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&#9;TRUTH AND RECONCILIATION COMMISSION
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 &#9;TRUTH AND RECONCILIATION COMMISSION

&#9;AMNESTY HEARING

NAME:&#9;&#9;&#9;GENERAL LE ROUX

APPLICATION NO: &#9;AM4148/96

DATE:&#9;&#9;&#9;12 JULY 1999

MATTER:&#9;&#9;&#9;DEATH OF JAPIE MAPONYA

HELD AT:&#9;&#9;&#9;IDASA CENTRE, PRETORIA

DAY:&#9;&#9;&#9;&#9;1

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CHAIRPERSON: Good morning everybody. Today we're starting with the hearing relating to the death of Mr Japie Maponya, which hearing has been set down for the duration of the week. Before we start I'd like to briefly introduce the panel to you. On my right is Advocate Leah Gcabashe, she is a member of the Amnesty Committee and she is an advocate from Johannesburg. On my left is Mr Wynand Malan, he is also a member of the Amnesty Committee and a commissioner on the Truth and Reconciliation Commission, also from Johannesburg and I am Selwyn Miller, I'm a judge of the High Court from the Eastern Cape attached to the Transkei Division of that court there.

&#9;I would like at this stage to ask the legal representatives kindly to place themselves on record. I think perhaps we will start with Mr Visser and just go around in turn.

MR VISSER: May it please you Mr Chairman. Good morning, Members of the Committee. My name is Louis Visser. I appear for the applicant, General Le Roux and insofar as it may be necessary, I also act for Mr Martin Naude and Willem Schoon insofar as they may be implicated in the present matter.

MR WAGENER: Jan Wagener, Mr Chairman, I appear in this matter on behalf of Isak Johannes Engelbrecht, an implicated person.

MR WILLIAMS: Mr Chairman, my name is Peter Williams, I appear on behalf of the applicant, Mr Thabelo Mbelo.

MR KNIGHT: Thank you Mr Chairman, my name is Julian Knight, I appear for implicated person, Almond Nofomela.

MR VAN DER MERWE: Thank you Mr Chairman, my name is Francois van der Merwe, I appear for implicated persons Mr Riaan Bellingan and Dave Baker.

MR LAMEY: Thank you Mr Chairman, Lamey, I appear on behalf of Nortje, Fourie, Van der Walt and Mosiane.

MR HATTINGH: Thank you Mr Chairman, my name is Hattingh, I appear on behalf of Mr De Kock, Mr Simon Gadebe and also on behalf of the implicated Mr Eric Sefadi and I'm instructed by Mr Schalk Hugo.

CHAIRPERSON: Thank you. These proceedings will be simultaneously translated into Afrikaans, English and Sotho and in the other African language that may be necessary. The channel one of this device which you must have if you want to benefit from the translation, they are available from the sound technician. Channel 1 is Afrikaans, Channel 2 is English and Channel 3 is Sotho. Sorry, I forgot about Ms Lockhat.

MS LOCKHAT: My name is Lyn Lockhat and I appear on behalf of the Truth and Reconciliation Commission. Thank you Chairperson.

MS BRIDJLALL: My name is Ms Bridjlall, I appear on behalf of the family of Japie Maponya.

CHAIRPERSON: Sorry, I didn't intentionally mean to omit you. Thank you. We will be commencing with the evidence of General Le Roux, is that correct?

MR VISSER: Mr Chairman, it has so been decided if you will allow me just a short introduction. 

&#9;Chairperson, before you we have placed two documents. The one is headed "General Background to Amnesty Applications" and I'd like to just address a word or two to you about that document and the other is a statement which we have become used to prepare for the Amnesty Committees in order to place the evidence on record and in order to save time.

&#9;Chairperson, if I may refer to the General Background document, you will recall from your experience in the Stanza Bopape matter how much time was taken up on each occasion with applicants giving evidence about the full background and how they saw it and the conflict of the past, etc. As time went by it was felt by various Members of the Committee that there should be some method employed in order to cut down on the time spent on the general background. On the 5th February there was a meeting chaired by Justice Wilson at which Commissioner Malan was also present and this point was again made and the meeting was in fact informed that certain decisions of the Amnesty Committee were ready to be released and that it might be of assistance in order to shorten proceedings in future. After those decisions came about and I specifically refer to the Jack Cronje 5 decisions, Chairperson, we drafted this document which is now before you. The intention of the document was to give a very brief summary in which most if not all points affecting applicants who were members of the security forces would have been effected by. We have now used the document on three or four occasions, Chairperson, and it seems that the Amnesty Committees have appreciated the document and have accepted it as a basis so that one does not have to regurgitate the whole thing every time when a witness is called. In the event, Chairperson, what we have done is as in the past and we will ask your permission to do so again, is merely to ask the witness to confirm as far as it's applicable to him, and if there's anything that he finds is not applicable to him in this document is to alert us to that.

