you decided to exercise your own discretion?

MR DE KOCK: That is correct.

MR HATTINGH: You've also heard the evidence of General van der Merwe before another Committee, approximately two weeks ago. That was with regard to the Zero-Zero hand grenade incident, the matter which was heard. During that time he reiterated the evidence which he gave, which is contained within Exhibit C. 

MR DE KOCK: Yes, that is correct.

MR HATTINGH: Just a moment please, Chairperson. Very well. In this section of Exhibit C it is also mentioned with regard to cases of the past, and you can correct me if I'm wrong, but I think it is also of application to this matter. In cases during the past where you exercised your own discretion, the incidents would be reported to the commanders afterwards?

MR DE KOCK: Yes, that is correct.

MR HATTINGH: And therefore they knew that you had acted beyond the parameters of the law?

MR DE KOCK: Yes. Our cross-border operations for example, were all beyond the parameters of the law. If we can just take a more comprehensive look at this. If we blew up an office of the ANC in London, it would qualify as international terrorism. This wasn't something that was funny at all.

MR HATTINGH: Were any disciplinary steps ever taken against you or any other member of Vlakplaas, as a result of the fact that you had been involved in operations which went beyond the boundaries of the law?

MR DE KOCK: No. Even with the inception of the Harms Commission and other investigations, all the information which the Security Branch had was used to cover up the real facts. 

MR HATTINGH: And was this also the case, was this also covered up?

MR DE KOCK: Yes, completely.

MR HATTINGH: Yesterday afternoon you testified that you had already told General Engelbrecht on the scene that there was a problem with regard to this incident.

MR DE KOCK: Yes, that is correct. 

MR HATTINGH: You also testified that he was present at Grasdak when statements were compiled. 

MR DE KOCK: That is correct.

MR HATTINGH: And on this occasion, was he once again informed what had really taken place?

MR DE KOCK: I do not recall independently, but I think yes, because the evidence would have to correlate with other aspects of evidence. So one couldn't really help, but to discuss these aspects of the true evidence.

MR HATTINGH: Did you receive any commendations or awards for operations in which you had been involved, such operations having involved illegal actions?

MR DE KOCK: Yes. For the bomb explosion in London and also for a cross-border operation in Lesotho, a third operation in Swaziland during which Zwelibanzi Nyanda was shot dead. And where there weren't any decorations, there would for example be a function at which persons would be personally congratulated. The Minister would be there to shake hands with them.

MR HATTINGH: And by the Minister, you refer to the former Minister of Security, Mr Vlok? MR DE KOCK: Yes, that is correct. And then we also had the Head of Security there and congratulations were extended all over.

MR HATTINGH: What is the highest award that you received as a member of the South African Police?

MR DE KOCK: The Silver Cross for Courage.

MR HATTINGH: Let us just deal with them one for one. The Silver Cross for Courage, what is that for?

MR DE KOCK: That is for the action in Lesotho.

MR HATTINGH: And that was the operation during which you went over the border and shot dead a group of people?

MR DE KOCK: Yes, I think nine or ten people were shot dead.

MR HATTINGH: And that award, is it usually extended to officers below the rank of General?

MR DE KOCK: Yes, this is an award which can be allocated to any member.

MR HATTINGH: And what other award did you receive?

MR DE KOCK: Upon two occasions I received the SOE. It is a decoration which is only awarded to Generals when they become Generals.

MR HATTINGH: And why did you receive these two awards?

MR DE KOCK: One was for the explosion of the ANC's head offices in London and the other was for the attack on the ANC transit house in Swaziland, during which Zwelibanzi Nyanda was killed.

MR HATTINGH: And those actions took place with the full knowledge and sometimes the order of the Generals in staff in Pretoria, at head office?

MR DE KOCK: Yes. And we also enjoyed full logistic support as we did with all our operations.

MR HATTINGH: And was this awarded by the Minister?

MR DE KOCK: Yes. The medal from the London operation was awarded by Minister le Grange personally and in the case of the Nyanda operation as well as - it was an SOE for the London operation. The Silver Medal was awarded by General Smit and General Johan van der Merwe, who conducted the awards. Photos were being taken and hands were shook. 

MR HATTINGH: That was when van der Merwe was the Commissioner of Police?

MR DE KOCK: Yes, and Smit was the Head of Security. And the other SOE was also awarded during a ceremony. But this was all done in secret, this wasn't the usual award ceremony with a passing-out parade at the end of the year, which would take place at the Police College. One would simply call these six to eight people in a small group into the office and the decorations would be awarded, there'd be a pat on the back and goodbye.

MR HATTINGH: And for what was this? - the last one.

MR DE KOCK: That was the shooting incident in Swaziland. An SOE was also awarded for that.

MR HATTINGH: And was the reason for this exceptional method of award, the secrecy that was attached to it?

MR DE KOCK: Yes, the announcement of medals would take place in the police rank orders. There were two types of orders, the general and the officers'. And a brief reference was simply made regarding an action which for the interest of the State could not be made known and the names of the persons to whom it had been allocated.

MR HATTINGH: I have already asked you whether any disciplinary action was taken against you or other members of Vlakplaas, as a result of your involvement in illegal activities. Let us just take it further. In the approximately nine years that you were the Commander of Vlakplaas, was any disciplinary action whatsoever taken against you? Was any action or authorisation of yours ever questioned or severely criticised?

MR DE KOCK: No. And with regard to the involvement of my members, with particular reference to ANC and PAC members, we had all the power at our disposal. We covered up those matters. And where necessary we submitted false statements, changed certain statements and even went as far as changing the identities of some askaris that even to this very day they cannot reclaim their original identities.

MR HATTINGH: And at that time when you were still a member of Vlakplaas, Mr de Kock, how did you feel about your actions against the liberation movements?

MR DE KOCK: Chairperson, I felt that it was justified. I felt that we would fight it out until there was not a white person left in this country, even if we have to leave the country was in ruins. If we had to use extreme violence we would do so. I was not prepared to see this country in a similar situation to the other countries in Africa, such as Mozambique for example, where we would have a case where the entire population of a village would be obliterated completely, where men and women and children would be chopped to death and raped. I wasn't prepared to have such a situation in this country.

MR HATTINGH: And how do you feel today regarding your actions in the past?

MR DE KOCK: The way I feel now, Chairperson, we wasted time, we strangled one another and destroyed one another and wasted a lot of time which we could sooner have spent on the creation of a safer country with a zero crime rate. We have changed the lives of many others irrevocably. And in my opinion we could just as well have handed the country over in 1960 and gotten over with it.

MR HATTINGH: Do you mean that you achieved nothing by killing people and destroying buildings?

MR DE KOCK: No, it was completely futile, it was only to maintain that particular government and for nothing else.

MR HATTINGH: And how do you feel about those persons who suffered as a result of your actions?

MR DE KOCK: I am not suffering as much as they are. If we measure their losses we will see that they are completely unrecoverable and they have all my sympathy in this regard. Although it will not reclaim anything, I would like them to know this.

MR HATTINGH: Chairperson, yesterday afternoon I told you that we would attempt to obtain photographs of the scene in order to assist you. We have obtained a series of photos, but unfortunately these are not the photos that we actually wanted. We recall photos having been taken from above on the bridge, which will give a much better perspective of the scene as such. We will still attempt to obtain those photographs. 

&#9;In the meantime, could we refer you to two photographs of the scene, which may assist you in garnering a better impression of how things looked there. If we could just hand this in. A colour copy of the originals and then for the convenience of the Committee, I have made regular copies of that. We have also received copies for the rest of the legal representatives.

CHAIRPERSON: Very well. Mr Hattingh, we will mark this - I think we were busy with C, so we will mark this as D. This one with a number 17 on it, will be D1. It is a photograph with a signpost indicating Nelspruit and Kwanyemazaan. So that one is going to be D1 and the other one with the number 56 on it, will be D2.

MR HATTINGH: Thank you, Chairperson. 

&#9;Might I just ask you, Mr de Kock, to assist us in this regard. As I recall D1 indicates the road which the minibus travelled on and the direction in which it travelled when it was fired at.

MR DE KOCK: Yes, that is correct.

MR HATTINGH: The bridge where you stood is not visible on the photograph. It is not the bridge in the background of this photograph, the bridge would be more tot he front of the photograph.

MR DE KOCK: Yes. If I look at the left corner at the bottom of the photograph, there is an elevation in the level of the ground.

MR HATTINGH: And that leads up to the bridge?

MR DE KOCK: Yes, it leads up to the bridge.

MR HATTINGH: Did you walk up that embankment, when you took up position on the embankment?

MR DE KOCK: Yes.

MR HATTINGH: And the vehicle which is parked there, the white vehicle with a blue revolving light on it? Do you see it?

MR DE KOCK: Yes.

MR HATTINGH: Is that the position that a vehicle was placed in after the shooting incident?

MR DE KOCK: I am not certain. It may be so, but I'm not certain.

MR HATTINGH: Very well. And then there is a minibus on the left front side, which is parked there.

MR DE KOCK: Yes, that is correct. I don't know if it is that minibus, or whether it is one which was placed there for the purposes of reconstruction. I wasn't there when the photographs were taken.

MR HATTINGH: Well it cannot be the same minibus because the original was burnt. But is that the spot where the minibus came to a standstill, the point at which you opened fire on the minibus?

MR DE KOCK: Yes.

MR HATTINGH: And the road that we see in the photograph leads to the industrial area of Nelspruit, is that correct?

MR DE KOCK: Yes, that is correct.

MR HATTINGH: The two vehicles which can be seen in the left bottom corner of the photograph, the bakkie and the sedan vehicle, they had just come down from the main road between Nelspruit and Witrivier.

MR DE KOCK: Yes, Chairperson. They were not part of this ...(intervention)

MR HATTINGH: Yes, that is correct, they were not part of it, but it's just to give an indication how one would come down from the crossing to this road.

MR DE KOCK: That's correct, Chairperson.

MR HATTINGH: Very well, if we can just turn to Exhibit D2. That also indicates the road in the same direction, is that correct?

MR DE KOCK: Yes, that is correct.

MR HATTINGH: And it also indicates a minibus which is parked there, such as the one on the previous photograph. In fact it is a photograph of the same scene, just from a different angle.

MR DE KOCK: That is correct.

MR HATTINGH: And here we have certain indications. Can you just tell us if you can recall what C1 indicates?

MR DE KOCK: Chairperson, I'm not certain, I think it may be an angle of fire.

MR HATTINGH: Well there are more stripes, could that possibly indicate the positions where shells were found, which were left by Vlakplaas members who fired shots at the bus?

MR DE KOCK: Yes.

MR HATTINGH: Would that be approximately where the members took up their positions before the shooting incident ensued?

MR DE KOCK: No, I think it may be where Gevers and Swart were, if my memory serves me correctly. If you look to the left from the middle, you will see that there is some kind of elevation in the ground level there and some distance higher up would be where Holtzhausen and Gouws took up position. I'm not exactly certain where they took up position, in comparison to Boshoff. I'm not really certain of that.

ADV DE JAGER: Do you not have a key to this plan or this photo, so that you could indicate to us what these C1 stripes indicate, for example. 

MR HATTINGH: I believe that there must be something like that. Would you please grant me a moment so that we can look into that matter.

ADV DE JAGER: Well I'm sure you can do this later, because I see that there are other stripes here ...(indistinct) on the right hand side of the road - I don't know what the indications there are, but it might be a B.

MR HATTINGH: No that's also ...(intervention)

CHAIRPERSON: No that's also a C with a 245 - C1, with five stripes indicating points which appear to me to have been drawn on the road with chalk. It's very clear on the colour photograph which I have here. So these may be shells.

MR HATTINGH: Yes, we will investigate this further. May we do so during the tea adjournment, so that we could submit the relevant information to you afterwards?

CHAIRPERSON: Certainly. 

MR HATTINGH: Mr Chairperson, thank you. We have nothing further.

NO FURTHER QUESTIONS BY MR HATTINGH

CHAIRPERSON: Thank you, Mr Hattingh. Mr Lamey, have you got any questions?

CROSS-EXAMINATION BY MR LAMEY: Thank you, Mr Chairperson.

&#9;Mr de Kock, is the foundation for co-operation between C1 and Murder and Robbery, specifically in Pretoria, something which was already established during that briefing session from General Engelbrecht, which took place in 1991? 

MR DE KOCK: Yes, it was a proposal and some sort of an introduction to one another, so that the co-ordination was official. Let me put it that way. 

MR LAMEY: And the members of Murder and Robbery, Pretoria, who were specifically involved in this case, were the former acting commander. That was Captain Geldenhuys, is that correct?

MR DE KOCK: Yes, that is correct.

MR LAMEY: As well as a member of that branch, Sgt Deon Gouws?

MR DE KOCK: Yes, that is correct.

MR LAMEY: Is it also correct that Murder and Robbery members, due to the nature of their line function, also were involved in investigations of murders, but also politically related murders and politically related robberies, or robberies in which members of political organisations were involved?

MR DE KOCK: Yes, I am aware of the fact that members of Murder and Robbery were deployed for the exact purpose of investigating the escalation in political violence. And just for the sake of completion, I would like to mention that one of the other persons who were there from Murder and Robbery, was a Mr Boshoff. He was also at the scene.

MR LAMEY: Who was also on the scene, yes. I omitted to mention him. And with this specific operation, it was probably also due to its illegal nature - or let me rather put this in a question form. Was it also due to that reason and due to the cover-up which was to take place, important that the members be there, otherwise it would appear strange if it was robbers and no Murder and Robbery Unit members were involved?

MR DE KOCK: The element of robbery and armed robbery here also indicated that they would have to be involved.

MR LAMEY: I can just tell you that Sgt Gouws was also involved in that meeting, he was also present during that meeting and he will give evidence that it also came to his knowledge during that meeting that it was one of the subjects during that meeting that robberies were being committed by members of the liberation movements.

MR DE KOCK: I would accept that, with the exception of the officers. I think every officer had to bring two or three of his own members along from the various murder and robbery units. However, I didn't know the members.

MR LAMEY: Mr de Kock, you have already given evidence that that information indicated to you in your capacity as the Commander of Vlakplaas, that there were members of the liberation movements who were involved in the robberies. This was information which you had at your disposal at that stage.

MR DE KOCK: Yes, that is correct.

MR LAMEY: The channel with regard to the handling of Mr Ben van Zyl as an informer, is it correct that you also appointed Sgt Dougie Holtzhausen as his handler?

MR DE KOCK: That is correct.

MR LAMEY: Can you recall that there was a meeting between yourself and Mr van Zyl, during which you also requested him to provide information to C1 on a more regular basis and that you were the one who appointed Sgt Holtzhausen as his handler. 

MR DE KOCK: Yes, this was in Johannesburg. I think that it was at one of the Sun International Hotels, and Mr van Zyl, upon two or three occasions, reported to our offices. So there was liaison.

MR LAMEY: And you also knew that Mr van Zyl had previously himself been a member of the Murder and Robbery Unit in Brixton?

MR DE KOCK: Yes, that is correct.

MR LAMEY: And after he left there, by means of his private initiative, he gathered information which was sent to various branches of the South African Police, with regard to crime?

MR DE KOCK: Yes, that is correct.

MR LAMEY: And the overall factor which led to the fact that he became more involved in the provision of information to Unit C10, can you recall that this was an incident which took place at Eikenhof, involving information that he had obtained regarding weapons and that as a result of this information that he gave a woman was arrested?

MR DE KOCK: Yes, that is correct.

MR LAMEY: Now if we just look at the channel, Mr van Zyl would then provide the information to Mr Holtzhausen and Mr Holtzhausen would from that point keep you up to date with what was going on?

MR DE KOCK: Yes, that is correct.

MR LAMEY: And the information which you then received from Holtzhausen, in this case that an armed robbery was going to be committed, during ANC or MK members would be involved, was given to you by Holtzhausen.

MR DE KOCK: Yes, that is correct.

MR LAMEY: And then that information which you received as such, was not strange to you given the background of that briefing session which had taken place previously as well as the information which was circulating in security circles?

MR DE KOCK: No.

MR LAMEY: It was also not strange to your subordinate members?

MR DE KOCK: No.

MR LAMEY: Mr Holtzhausen basically planned this operation with your approval, is that correct?

MR DE KOCK: Yes, that is correct.

MR LAMEY: I just want to ask you whether you knew that Mr van Zyl had also used staff members such a person by the name of Hamilton, during the Nelspruit incident as well as another person by the name of James. These would be staff members who had collected information for him and sent it through.

MR DE KOCK: I would accept that he had sub-sources yes, Chairperson, but I was not aware of their identities.

ADV DE JAGER: Mr Lamey, staff from where? From the police or from his own company, or staff of another company? Which staff are you referring to?

MR LAMEY: His own staff.

&#9;Did you know that Hamilton at a stage was also an informer for the Johannesburg Security Branch, also with regard to the connections of Tiso with the Returned Exile Committee?

MR DE KOCK: Chairperson, not that I can recall. I'm sorry, but I really can't recall it.

MR LAMEY: Did you know that Hamilton himself was a PAC member?

MR DE KOCK: No, I didn't.

MR LAMEY: Chairperson, I would just like to submit to you a document that I want to examine Mr de Kock about. Let me just explain that a bundle of documents has been compiled, which has been provided to the Committee. Can we just allocate an exhibit number to this document?

CHAIRPERSON: Yes, it is the bundle of additional documents. There are eight documents in this bundle.

MR LAMEY: Shall we make this Exhibit E?

CHAIRPERSON: Yes, very well. Yes, it is paginated and apparently there are 51 pages in my copy.

MR LAMEY: Yes, that is correct. Chairperson, afterwards it came to my knowledge that there is a report from the Weekly Mail from the 8th of May 1992, which I would like to submit to the Committee. It has already been distributed to all the legal representatives.

CHAIRPERSON: Will this then form part of Exhibit E?

MR LAMEY: Yes, we can incorporate this with Exhibit E and just give it a page number from 52 onwards.

CHAIRPERSON: Very well. Then this is an article from the Weekly Mail, 8th of May 1992, with the heading:

&#9;&#9;"MK rebels turn to gangsterism."

Is that correct?

MR LAMEY: Yes, that is correct.

&#9;Mr de Kock, I just want to tell you that I received this document from a former member of the Security Police, who was stationed at the Intelligence Services in Soweto and who managed a library among others, where this documentation was kept for his official purposes. Do you have the bundle before you by any chance, Mr de Kock? I would like to begin with the first document which appears to be a document of decisions which were adopted by the ANC's National Conference in July 1991. On page 1 reference is made to the four pillars, which we have referred to numerous times in previous amnesty applications. But if we look at this document, in 1994, those four pillars were still very firmly in place. Is that what your knowledge was?

MR DE KOCK: Yes, that is correct.

MR LAMEY: If we look at page 2 for example, the so-called underground is there constituted to be fortified.

MR DE KOCK: Yes, that is correct.

MR LAMEY: With reference to the armed struggle it is stated that although the armed struggle had been suspended, it still remained a pillar of the struggle.

MR DE KOCK: Yes. And I must qualify. I think that in 1994, from the end of May or June or July onwards, a house in Melville or Bertrams was searched and an army truckload of handgrenades and limpet mines of eastern block origin, as well as any other form of ammunition, was taken from there and transported to Pretoria. And in a Sunday newspaper, an Afrikaans newspaper, there were colour photographs of this and there was quite a public uproar because the ANC refused to have these weapons ballistically tested. But this is just to give an indication that all the sides were still in conflict with one another. I'm sorry, please proceed.

MR LAMEY: Very well. And then on page 5, if you will turn to that page, there is a paragraph 5 there. Reference is made to a decision which was already adopted in December 1990 during the National Consultative Conference, to establish so-called defence committees.

MR DE KOCK: Yes, that is correct.

MR LAMEY: The so-called SDUs or Self Defence Units, is it correct that they were especially strengthened after this period in time?

MR DE KOCK: Yes, there was some form of a group, but it lacked co-ordination, there wasn't proper leadership or co-ordination, but after the unbanning it really became an organised body as such.

MR LAMEY: And then with regard to Umkhonto weSizwe, on page 9, the resolution was also adopted that MK would be maintained and developed and with regard to point 2, MK would in all aspects be, or remain combat ready.

MR DE KOCK: Yes, that is correct.

MR LAMEY: The following document, Mr de Kock ...(intervention)

INTERPRETER: The speaker's microphone is not on. The speaker's microphone.

MR LAMEY: I beg your pardon, my microphone was switched off.

&#9;On page 13 there is a document from the ANC which was compiled in July 1989. And Mr de Kock, is it correct that in July 1989 already there was talk of negotiations and this was shortly before what took place in February 1990, when the ANC was unbanned?

MR DE KOCK: Yes, actually on the contrary, if I don't have it incorrectly, it goes back as far as 1986, when Kobie Coetzee went to speak to Mr Mandela for the first time on Robben Island. And that was the first occasion upon which I noticed that the winds were about to change.

MR LAMEY: I just want to refer you specifically to paragraph 17 on that page, where the following is said:

&#9;&#9;"Discussion of the whole question of negotiations in no way affects and should not affect the overall strategic orientation of our movement and the tasks that arise from the orientation. Our strategic task is the destruction of the apartheid regime and the transfer of power to the people. This we seek through mass political action, armed struggle, the international isolation of the apartheid system and by ensuring that the ANC plays its proper role as the revolutionary vanguard of our struggling people."

Do you see that on page 15?

MR DE KOCK: I beg your pardon, I was on page 17.

MR LAMEY: I'm sorry, it's paragraph 17 on page 15.

MR DE KOCK: Yes, Chairperson.

MR LAMEY: And all that that really means is that in the prospect of negotiations the armed struggle remained one of the more important elements of the struggle which would ultimately replace the government.

MR DE KOCK: Yes, Chairperson, I believe in the same way that we were on standby they were also on standby.

MR LAMEY: Mr de Kock, there is then a security report on page 16, which was issued after the unbanning of the ANC, is that correct?

MR DE KOCK: Yes, that is correct.

MR LAMEY: And that the security report refers to a report which was transmitted on the ANC's Radio Freedom, on the 11th of February 1990. That was after the de Klerk speech and the announcement of the unbanning of the ANC.

MR DE KOCK: Yes, that is correct.

MR LAMEY: And there it is stated that the armed struggle will not be suspended and that the request to hand over weapons will not be complied with.

MR DE KOCK: That is correct.

MR LAMEY: And then Mr de Kock, there is an extract from the ANC journal of July or August 1990 ...(intervention)

MR DE KOCK: Which page is this?

MR LAMEY: Page 25 and 26. There are articles there which actually begin on page 25, but goes over to page 26, dealing with the armed struggle. On page 26 you will see the following is said:

&#9;&#9;"And the ranks of Umkhonto weSizwe should be expanded, it's cadres must be systematically upgraded..."

...(intervention)

ADV DE JAGER: Mr Lamey, could you give us an indication of the point in the page where you are reading?

MR LAMEY: It is the final column of the article under the heading "Armed Struggle", which begins on page 25.

&#9;&#9;"And the ranks of Umkhonto weSizwe should be expanded, it's cadres must be systematically upgraded. In the final analysis the armed struggle can only be abandoned altogether, as distinct from its suspension in a cease-fire when a new constitution has been democratically adopted."

So actually, what this mouthpiece states is that only upon the adoption of a new constitution will the armed struggle be suspended in earnest.

MR DE KOCK: Yes, that is correct.

MR LAMEY: And then the following document I understand, is a document which was compiled by an ANC task group in 1991, and this deals with among others, the role of the self defence structures which have been referred to. I refer you to page 30, paragraph 1.5. Paragraph 1.5 refers to this so-called self defence structure which by definition was paramilitary.

MR DE KOCK: That is correct, Chairperson. I can only say that some of these aspects here, as I have read them, are based on a book by Maregwela. The name of the book is the Mini Manual on Guerrilla Warfare, or Suburban Guerrilla Warfare. And I see many aspects of that book which are reflected within this document.

MR LAMEY: We are still on page 30, paragraph 1.6, lower down in the page. There it is said:

&#9;&#9;"The August 6 cease-fire ..."

I think that refers to the Pretoria Minute, and you have also referred to that in your evidence of what Gen Siphiwe Nyanda testified about.

&#9;&#9;"The August 6 cease-fire does not neutralise MK, it has an important role to play. MK cadres, particularly ex-prisoners and those due to return from exile must play a leading and active role in the establishment of the defence structures."

MR DE KOCK: That's correct, Chairperson.

MR LAMEY: Is it also your experience that the exiles, especially the MKs who had returned, played prominent roles in the leadership that they extended to the Self Defence Units which were created by the ANC?

MR DE KOCK: Yes, that is correct.

MR LAMEY: And then I would like to refer you to page 33 and further. From page 33 it deals with the subject of among others, training of people for the purposes of the SDUs. On page 66, or at least on page 34, paragraph 6.6, reference is made to weapons.

&#9;&#9;"Political campaign will have to waged for the arming of the Self Defence Units. All avenues need to be explored, including the setting up of licensed security organisations. Licensed weapons can be obtained. Funds will have to be collected on a voluntary basis from the community."

And then:

&#9;&#9;"Once even a few firearms have been obtained, firearm training can begin. This should be handled by MK cadres and sympathetic township police."

I would just like to pause here for a moment, Mr de Kock, because this document implies that licensed weapons were to be used for this purpose only, and you have already referred to this in your evidence and you know that one of the clients that I represent, Mr Nortje, was very closely involved in the issue of weapons smuggling into the RSA.

MR DE KOCK: That is correct.

MR LAMEY: And is it correct that especially illegal weapons which were used by the SDUs, caused a great headache for the South African Police and particularly your unit because you were specifically tasked in combating this kind of activity?

MR DE KOCK: Well the standard issue weapon of the SDU was an AK47.

MS PATEL: Honourable Chairperson, if I may just interrupt at this stage. I'm not sure that I follow the line of questioning of my learned colleague. Is the allegation that the victims in this matter were in any way related to the SDUs and the functioning of the SDUs? Otherwise I don't understand the relevance of the questioning. I just need clarity.

CHAIRPERSON: Yes. Are you attempting to establish that the armed struggle continued after the so-called peace talks?

MR LAMEY: Chairperson, the purpose with this is simply that from the point of departure of my clients, they had a specific understanding of the context and the continuation of the struggle at that stage, even within the context of the time period after the unbanning of the ANC. Mr de Kock in his evidence, also referred to information which he had and the purpose of this documentation is simply to view the situation from the mouthpieces of the organisations, so that we can understand what their strategy was. But it goes further than this. For example with regard to the issue of unlicensed weapons, we will find in practice, as Mr de Kock gave evidence, that illegal weapons were used by these structures and not licensed weapons, and that once again returns to the crime element which emerged during that period. It is about that, Mr Chairperson. I am trying to get to the document which is marked page 52, which I will still get to.

CHAIRPERSON: Is it your clients' case that the establishment of the SDUs was a consequence of the armed struggle?

MR LAMEY: The armed struggle which had not yet come to an end.

CHAIRPERSON: But that's the problem that Ms Patel has, she has a problem with the relevance of all this information and examination regarding the SDUs when this incident is actually about a bank robbery. So are you trying to establish a connection between the bank robbery which provided funds to the liberation movements and in some or other way had something to do with the SDUs, or what is the relevance of this? Does this have to do with the SDUs?

MR LAMEY: It is about the SDUs and that particular aspect as well. It is about the crime element with regard to the smuggling of weapons in that regard. And then, I will still get to page 52 and the document which appears on page 52, which deals with a reference to criminal activities during which certain factions were involved. 

CHAIRPERSON: Yes.

MR LAMEY: And unfortunately I have been stopped at an isolated aspect before I could completely attempt to illustrate the point that I'm actually driving at.

CHAIRPERSON: Very well, then I will allow you to continue, but the point which Ms Patel is trying to make is a very relevant point.

MR LAMEY: No, it is not our contention that the people who were killed during the Nelspruit incident were members of the SDUs. We do not have information which stretches that far, and that is not what I'm aiming to point out.

CHAIRPERSON: Yes, because it would appear as if it is the case that even after the unbanning of the ANC, the struggle between the Security Forces and the ANC continued. If I understand it correctly.

MR LAMEY: Well the matter actually has two perspectives. On the one hand the documentation indicates that the SDUs from the liberation movements were established to protect themselves against unlawful attacks by police, and on the other hand there was another perspective from the Security Force regarding that.

CHAIRPERSON: Very well. Yes, I will allow you to continue, but please bear in mind the point that Ms Patel has issued.

MR LAMEY: Well I will just continue then. Thank you.

CHAIRPERSON: Go ahead.

MR LAMEY: Mr de Kock, I just want to ask you, as the Security Police were using the facade of legal actions, this was also the case with the licensed weapons, that it was presented that illegal methods were not used in order to provide the SDUs with funding and weapons. Reference is made to the voluntary basis within the community when it came to collecting funds for these organisations. So at face value it appeared to be completely illegal, if you look at the documentation.

MR DE KOCK: Yes, Chairperson.

MR LAMEY: But what was your experience in practice?

MR DE KOCK: Chairperson, those persons who did not have sufficient funding would, by means of a barrel of a gun, be forced to obtain funding. I'm sure that there were those who would give them money voluntarily. However, the SDUs served a very good purpose. Those areas in which they functioned were handled by them and they executed a measure of control in such areas. Yet on the other hand they were also an agent of coercion to force the inhabitants of such areas to participate in marches and to strike and so forth. The one part looked good, but the other part was something like a war in the shadows, so to speak.

MR LAMEY: But the point that I'm trying to make is that in just as little as there was an express criminal approval for a criminal action in a State document, just so one would not find this within the planning or policy document of a liberation movement.

MR DE KOCK: No, Chairperson.

MR LAMEY: But in practice it looked completely different.

MR DE KOCK: Yes. It would give government or institutions the advantage of deniability.

MR LAMEY: And then Mr de Kock, while we are still on this point I would like to refer you to page 52. That is the actual document that I have been getting at. Do you have the document before you, "MK Rebels turn to Gangsterism"?

MR DE KOCK: Yes, Chairperson.

MR LAMEY: Now you must have known that the Weekly Mail was a newspaper which at that stage had exposed offences committed by the Security Police.

MR DE KOCK: Yes, Chairperson.

MR LAMEY: And that their reporting was primarily aimed at that.

MR DE KOCK: Yes.

MR LAMEY: And in this case, if I could refer you, the report deals primarily with factions within the ANC and exiles who had returned and who were not completely in concurrence with the direction that had been adopted during the negotiation process. But what I actually want to get to - I just want to find that particular place. In the second column of the report you will see at the bottom it begins:

&#9;&#9;"The Polla Park rebels ..."

MR DE KOCK: That is correct, I have it.

MR LAMEY: 

&#9;&#9;"... for example, are clearly operating hand in glove with criminal groupings."

MR DE KOCK: That's correct, Chairperson.

MR LAMEY: 

&#9;&#9;"... who are opposed to a sophisticated development scheme that was pioneered by the former residents committee and would have brought some form of order to the settlement."

And then below that it is said:

&#9;&#9;"Activists in the ...(indistinct) report that the local warlord-type figure who operates out of one of the hostels in the name of MK, runs a private army that has aroused considerable resentment by collecting levies for arms and imposing protection fees on residents."

The report refers to an example of an incident where it appears to me that arming took place on an illegal basis and that the request for funding for these weapons was made to the community in a forceful way by these members who had resorted to methods of gangsterism. That is basically what it is about. What I want to ask you is whether the content of this report correlates with information and experiences which you had?

MR DE KOCK: Yes, Chairperson. I did not hear of any official financial logistical line which was given to the SDUs from Shell House, and one could then accept that they must have obtained funding among others, in this manner. All that I know which emanated from Shell House, which was an official appointment from the ANC's side, was the overall co-ordinator and commander of the SDUs, who was Robert McBride, but the rest I believe, the rest of these persons would have had to rely on themselves for funding.

ADV DE JAGER: And I think that it is also common cause that they attempted to obtain weapons so that they could execute their objective of self-protection or self-defence.

MR DE KOCK: Yes, that is correct.

MR LAMEY: Chairperson, I see that it is 11 o'clock now, would this be a suitable time for the adjournment?

CHAIRPERSON: Yes, we'll take an adjournment for 15 minutes.

COMMITTEE ADJOURNS

ON RESUMPTION

CHAIRPERSON: Mr Hattingh, it has come to our knowledge that your client is actually not very well at this point and that it would be advisable to have him properly examined a medical doctor and to obtain a report on his condition, particularly in regard to the possibilities of him proceeding with his testimony. And for that purpose his evidence will stand down at this point, pending the outcome of the investigation.

MR HATTINGH: Yes, that is correct, Mr Chairman, thank you very much.

CHAIRPERSON: Yes. So at this stage we will let the testimony of Mr de Kock stand down and we will continue with his testimony as soon as he has been properly examined by the doctors and we have a report on his condition. The indications are that it might be in his best interest to get the testimony in this matter completed as soon as possible. And for that purpose we will - if it is possible, we will continue with his testimony as soon as he is in a position to continue.

EUGENE DE KOCK STANDS DOWN DUE TO ILLNESS

CHAIRPERSON: Ms Patel, who is the applicant that we will be dealing with at this point?

MS PATEL: Mr Lamey, advises me that it's Rolf Gevers. CHAIRPERSON: Thank you.

MR HATTINGH: Mr Chairman, just before Mr Lamey proceeds, may I hand up to you another two photographs and a key to the three pages or the three photographs then, Mr Chairman. 

CHAIRPERSON: Yes.

MR HATTINGH: The next photograph, in fact photo number 2 in fact shows the bridge over the Kwanyemazaan Road and the third one doesn't really, just indicates a person pointing out, I think empty cartridge cases. But the photo number 2 might be of assistance and then the key will indicate what the markings on the photograph represent.

CHAIRPERSON: Thank you, Mr Hattingh. We will mark those, it would be D3. D3 would photograph number 2. In fact - yes, perhaps we should mark them individually. Photograph number 2 would be D3 and photograph number 3 would be D4 and the key to the photographs would be D5.

MR HATTINGH: Thank you, Mr Chairman.

CHAIRPERSON: Thank you.

ADV DE JAGER: I don't know if there is an error here, but I did not receive D4.

CHAIRPERSON: Yes, Mr Lamey, are we continuing with the application of Mr Gevers?

MR LAMEY: Indeed, Mr Chairman, thank you.

NAME: ROLF DIETER GEVERS

APPLICATION NO:

--------------------------------------------------------------------------

CHAIRPERSON: Mr Gevers, will you switch on your microphone please and your full names for the record.

ROLF DIETER GEVERS: (sworn states)

CHAIRPERSON: Mr Lamey?