&#9;Chairperson, just lastly, before the so called De Kock Clusters commenced there was a hearing in this forum on the general background relating to Vlakplaas etcetera and evidence was given which is being transcribed and which is before you, I'm not going to refer to it save for one thing and that is that as we understood the evidence of Mr de Kock, whatever he presented regarding Vlakplaas to the Committee did not detract at all from this document which is the "Algemene Agtergrond", General Background. In point of fact my learned friend Mr Hattingh at that time confirmed that Mr De Kock will also rely on the contents of this document which we have drafted and here has intimated the same to me this morning. Chairperson, under the circumstances may I ask for this document to be received by you as Exhibit A?

CHAIRPERSON: Yes, thank you Mr Visser. Is there any objection from anybody to this document being received as Exhibit A?

MS LOCKHAT: No Chairperson, thank you.

CHAIRPERSON: Thank you Mr Visser, we'll receive that document then, the "Algemene Agtergrond Amenstie Aansoeke" and we'll call it Exhibit A.

MR VISSER: Thank you Mr Chairman. Mr Chairman, I don't believe with respect that there's much point in me taking you through the document at this time. We will deal with the contents of this document when we deal with argument at the end of the day in any event but perhaps just by way of summary you will see that it really deals with all the issues which normally come to fore in amnesty applications of ex-security policemen and present policemen.

CHAIRPERSON: Thank you very much, Mr Visser.

MR VISSER: Mr Chairman, then the second document which we place before you is a statement which we have drafted of the evidence of General Le Roux and he will stay very closely to this document. Obviously after he has given his evidence in chief he will be ready and willing to field any questions arising. May we ask that this document then be marked as Exhibit B Chairperson?

CHAIRPERSON: Yes, any objections to that?

MS LOCKHAT: No Chairperson, thank you.

CHAIRPERSON: Then we receive it as Exhibit B, Mr Visser.

MR VISSER: As it pleases you Mr Chairman, may I then call General Le Roux to give evidence? He prefers to give his evidence in Afrikaans.

CHAIRPERSON: Yes, certainly. Sorry, Mr Visser, Mr Lamey wishes to say something?

MR LAMEY: Mr Chairman, may I just receive Exhibit A, a copy? I don't have a copy from my learned friend.

CHAIRPERSON: Yes thank you.

GENERAL LE ROUX: (sworn states)

EXAMINATION BY MR VISSER: Mr Chairman, in order to facilitate matters we have given a copy of Exhibit B to the interpreters but we have warned General Le Roux to go perhaps a little bit slowly to give them the opportunity of interpreting.

&#9;General, you were a Lieutenant General in the South African Police, is that correct?

GEN LE ROUX: Yes.

MR VISSER: And you are applying for amnesty in terms of the Promotion of National Unity and Reconciliation Act and in terms of the incidents regarding the abduction, detention, torture and murder of Mr Japie Maponya, is that correct?

GEN LE ROUX: Yes that is correct.

MR VISSER: Your application appears in bundle 1(c) from page 658 to page 707 and the relevant section where you deal with the particular matter appears on page 683 up to and including 686, is that correct?

GEN LE ROUX: Yes that is correct.

MR VISSER: Do you confirm the content of your amnesty application?

GEN LE ROUX: Yes I do.

MR VISSER: And do you also confirm after you have consulted regarding the matter with your legal representatives the document which has been served as Exhibit B before this Committee?

GEN LE ROUX: Yes that is correct.

MR VISSER: Do you have a copy or have you seen a copy of Exhibit A?

GEN LE ROUX: Yes I have.

MR VISSER: Have you studied this document?

GEN LE ROUX: Yes.

MR VISSER: Is there anything contained therein which you feel is not correct?

GEN LE ROUX: No Chairperson.

MR VISSER: Do you also then confirm and request that the Committee incorporates the contents of Exhibit A within your evidence and also considers this when considering your amnesty application?

GEN LE ROUX: Yes I request that.

MR VISSER: In Exhibit A reference is made to various aspects of evidence on page 1 and you ask that this also be incorporated with your evidence?

GEN LE ROUX: Yes that is correct.

MR VISSER: General, previously you have made a written submission to the Human Rights Violations Committee of the TRC, is that correct?

GEN LE ROUX: Yes that is correct.

MR VISSER: And we will find this in bundle 2(c) from page 1 to 52 and you've also given evidence before the Human Rights Violations Committee?

GEN LE ROUX: That is correct.

MR VISSER: And the transcription of your evidence can be found in bundle 2(d) from page 300 to page 537?