MR LAMEY: Chairperson, just one aspect.

&#9;Mr Gevers has requested me to apologise for not bringing his jacket with today, because we anticipated that Mr de Kock would still be busy with his evidence today. 

CHAIRPERSON: Everything is in order.

EXAMINATION BY MR LAMEY: Thank you.

&#9;Mr Gevers, you have applied for amnesty for only one incident, that being the Nelspruit incident which has to do with the Coin preplanning incident which took place before the Nelspruit incident, is that correct?

MR GEVERS: Yes, that is correct. 

MR LAMEY: You were also a State witness in the trial of Mr de Kock.

MR GEVERS: That is correct.

MR LAMEY: And you received indemnity in terms of Section 202 of the Criminal Procedure Act.

MR GEVERS: Yes, that is correct.

MR LAMEY: Your amnesty application appears on page 64 and runs to page 84 of the bundle of documents.

MR GEVERS: That is correct.

MR LAMEY: And do you confirm to the best of your knowledge, the correctness thereof?

MR GEVERS: Yes, Chairperson.

MR LAMEY: Briefly, at the time of the Nelspruit incident you were a member of Section C10, under the command of Col de Kock, is that correct?

MR GEVERS: Yes, that is correct.

MR LAMEY: And what was your rank at that stage?

MR GEVERS: I was a Captain.

MR LAMEY: Before I proceed, was the Nelspruit incident indeed the only incident in which you were involved with unlawful activities?

MR GEVERS: That is correct.

MR LAMEY: When did you become a member of Unit C10?

MR GEVERS: That was during September 1991.

MR LAMEY: And where were you before you became a member of C10?

MR GEVERS: I was with the computer section of the Security Head Office in Pretoria.

MR LAMEY: So at that stage you had already been a member of the Security Police?

MR GEVERS: Yes, that is correct, from the commencement of my police career I was a member of the Security Branch.

MR LAMEY: And at that stage did you also serve in the former South West Africa?

MR GEVERS: That is correct.

MR LAMEY: And where were you stationed?

MR GEVERS: I was stationed at Oshakati for five years. That was in Ovamboland. And after that I was in Windhoek for two years at the Divisional Headquarters.

MR LAMEY: And in terms of your former service in the Security Police before this incident, you also knew of the nature of the political struggle, the revolutionary struggle of the ANC and the PAC as such.

MR GEVERS: Yes, that is correct.

MR LAMEY: Then I would just like to come to the background of your career. That we can find on page 71.

MR GEVERS: That is correct.

MR LAMEY: Very well. If we proceed to page 72, you say that on a day in February 1992, you were approached by Dougie Holtzhausen. He was also a member of C10 at that stage, is that correct?

MR GEVERS: Yes, that is correct.

MR LAMEY: He wanted to know whether you would be available to assist with an action where prospective robbers would be apprehended in a Coin Security office in Nelspruit.

MR GEVERS: That is correct.

MR LAMEY: Might I just ask you, apart from the request for your involvement, which was issued by Dougie Holtzhausen, did you know that this was also overall under the command and approval of Col de Kock?

MR GEVERS: Yes.

MR LAMEY: You proceed and say that you were a member of a group who would apprehend the robbers in the offices of Coin Security in Nelspruit.

MR GEVERS: That is correct.

MR LAMEY: Col de Kock has already given evidence about that and he said that ultimately this robbery did not take place, due to the fact that a security guard was noticed in the vicinity and they then decided to abandon any further action.

MR GEVERS: That is correct.

ADV DE JAGER: Mr Gevers, you were a Captain at that stage.

MR GEVERS: That is correct.

ADV DE JAGER: And Holtzhausen was a Sgt.

MR GEVERS: That is correct.

ADV DE JAGER: Now with this first operation in February 1992, who would have been in command there, you or him?

MR GEVERS: It was him.

ADV DE JAGER: Now how is it that a Captain would serve below a Sgt?

MR GEVERS: That way it worked, Chairperson, in an operational unit, was that a rank didn't really count for much in terms of operations, the person who had received the information who was handling the informer, would usually be the person who was involved or in charge of such an operation.

ADV DE JAGER: It's just that I have a problem. If he issued an order, if a Sgt issued an order to a Captain, upon what basis would the Captain observe the order?

MR GEVERS: Chairperson, I can just inform you that it was also due to the fact that I was a new member in the unit and ultimately that meant that the more experienced members would take command. I assumed that they knew exactly what they were doing. So then we would react upon an order which was given by a Sgt.

MR LAMEY: Very well. But Mr Gevers, you knew - or let me put it this way. Are you saying that the detailed planning and the execution thereof was under the command of Sgt Holtzhausen?

MR GEVERS: That is correct.

MR LAMEY: But that he received his orders from Col de Kock?

MR GEVERS: Yes, that is what I assumed because we conveyed all our information to Col de Kock as well, so I assume that he would have known about it as well.

MR LAMEY: So upon that basis you accepted because the line came from Col de Kock and because he had placed Sgt Holtzhausen in that position, you would have to take further instructions from Sgt Holtzhausen?

MR GEVERS: Yes, that is correct.

MR LAMEY: Then the robbery did not take place ultimately?

MR GEVERS: Yes, that is correct.

MR LAMEY: But the idea was also that you took up position in the offices of Coin Security, is that correct?

MR GEVERS: Yes, that is correct.

MR LAMEY: And you also mention that the source of the information that these persons to carry out the robbery, originated from a source by the name of Mr Ben van Zyl, who was handled by Mr Holtzhausen.

MR GEVERS: That is correct.

MR LAMEY: You yourself never had direct contact with Mr Ben van Zyl and you received instructions and information from Mr Holtzhausen?

MR GEVERS: That is correct.

MR LAMEY: Then just to go over to the Nelspruit incident itself. You say that you and a Sgt Chait on the 24th of March, departed for the Bosbokrand vicinity.

MR GEVERS: That is correct.

MR LAMEY: And how long was this before the Nelspruit incident took place?

MR GEVERS: It was the day before the incident.

MR LAMEY: And the shooting incident took place during the early morning hours of the 26th?

MR GEVERS: Yes, that is correct.

MR LAMEY: And when you departed for the Bosbokrand vicinity, you realised that you were a member of a group which was going to launch this action in Nelspruit.

MR GEVERS: Yes, that is correct.

MR LAMEY: And you only departed for Bosbokrand because you had to do some other tasks there?

MR GEVERS: Yes, that is correct. Sgt Chait had other matters to deal with in Bosbokrand.

MR LAMEY: And did you know that these persons were going to be lured into an ambush and that this was part of the action?

MR GEVERS: At that stage I was not fully aware of the complete planning, this would have been conveyed to us at the Drumrock Hotel.

MR LAMEY: You also state that Sgt Chait had been involved in an accident, or that you and he were involved in an accident. 

MR GEVERS: Yes, that is correct.

MR LAMEY: As a result of which he obtained a cut wound and was taken into hospital.

MR GEVERS: Yes.

MR LAMEY: And were you able to meet with the others at the Drumrock Hotel as you had arranged?

MR GEVERS: Yes.

MR LAMEY: Can you tell us briefly what took place there at the Drumrock Hotel?

MR GEVERS: At that stage, I think it was Sgt Holtzhausen, told us exactly what was going to happen, not precisely all the planning, but we were informed that it would be bank robbers again, that these were the same persons who had attempted to rob the Coin Security company previously and that we simply had to wait for the others and when they arrived we would be informed about the complete plan.

MR LAMEY: And did the others then arrive eventually and did further planning take place upon that point?

MR GEVERS: Yes, that is correct.

MR LAMEY: And could you tell us briefly what that planning entailed.

ADV DE JAGER: Who are these persons who arrived and who undertook the planning? Could you tell us.

MR GEVERS: Chairperson, all the members were not yet present at the Drumrock Hotel when we were taken by the members of the Nelspruit Security Branch from the hospital to the Drumrock Hotel, there were still other members who were going to arrive later in another vehicle. So that would have been W/O Boshoff and Sgt Gouws. The members who were present were Sgt Holtzhausen, Nortje, Const Swart and Sgt Hanekom.

MR LAMEY: Did you also know that members of Pretoria Murder and Robbery Unit would be joining you?

MR GEVERS: Yes.

MR LAMEY: Such as Capt Geldenhuys?

MR GEVERS: Yes, that is correct.

MR LAMEY: And Sgt Gouws?

MR GEVERS: That is correct.

MR LAMEY: Did you then wait a while there at the Drumrock Hotel? You state in your statement that you were in the canteen at one point. Was that while you were waiting for the other members to join you?

MR GEVERS: Yes, that is correct, certain other members and I - I cannot recall who all of them were, went to the canteen in Nelspruit.

MR LAMEY: And then from there you returned to the Drumrock Hotel?

MR GEVERS: Yes, that is correct.

MR LAMEY: And who did you find there?

MR GEVERS: I found Lt-Col de Kock and the then Lt Klopper and the two typists from our offices, Sgt van Vuuren and Sgt le Roux. We found them there in the ladies bar of the hotel.

MR LAMEY: We have heard Mr de Kock's evidence that at a stage they departed from there to Malelane Lodge. You also state this in your affidavit.

MR GEVERS: That is correct.

MR LAMEY: Furthermore, you state that your group then proceeded to the room of Mr Nortje.

MR GEVERS: That is correct.

MR LAMEY: And that is where W/O Boshoff and Sgt Deon Gouws. From where was W/O Boshoff?

MR GEVERS: He was also a member of Section C10. He had been transferred from Murder and Robbery in Pretoria to our unit.

MR LAMEY: So he was a former Murder and Robbery Unit member, who had been transferred to C10?

MR GEVERS: That is correct.

MR LAMEY: And that is where the prospective action was discussed?

MR GEVERS: That is correct.

MR LAMEY: And who took the lead with regard to this action?

MR GEVERS: Sgt Holtzhausen took the lead.

MR LAMEY: And was it there that you heard that these would be the same persons who had attempted to rob the Coin Security company offices in Nelspruit, that these would be the same persons who would be involved in this prospective action?

MR GEVERS: That is correct.

MR LAMEY: And then on page 75 of your affidavit you also state that according to your recollection certain facts were discussed.

MR GEVERS: That is correct.

MR LAMEY: Did you then understand that it would be an ambush which would be set up in order to shoot the robbers?

MR GEVERS: That is correct.

MR LAMEY: And what would your role have been?

MR GEVERS: I would simply have participated as an ordinary member, as a supportive element in the ambush.

MR LAMEY: Would you also have prepared to participate in the shooting?

MR GEVERS: Yes, that is correct.

MR LAMEY: Did you also have a weapon for this purpose?

MR GEVERS: That is correct.

MR LAMEY: What sort of weapon was it?

MR GEVERS: It was an R5 gun.

MR LAMEY: Was it issued to you?

MR GEVERS: That is correct.

MR LAMEY: Did you understand in any way that there were political connections to these persons who had planned the robbery, or who wanted to execute the robbery?

MR GEVERS: That is correct. At that stage I was informed by Mr Holtzhausen, he informed the group of this, the fact that this was the same group which had been exposed by Mr Ben van Zyl, who was the informer and Leballo would also be there. He was among others, presented to us as Mrs Winnie Mandela's driver.

MR LAMEY: What did you personally understand at that stage about the political connections which existed with this group which was planning the robbery?

MR GEVERS: Chairperson, I understood that these persons were trained MK members, who by means of robberies were seeking to procure money for the ANC and possibly also for the PAC.

MR LAMEY: And in your affidavit which you made, you stated ANC/PAC. Did you have both of these organisations in mind when you completed your amnesty application?

MR GEVERS: Yes, that is correct. For me it was a joint front comprising the ANC, PAC and SACP, so they had one mutual goal. That is why I stated it as such.

MR LAMEY: Might I just ask you, did you understand at that time, due to your previous experience with the Security Police, that there was talk of a united front among the PAC and the ANC?

MR GEVERS: Yes, that is correct, this emanated from intelligence notes which were circulated in the Security Branch. It was mentioned quite a few times and it was also mentioned as such in the media.

MR LAMEY: Did it also come to your knowledge, beforehand, perhaps during discussions or as a result of information channels, that members of both the ANC and the PAC were involved in crime related incidents among others, robbery?

MR GEVERS: Yes, I understood it as such at that stage. I also received information documents which had been circulated in the Security Branch, in which these facts were mentioned.

MR LAMEY: Then you also make a specific reference t the PAC, where you state in your affidavit that as a result of information documents, you understood that they were suffering financially and that the strategy was to commit robberies in order to obtain funding. Is that how you understood it?

MR GEVERS: Yes, that is correct. The way I understood it at that stage was that the PAC did not enjoy such an extensive foreign support power bases as the ANC and for this reason the PAC then focused much more on robberies and bank robberies in order to generate funds for themselves.

MR LAMEY: And in terms of this group itself which would execute the robbery, what did you understand, did you understand that there was a political connection with this group with the liberation movements?

MR GEVERS: Yes, that is correct. Mr Holtzhausen told us that Mr Leballo was Mrs Winnie Mandela's motor driver and at that stage I was thoroughly convinced that he would also have been involved in her Mandela United Football Club. At that stage they were members of the Young Lions so to speak, of the ANC and therefore there was a criminal element which was politically coloured.

MR LAMEY: With the exception of the information which Sgt Holtzhausen provided, were you personally surprised as a result of previous experience or information which had come to your knowledge, were you surprised by that?

MR GEVERS: No.

MR LAMEY: Very well. And after the planning session you waited for Col de Kock and Mr Klopper to arrive at the hotel.

MR GEVERS: That is correct.

MR LAMEY: Was the idea also that they would participate in the operation?

MR GEVERS: From what I understood, Chairperson, that was the idea, yes.

MR LAMEY: Did Col de Kock and Mr Klopper then arrive, after they had been elsewhere? This is at the Drumrock Hotel, before you departed for the scene.

MR GEVERS: Yes, that is correct, just before we departed they arrived.

MR LAMEY: Shortly before you departed?

MR GEVERS: Yes, that is correct.

MR LAMEY: I just want to ask you whether you can recall that there was also a discussion that Col de Kock and Mr Nortje would not participate specifically in the shooting, that they would fulfil different roles?

MR GEVERS: That is correct, I can recall that.

MR LAMEY: And the entire group, including Col de Kock and Lt Klopper, then departed for the scene where the ambush would be set up.

MR GEVERS: Yes, that is correct.

MR LAMEY: Were any further instructions issued on the scene itself? Was Nortje present at this stage, when you were at the Drumrock Hotel?

MR GEVERS: Yes, that is correct.

ADV DE JAGER: Did he depart with you?

MR GEVERS: That is correct.

ADV DE JAGER: That would be on the morning of the 26th?

MR GEVERS: That is correct.

MR LAMEY: Very well. Sgt Holtzhausen also departed with you. In other words all the members who were ultimately involved in the total operation then departed for the scene of the incident?

MR GEVERS: That is correct.

MR LAMEY: In your affidavit you state that at the scene you received further information. Could you perhaps tell us at approximately what time you arrived at the scene?

MR GEVERS: As far as I can recall it was approximately 1 o'clock that morning, but I may be mistaken. However, as far as I can recall it was at approximately 1 o'clock in the morning.

MR LAMEY: Mr Nortje's recollection is that this was somewhat earlier. Could it have been earlier than what your recollection indicates?

MR GEVERS: It may have been earlier yes, Chairperson.

MR LAMEY: And were any further detailed instructions issued at the scene of the incident?

MR GEVERS: That is correct, Sgt Holtzhausen explained to us what was going to happen, because I myself didn't really know where this specific incident would take place, when we were going to set up the ambush, how the scene looked. So all the further instructions were basically issued on the scene of the incident.

MR LAMEY: Would that involve the direction from which the vehicle would be approaching, that one vehicle would be a minibus and that Ben van Zyl would be driving ahead and that he was the informer and from what direction the planning would take place and the positions that you were supposed to assume? Was that basically the detail that was issued to you on the scene of the incident?

MR GEVERS: Yes, that is correct.

MR LAMEY: You also state that Mr Nortje's observation post was pointed out. 

MR GEVERS: That is correct.

MR LAMEY: And the purpose behind that point of observation was that Mr Nortje would then be able to send the message through timeously, that the minibus containing the robbers was on its way?

MR GEVERS: Yes, that is correct.

MR LAMEY: You also state that Mr Simon Radebe and Eric Sefade, who were also other members of C10, were involved.

MR GEVERS: Yes, that is correct.

ADV DE JAGER: The admissions that he has provided there, is that what you have described on page 76, from point 1 to point 8?

MR GEVERS: That is correct.

MR LAMEY: Where did you take up position?

MR GEVERS: I took up position behind the embankment at the bridge. It would have been on the Witrivier side of the bridge, against the embankment.

MR LAMEY: And the rest of the members who were also preparing to fire at the minibus, can you say with which weapons they were issued?

MR GEVERS: All of us had R5 combat guns and I recall that some members also had their hand weapons with them, but I cannot recall precisely which members were armed as such.

MR LAMEY: What did you yourself understand with regard to the robbers themselves, would they also be armed?

MR GEVERS: I was mentioned to us by Holtzhausen that the robbers could possibly have been armed.

MR LAMEY: Just to proceed to page 77. You state that Lt Klopper took up position closest to Bosh Street and that you were between him and Const Swart, with Jannie Hanekom and Chait following. Was Sgt Tait then also on the scene?

MR GEVERS: Yes, he was also there.

MR LAMEY: Is this after he had been discharged from hospital?

MR GEVERS: That is correct. Sgt Chait had three stitches in his left forearm. He was admitted to hospital of observation for the evening of the 24th to the 25th of March, but he was discharged and his arm was in a sling.

MR LAMEY: And then you state further that you do not know where Col de Kock and Geldenhuys and Boshoff took up position, but that they were present there.

MR GEVERS: That is correct.

MR LAMEY: Is it correct that at a stage Mr Nortje gave notification that the vehicle was approaching and that you stood by?

MR GEVERS: That's correct, Chairperson. Lt Klopper, who stood in front of us basically, also had a radio and we heard via the radio that W/O Nortje had given the signal that the vehicle had passed him.

MR LAMEY: And then, what happened next? I just want to ask you to describe in your own words what the further course of events was.

MR GEVERS: At a stage Deon Gouws and Sgt Holtzhausen, who had climbed up against the embankment, told us that the vehicle was approaching, we took up position and prepared, we cocked our guns. The vehicles began to move through underneath the bridge. The first vehicle was a BMW sedan. I cannot recall the colour of the vehicle because it was dark. That was the vehicle that drove in front. And then a white minibus followed. In my opinion it was white. 

&#9;As the BMW vehicle was under the bridge it suddenly accelerated and we knew that that was the informer, Mr Ben van Zyl. Shortly afterwards shots were fired. That was the sign from Holtzhausen and Gouws. They would have fired the first shots to indicate that the vehicle was moving into our line of fire. All of us moved out and opened fire on the front side of the vehicle.

MR LAMEY: Did you yourself also fire on the vehicle?

MR GEVERS: Yes.

MR LAMEY: And what happened next?

MR GEVERS: Chairperson, the minibus suddenly accelerated and we moved out of the way. I can recall at that stage I had a brand new 50 round magazine on my gun, however the magazine was defective. My first few rounds - I cannot recall exactly how many, fired on automatic and after the minibus had passed us, we continued to shoot. My firearm failed at that stage and I had to switch over to a semi-automatic action. In other words, I had to cock the gun every time I'd fire a shot. 

&#9;The vehicle finally came to a standstill about 80 metres away from the bridge. We moved along towards the vehicle in some sort of a line. All of us were firing shots. I saw at a stage that Sgt Hanekom on my left-hand side, or on the left side of the road, was firing shots with a handgun and that is how we approached the minibus which at that stage had come to a complete standstill. We moved towards the minibus and all the while that we were moving we were firing shots.

MR LAMEY: And the minibus then came to a standstill?

MR GEVERS: Yes, that is correct.

MR LAMEY: And what took place after that?

MR GEVERS: We approached forward. Some of the members were still firing shots. I was more to the right-hand side of the line, so I basically observed the vehicle and approached the vehicle from the right back side. As we arrived at the vehicle, I heard light groaning sounds. Lt Klopper and Const Swart then fired shots through the sliding door window which had already been shot through and after that the groaning stopped.

MR LAMEY: What else did you observe and what else happened?

MR GEVERS: Chairperson, when it appeared that there was no more life within the vehicle, Sgt Holtzhausen opened the sliding door of the vehicle. He had an AK47 gun and he fired shots between the front seats of the minibus. I saw two persons lying in the back of the vehicle and one on the front driver's seat, as well as another person on the front passenger seat. We were then instructed by Sgt Holtzhausen to return to the side of the bridge. &#9;At that stage I noticed that Sgt Chait was approaching with a five litre can containing liquid. And at that stage we turned around and returned to the bridge. I did look back and I saw that the liquid was being poured into the inside of the vehicle, but I did not see that the vehicle was on fire. The next minute we turned around and the vehicle was on fire.

MR LAMEY: What happened next?

MR GEVERS: At that stage all of us were basically back. I think Sgt Chait was the last one to join us. And then, basically we stood near the bridge. The minibus was burning. I cannot recall precisely how long it was, but suddenly there was a tremendous explosion from the inside of the minibus. The left passenger - it sounded like a grenade explosion or an explosion that was due to explosives. The person who had been seated on the left front side was hurled out of the window. And at that stage the vehicle was completely in flames. Shortly afterwards there was another explosion which sounded just like the first one and the person who had been hurled halfway out of the passenger window, was hurled completely out of the vehicle and it looked as if the road was on fire, as if petrol or fuel had been poured all over the road and he basically lay there in flames.

MR LAMEY: Might I just ask you something else. At a certain stage you noticed that Sgt Holtzhausen had an AK47 you said and that he fired from within the vehicle to the outside.

MR GEVERS: Yes, he fired through the two front seats.

MR LAMEY: And do you know what happened to the weapon or the weapons? Did you see one or two weapons in his possession?

MR GEVERS: I saw only one weapon.

MR LAMEY: Do you know what happened to this weapon?

MR GEVERS: At that stage I didn't know, but afterwards it was said that they had left this weapon within the vehicle.

MR LAMEY: What did Lt Klopper do furthermore on the scene?

MR GEVERS: The planning that we had undertaken on the scene of the incident before the time, also included that Lt Klopper would pull his car opposite or over the road, it was a Jetta. We would place a blue revolving light on top so that it would like as if it was a legal roadblock. Lt Klopper did do this. And before the time there was also talk that we would fire a number of shots at the vehicle, but this never transpired. We did not shoot the vehicle. The vehicle was pulled into the road and the blue light was placed on the roof of the vehicle.

MR LAMEY: In other words, it was supposed to represent some kind of apprehension vehicle?

MR GEVERS: Yes, that is correct.

MR LAMEY: And did Mr Nortje arrive from the point where he had taken up position?

MR GEVERS: That is correct. Briefly afterwards, I saw Mr Nortje approaching from the Nelspruit direction in his vehicle.

MR LAMEY: And did you at any stage see a discussion taking place between Col de Kock and Sgt Holtzhausen?

MR GEVERS: That is correct. De Kock, Holtzhausen and Nortje stood together and there was a discussion among them, however I did not know what the gist of the conversation was because I was not within hearing distance.

MR LAMEY: And what happened after this discussion?

MR GEVERS: Chairperson, afterwards, Mr Nortje and Mr Holtzhausen climbed into Mr Holtzhausen's vehicle and departed in the direction of Nelspruit. Nobody said anything about there being another person or anything like that.

MR LAMEY: Do you know why they departed?

MR GEVERS: No.

MR LAMEY: Because you said you didn't know.

MR GEVERS: No, I didn't know why they departed.

MR LAMEY: Not at that stage?

MR GEVERS: That is correct.

MR LAMEY: And what else happened after that?

MR GEVERS: Chairperson, the fire-brigade arrived at the scene and stopped under the bridge. We advised them not to approach any further because there had already been explosions and it would have been dangerous for them to approach any further.

&#9;At one stage there was a white man, I think he was between 40 and 50 years of age, who was dressed only in a pair of shorts and he wanted to know what was going on and Klopper and Swart told him to leave the scene.

MR LAMEY: Just with regard to another aspect in-between, do you know what caused the explosion of the minibus?

MR GEVERS: I know now what caused it, but at that stage I did not know.

MR LAMEY: And what do you know about it now?

MR GEVERS: I know that after the incident, after we had had our discussion, I heard that two AK47 guns with live ammunition rounds within the magazines, had been placed inside the vehicle and that there had been two handgrenades of which the pens had not been removed, which had been left in the vehicle before it was set alight.

MR LAMEY: Therefore the subsequent explosions were caused in all probability by the handgrenades which were left in the vehicle?

MR GEVERS: Yes, that is my inference.

MR LAMEY: Now did Nortje and Holtzhausen return at one point, after they had departed?

MR GEVERS: Yes, that is correct. I think it was approximately 15 minutes later when they returned once more and once again they had a discussion with Lt Col de Kock, and once again I could not hear what was being said because I was not within hearing distance. What ensued was that I saw Col de Kock calling Const Swart and Sgt Chait and afterwards I saw that Const Swart had parked his vehicle next to the vehicle of Mr Nortje. And after that Const Swart took personal items and other items which were in the boot of his car and placed them in the boot of Nortje's car.

MR LAMEY: What happened further?

MR GEVERS: Just before Sgt Chait and Const Swart departed, Col de Kock called me closer and instructed me to go with Sgt Chait and Const Swart. However, he did not mention where we were going or what we were supposed to go and do.

MR LAMEY: And you then drove in the vehicle of Const Swart and Sgt Chait?

MR GEVERS: That is correct.

MR LAMEY: And when you departed from there, did the reason for your departure come to your knowledge?

MR GEVERS: At that stage I still didn't know and I didn't ask either. The discussion which I could infer from Const Swart and Sgt Chait, was that there was another person who had been arrested.

MR LAMEY: And when you refer to another person, what do you mean by that?

MR GEVERS: Well they simply told me that another person had been arrested and that we were on our way there.

MR LAMEY: But when you refer to another person being arrested, is that in connection with this Nelspruit planned robbery or another incident?

MR GEVERS: No, they said it was a member of the same group.

MR LAMEY: What happened further?

MR GEVERS: We drove through Nelspruit and near the Halls complex there ...(intervention)

MR LAMEY: Did you follow the Pretoria road?

MR GEVERS: Yes. And near the Halls complex, we turned into a dirt road and drove for approximately two to three kilometres before we arrived at the vehicle of Sgt Sefade and W/O Radebe.

MR LAMEY: And what else did you find there?

MR GEVERS: All of us climbed out of the vehicle. W/O Radebe opened the boot of his car and I saw that there was a black man in the back of the vehicle, in the boot. He was blindfolded and his hands were bound behind his back. W/O Radebe then informed me that this was Tiso, one Tiso, and that he was the vehicle driver of Mrs Winnie Mandela.

&#9;The person was then loaded into the vehicle of Const Swart. At that stage I still didn't know what we were going to do with him. W/O Nortje told me that Col de Kock had given him the order to contact Dawid Britz or Snor Vermeulen in Pretoria.

MR LAMEY: Now Holtzhausen and the others, were they there when you found Tiso in the presence of Simon Radebe and Eric Sefade?

MR GEVERS: Yes, that is correct, we drove behind their vehicle in our vehicle.

MR LAMEY: And did Mr Nortje say what he was going to do?

MR GEVERS: Yes, that is correct. He said that he was going to return to the hotel to call either Mr Snor Vermeulen or Duiwel Britz or Lionel Snyman.

MR LAMEY: And where were you supposed to go?

MR GEVERS: We were given an instruction by W/O Nortje to go to the Middelburg Ultra City in the meantime and that somebody would meet us there.

MR LAMEY: And who did you expect to find you there?

MR GEVERS: Seeing as W/O Nortje mentioned these names, we assumed that it would be one or more of these three persons.

MR LAMEY: And on the way there, what else did you find out? What was the planning?

MR GEVERS: On the way from Nelspruit, after we had picked up Tiso, on the way to the Ultra City, I began to ask questions regarding what we were going to do with this person and if I can recall correctly it was Sgt Chait who told me that he was going to say goodbye, and by that I understood that he was going to be killed.

MR LAMEY: What did you know about Tiso?

MR GEVERS: My knowledge regarding Tiso was that he was the motor vehicle driver for Mrs Winnie Madikizela-Mandela and that he was also an active trained ANC/MK member. Yes, that is basically what I knew about him.

MR LAMEY: You also state here in your affidavit that according to your information, with regard to Tiso, that he was involved in the procurement of weapons. Did you know this at that stage?

MR GEVERS: There was no concrete evidence, but this was also just information which Sgt Holtzhausen had conveyed to us. So that is how far my knowledge of the matter extended.

MR LAMEY: Did you have any previous knowledge or understanding that Tiso would also be a member of this robbery group? This bank robbery group.

MR GEVERS: Yes, that is correct, because he had also been involved in the Coin Security incident and Holtzhausen had told us that it would be specifically the same group of people who had been involved in the Coin incident.

CHAIRPERSON: And was the robbery executed?

MR GEVERS: The Coin incident was not executed.

CHAIRPERSON: No, I'm referring to this robbery.

MR GEVERS: No.

CHAIRPERSON: So was it a robbery that still had to be executed?

MR GEVERS: That is correct.

CHAIRPERSON: So these persons were attacked in their minibus before the execution of the robbery?

MR GEVERS: That is correct.

CHAIRPERSON: Sorry, Mr Lamey.

MR LAMEY: I would just like to ask you whether you know from your own knowledge, whether the fact that Tiso was not in the minibus was an unexpected turn of events for you?

MR GEVERS: Yes, that is correct.

MR LAMEY: Because you expected to find him in the minibus as well?

MR GEVERS: That is correct.

MR LAMEY: And did you then arrive at the rendezvous point at the Ultra City?

MR GEVERS: Yes, that is correct, it was at approximately 7 o'clock that morning, if I recall correctly.

MR LAMEY: And did anybody else arrive there later, any of the persons that you would have met there?

MR GEVERS: Yes, W/O Vermeulen and Sgt Duiwel Britz arrived there from Pretoria.

MR LAMEY: And did any discussion take place that you know of?

MR GEVERS: Yes, there was a discussion, it was primarily between Sgt Chait and W/O Britz and Sgt Vermeulen. I simply heard that they had to move back to Pretoria in order to fetch explosives and that they instructed us to wait for them at Ohrigstad(?) in the meantime.

MR LAMEY: And I assume that you and Sgt Chait and Sgt Swart arrived for Ohrigstad in the meantime?

MR GEVERS: Yes.

MR LAMEY: And where was Tiso all the time, where did you keep him?

MR GEVERS: Chairperson, Tiso was bound in the back in the boot of the car.

MR LAMEY: Very well. And can you recall at what time you arrived near Ohrigstad?

MR GEVERS: No, unfortunately I cannot recall. I'm assuming that it must have been at approximately 10 o'clock, but I'm not entirely certain.

MR LAMEY: And you then knew that you would have to wait a while longer for Vermeulen and Britz, because they had to go back to Pretoria to fetch explosives?

MR GEVERS: That is correct.

MR LAMEY: In your statement you mention that you purchased a beer.

MR GEVERS: That is correct. We went to buy beer and we also bought something to eat.

MR LAMEY: And in your statement you say that at approximately half past two that afternoon, Vermeulen and Britz joined you.

MR GEVERS: That is correct.

MR LAMEY: And they then told you to follow them.

MR GEVERS: That is correct.

MR LAMEY: And where did you arrive eventually?

MR GEVERS: We drove along after them, or behind them, from Ohrigstad towards Penge Mine. This was the first time that I had visited the mine. It was only when I arrived there and when we made enquiries, that I realised that this was the Penge Mine.

MR LAMEY: And what else happened there?

MR GEVERS: Chairperson, W/O Vermeulen and Britz then went in by the security gates, they went through the security office. I think that it must have been to get a key for a gate. After which we once again drove behind them, past an opencast mine to an old dilapidated building, which served as shelter.

WITNESS DISTRESSED

CHAIRPERSON: Very well, Mr Lamey.

MR LAMEY: Thank you, Chair.

&#9;Would you continue to tell us what happened.

MR GEVERS: Const Swart and I then loaded Tiso out of the vehicle and took him to one of the building ruins. W/O Britz and W/O Vermeulen and Sgt Chait departed from there. At that stage I did not know where they were going. Const Swart and I then began to interrogate Tiso. It assumed the form that we struck and kicked him.

MR LAMEY: And what was the topic of the interrogation, what did you want to know?

MR GEVERS: The topic of interrogation was his involvement in weapons smuggling, the illegal smuggling of weapons as well as the connection of Mrs Mandela and the soccer club with illegal weaponry, as well as the establishment and maintenance of SDUs.

MR LAMEY: Did you also interrogate him about the robberies?

MR GEVERS: We also interrogated him about the robberies, Chairperson, however he did not have or provide any information about it.

MR LAMEY: And emanating from the interrogation, did he provide any information for you?

MR GEVERS: The only piece of useful information was that Mrs Mandela, via the DHL Courier company, was smuggling or receiving weapons from Zambia. That was the only piece of information which was of essential significance which we obtained.

MR LAMEY: Did he indicate for whom these weapons were intended?

MR GEVERS: No, he simply mentioned that they were for Mrs Winnie Mandela and at that stage it was my perception that Mrs Mandela and the Mandela United Football Club and the SDUs were all hand-in-glove.

MR LAMEY: And what else happened after this? This is after the interrogation.

MR GEVERS: The interrogation continued for approximately an hour, after which Sgt Chait and W/O Vermeulen and W/O Britz returned with the kombi. W/O Britz took us aside, that is me and Const Swart, and asked who was going to do the shooting. At that stage I told him that it would be me. He then gave me a .38 special revolver ...(intervention)

MR LAMEY: And do you know where the weapon came from?

MR GEVERS: No, I did not know where the firearm came from.

CHAIRPERSON: Mr Gevers, according to whose instruction did you undertake the interrogation?

MR GEVERS: It was upon my own initiative.

CHAIRPERSON: Did you yourself decide that you were going to interrogate the deceased?

MR GEVERS: Yes.

CHAIRPERSON: And why did you assault him?

MR GEVERS: Chairperson, seeing as we knew that he was involved with Mrs Winnie Mandela and emanating from intelligence reports which I personally had read at Security Head Office, that Mrs Mandela and the Mandela United Football Club, the Young Lions, the persons who supported her, had much to do with weapons smuggling. He did not provide any information to us and based upon that, we began to assault him. That is why we hit him and kicked him.

CHAIRPERSON: Was this for the entire length of the hour-long interrogation?