GEN LE ROUX: Yes that is correct.

MR VISSER: Now if we might skip the next paragraph to return to the end, General Le Roux, we will go directly to the facts on page 2 and I ask, General Le Roux, that you present the evidence which is given here to the Committee with regard to your recollection of the incident and the various occurrences.

GEN LE ROUX: Thank you Chairperson. In 1985 I was the Divisional Commander of the Security Branch, West Rand, seated in Krugersdorp. My task was to be in command of the total Security Branch West Rand. This also included among others the Vaal Triangle.

MR VISSER: General?

GEN LE ROUX: Yes?

MR VISSER: It would perhaps be favourable to remember that at the end of the sentence where there is a full stop to pause for a while so the interpreter can catch up as you are reading. Very well, proceed?

GEN LE ROUX: The divisional commander of the then West Rand Security Division, it was then also my responsibility to investigate all matters of terror, sabotage and incidents of unrest which were related to the West Rand and where possible to combat and prevent these incidents. Without doubt, the period of time during which I was in command there was one of the most difficult periods in my life. As a result of the political violence due to the enhancement of the ANC/SACP Alliance and their national war and the accompanying pressure from above to normalise the situation. The methods which we applied in combating political violence was the collection of information by means of informers and agents. Observation, monitoring of telephones and letters as well as arrests and court oriented action where possible. Regarding the latter, it was our experience that there were less successful prosecutions due to the unknown high factor of intimidation. &#9;A point was reached where Black people could simply not risk giving evidence against members and supporters of liberation movements due to the fact that they feared for their own lives and the lives of their families. Whatever the case may be, it was always the working method that field workers would decide amongst themselves how a task was to be executed. The commander of the field workers would then separately or during the morning conference in general terms provide information with regard to progress regarding a specific matter. As commander, I would then also brief them regarding the security situation in the rest of the country as well as tasks which had been given through from the security head office and so forth. 

MR VISSER: That would probably be what was to be executed, is that correct?

GEN LE ROUX: Yes, that had been given or had to be executed, yes.

MR VISSER: Please proceed?

GEN LE ROUX: Field workers and other investigating officers had a free hand to conduct the investigations according to their own specialist knowledge and experience. What I did expect from them was absolute loyalty to the cause in order to protect South Africa against terrorism and communism. I pressurised them to trace and arrest terrorists and to attempt as far as possible to bring the situation of political violence under control. As a result of the murder of a Black Warrant Officer of the South African Police on the 27th May 1985, the Pretoria Security Branch sent telexes to certain security branches which explained the surrounding circumstances and also that according to information one Mishak Kitty Ordi (Ordereli Maponya) with the MK name Mainstay from Kagiso was among others responsible for the relevant murder. 

MR VISSER: You have attached certain documents and you give the references, that's bundle 1(c) of your application?

GEN LE ROUX: Yes.

MR VISSER: And that explains the murder and so forth and accompanying aspects which we will deal with later but proceed for the moment.

GEN LE ROUX: Ordereli Maponya's family lived in Kagiso in Krugersdorp at that time and consequently my division became involved in the investigations of Ordereli's activities and his whereabouts. His and Japie's father, Joseph Maponya, was at a stage an informer of the security branch, Krugersdorp and also received incentive money.

&#9;I refer to the statement made by Captain Kleynhans.

MR VISSER: Proceed?

GEN LE ROUX: There was according to Captain Kleynhans' statement also an attempt to recruit Japie Maponya as an informer.

MR VISSER: That is bundle 2(a), page 204, paragraph 9?

GEN LE ROUX: That is correct. It was primarily in order to find out where Ordereli Maponya was. Excepting that, Ordereli Maponya was wanted as a suspect in the murder of Detective Warrant Officer Tswane Te-dewild(?). He was according to reliable information the leader of an MK unit (the Maponya Group) which was responsible for large scale political violence in the Pretoria and Vaal Triangle environment.

MR VISSER: Mr Chairman, apart from Commissioner Malan, you heard about this evidence during the Stanza Bopape incident, you might recall Commission Gcabashe was also a member, if I remember correctly, of that Committee?

CHAIRPERSON: Yes, thank you.

MR VISSER: Please proceed, paragraph 12?

GEN LE ROUX: From information reports, of that time I was made aware that the Maponya Group was responsible for various bomb explosions, particularly in public places. Ordereli Maponya later died while he was busy placing an explosive device at the Ster Complex in Sunnyside, Pretoria when the explosive device went off prematurely. The investigating team of the West Rand was thus anxious to get hold of Ordereli because if this could not take place speedily, further incidents of bomb explosions and murders on policemen on Black council members may have ensued. Captain Kleynhans was in command of the West Rand investigation into the activities of Ordereli and his group. At a stage he suggested to me that the security head office's terrorism unit, C1 Vlakplaas, be approached to assist with tracing Ordereli Maponya. Vlakplaas was, according to my understanding, tasked to assist with the tracing, arrest and identification of terrorists. The Ordereli investigation was regarded as of national interest and stretched beyond provincial borders. 