MR GEVERS: No, it was only at the beginning that we hit and kicked him and at the end of the interrogation we did not torture or assault him for the entire duration of the interrogation session.

CHAIRPERSON: Mr Lamey?

MR LAMEY: Did he give you the information that he provided immediately or was this the result of the course of the interrogation after you had assaulted him?

MR GEVERS: It was only after the course of the assault that he came forward with this information.

MR LAMEY: What happened next, after the interrogation was completed?

MR GEVERS: Very well. I just want to make one point clear and that is the fact that I offered to perform the shooting, basically is that while Const Swart and Sgt Chait and I waited in Ohrigstad, Const Swart mentioned to me that because he was the youngest he would have to do the shooting because he occupied the lowest rank and I could see that it bothered him tremendously and that is why I offered to do it, seeing as since 1981 and up to and including 1986, I was stationed in an operational area. So that is why I was the one who offered to perform the shooting. 

&#9;After that all of us climbed into the kombi. I informed Tiso that we were satisfied with the information that he had provided during his interrogation and I told him that we were going to take him to Ohrigstad to release him.

MR LAMEY: Why did you tell him that?

MR GEVERS: It was in order to get him into the vehicle, so that he would not resist re-entering the vehicle.

MR LAMEY: Very well. What happened after that?

MR GEVERS: On the way back we passed the opencast mine once again and it was there that W/O Vermeulen stopped and said that he had seen something interesting in the bottom of the mine earlier on. 

&#9;All of us climbed out. Britz and I explained to Tiso that we also wanted him to see it. We were very friendly to him and he basically went with us of his own free will, without us having to coerce him to the middle of this opencast mine.

CHAIRPERSON: Was he still blindfolded at that stage?

MR GEVERS: No, Chairperson, he was also not bound, not at all.

MR LAMEY: So at that stage he actually didn't know what was going to happen?

MR GEVERS: No, he didn't know.

MR LAMEY: What happened next, Mr Gevers?

MR GEVERS: I walked on his left-hand side and W/O Britz was on his right-hand side and when we were approximately in the middle of this opencast mine, W/O Britz grabbed Tiso by the shoulders and held him next him and shouted at me "Shoot, shoot, shoot". I took the revolver out of the front part of my belt and aimed it in the direction of Tiso's chest. At that stage I was approximately half a metre away from him. The first shot did not go off. I still don't know to this day why that happened. Tiso began to struggle, seeing as he had realised what was about to happen. W/O Britz shouted at me again "Shoot" and I fired again, I pulled the trigger again and after that I fired three shots into his chest.

MR LAMEY: What happened next?

MR GEVERS: Chairperson, it appeared to me as if Tiso was dead. He collapsed. Britz and I immediately removed his clothing so that he was completely naked. At that stage Sgt Chait and W/O Vermeulen approached with bags full of yellow and blue sausages, it appeared to me to be. Later I realised that these were explosives. Unfortunately I'm not a demolitions expert. We placed Tiso in a sitting position. We placed some of the explosives on his lap and some of the explosives we fixed around his body with plastic, after which Swart and I were ordered to return to the kombi. I took Tiso's clothing and shoes with me to the kombi.

MR LAMEY: What was the purpose behind the removal of his clothing?

MR GEVERS: Chairperson, it was to remove any sign of evidence that an offence or a crime had been committed there, it was to remove all aspects of evidence or proof from the scene of the incident.

MR LAMEY: What happened next?

MR GEVERS: After we arrived at the kombi, Sgt Chait and W/O Vermeulen and W/O Britz rejoined us. We climbed into the kombi and drove back in the direction of the ruins where we had been previously. Approximately a kilometre, I think it was a kilometre further, we stopped and all of us climbed out and basically about half a minute afterwards we heard a great explosion. I can recall that W/O Vermeulen said that he thought something had gone wrong with the explosion. All of us climbed back into the kombi and drove back and walked back to where we had left Tiso. However, there was just a big hole in the ground. And because it was already dark we returned to the kombi and drove back to the ruins.

MR LAMEY: Very well.

CHAIRPERSON: We'll take the luncheon adjournment at this stage and we'll reconvene at 2 o'clock.

MR LAMEY: As it pleases you, Mr Chairman.

COMMITTEE ADJOURNS

ON RESUMPTION

ROLF DIETER GEVERS: (s.u.o.)

CHAIRPERSON: Mr Lamey?

EXAMINATION BY MR LAMEY: (cont)

&#9;Thank you, Chairperson.

&#9;Mr Gevers, we adjourned at the point where the explosion then took place. Would you proceed from that point and tell us what happened next.

MR GEVERS: Chairperson, W/O Vermeulen mentioned that the explosion did not sound right. We returned to the scene and it was at that stage already dark. We went to the place where we had left Tiso and all we found was a big hole. Mr Vermeulen then told us that it appeared as if everything had gone according to plan and we left in the vehicle and went to the ruins where we spent the night.

MR LAMEY: Might I just ask you whether you knew that Mr Vermeulen was a specific demolitions expert?

MR GEVERS: That is correct, he was a demolitions expert.

MR LAMEY: What happened next?

MR GEVERS: We then built a big fire and burnt all Tiso's clothing in it. Britz however was of the opinion that his shoes were of such a high quality that they were still usable. He then took the shoes for himself and the rest of the clothing was burnt in the fire. Furthermore we spent the night there.

MR LAMEY: Did you return at any stage to the scene of the explosion?

MR GEVERS: That is correct. The following morning at approximately half past six, we returned to the scene of the explosion. That was all of us. We cleared the area. In other words, we checked to see if there were any remains of the body. We did find such remains and we placed it in the hole again. The search took approximately three hours. 

&#9;There was quite an extensive area around the opencast mine and we searched that area thoroughly and those remains which we found we placed in the hole once again and W/O Vermeulen and Britz once again destroyed it by means of explosives.

MR LAMEY: And this further explosion, how many times was it repeated?

MR GEVERS: We did this twice.

MR LAMEY: The first explosion took place the previous evening, is that correct?

MR GEVERS: That's correct.

MR LAMEY: And the following morning, how many times did you repeat the explosion?

MR GEVERS: The first explosion took place the previous evening and the following morning we repeated the clear-up twice, so there were two explosions.

CHAIRPERSON: So the following morning after the first explosion, you once again cleared up the place and set off another explosion?

MR GEVERS: That is correct.

MR LAMEY: And what did you do furthermore?

MR GEVERS: From there we departed once again in our vehicles to Nelspruit for the Drumrock Hotel. There we were informed that the other members had already been booked out and we moved ahead to Pretoria. On the way to Pretoria, I think it was approximately in the vicinity of Bronkhorstspruit, we received a pager message from Col de Kock, that all of us had to meet at the Grasdak house. And at that stage I didn't feel like going there and I asked Const Swart to take me home. This wasn't very far away from Grasdak.

MR LAMEY: And on what day of the week was it that you received the message that Col de Kock wanted to see you at the Grasdak?

MR GEVERS: It was on a Friday.

MR LAMEY: And did you go and see Col de Kock, and if you did, when?

MR GEVERS: The next time that I saw Col de Kock was on the Monday at Grasdak. He then called me into his office and closed the door and told me that I as well as the other members who had been at Penge Mine, that would be me, Sgt Chait, Const Swart, W/O Vermeulen and W/O Britz, would be permitted to submit false claims to the value of R2 000 per month for the following five months.

MR LAMEY: Would that be five months at how many rands per month?

MR GEVERS: Every one of us could submit a claim for R2 000 per month.

MR LAMEY: And was that done?

MR GEVERS: Initially it was done like that. It lasted for about two or three months, I'm not certain. The members brought those specific claims for R2 000 to me, upon which I would take them to Col de Kock and explain to him that these are the claims that he gave me the order to submit. He signed these claims and they went through. I cannot say with certainty whether this went on for two or three months, but he told me that the claims had to be ceased.

MR LAMEY: So then it was ceased. That meant that it didn't take place for the ensuing five months.

MR GEVERS: That is correct.

MR LAMEY: And on page 57 you say that you received R7 000 from Mr de Kock. Is this due to the false claims that you received?

MR GEVERS: Yes, that would be equivalent to three months worth of claims.

MR LAMEY: And before your participation in the operation and before the specific decision to eliminate Tiso, did you have any expectation or promise of additional remuneration that you would receive?

MR GEVERS: No, none whatsoever.

MR LAMEY: Then I would just like to come to another aspect. The firearm that you shot Tiso with, to whom did you give it?

MR GEVERS: I returned it to W/O Britz.

MR LAMEY: And then you also had to submit a statement for the purposes of a post-mortem inquest into the incident?

MR GEVERS: That is correct.

MR LAMEY: Was that statement the truth?

MR GEVERS: No, not at all.

MR LAMEY: Upon whose request did you make these statements?

MR GEVERS: It was upon the order or request of Maj-Gen Krappies Engelbrecht.

MR LAMEY: But did you receive a direct order from Engelbrecht or how did it come to be that you submitted a false statement?

MR GEVERS: All of us were called in together at the Grasdak and if I recall correctly, the order came from Col de Kock, that we had to compile our statements.

MR LAMEY: You have heard Mr de Kock's evidence that the proposal was as such that it had to appear that the deceased had been shot during a legal roadblock. Is that your recollection of the false presentation?

MR GEVERS: Yes, that is correct.

MR LAMEY: Was Gen Engelbrecht present at any stage of the submission or compilation of statements?

MR GEVERS: That is correct. All of us sat down around a table at Grasdak and Gen Engelbrecht - we compiled our statements according to what we had agreed upon before the time, and Gen Engelbrecht then controlled the aspects that we mentioned in it. He removed certain aspects or added other aspects. I recall for example that the number of shots which were fired had to be corrected. However, I cannot recall anything else specific, but he definitely prescribed to us what we were supposed to put in our statements.

ADV DE JAGER: Mr Lamey, is that the statement which appears on page 290 to page 300, or is it another statement?

MR LAMEY: Chairperson, let me just look at that statement.

ADV DE JAGER: It appears to have been made before the Attorney-General or something like that.

MR GEVERS: No, that is not the statement.

MR LAMEY: The statement on the page which has been referred to was made, according to the typed version, on the 8th of August 1995, so it is not the same as the falsified statement which you made.

MR GEVERS: No, definitely not.

MR LAMEY: That would be the affidavit which you submitted for the purposes of the de Kock hearing.

MR GEVERS: Yes, that is correct.

MR LAMEY: Mr Gevers, you mention in your statement, in answer to the question on page 67, the question whether your participation in the action took place as a result of an order and your answer is:

&#9;&#9;"Yes" 

And then in 11(b) you state:

&#9;&#9;"Col Eugene de Kock". However, believe the order came to him from Maj-Gen Krappies Engelbrecht."

Could you tell the Committee upon what you base the belief that it came from Gen Engelbrecht. Or let me ask you, do you have any direct evidence about that?

MR GEVERS: No.

MR LAMEY: Then upon what do you base your belief that the order came from Engelbrecht?

MR GEVERS: Chairperson, this is how it worked among us. Every morning the officers of C1 Unit would meet at Gen Engelbrecht's office in the Security Headquarters and information would be exchanged. The planning for the day would be conducted there. Information which was received during the previous day would then be conveyed to Gen Engelbrecht, it would be discussed. However, it happened quite often that Col de Kock would remain behind alone specifically after the rest of us had departed. Therefore, what was discussed there is unknown to me because I wasn't present during those meetings. But the fact that Gen Engelbrecht knew exactly what we were supposed to say in our statements, put me under the impression that he basically had to have known exactly what took place there. Therefore, I believed at that stage that it definitely took place upon the order of Gen Engelbrecht, or that he must have known about it.

ADV DE JAGER: Did you attend those morning meetings?

MR GEVERS: Yes, that is correct.

ADV DE JAGER: And during those meetings, was any such order ever given by him?

MR GEVERS: No, Chairperson.

ADV DE JAGER: Did he issue orders in other instances, while you were present?

MR GEVERS: No, not orders for this sort of operation, but he did issue orders for other operations which were connected specifically with a SANAB action in Pretoria and a gold and diamonds action in Johannesburg, and for those operations he gave specific orders, I recall.

ADV DE JAGER: Do you know whether there was meeting during which this Nelspruit robbery was discussed?

MR GEVERS: No.

MR LAMEY: What I would like to ask you is what your impression was with these meetings during which officers were present, and were covert actions necessarily discussed during such meetings, or how did it function?

MR GEVERS: No, covert operations were never discussed during these meetings, due to the fact, in my opinion, that there were too many of us there. In the Security Branch and more specifically in Unit C1, we operated strictly on a need-to-know basis. So the three components of C1, one could say superficially we exchanged information in terms of our activities and so forth, but with regard to covert operations there would be consultation only with those specific persons who were involved in such operations, or people that handled informers.

ADV DE JAGER: Mr Gevers, the submission - the apprehension of the robbers, did you believe that this was a covert operation?

MR GEVERS: Yes, I thought so.

ADV DE JAGER: Why was it a covert operation if Murder and Robbery was going to be involved? Why did you feel that it was covert?

MR GEVERS: Because it was not openly discussed during meetings with Gen Engelbrecht. 

ADV DE JAGER: But if one was going to apprehend robbers, if those were going to be the facts, that it was going to be a robbery that you were going to thwart or that you were going to apprehend robbers, then there was nothing covert about it.

MR GEVERS: I cannot recall whether it was ever discussed during a meeting or something like that, but according to what I can recall, I cannot recall that it was ever discussed during a meeting.

MR LAMEY: Mr Gevers, your recollection is that there was indeed a meeting before this action, is that correct?

MR GEVERS: The meeting took place at the Drumrock Hotel.

MR LAMEY: No, this meeting that you have referred to, during which you formed the impression that Gen Engelbrecht must have known about it, when did that take place, how long before the incident did it take place?

MR GEVERS: I cannot recall, Chairperson, whether it was ever mentioned during a meeting or after the time.

MR LAMEY: No, you said that there was a meeting that you attended before this action, is that correct, did I understand you correctly? The meeting that you attended with the other officers at Security Head Office.

MR GEVERS: Yes, that would be the daily morning meeting.

MR LAMEY: Yes, and there must have been such a meeting before you departed for Nelspruit.

MR GEVERS: That is correct.

MR LAMEY: But at the general meeting, according to you, it was not discussed, this prospective action?

MR GEVERS: No, not that I can recall.

MR LAMEY: But if I understand your evidence correctly, after the meeting you noticed that Gen Engelbrecht and Col de Kock were alone in a discussion.

MR GEVERS: No, it just happened quite often, after such a daily morning meeting, that Col de Kock and Gen Engelbrecht would have a discussion by themselves after the time.

MR GEVERS: I cannot recall that it took place specifically on that day, before the operation.

MR LAMEY: So in other words, you base your belief on the fact that you do not know whether Gen Engelbrecht issued a direct order, but on your impression that you formed after the time and with the submission of the false statements?

MR GEVERS: That's correct, Chairperson.

ADV DE JAGER: Did you hear Mr de Kock's evidence that he did this upon his own initiative?

MR GEVERS: That is correct.

ADV DE JAGER: So he doesn't maintain that he received an order from Engelbrecht.

MR GEVERS: At that stage it was my belief that Gen Engelbrecht did know about it. I believed that he knew about it.

ADV DE JAGER: I beg your pardon. Before the incident or after the incident?

MR GEVERS: Before the incident.

ADV DE JAGER: Because I just want to put it to you that after the incident, according to Mr de Kock's evidence, Mr de Kock informed Mr Engelbrecht about certain facts relating to the matter.

MR GEVERS: I believed before the time that Gen Engelbrecht would have been informed.

MR LAMEY: That was your personal belief, it could be that that belief was mistaken?

MR GEVERS: Yes, that is possible.

MR LAMEY: Mr Gevers, then I would just like to get to the questions which deal with the political objective and which you have referred to in your version of the nature and particulars in your amnesty application, specifically paragraph 10(a) and (b). You have given your version regarding that, is that correct?

MR GEVERS: Yes, that is correct.

MR LAMEY: And you still confirm that it is the way you understood it, what the objective was behind the action?

MR GEVERS: Yes, that is correct.

MR LAMEY: There's just something else that I would like to ask you. Before you went to Vlakplaas, you stated that you had worked at head office and that you were involved in computer information.

MR GEVERS: Yes, that is correct.

MR LAMEY: And that was up to and including 1990, that you worked there, before you went to Vlakplaas. Is that correct?

MR GEVERS: Yes, it was until September 1990.

MR LAMEY: Specifically with regard to the work that you did, did you receive information pertaining to the armed struggle during 1991?

MR GEVERS: That is correct, we received daily security reviews in Security Head Office, which we had to read, particularly the officers, so everything was very familiar to me.

MR LAMEY: Was there something specific that you knew which also came to your knowledge with regard to - you heard the evidence of Mr de Kock, he referred to Operation Vula, did you know anything about that?

MR GEVERS: Yes, that is correct. After these persons had been arrested in Natal, regarding Operation Vula, before the temporary structures were erected on Vlakplaas, it was our task to transfer the tactical information as quickly as possible from the hard-drive and disks of the computers. We worked day and night on that. 

&#9;Automatically one would have read some of those documents and I was thoroughly aware that the ANC, specifically with Operation Vula, had planned to expand their underground structures. And seeing as they had better access after having been unbanned, they could achieve this quite easily and they would definitely have continued with the armed struggle against the National Party Government. They would have contained information in that documentation from Vula and also specifically have mentioned the establishment and reorganisation and arming and funding of, one could say the Self Defence Units, the co-ordination thereof. So I had knowledge about it, yes.

MR LAMEY: You refer to the underground structures and so forth. The fact that in this case it came to your knowledge that the persons who had planned the robbery had political connections with the liberation movements. Did this correlate with the underground structures in your opinion?

MR GEVERS: Yes, entirely.

MR LAMEY: You then request amnesty specifically for your involvement in the murder of the four persons who were shot dead in the minibus in the ambush, for conspiracy to murder, and then any lesser offence which may emanate from the facts pertaining to the matter or any other illegality emanating therefrom, also for murder and conspiracy to murder Tiso, who was later murdered at Penge Mine.

MR GEVERS: Yes, that is correct.

MR LAMEY: What did you yourself understand ...(intervention)

ADV DE JAGER: Mr Lamey, where in his application is he requesting amnesty for any other related offences?

MR LAMEY: Chairperson, if I might refer you to page 69 ...(intervention)

ADV DE JAGER: Would that be part of the answer?

MR LAMEY: Yes.

ADV DE JAGER: Thank you.

MR LAMEY: I see there is a repetition of this on page 84, but I think it's actually just a duplication.

ADV DE JAGER: I was looking at page 65 and I couldn't find anything there.

MR LAMEY: Mr Gevers, Tiso himself, what did you understand with regard to his role in this group? Do you understand what I have put to you?

MR GEVERS: Yes, I understand. I understood that Tiso was the leader of this group and just as the Coin Security incident which did not take place, it was my impression that Tiso had also been the leader of that similar group and he was also the leader of this group. I was placed under that impression and accepted it completely that he was Mrs Mandela's driver and that he was also involved in her underground activities. In other words, he knew precisely what was going on with her underground activities and that he had given assistance in assisting her in the achievement of her objectives.

MR LAMEY: Thank you, Chairperson, I think that will then be the evidence-in-chief of Mr Gevers.

NO FURTHER QUESTIONS BY MR LAMEY

CHAIRPERSON: Thank you, Mr Lamey. 

MR SIBANYONI: Maybe just one question before cross-examination. Did you have information of where exactly was Tiso arrested?

MR GEVERS: No, Chairperson, I do not know precisely where he was arrested.

MR SIBANYONI: Thank you.

CHAIRPERSON: Mr Hattingh, do you have any questions?

CROSS-EXAMINATION BY MR HATTINGH: Thank you, Chairperson.

&#9;Mr Gevers, you were examined regarding the issue that you as Captain were subordinate to the orders of Sgt Holtzhausen. I would like to refer to Exhibit C. On page 70 - perhaps I should begin at the bottom of page 69, the final sentence. And this is what Mr de Kock has to say there:

&#9;&#9;"In this regard I can only mentioned that I had great confidence in my members and that I could rely on the information that they had conveyed to me in this regard. We were a close unit, in which rank didn't really play a very significant role. Sometimes it occurred that I would place somebody in charge of an operation, regardless of the fact that there were other members with a higher rank who would be involved in the operation, because that particular person under the circumstances would be the most suitable person to take the lead of such an operation."

Is that how you understood the command structure in the short time that you were at Vlakplaas?

MR GEVERS: Yes, that is correct.

MR HATTINGH: And in either event, if you received an order to serve below another person who occupied a lower rank that you, then you actually received an order from your commander to carry out such an order?

MR GEVERS: That is correct.

MR HATTINGH: And in this particular case, the Nelspruit case, your commander was Col de Kock and he was present at the scene?

MR GEVERS: Yes, that is correct.

MR HATTINGH: Then just one further aspect. You have mentioned the fact that Mr Holtzhausen shot from within the minibus, with an AK, towards the outside.

MR GEVERS: Yes.

MR HATTINGH: And you are aware that the shells were tossed to the outside of the vehicle.

MR GEVERS: Yes.

MR HATTINGH: And that shells were found to the right of the vehicle.

MR GEVERS: I don't know whether shells were found, but it is entirely possible.

MR HATTINGH: That is where you would have expected them?

MR GEVERS: Yes.

MR HATTINGH: And this created a problem because that would have indicated that the person shot forward while you were actually behind them at that stage?

MR GEVERS: That is correct.

MR HATTINGH: Was that fact ever picked up by the investigating officer who dealt with the matter for the purposes of the post-mortem inquest?

MR GEVERS: No, not as far as I can recall.

MR HATTINGH: And you also say that the number of shots which you fired had to be adjusted when you made your statements. Was this done because some of your members picked up some of the shells after the shooting, at the scene?

MR GEVERS: Yes. And somebody, I don't know who it was, also had some form of apparatus, a kind of a bag which was placed over that portion of the gun where the shells would be picked up. Can you recall who that was?

MR GEVERS: No, I cannot.

MR HATTINGH: Therefore the number of shells which was picked up at the scene did not match the number of shots which had been fired?

MR GEVERS: No, Chairperson.

MR HATTINGH: Thank you, Chairperson, nothing further.

NO FURTHER QUESTIONS BY MR HATTINGH

CHAIRPERSON: Thank you, Mr Hattingh. Mr Cornelius, any questions?

CROSS-EXAMINATION BY MR CORNELIUS: Thank you, Chairperson.

&#9;Mr Gevers, at all times you carried out the orders of Col de Kock, and you obeyed his orders?

MR GEVERS: Yes, that is correct.

MR CORNELIUS: If you had not done so, it would have held certain consequences for you within the Police Force.

MR GEVERS: That is correct.

MR CORNELIUS: And you are aware of the evidence already given by Gen van der Merwe in this regard.

MR GEVERS: No, I do not know about his evidence.

MR CORNELIUS: And you had no reason to question the judgement of Mr de Kock, that C10 should become involved in this operation?

MR GEVERS: No.

MR CORNELIUS: You accepted that the facts had been appropriately evaluated and that this was the sort of incident in which the intervention of C1 was necessary?

MR GEVERS: That is correct.

MR CORNELIUS: And I believe that your subjective belief in that was fortified by the fact that Murder and Robbery would be working hand-in-hand with you, it wasn't simply a frolic of C10 on their own?

MR GEVERS: That is correct.

MR CORNELIUS: And at all times you accepted, as I understand your evidence, that you expected these victims to be armed with eastern block weapons.

MR GEVERS: Yes, it was mentioned to us. I thought that they would have at least one or two weapons within the vehicle. Yes, that is correct.

MR CORNELIUS: And consequently you did not erect the usual roadblock, instead you set up an ambush so that you could eliminate these persons.

MR GEVERS: That is correct.

MR CORNELIUS: And you also accepted that Security Head Office would either have ratified it after the time or would have known about it before the time.

MR GEVERS: That is correct.

MR CORNELIUS: It would appear to me that you also accept that the control of the operation lay between Geldenhuys and Holtzhausen.

MR GEVERS: That is correct.

MR CORNELIUS: And that Murder and Robbery took the initiative to request the intervention of C10.

MR GEVERS: That is correct.

MR CORNELIUS: So there were two sets of evaluation to be applied to the situation, that of C10 and the commander and also that of Murder and Robbery?

MR GEVERS: That is correct.

MR CORNELIUS: Then I would like to take you back to Tiso Leballo and Penge Mine. With the interrogation of Tiso, can you recall that Mr Swart, the one applicant, took notes of the events?

MR GEVERS: No, not that I can recall. It is possible, but I don't recall it.

MR CORNELIUS: And that he handed this over to Willie Nortje at a later stage, or don't you know about this?

MR GEVERS: No, I cannot recall this.

MR CORNELIUS: Very well. Then with regard to the incident during which you shot him. The evidence of my applicants will be, that is Britz and Vermeulen, that the first shot was more like a thud and that they thought there was something wrong with the bullet. Is that possible?

MR GEVERS: Yes, it is possible. It is possible that with the first shot I may have held the barrel of the gun against his chest because I stood very close to him. It is possible, but I cannot recall it.

MR CORNELIUS: And according to their recollection, three shots were fired in total, including the first bullet.

MR GEVERS: That is correct.

MR CORNELIUS: And then ...(intervention)

ADV DE JAGER: I beg your pardon, you say that is correct. Wasn't it your evidence that once shot didn't go off and that after that you fired three more shots?

MR GEVERS: That is correct, the first shot appeared not even to have had a bullet in the chamber and that is why the second that I physically pulled the trigger, it let off a thud and after that there were two loud shots. So in total three shots were physically fired.

MR CORNELIUS: Then to put it clearly, the trigger was pulled four times in effect, once with an empty chamber and three with bullets, of which the second shot produced the feint thud?

MR GEVERS: That is correct.

MR CORNELIUS: And Mr Vermeulen, the demolitions expert will give evidence that the explosives was a block of plastic explosives, not rolls as you put it. Is that possible?

MR GEVERS: Chairperson, I am not a demolitions expert, I do not have much knowledge of explosives. At that stage it was already reasonably dark and it is possible, but my recollection is that they looked like yellow and blue sausages. However, it is possible that it may have been a block of explosives.

MR CORNELIUS: And I understand that the following day you played with the explosives, or you practised with the explosives, is that correct?

MR GEVERS: That is correct.

MR CORNELIUS: Did you use the rolls then?

MR GEVERS: That is correct.

MR CORNELIUS: And once you had bound the victim with the explosives, was it already dark?

MR GEVERS: Yes.

MR CORNELIUS: And you were not present when the explosives were prepared and placed in the quarry hole in Penge Mine?

MR GEVERS: No.

MR CORNELIUS: So you did not attend specifically to that?

MR GEVERS: No.

MR CORNELIUS: Thank you, Chairperson.

NO FURTHER QUESTIONS BY MR CORNELIUS

CHAIRPERSON: Thank you, Mr Cornelius. Mr van den Berg, any questions?

CROSS-EXAMINATION BY MR VAN DEN BERG: Thank you, Mr Chairperson.

&#9;Mr Gevers, in terms of Section 202 you've already received indemnity.

MR GEVERS: That is correct.

MR VAN DEN BERG: Then I would just like to understand why you are proceeding with an amnesty application now, because it would appear to me that this application is actually more academic by nature, you were not going to be prosecuted.

MR GEVERS: Chairperson, my primary objective with this application is the following. From 1994 onwards our country has changed a great deal, our perspectives have changed, the people have changed, our convictions have changed, the things that we grew up with have changed, the government has changed. I just feel within my heart to - at the end of 1994, I was discharged from the police due to medical reasons and post-traumatic stress disorder. I'm still bearing the consequences with me. I just wanted the opportunity to cleanse my conscience, to get this off my chest and basically to tell the family that I am sorry about what I have done. I do this in the spirit of reconciliation. We will have to cooperate in the new South Africa, we have to live together in the new South Africa and the quicker we get to the truth, the better for all of us. That is the primary objective with my amnesty application, Chairperson.

MR VAN DEN BERG: You have not personally approached any of the families involved here, after you gave evidence during the criminal trial?

MR GEVERS: No.

MR VAN DEN BERG: If we could return to the Nelspruit incident. As I have understood your evidence and as I've understood your affidavits, there were two proposed actions, the one in February and the other during which the persons were shot dead, is that correct?

MR GEVERS: Yes, that is correct.

MR VAN DEN BERG: Then I would just like to focus on the first one, the one in February during which, as I have understood your affidavits, you waited at the Coin Security company.

MR GEVERS: That is correct.

MR VAN DEN BERG: What planning was undertaken there, in light of this incident? Which information did you receive?

MR GEVERS: The planning which was conducted there was that Sgt Holtzhausen approached me on a certain day. I don't know precisely what the date was, but it was during February 1992. He approached me and told me that he had obtained information regarding a robbery which a band of robbers was going to execute at the Coin Security company in Nelspruit. He told me that it would be ANC and possibly also PAC cadres who would participate in this robbery and that he had or would make arrangements with Murder and Robbery to co-execute this operation. 

&#9;And we departed for Nelspruit, where we contacted the Murder and Robbery Unit at Nelspruit itself. They also made some of their members available for the action. And the further information which I received was that it would be possibly two to five persons. The informer was Mr Ben van Zyl and one Tiso was also the leader of this band of robbers.

MR VAN DEN BERG: And what was your objective? You waited for these persons at Coin Security, as I've understood your affidavit. Is that correct?

MR GEVERS: Yes, we took up position within the building and waited there for them.

MR VAN DEN BERG: And would they then have been arrested there?

MR GEVERS: No, Chairperson, we would also have shot them.

MR VAN DEN BERG: What information was conveyed to you with regard to Tiso? That would be in reference to the first event.

MR GEVERS: The same information that I mentioned earlier, that he was the leader of the gang and that he was a trained MK cadres, who had returned from abroad.

MR VAN DEN BERG: Were you informed at this stage that he was the driver of Winnie Mandela's motor vehicle?

MR GEVERS: No, not with regard to the first incident, no.

MR VAN DEN BERG: So that information that he was the driver, when did you receive that information?

MR GEVERS: It was given to us shortly before the shooting at Nelspruit, the second incident.

MR VAN DEN BERG: The second incident?

MR GEVERS: Yes, that is correct.

MR VAN DEN BERG: And it is indeed correct that he was a member of the ANC, and that he had left the country and that he had received a certain measure of training. That is indeed correct, you cannot dispute that?

MR GEVERS: No, Mr Chairperson.

MR VAN DEN BERG: But for a great portion of the time that he left the country he spent in Quatro. You probably wouldn't know about that?

MR GEVERS: No, I don't know about that.

MR VAN DEN BERG: Mr Chairperson, if you'd just give me a moment to have a look at my notes.

CHAIRPERSON: Yes, I was just going to ask you, but first have a look at your notes. Mr van den Berg, what are your instructions, was he in Quatro as a detainee or ...? What is the effect of the Quatro soldier ...

MR VAN DEN BERG: Let me put it to the witness. He won't be able to contest it.

&#9;My instructions are that he was in arrest there.

MR GEVERS: I don't know about that, Chairperson.

MR VAN DEN BERG: And that for a short while after he had returned to the country there was a dispute between him and the ANC. You wouldn't know about that either?

MR GEVERS: No, I wouldn't know about that.

MR VAN DEN BERG: However, his problems were sorted out and at a stage, I think it was in March, he began driving Mrs Mandela's vehicle for her. You wouldn't know about that either?

MR GEVERS: No, I don't know precisely when he became Mrs Mandela's driver.

MR VAN DEN BERG: The information which you received regarding the persons who you described as a gang, was they were ANC/PAC persons.

MR GEVERS: That is correct.

MR VAN DEN BERG: Now as I understand the position, wasn't there co-operation between the ANC and PAC? Can you comment on that?

MR GEVERS: Yes, according to intelligence reports and according to my own information which I had collected in my years at the Security Branch, they had basically formed a joint front, or had attempted to suggest a united front against the National Party Government. Now it was no proclaimed policy, according to me it was not a proclaimed policy that PAC and the ANC were co-operating, but on grassroots level it was definitely another story. The PAC and the ANC on grassroots level, where it really mattered most in the townships and such places, were definitely co-operating. And that is information which I myself verified, which I personally collected and which I also read about in many security reports.

MR VAN DEN BERG: We do not have the exact facts at hand, but there are incidents which have already been heard before this Amnesty Committee, during which there was dispute between the members of the PAC and the ANC, during which members of the ANC were stolen, to use your words because I cannot think of the Afrikaans word. There were events where members of the ANC were kidnapped by members of the PAC, where they were assaulted. Do you know about that?

MR GEVERS: Yes, I do know about it and it did take place. However according to my knowledge, especially here in Gauteng, such incidents did not take place.

MR VAN DEN BERG: And then there were also incidents during which the opposite took place, during which the ANC attacked supporters or members of the PAC or APLA. Do you know about that?

MR GEVERS: Yes.

MR VAN DEN BERG: And then there was also another incident and I think it was Joe Slovo who spoke about it. On the day that the PAC decided that - on the day on which the PAC decided to suspend the armed struggle, I believe it was Mr Slovo who said that they would have to declare war for a day because they hadn't participated in the war at all. Do you know about that?

MR GEVERS: I cannot recall those specific words no, Chairperson.

MR VAN DEN BERG: You do know that there were members of the PAC who applied for amnesty for their involvement in a variety of bank robberies and so forth. Do you know about that?

MR GEVERS: Yes, that is correct.

MR VAN DEN BERG: Do you know about any other applications which were submitted by members of the ANC, which were similar in nature?

MR GEVERS: Not that I can recall of the top of my head, no.

MR VAN DEN BERG: Sorry, Mr Chairman, I'm in the embarrassed position where I've lost my train of thought. If you'd just grant me a moment.

CHAIRPERSON: Yes, do you want us to stand down just for a few moments, Mr van den Berg? Will that assist you?

MR VAN DEN BERG: That will certainly assist me. I'm sorry, Mr Chairperson. I'm embarrassed by it.

CHAIRPERSON: No, no, that's in order. We'll stand down very briefly.

COMMITTEE ADJOURNS

ON RESUMPTION

CHAIRPERSON: Mr van den Berg, are you ready to proceed?

MR VAN DEN BERG: Thank you, Mr Chairperson, I apologise for my lapse in concentration.

CHAIRPERSON: Yes.

&#9;Mr Gevers, you are still under oath.

ROLF DIETER GEVERS: (s.u.o.)

MR VAN DEN BERG: You were a security policeman for a reasonably long period of time, some five to six years before this incident took place, is that correct?