&#9;In terms of a standing order, security head office had to be informed regarding every matter during which use was made of the said terrorist tracing unit, C1. The order was marked S18/1/6 and dated 11th September 1981 with the heading "Combating Terrorism, Republic of South Africa." A copy of this can be found in annexure D, bundle 1(c) page 704 to 705, read along with annexure E, bundle 1(c) page 706 to 707. 

&#9;I agreed with Kleynhans' proposal and gave him my authorisation to make arrangements with security head office Pretoria. The further order was that C1 in consultation with head office should first undertake a needs assessment before a team was to act within a determined division. C1 existed of White handlers, Black members as well as rehabilitated terrorists of which some had become full members of the SAP.

MR VISSER: And before they became members they were known as askaris?

GEN LE ROUX: Yes that is correct. Upon a date which now appears to have been 25th September 1985, Warrant Officer Nortje visited me in my office. I cannot recall whether he informed me upon that occasion of the plan to send an askari in order to attempt to obtain information from Japie Maponya. I suspect that I was aware of the plan beforehand. 

&#9;Later I once again spoke to Warrant Officer Nortje. I have a recollection that it was reported to me that the plan had been unsuccessful and that there was a proposal to abduct and interrogate Japie in order to obtain the information from him. My recollection is in correlation with the evidence given by Warrant Officer Nortje in bundle 1(c) page 337, paragraph 5.

MR VISSER: Just briefly, he gave evidence which stated that an askari was sent to pretend that he was an MK member and in this manner when Japie Maponya's confidence and that this had not been successful in that he could not obtain the information that the askaris had suggested that Japie be abducted in order to interrogate him, is that correct?

GEN LE ROUX: Yes that is correct.

MR VISSER: And that is how you recall it?

GEN LE ROUX: That is correct.

MR VISSER: Proceed?

GEN LE ROUX: I recall that I considered this proposal of abduction rather than arresting Japie and detaining him in terms of Section 29 of the Internal Security Act and that I decided against the latter mentioned option in favour of an abduction after I had had discussions with Kleynhans. The reason why I decided against legitimate detention and questioning was because Japie's father was already a registered informer in my division and I was afraid that by arresting Japie I would make the father unfavourably inclined towards the police. Consequently, Japie had also been interrogated before and he could not give any information to the police regarding the whereabouts of his brother.

&#9;Should he be detained in terms of Section 29 the police would be obliged to notify his family regarding his detention and if Ordereli would hear about this, he would disappear quickly.

&#9;Lastly, I realised that if Japie were to be abducted, he could be aggressively interrogated and that there would be a better chance of him providing information. As it has already been put, contact had been made with Japie previously by members under my command during which he admitted that he did not know where Ordereli was. After that information came to light which indicated that Japie had not spoken the truth. I refer to annexure B, bundle 1(c), page 699 to 700, bundle 2(a), page 209 to 210.

MR VISSER: Yes, that would be the same document which appears in different bundles?

GEN LE ROUX: That is correct. And then also annexure C, bundle 1(c), page 701 to 702, bundle 2(a) page 212.

MR VISSER: Mr Chairman, you might find the reference in parenthesis the easier one to read.

&#9;Mr Le Roux, what you are referring to here has to do with a visit to Ga-Rankuwa by Japie Maponya?

GEN LE ROUX: Yes that is correct.

MR VISSER: Could you briefly summarise what you are referring to in this relation?

GEN LE ROUX: Chairperson, that he went to Ga-Rankuwa in order to determine from his mother whether Japie Maponya or Ordereli Maponya, I beg your pardon, was there and that there was a black bag there which belonged to Ordereli and that the state of illness of the mother as a result of these circumstances surrounding the presence of this son were the reason for that.

MR VISSER: And there was information that he, Japie, did indeed meet Ordereli there?

GEN LE ROUX: Yes that is correct.

MR VISSER: Very well, proceed?

GEN LE ROUX: As a result of that Captain Kleynhans informed me that he had reason too believe that Japie knew where Ordereli was but refused to make this information known. Colonel Eugene de Kock later arrived and I also had a discussion with him in my office. The discussion was about determining from Japie Maponya with the assistance of Vlakplaas where his brother Ordereli was so that he could be arrested and so that the matters in which he was involved could be investigated further. I recall that Colonel de Kock informed me that it was the working method of C1 to pick up suspects. Their object was consistently to recruit new agents or informers. I agreed with this working method seeing as it was a normal and acceptable head office working method. Because they came from head office, De Kock and his team played the leading role and assumed total responsibility. The incident thus left my area of jurisdiction because Vlakplaas was in Pretoria and consequently, the investigation no longer fell below me. Captain Kleynhans and his staff would however still assist with the investigation. De Kock and I did not know each other personally and I cannot recall whether I had met him previously. De Kock and I did not spend a long time in each other's company and with the exception of the abduction and the purpose of interrogating Japie, we discussed terrorism in general. I deny that at any stage before or during the discussion with De Kock I considered or discussed the killing of Japie Maponya. Consequently, at no stage did I intend to bring De Kock under such an impression. I would also not have used the expression during the discussion that I never again wanted to see Japie in Krugersdorp or that I said to De Kock that I wanted him dead. Bundle 2(a) page 12.

MR VISSER: That would be the allegation of Mr de Kock not so? Very well, proceed?

GEN LE ROUX: There was no reason why I wanted to see Japie Maponya removed from my area. He himself created no problem for the security police. For the same reason I deny the statement in Mr Jacques Paau’s book that Warrant Officer Nortje and Colonel de Kock would have said to me that they would abduct Japie Maponya but that if he did not want to talk he would be murdered.

MR VISSER: You refer to bundle 2(a) page 15?

GEN LE ROUX: That is correct. In either event it is clear from the evidence which appears in the written documents that De Kock, only after the interrogation of Japie Maponya at Vlakplaas, became concerned regarding the possible identification of members or askaris by him or the exposure of the activities at Vlakplaas and that after that he went to head office in order to request orders regarding what to do with Japie. My recollection of the events correlate with that of Warrant Officer Nortje, bundle 1(c), page 338, paragraph 9.

MR VISSER: Now in that reference, Mr Nortje basically said what you have just said, namely that after the interrogation a problem arose and that Mr de Kock then went to head office the next day to obtain orders, is that correct?

GEN LE ROUX: Yes.

MR VISSER: Chairperson, I'm told that I made a mistake, it's not 1(c) it is bundle 1(b), I do apologise. The page reference is correct. 

&#9;Please proceed?

GEN LE ROUX: I was informed that Japie Maponya had been picked up and had been taken by De Kock and his team to Vlakplaas for interrogation. At a point Kleynhans reported to me that the investigation had not delivered much, according to Kleynhans Japie didn't want to talk, in other words he was not willing to cooperate. My recollection is that Kleynhans on more than one occasion reported this to me but I am prepared to accept that I could be incorrect in the light of other evidence that Japie Maponya was detained for only one evening at Vlakplaas before he was taken away and murdered the following day, 26th September 1985. Kleynhans never informed me that Japie Maponya had been brutally assaulted or tortured. I do however admit that I foresaw that De Kock and team would aggressively interrogate Japie Maponya and that it was probable that they would have assaulted him in the process.

However, at that stage I was unaware of any torturing or a decision to murder Japie. 

&#9;The following day, 26th September 1985, I decided to inform myself of where Vlakplaas was situated and how it looked there. On the one hand I was curious to see where the farm was and how things looked there and on the other hand I thought that this was an opportunity for me to go and see, given the fact that Japie Maponya had been taken from my area to that place. I drove there alone after I had received the necessary directions.

&#9;Upon my arrival there, I initially saw no one apart from old buildings. I was disappointed and decided to leave the place. After I had turned around I heard someone calling my name. It was Captain Kleynhans. He briefly informed me that Japie Maponya did not want to cooperate and that he would have to be taken out in order to ensure the identities of the members as well as the secrecy of Vlakplaas. I was caught completely unawares by this information. Up to that point the killing of Japie Maponya was not an aspect which had arisen with me, or which had been discussed. According to my recollection, I answered to him that it was not my problem or that it was not a problem, after which I immediately turned around and walked back to where I had parked my car. After that I immediately drove back to Krugersdorp.

&#9;Later, I thought back a lot about what was going on in my innermost self during my discussion with Kleynhans. I suspect that against my better knowledge I attempted to convince myself that I wanted nothing to do with the murder of Japie Maponya and that this was the reason for my words to Kleynhans. Simultaneously, I must have realised that the idea to murder Japie would have come from De Kock and that he fell under the command of head office and that I probably had no say over his actions. 