MR GEVERS: No, Chairperson, since 1981 I was a member of the Security Branch.

MR VAN DEN BERG: '81?

MR GEVERS: Yes, that is correct.

MR VAN DEN BERG: And you must have known of information surrounding Mrs Mandela, is that correct?

MR GEVERS: Yes, that is correct.

MR VAN DEN BERG: And then you must also have known about a campaign which was launched against her to discredit her and so forth?

MR GEVERS: Yes, that is correct.

MR VAN DEN BERG: Now you have a situation where, according to you, a gang of ANC/MK members were planning to execute a robbery and one of these members was connected to Mrs Mandela. Would that not have presented the ideal opportunity to embarrass both the ANC and Mrs Mandela?

MR GEVERS: That is not how I saw it at that stage, no.

MR VAN DEN BERG: If we look at your first affidavit which you made - that is contained in the bundle from page 292 and further, do you recall that affidavit?

MR GEVERS: Yes, I do recall this affidavit.

MR VAN DEN BERG: And this affidavit was made on the 8th of August 1995, is that correct? If one looks at page 305.

MR GEVERS: That is correct, Chairperson.

MR VAN DEN BERG: And for what purposes was this affidavit made?

MR GEVERS: It was for the purposes of the prosecution of Col de Kock.

MR VAN DEN BERG: And did you mention to the person who compiled the affidavit that there was ANC/PAC involvement in the incident?

MR GEVERS: No, I did not deem it relevant with regard to criminal prosecution.

MR VAN DEN BERG: Because it appears in your statement that the ANC and the PAC are not mentioned at all, that is was simply a gang of robbers. Would you agree with me?

MR GEVERS: Yes, for a criminal prosecution, political affiliation would have been of absolutely no use.

MR VAN DEN BERG: Did you have anything to do with Mr van Zyl? You would not his handler, as I understand it?

MR GEVERS: No, I wasn't.

MR VAN DEN BERG: Did you ever discuss the matter with him before the incident took place?

MR GEVERS: No.

MR VAN DEN BERG: And you were not present when he submitted information that Tiso would not be with the rest of the group?

MR GEVERS: No.

MR VAN DEN BERG: When was the first time that you came to hear of this?

MR GEVERS: As I can recall and what I also stated in my affidavit, I recall that when Mr van Zyl sped past he shouted out of the window "Tiso isn't with them". But I may be wrong, this was a long time ago. So the first time that I really got to know about it was when Sgt Holtzhausen conveyed it to us.

MR VAN DEN BERG: Because I see that that aspect emerges in paragraph 34 of your affidavit, which is on page 299, and you did not mention this in your oral evidence today.

MR GEVERS: That is correct. I'm not entirely certain about it, I'm not quite sure that it did happen that way.

ADV DE JAGER: I'm sorry, I don't understand your answer. You say that you're not certain whether it did happen that way, that Mr van Zyl sped past and shouted "Tiso isn't with them".

MR GEVERS: At this stage I cannot recall whether it actually did happen that way.

ADV DE JAGER: But in 1995 you remembered it like that.

MR GEVERS: But that wasn't so long after the incident and four years have elapsed since the incident.

ADV DE JAGER: When did you - did you read your affidavit again?

MR GEVERS: Yes I did, but after we had discussed it, I realised that I was the only person who had apparently heard it.

ADV DE JAGER: And now you want to say that you didn't hear it, but that stage you were sure that you had heard it.

MR GEVERS: As I've said, I'm no longer certain whether I heard it or not.

ADV DE JAGER: But what are you sure of Mr van Zyl(sic), in terms of this affidavit that you made?

MR GEVERS: I am dead certain of the rest, it's just that one particular aspect that I'm not entirely certain of.

MR VAN DEN BERG: And what did Mr Holtzhausen tell you with regard to the fact that the robbers were armed or not?

MR GEVERS: He told us that there was a high possibility that they would be armed. However he wasn't certain whether they definitely had firearms, but he said that it is highly possible that they could have weapons.

MR VAN DEN BERG: If one looks at his affidavit he says that he was requested by Mr van Zyl at a certain stage to give them weapons and he refused. Do you know about that?

MR GEVERS: No, I don't know about that.

MR VAN DEN BERG: After the shooting you looked into the motor vehicle to see how many people there were and so forth, is that correct?

MR GEVERS: Yes, that is correct, I looked at them.

MR VAN DEN BERG: And you didn't see any weapons?

MR GEVERS: No, not that I can recall.

MR VAN DEN BERG: And were you surprised?

MR GEVERS: At that stage everything happened so quickly that I cannot recall what I thought at that stage, but I don't believe that I would have been surprised.

MR VAN DEN BERG: Do you know about the intelligence note which was prepared before the incident?

MR GEVERS: No, not at all.

MR VAN DEN BERG: And this is about the fact that it was about arms smuggling.

MR GEVERS: No, I don't know anything about it.

MR VAN DEN BERG: You don't know anything about it. When did you realise that Tiso Leballo would have to be eliminated?

MR GEVERS: When we were driving in the car after we had picked him up, on the way to the Ultra City.

MR VAN DEN BERG: And the motivation for that was probably to eliminate all possible witnesses who could identify you?

MR GEVERS: That was part of the motivation, yes that is correct.

ADV DE JAGER: Mr van den Berg, could I just get some clarity here. You put the question "And are you saying that Tiso was related to the group or that he knew them or that he co-operated with them and that he knew that if he were to die he wouldn't be able to say anything about it".

MR VAN DEN BERG: My instructions, Mr de Jager, are that the families did not know one another and the Leballo family was surprised at this incident. Insofar as their knowledge went, Tiso was not involved in any unlawful deeds. The extent of the question is actually about the motivation to eliminate him. That he was involved in this group if common cause in my opinion. How that came to be is something that the family does not know about.

&#9;Did you have insight into Exhibit C before this Committee? That is the statement made by Mr de Kock, the so-called "Supplementary bundle - Eugene de Kock", which deals basically with the activities of Vlakplaas. Have you had insight into this document?

MR GEVERS: No, Mr Chairperson.

MR VAN DEN BERG: If one looks for example, at paragraph 2.5 of the annexure, that would be page 57 - I beg your pardon, page 65, it deals with Vlakplaas' finances.

MR GEVERS: That is correct.

MR VAN DEN BERG: And it also deals with false claims which were submitted. 

MR GEVERS: I have not yet read this particular piece of documentation.

MR VAN DEN BERG: With the exception of the claim that you submitted on behalf of you and the other members who were involved in Tiso's death, did you submit any other false claims?

MR GEVERS: That is correct.

MR VAN DEN BERG: And these were claims for informers' fees, for example?

MR GEVERS: Yes, for example, but there were also false claims in-between. 

MR VAN DEN BERG: You also submitted false claims?

MR GEVERS: That is correct.

MR VAN DEN BERG: The phenomenon of false claims, when according to you did this appear for the first time?

MR GEVERS: I became aware of it the first time, Chairperson, when I had been at Vlakplaas for two or three weeks. This was in September 1991, when we were busy with an operation in the Eastern Transvaal at Malelane, where I paid for a drink at the hotel with my own money and one of the members then asked me if I had used my own money and I said "Yes", and he said "But you are stupid, here we have a standing allowance for that." And that was the first time that I came to hear of it.

MR VAN DEN BERG: And then according to you this second incident during which the persons were killed, this sort of thing was not discussed during the daily morning meetings?

MR GEVERS: That's correct.

MR VAN DEN BERG: I did not really understand your evidence with regard to that aspect, but the fact of the matter remains that it was an attempt to rob Coin Security. So why would you regard it as covert?

MR GEVERS: I did not have the complete picture or the full level of information. So at that stage, as I have already mentioned earlier, we functioned on a need-to-know basis, if it didn't have anything to do with you, you wouldn't ask any questions about it. And that is why I didn't worry about it any further.

MR VAN DEN BERG: Can you recall the information that you received from Tiso after the interrogation? Could you repeat it for me please.

MR GEVERS: The only thing that I can recall which may have been remotely significant with regard to our sort of work and especially with the tracing of stolen arms or weaponry and would have assisted with the oppression of terrorism, was that Mrs Mandela had used the DHL courier service to receive weapons from Zambia.

MR VAN DEN BERG: Did you read the evidence of General Nyanda? Were you present in the Court when he gave evidence?

MR GEVERS: No.

MR VAN DEN BERG: Because it would appear to me as if it was a common fact that weapons were being smuggled in by means of petrol tanks and so forth. Do you know about that?

MR GEVERS: Yes, that is correct.

MR VAN DEN BERG: And there is a singular aspect that I still want to determine and I'm going to put it to you, but I would like to correct that in the morning possibly. As I understand your position, especially with regard to the Mandela United Football Club, their activities towards the end of the '80s came to an end. Do you know about that?

MR GEVERS: It was common knowledge or propagated that that was the case, but on ground level, as we experienced it and as we received it in our daily intelligence reports at Security Head Office, it was not the case. 

MR VAN DEN BERG: And a committee was established, including Mohammed Valli Moosa and Frank Chikane among others, which was investigating the entire issue in the mid-'80s. Do you know about that?

MR GEVERS: Yes, I know about it.

MR VAN DEN BERG: And that Mrs Mandela was pressurised to cease the activities of the football club.

MR GEVERS: Yes, that is correct.

MR VAN DEN BERG: I have no further questions, Mr Chairperson.

NO FURTHER QUESTIONS BY MR VAN DEN BERG

CHAIRPERSON: Thank you, Mr van den Berg. Mr Francis, 

have you any questions?

MR FRANCIS: Mr Chairperson, my colleague will be conducting the cross-examination.

CHAIRPERSON: Yes. Ms Pillay?

CROSS-EXAMINATION BY MS PILLAY: Mr Gevers, at the time of the so-called Nelspruit incident, did you know the name Glennek Mashilo Mama?

MR GEVERS: No, Chairperson, no.

MS PILLAY: Did you know anything else about Mr Mama?

MR GEVERS: No, Chairperson, nothing.

MS PILLAY: Did you know his politics?

MR GEVERS: No.

MS PILLAY: Did you know where he came from?

MR GEVERS: No.

MS PILLAY: Did you know the name Gona Gabelo?

MR GEVERS: No.

MS PILLAY: Did you know his politics?

MR GEVERS: No, Chairperson.

MS PILLAY: Did you have any information on him?

MR GEVERS: No, Chairperson.

MS PILLAY: Did you know Lawrence ...(intervention)

ADV DE JAGER: A little bit slower, we're trying to write down what you're asking.

MS PILLAY: ...(indistinct). Can I proceed now?

ADV DE JAGER: Yes.

MS PILLAY: Do you know the name Lawrence J C Nyalinda?

MR GEVERS: I didn't know it by that time, no.

MS PILLAY: Did you know anything about the man?

MR GEVERS: No, Chairperson.

MS PILLAY: Did you know the name Oscar Mzolisi Nshota?

MR GEVERS: No.

MS PILLAY: Did you know anything about his politics?

MR GEVERS: No.

MS PILLAY: Did you know where he came from?

MR GEVERS: No, Chairperson.

MS PILLAY: So of the Nelspruit, the so-called people involved in the Nelspruit incident, the only person you really knew anything about was Tiso, is that correct?

MR GEVERS: That is correct, Chairperson.

MS PILLAY: We'll come back to the Nelspruit incident in a while. Let's go back to the Coin Security incident. You were informed that the robbery was planned by Holtzhausen and van Zyl, is that correct?

MR GEVERS: That is correct.

MS PILLAY: And were you informed beforehand that the people who were to be involved in the Coin Security incident were to be killed?

MR GEVERS: Could she please repeat her question.

MS PILLAY: Prior to the Coin Security incident, when you were informed of the planning of the incident, you were informed that the people who were involved in this incident were to be killed, is that correct?

MR GEVERS: That is correct, Chairperson.

MS PILLAY: Can you just give us a little bit more detail around what you perceived the operation to be like. What was the Coin Security operation all about?

MR GEVERS: Chairperson, basically it would have adopted the same form as the Nelspruit incident. Once again this was a group of trained ANC/PAC cadres which had returned with Tiso as their leader then. He was identified to us specifically as the leader of the group and that basically they were also part of these vigilante groups one could say, who were going about collecting money for the liberation movements, especially for the creation of Self Defence Units and the funding of SDUs. So that was my perception at that stage. And that is why we would also have shot them dead, because it was still part of their struggle and we wanted to prevent it.

MS PILLAY: Okay, just for clarity's sake, Mr Gevers. You're saying that your perception was that this was a group of vigilantes, this was a group to do with some kind of Self Defence Units and they were bank robbers, is that correct?

MR GEVERS: That's partly correct, yes.

MS PILLAY: You're saying partly correct, why do you say that?

MR GEVERS: These were trained persons who had returned from abroad.

MS PILLAY: I'm sorry I missed that one out. So you're saying these were people who were trained overseas, right, ANC/PAC people, these were people who were vigilante groups, these were people who were associated with Self Defence Units and these were people who were bank robbers. Is that right?

MR GEVERS: That's correct, Chairperson.

MS PILLAY: Now why isn't all of that reflected in your application, your written application, Mr Gevers? Because that is actually fundamental to showing your political objective. Why is it the first time that we're hearing that they were part of a vigilante group and a self defence group?

MR GEVERS: I'm not requesting amnesty for the Coin Security incident and I have not expanded on that in my written application.

MS PILLAY: I agree completely with you, Mr Gevers, you're not asking for amnesty for Coin Security, but you have testified here that you believed that the people who were involved in Coin Security were also the people who were involved in Nelspruit killings and the people who you were instrumental in actually killing and the people for which you are today asking for amnesty. Isn't that correct?

MR GEVERS: That's correct, Chairperson.

MS PILLAY: So I asked - let's just go back to your perception. So this was your perception of the group involved in the Coin Security incident, is that correct?

MR GEVERS: That is correct.

MS PILLAY: On what this perception based?

MR GEVERS: It was based upon information which I had received from Dougie Holtzhausen.

MS PILLAY: So let me just summarise just for clarity's sake, because I'm sure this is going to come up again and again. You're saying that the information you got from Mr Holtzhausen was that these people were involved in vigilante groups, were involved in Self Defence Units, were trained overseas as the ANC/PAC people trained overseas and were also bank robbers. Is that correct?

MR GEVERS: Yes, that is correct.

MS PILLAY: Thank you, Mr Gevers. I just needed some clarity. You mentioned the fact that these people were these well-trained operatives, you didn't fully describe the operation. What was going to be happening at Coin Security?

MR GEVERS: According to what was said to us, Mr van Zyl would come from Johannesburg with these people, they would be travelling in their own vehicle and Mr van Zyl would travel in his vehicle. 

&#9;After the time I found out that Mr van Zyl had been there previously with Tiso I think, in order to point out the scene to him. We took up position in the building physically where the only entry to the building was. We took up position there. I recall that I was on the bottom floor of the Coin Security building in Nelspruit, which consists of two storeys. The lower storey is reception, rest-rooms and also is the loading zone for vehicles. And then the top story is the place where money is counted and placed into packages for large companies such as the Mondi factory, which is close to Nelspruit and so forth.

&#9;In other words some or our members, and I cannot recall exactly who, took up position upstairs because according to all indications that would be the place where the robbers would want to go. And some of us then remained downstairs in order to apprehend any of these persons if they managed to escape. There would be no lift, there were only stairs. We took up position near the stairway. I myself sat in the bathroom door. And then if these persons had succeeded in passing us to the upstairs section and succeeded again in getting back downstairs, we would have apprehended them at the bottom.

CHAIRPERSON: Mr Gevers, you say that Mr van Zyl and Tiso visited the scene earlier.

MR GEVERS: Yes, I only heard about this from them after the time. I did not know it before the time.

CHAIRPERSON: What was that about?

MR GEVERS: Apparently Mr van Zyl showed the building and the premises to Tiso.

CHAIRPERSON: So it would appear that Tiso didn't know where the robbery would take place?

MR GEVERS: Yes, that's how I understood it.

CHAIRPERSON: Is it something that van Zyl initiated?

MR GEVERS: I'm not certain, I don't know.

CHAIRPERSON: Because van Zyl had knowledge of the scene, which he conveyed to Tiso.

MR GEVERS: According to what I heard, that was the case, yes.

CHAIRPERSON: Did he encourage this group to commit robbery? What was van Zyl's role?

MR GEVERS: Once again he was the informer, so I don't know precisely what his role was in this whole story. He went with the information to Mr Holtzhausen.

CHAIRPERSON: Was he involved in a liberation movement?

MR GEVERS: Who?

CHAIRPERSON: Van Zyl.

MR GEVERS: Was he involved in the liberation movement?

CHAIRPERSON: Yes.

MR GEVERS: He had been a member of the Brixton Murder and Robbery Unit, but that was for the police, not for the liberation movements. No, not as far as I know.

MS PILLAY: Just bear with me for a second, Mr Gevers. You're saying that Mr van Zyl took Tiso to the - to Coin Security, to - and I quote what you're saying "To point it out". Which means that he was showing Tiso the place, is that correct?

MR GEVERS: That is what I heard after the time, from Mr Holtzhausen. But I myself didn't see it, so it is hearsay evidence.

MS PILLAY: So you're saying his "getuienis", when are you talking about? When did this information come to you?

MR GEVERS: When did this ...?

MS PILLAY: When did this information come to you?

MR GEVERS: After the incident.

MS PILLAY: Now when "na die voorval"? Exactly when are you talking? When did you receive information that in fact Tiso did not know about Coin Security and he was shown exactly where Coin Security is, by Ben van Zyl.

MR GEVERS: If my memory serves me correctly, it was approximately two days, two or three days after the incident that I heard this from Mr Holtzhausen.

MS PILLAY: You're talking ...(indistinct - no microphone)

MR GEVERS: That's correct, Chairperson.

MS PILLAY: ...(indistinct - no microphone)

MR GEVERS: That is correct, Chairperson.

MS PILLAY: ...(indistinct - no microphone)

INTERPRETER: The speaker's microphone is not on.

MS PILLAY: You were saying that you were planning - when I say you I mean plural you, were planning to kill the robbers at Coin Security.

MR GEVERS: That's correct, Chairperson.

MS PILLAY: Was that before or after they had taken the money?

MR GEVERS: It would have been after the time.

MS PILLAY: So they were actually going to take the money and leave and then you would have killed them?

MR GEVERS: Yes. The planning was that they would not have escaped the building because we would have waited for them downstairs.

MS PILLAY: How were they going to take the money?

MR GEVERS: I don't know. I don't know, Chairperson, perhaps they would have placed it in bags. I don't know how they were going to take the money.

MS PILLAY: I put it to you, Mr Gevers, that you do not know because in fact the plan was not that they should take the money. I put it to you, Mr Gevers, that the plan was that at Coin Security there was not going to be any kind of robbery, that Coin Security was just a set-up to kill Tiso and the four robbers who were with him. What is your response?

MR GEVERS: It was not my perception of the incident.

MS PILLAY: Mr Gevers, who were the other people involved with Tiso at the Coin Security incident?

MR GEVERS: Chairperson, that which was conveyed to me was that it would be precisely the same persons who were involved in the Nelspruit incident.

MS PILLAY: You found out afterwards, two days or three days after the Coin Security incident, right, you found out - you received information which clearly seems as if Tiso and his - the people who accompanied him were in fact set up by Ben van Zyl. Is that correct?

MR GEVERS: That is correct.

MS PILLAY: And yet you still proceeded with an operation to kill them a month or two later.

MR GEVERS: That is correct.

MS PILLAY: So in other words, Mr Gevers, you received information that in fact there was no real robbery, you received information that it appeared to be a just a ruse to kill the people, Tiso and his, the people who accompanied him, and yet you proceed with what you referred to as - I forget the Afrikaans word, basically just a trap to kill them a month later, is that correct?

MR GEVERS: Yes, that is correct, this is why the Nelspruit incident was not set up as a roadblock, but as an ambush.

MS PILLAY: So you knew beforehand that Nelspruit was an excuse to kill these people?

MR GEVERS: That is correct, Chairperson.

MS PILLAY: And you proceeded with it.

MR GEVERS: That's correct.

MS PILLAY: Did you question anything? Did you question anyone about that, Mr Gevers? Did you question any of your - oh well you're saying Holtzhausen was in charge. Did you question Holtzhausen or de Kock about the fact that this was a ruse just to get these people killed?

MR GEVERS: No, Chairperson, with us the case was "ask no questions hear no lies". So I didn't ask any question, no.

MS PILLAY: So you anticipated that the answers to your questions would be lies? Is that what you are saying to us, Mr Gevers? You're saying "ask no questions expect no lies", are you saying to us that you anticipated that the answers to your questions would be lies?

MR GEVERS: That is correct, Chairperson.

MS PILLAY: So Mr Gevers, you went through with an operation in which four it seems, innocent people were killed - sorry, five innocent people were killed, without questioning your, any superiors as to the validity or the - whether in fact it was bona fide, whether in fact the operation was bona fide?

MR GEVERS: That is correct, Chairperson.

MS PILLAY: So Mr Gevers, is it then your testimony that in fact there was going to be no robbery in Nelspruit?

MR GEVERS: I don't understand the question.

ADV DE JAGER: Mr Gevers, if you don't understand the English, there is a device with which you can listen to an Afrikaans interpretation, but if you want to listen to the English you are free to do so. I don't understand what you mean when you say that you don't understand the question.

MR GEVERS: No, what I meant is that I didn't understand to which incident she referred, whether it was the Nelspruit incident or the other one. 

CHAIRPERSON: Did you know that there would be a robbery in Nelspruit before the time?

MR GEVERS: That is correct.

MS PILLAY: So there was going to be no bank robbery in Nelspruit, is that your evidence here today, Mr Gevers?

MR GEVERS: That is correct.

MS PILLAY: And was that the knowledge amongst all the members who were present there that day?

MR GEVERS: That's correct.

MS PILLAY: So let me ask you this, Mr Gevers, why were these people killed?

MR GEVERS: These persons according to my perception, were killed because they were underway, they were underway to commit a robbery. These were political cadres, ANC/PAC people who were trained and underway to commit a robbery, so it was our order to shoot these people dead.

MS PILLAY: Mr Gevers, we seem to be speaking at cross-purposes. I asked you specifically whether it is your testimony that there was not going to be a bank robbery in Nelspruit that day and your answer was "Yes, there was not going to be a bank robbery".

MR GEVERS: That's correct, Mr Chairperson.

MS PILLAY: So there was not going to be a bank robbery?

MR GEVERS: No, there wouldn't be a bank robbery.

MS PILLAY: So I ask you, Mr Gevers, why were these people killed?

MR GEVERS: These persons would be killed because they were part of the liberation movement, according to my perception.

MS PILLAY: So they were killed because they were members of the ANC?

MR GEVERS: Chairperson, ANC/PAC.

MS PILLAY: ANC/PAC. We'll come back a little later to the ANC/PAC, but let's just say for now okay, the liberation movements. Is that correct?

MR GEVERS: That is correct.

MS PILLAY: But Mr Gevers, your testimony earlier was that you did not know what the political beliefs of - and I've got a list of the names, let me just give it to you again, Glennek Masilo Mama, Gona Gabelo, Lawrence J C Nyalinda, Oscar Mzolisi Nshota, you did not know what their political beliefs were?

MR GEVERS: Chairperson, it was before the Nelspruit incident and before the Carousel incident that Mr Holtzhausen conveyed this to me.

MS PILLAY: What was told to you by Mr Holtzhausen?

MR GEVERS: It was conveyed to me that these were trained ANC and PAC cadres who had returned from abroad and who were carrying out bank robberies among others. And specifically what I can recall, is that he said that this specific group had been involved in 16 previous cases of robbery, among others where a woman in Witbank had been shot in the face. That was the information that Mr Holtzhausen conveyed to me.

CHAIRPERSON: But did he identify the members of the group?

MR GEVERS: He did not identify them by name, with the exception of Tiso.

CHAIRPERSON: So you didn't know. I think that is the question that Ms Pillay is putting to you. You didn't know about the specific circumstances surrounding these persons who were killed?

MR GEVERS: No.

MS PILLAY: Mr Gevers, so your testimony is that these people were killed because they were trained members of the ANC/PAC, is that correct?

MR GEVERS: That is correct, Chairperson.

MS PILLAY: Yet Mr - Mr Gevers, let me refer you to a question that my learned colleague, Mr van den Berg posed to you as to why it was omitted from your affidavits that were handed in during Mr de Kock's criminal trial. Why was it omitted what the political persuasions of these people were? In those affidavits you refer to them as "rowers".

MR GEVERS: Chairperson, as I have already said a few moments ago, in a criminal trial political affiliation played no role and that is why I did not think that it would make any kind of difference to my evidence there.

MS PILLAY: So you're saying that what was contained in your affidavit was lies, is that correct?

MR GEVERS: No, that is not what I'm saying.

MS PILLAY: We've ascertained today that you're saying that these people were not going to rob a bank, therefore they were not "rowers".

MR LAMEY: No that is not I think the intention of what he is trying to convey, with all due respect. 

CHAIRPERSON: Yes, what is - I'm sorry. Mr Lamey, are you objecting to the question?

MR LAMEY: I think the conclusion here that my learned friend draws, that because they were stopped beforehand and the robbery, the planning was that there will be no robbery, that because of that they were not robbers. I think that goes a bit far in drawing the inference from Mr Gevers' evidence.

MS PILLAY: Sorry, Mr Chairperson. My question was very clear, "Was there going to be a robbery taking place that day?" And Mr Gevers' answer was "No".

CHAIRPERSON: Yes, that ...

MR LAMEY: That I understand, that I understand, but what has been drawn as a further conclusion and put to Mr Gevers is that because on this particular day the robbery would not place, that therefore these people were not robbers. That is ...(intervention)

CHAIRPERSON: Yes, alright. You follow that distinction that Mr Lamey is making?

MS PILLAY: I'm sorry I don't, Mr Chairman ...(indistinct - no microphone)

CHAIRPERSON: He's suggesting that but for the action of the police on the scene, there would have been a robbery. So it is a pre-emptive strike if you wish.

MS PILLAY: With all due respect, Mr Chairperson, that was not my impression of Mr Gevers' testimony. My question to Mr Gevers was quite clear "Was there going to be a bank robbery that day?" His answer was "No".

CHAIRPERSON: Yes. Would you like to clarify that if it's necessary?

MR GEVERS: Chairperson, may I just respond to that please. I understand her question and I have just stated that Mr Holtzhausen conveyed the information to us that these persons had already been involved in 16 other incidents of robbery, among others one during which a woman was shot dead through the face in Witbank. So they were robbers.

MS PILLAY: But Mr Gevers, in my earlier question to you, you told me that the primary reason - I asked you very explicitly so that there's no confusion as to what I am asking of you. I asked you "Why were they killed?" and your answer to me, Mr Gevers, was "Because they are ANC/PAC members".

MR GEVERS: Chairperson, I omitted then to add that they were robbers.

MS PILLAY: So which is the primary reason, the fact that they're bank robbers or the fact that they're ANC/PAC members?

MR GEVERS: The fact that they were trained ANC/PAC members who were also bank robbers.

MS PILLAY: If the primary motivation was the fact that they were ANC/PAC members, Mr Gevers, then I ask you again, why wasn't that mentioned in your 204 - your affidavit?

MR GEVERS: Chairperson, because I did not think that one could attach any significance to it.

MS PILLAY: But you're saying, Mr Gevers, that that was the primary reason why you killed them.

MR GEVERS: That is correct, that is what I've said. At that stage when I wrote the statement, I thought that political affiliation or any form of politics whatsoever which would be mentioned in the statement would make absolutely no difference to a criminal prosecution. That was my conviction when I compiled this statement.

CHAIRPERSON: So did you consciously decide that you were not going to refer to the political element?

MR GEVERS: Yes, that is correct.

CHAIRPERSON: That would have been the prosecution of Mr de Kock?

MR GEVERS: Yes.

CHAIRPERSON: And this was an affidavit that you made as a possible State witness against Mr de Kock?

MR GEVERS: Yes, that is correct.

CHAIRPERSON: Would that not have been relevant to Mr de Kock's purposes? Would that not have placed his actions in perspective?

MR GEVERS: At that stage I did not think that it would make any kind of difference to Mr de Kock's criminal trial.

CHAIRPERSON: For example, if as part of your duties at Vlakplaas, you were supposed to act against alleged members of the liberation movements, if you had to act against them or combat them instead of only acting against regular bank robbers, don't you think that that would have placed a different perspective on the trial of Mr de Kock?

MR GEVERS: Chairperson, at that stage I didn't think about that aspect. I understand your question perfectly. I did not think about placing it in that perspective because I was one of I don't know how many State witnesses, if I had added the political element it would basically not have made any difference.

CHAIRPERSON: Thank you.

MS PILLAY: Mr Gevers, who informed you that this was a collaborative effort between the ANC and the PAC?

MR GEVERS: Chairperson, it was Mr Holtzhausen.

MS PILLAY: In that case, Mr Gevers, if I can refer you to Mr Holtzhausen's affidavit that he - that was also done during the criminal trial. I think it's page 308 or 309. There is no mention of the PAC in Mr Holtzhausen's affidavit. How do you respond to that?

MR GEVERS: Chairperson, it may have been omitted by him possibly as I understand it, because the ANC and the PAC formed a united front. We had many discussions and intelligence memos and security reviews in which we omitted the name of one of the two, because I had seen it and a number of people had seen it. It was a joint front which was established in order to topple the National Party Government. In other words, Mr Holtzhausen may have omitted it also with that perception, in that he meant that it was actually ANC/PAC.

MS PILLAY: Mr Gevers, are you trying to tell us that the ANC was synonymous with the PAC, is that what you're saying to us?

MR GEVERS: No, not at all. My perception of the entire issue is that they struggled for the same thing, they formed a joint front. They had the same objectives, they had the same methods, they basically acted in the same way. So they had a mutual goal.

MS PILLAY: Mr Gevers, I put it to you that in fact as we all know, the ANC and the PAC at the time were not collaborating. I put it to you further that Mr Holtzhausen did not mention the PAC, specifically because the - you had no information at the time that the PAC was involved, that any reference to the PAC is only made in your amnesty application now, to cover the possibility that in fact any one of the members might have been PAC members. How do you respond to that?

ADV DE JAGER: Ms Pillay, could you just have a look at paragraph 9 of Holtzhausen's affidavit. There he says:

&#9;&#9;"Ben van Zyl informed to me that Hamilton was a PAC member, who had contact with ANC members in the public."

MS PILLAY: That's correct, Mr Chairperson, Hamilton was in fact Mr van Zyl's employee and not one of the people who were involved in the actual robbery itself.

ADV DE JAGER: And there he says:

&#9;&#9;"... a PAC member having contact with ANC members".

MS PILLAY: I think, Mr Chairperson, the fact that Hamilton was a PAC member was purely coincidental and I'm not sure why it was specifically mentioned by Mr Holtzhausen. In all further references to the actual operation itself and to the fact that Mr van Zyl was making contact with the ANC, Mr Holtzhausen only mentioned ANC and not PAC at all. Even Mr van Zyl in his affidavit does not refer to the PAC.

ADV DE JAGER: And then he goes on and says:

&#9;&#9;"I told Ben that he should allow Hamilton to maintain contact with the ANC, so that information could be obtained regarding their activities."

So van Zyl's link was a PAC member with the ANC working together - well, as a link. The PAC was a contact.

MS PILLAY: Like I said, Mr Chairperson, our perception of that is that it was purely coincidental that Hamilton was a PAC member and that he was sent to infiltrate the ANC, not as a PAC member, but just merely as a source of information. I refer you, Mr Chairperson, to Mr van Zyl's affidavit as well, which does not refer in any way to the PAC, but only refers to the ANC. And if you look as well, Mr Chairperson, to Hamilton's affidavit himself, it refers only the ANC and not to the PAC at all.

ADV DE JAGER: ...(indistinct - no microphone)

MS PILLAY: Further Mr Gevers, I'd like to refer you to Mr Holtzhausen's affidavit where he refers to the motivation to actually conduct this robbery. That's page 309. If you have a look at paragraph 4 of page 309 - paragraph 10, sorry, he refers there to a dispute. The best word I think is the Afrikaans word, "'n twis" between Winnie Mandela and Tiso and that in fact:

&#9;&#9;"They wanted to commit their own robbery, independently from Winnie."

And that, Mr Gevers, I put it to you further pulls Tiso away from this whole ANC idea that you've been trying to give, the fact that he had this "twis" with Winnie Mandela and he was trying to - and he was actually conducting this robbery according to Holtzhausen "onafhanklik van Winnie". And therefore, this political motive that you have come up with is merely a ruse to allow you to comply with the requirements of the TRC Act. What is your response to that?

MR GEVERS: Chairperson, I did not know about the dispute or any aspect of that information which is contained within that paragraph.

ADV DE JAGER: Sorry, I'm just referring to what you - 

&#9;&#9;"For this reason they wanted to commit their own robbery independently of Winnie Mandela".

Then he goes on to say:

&#9;&#9;"The proposed robbery ..."

So referring to that "rooftog":

&#9;&#9;"Would be committed in Pretoria by 'n bank in Lynnwood Road"

MS PILLAY: Yes.

ADV DE JAGER: Isn't he referring to a specific "rooftog", a specific robbery ...(indistinct)?

MS PILLAY: Mr Chairperson, if you just - if you read the entire affidavit - and I'm not so sure I should have put this to this witness, I'm not so sure whether he'll have information on this or knowledge on this. But what actually appears was that Mr van Zyl in collaboration with members of C10, were planning the robbery themselves and were planning it at a location which they deemed was appropriate and initially van Zyl mentioned this Lynnewood one and other members of C10, I think including Holtzhausen, found that that is inappropriate and that's when they looked for alternatives. And I think Mr Chairperson, one of the alternatives was Coin Security, which didn't work out and then we went on to Nelspruit. So in effect it's the same "rooftog", as such.

CHAIRPERSON: Yes, yes, that seems to be clear for me, from paragraph 11, even paragraph 12.

ADV DE JAGER: 12, yes.

CHAIRPERSON: Yes?

MR LAMEY: Chairperson, I just want to mention also that further on, on page 310 on paragraph 15, there is again a reference to a possible role according to Holtzhausen, that Winnie Mandela would have played. We've ...(intervention)

MS PILLAY: Mr Chairperson, might I suggest that my learned colleague saves that for re-examination.

CHAIRPERSON: Yes, yes, I'm quite sure he's going to do that. I was going to make the same suggestion. In fact we've come to the end of the day, I'm going to adjourn. We'll reconvene here tomorrow morning at nine thirty.

COMMITTEE ADJOURNS