&#9;During my examination by Advocate Glen Goosen before the TRC he indicated that there was a massive difference between "it is not my problem" and "it is not a problem". I fully realised the difference. However, I have suppressed the recollection of that conversation to such an extent in my memory that I am not capable of saying which one of the two expressions I had used. The fact remains that I did not tell Captain Kleynhans expressly that it did not enjoy my approval and that this was not to take place under any circumstances. The fact is that I reconciled myself with the plan to kill Japie. My actions and words must have created the impression with Kleynhans that I agreed with the decision to murder Japie, however, that I left the execution of that over to them and wanted nothing to do with it.

&#9;Japie Maponya, through his unwillingness to cooperate signed his own death sentence in an ironic sense. If the activities of Vlakplaas and the brutal interrogation of Japie as it later appeared along with the fact that he had been abducted and illegitimately detained ever became known, it would have been a genuine political humiliation for the former government during a period of time when the ANC/SACP Alliance was achieving tremendous successes in placing the South African Government in a negative light on a global level and isolating the country on an international level.

&#9;Mr Jacques Paau states in his book, bundle 2(a), page 18, that the murder of Japie had nothing to do with crime or politics. I do not agree. The murder had everything to do with the politics of the time and the fight against political violence.

&#9;I realise that upon that day I attempted to distance myself from the unpleasant nature of the murder. However, I must admit that during that discussion I realised that Japie Maponya would have to be murdered and that I, through my conduct and words to Kleynhans, had to bring him under the impression that this enjoyed my approval and that I had left the execution thereof over to him and wanted nothing to do with it. Consequently, I cannot distance myself from responsibility for the death of Japie Maponya. I am just as guilty as the person who pulled the trigger seeing as I myself did not distance myself from the matter ambivalently and gave clear orders to Kleynhans to go ahead with it.

&#9;I cannot recall any telephonic discussion between me and Kleynhans as alleged by Colonel De Kock. My recollection of the discussion between me and Kleynhans regarding Japie's fate is as given above and it was a personal discussion which took place at Vlakplaas.

MR VISSER: If I may just interrupt you, Mr De Kock has stated that on the 26th September he went to security head office in order to obtain orders regarding what had to be done with Japie and that he could not get hold of Brigadier Schoon and that he then telephonically liaised with Kleynhans in Krugersdorp and asked him what the order would be regarding Japie. His evidence is that Kleynhans then said that he had to call him back in ten minutes time and that he did so and that Kleynhans then said that it was your order that Japie had to be taken out or had to disappear or had to be eliminated.

MR VISSER: That is the telephonic discussion or discussions regarding which you have just given evidence?

GEN LE ROUX: Yes that is correct.

MR VISSER: Just while we are at this point, after the discussion between you and Kleynhans at Vlakplaas. There were also further discussions between you and Kleynhans back at the office in Krugersdorp regarding Japie Maponya that you can recall?

GEN LE ROUX: Yes I can recall something like that.

MR VISSER: Can you recall the contents of those discussions?

GEN LE ROUX: Chairperson, what I can recall is that he did indeed tell me that ...(inaudible) be interrogating him ...(intervention)

MR MALAN: Might I just determine about the question, was this after the discussion at Vlakplaas when you were back at Krugersdorp?

GEN LE ROUX: Yes and that Kleynhans said to me that they would have to take Japie Maponya out.

MR VISSER: So that would be the same gist of the discussion at Vlakplaas which again took place at Krugersdorp?

GEN LE ROUX: Yes that is correct.

MR MALAN:&#9; I beg your pardon, just for clarity sake, I heard you say Mr Le Roux that Kleynhans had told you that afternoon that they were still busy interrogating Japie, is that correct?

GEN LE ROUX: Chairperson, I may be incorrect regarding that.

MR MALAN: No, I'm not arguing the point with you, I just want to know was it your statement that Kleynhans said to you that the man didn't want to cooperate, that they were still busy interrogating him and then once again said to you that they would have to take him out. Is that what you said, did I hear you correctly?

GEN LE ROUX: Chairperson, I must just say that this took place quite a long time ago and the extent of his words were the fact that he did not want to cooperate and that they would have had to take him out.

CHAIRPERSON: Sorry, Mr Visser, if I could just ask one question while we're still dealing with this point in paragraph 44?

&#9;General, in paragraph 44 you say:

&#9;&#9;"I cannot recall any telephonic discussion between me and Kleynhans as alleged by Colonel de Kock."

Now what are you saying there, are you saying that you can't remember it, it might have taken place?

GEN LE ROUX: That is quite possible Chairperson.

MR VISSER: I might just add, Chairperson, that the "telefoon gesprek" is something which occurred to us that might be read into his evidence, we'll have to wait and hear what Mr de Kock says himself as to whether that was a "telefoon gesprek" between him and Kleynhans or whether it was between him and Le Roux. Not entirely certain, but not much turns about that apart from the fact that Le Roux can't remember it and he says it is possible that it could have occurred and it's at page 110, Chairperson, of bundle 1(a) if you wish make a reference there and it's the middle paragraph. Perhaps I should just read it to you while we're at the point? De Kock says:

&#9;"The following day at approximately 11H00 I once again went to the security or contacted the Security Branch at Krugersdorp from head office. I spoke to Captain Kleynhans and asked him to determine from Colonel le Roux what his attitude was towards Japie Maponya and whether his attitude was still that he had to be gotten rid of. Captain Kleynhans told me that I should call him back ten minutes later while he discussed the matter with Colonel le Roux. Ten minutes later I contacted him and Captain Kleynhans said that Colonel le Roux's attitude and order was that Japie Maponya had to disappear."

I'm not quite certain whether Kleynhans spoke, according to De Kock, spoke to Le Roux in person or whether he phoned him and it is just that mere point which you've now just picked up, Chairperson.

&#9;Will you then proceed, paragraph 45?

GEN LE ROUX: No member, including Kleynhans, informed me at any stage exactly what had happened to Japie Maponya and how he had met his demise. I was, for obvious reasons, also not desirous of making enquiries regarding that. During the process I defeated the ends of justice because I did not make known the true facts of Japie's abduction, assault and death. The realisation of the murder of Japie Maponya has saturated me with guilt from that point onwards. I would like to believe that I'm not somebody who would take the life of another.

MR VISSER: In the sense of murdering someone?

GEN LE ROUX: Yes that is correct. And however, due to the circumstances of war which reigned, I found myself involuntarily involved in such a situation. The conviction that I acted in the interests of the government and the National Party does not relieve my deep remorse and sense of guilt regarding the incident. 

&#9;I request the understanding of the Honourable Committee with the fact that I, until this very day, have found it extremely difficult to bring myself to the point to admit the full range of my conduct to myself and make this known to others. In this amnesty application I believe is the first time that I could bring myself so far to make my guilt fully known. At a stage I discussed the fact that it was expected of Security Branch members to do unacceptable things with my Minister. By nature of the situation I could not make the full facts known to him. I learnt to live with this terrible secret, that is why I find it a relief that there is now an amnesty process in existence in which I can eventually open up the wounds of my innermost self and hopefully receive a measure of relief. I was informed that Andries Maponya, another brother of Japie and Ordereli Maponya, alleges that he was arrested after the disappearance of Japie and was detained. That is bundle 2(a) page 35. I have no personal knowledge of this. I do know however, that Andries Maponya was found guilty in terms of the Terrorism Act and served a prison sentence.

MR VISSER: That ought to read the Internal Security Act.

GEN LE ROUX: Yes I beg your pardon Chairperson, it is the Internal Security Act.

&#9;On bundle 2(a) page 22, Mr Paau says that the Security Branch West Rand sent false information to head office that Japie had been seen in Botswana. I'm aware that a cover story was spread regarding Japie Maponya.

&#9;Colonel de Kock refers to an occasion when I popped into Brigadier Schoon's office while he and Schoon were discussing a newspaper report. He alleges that I wished them strength. I will not deny this, it is an expression which I used frequently without any particular connotation. Furthermore, he alleges that he would have said to me that one of the cases which had been mentioned was one of my operations and that I became deathly pale. I cannot recall these words specifically but I can also not deny them. If he referred me to my operation I would certainly have become deathly pale. Bundle 1(c) page 113.

&#9;In conclusion, Colonel de Kock alleges that I attended the post-mortem inquest of Japie Maponya and that I wish them strength and wanted to know whether they would be able to get the case through court. Bundle 1(c) page 114. I cannot admit to this allegation because my recollection indicates that I never attended these proceedings.

&#9;In conclusion, Chairperson, I had no personal motive to do what I did. I did not act out of malice or personal vengeance. The acts and omissions which I committed, I committed in the execution of my official duties and as part of the opposition to the struggle and these were aimed against supporters of a liberation movement. What I did, I did in order to maintain the government and to protect the interests of the National Party and to combat the revolutionary onslaught. I acted as a policeman in the execution of my duty in the SAP and I truly believed that such conduct was expected of me and that my conduct fell within the scope of my express or sworn authorisations. I believed this, particularly within the light of the pressure which was placed upon us in the Security Branch by the political leaders of the time.

&#9;Although doubt was expressed whether Japie Maponya had been a member or a supporter of the ANC, I submit with respect that he could at least have been regarded as a collaborator through his conduct of protecting his brother Ordereli against arrest by the police and Ordereli was involved in political violence within the R.S.A. which included, among others, murder. 

&#9;Due to the circumstances I request, with respect, that the Honourable Committee will find that the acts and omissions committed by me stood in relation with political objective, that it was proportional to the achievement of a political objective in order to protect the government and the state and to maintain them in power and that this formed part of my official duties as a security policeman and that this fell under my express or sworn authorisation.

MR VISSER: If we may just return - just before the adjournment, I see I've gone past quarter past eleven, but I'm just about finished if you'll allow me?

&#9;If we could just return to page 1, you are consequently requesting amnesty for the abduction or human theft or illegitimate arrest of Mr Japie Maponya?

GEN LE ROUX: That is correct.

MR VISSER: His illegal detention or deprivation of freedom along with the assault or torture which you say may have taken place and then also the murder of Japie Maponya of which you had prior knowledge. You also request for any lessor offence such as conspiracy, collaboration and or accessory as well as the defeating of the ends of justice as well as any other offence or illegal deed which may emanate from the evidence.

&#9;Mr Chairman, would it be convenient to take the tea adjournment now?

CHAIRPERSON: Thank you Mr Visser, this will be a convenient time to take the tea adjournment. We'll now adjourn for twenty minutes for tea. Thank you.

COMMITTEE ADJOURNS

ON RESUMPTION

GENERAL LE ROUX: (s.u.o.)

CHAIRPERSON: Have you finished with your evidence-in-chief now?

MR VISSER: Mr Chairman, yes, that concludes the evidence-in- chief, thank you very much.

NO FURTHER QUESTIONS BY MR VISSER

CHAIRPERSON: Mr Wagener, do you have any questions you'd like to ask?

MR WAGENER: No, questions Mr Chairman.

CHAIRPERSON: Mr Williams?

MR WILLIAMS: I've got no questions.

CHAIRPERSON: Mr Knight?

MR KNIGHT: No questions, Mr Chairman.

CHAIRPERSON: Mr van der Merwe?

MR VAN DER MERWE: No questions, Mr Chairman.

CHAIRPERSON: Mr Lamey?

CROSS-EXAMINATION BY MR LAMEY: Yes, thank you Mr Chairman.

&#9;General, how long before the abduction of Japie Maponya, or may I ask you in the following, were there any attempts by the security branch, Krugersdorp on the West Rand, to beforehand that is before Mr Nortje had arrived there in Krugersdorp, to obtain information from Japie Maponya regarding the activities of his brother Ordereli Maponya as to where he would find himself?

GEN LE ROUX: That is correct, Chairperson. How long ago that was I cannot specifically recall but in the documents there are receipts with dates where Japie was attempted to be recruited.

MR LAMEY: Can you recall how long they endeavoured in those attempts?

GEN LE ROUX: Chairperson, I can really not recall, these were the field worker's investigative matter and they dealt with it as they thought suitable and how long that was I cannot recall, I cannot tell you.

MR LAMEY: But can you recall the incident took place in December of 1985, can you give an estimate as to how many months before that?

GEN LE ROUX: Chairperson the logical thing would be that after the telegram arrived.

MR LAMEY: This is the telegram of the 27th May?

GEN LE ROUX: Yes and I booked it out for investigation and I think it was from that day that they investigated the matter in all earnest.

MR LAMEY: And his father, Joseph Maponya, do you know anything of him?

GEN LE ROUX: Chairperson, he was a source of the Security Branch West Rand and he gave information over a period of time and I think it was in the documents he was scratched as an informer in some point in time.

MR LAMEY: Do you know whether Mr Japie Maponya at some occasion had been interrogated by members of your branch?

GEN LE ROUX: I can imagine something like that Chairperson.

MR LAMEY: Do you know whether he gave any information?

GEN LE ROUX: No he did not.

MR LAMEY: Do you know whether during that interrogation if he was also assaulted and if Japie had laid a charge against the Security Branch members?

GEN LE ROUX: Chairperson, I cannot recall that anything like that had happened, I cannot recall it at all.

CHAIRPERSON: General, sorry Mr Lamey, do you know whether Mr Japie Maponya's father was approached regarding information of his other son, Ordereli's whereabouts prior to September?

GEN LE ROUX: That is correct, Chairperson.

CHAIRPERSON: Was any information gained from him at all?

GEN LE ROUX: The report of the date is somewhere, the report was given there that he requested his son to visit Ga-Rankuwa.

MR LAMEY: Very well, what was the reason why Krugersdorp, let's refer to it as the Krugersdorp security branch, what was their involvement with Japie Maponya?

GEN LE ROUX: Chairperson, if I understand the question correctly ...(intervention)

MR LAMEY: Excuse me, this was regarding Ordereli Maponya?

GEN LE ROUX: That is correct.

MR LAMEY: But why specifically West Rand Security Branch who became involved here?

GEN LE ROUX: The Maponya family lived in our area and the last known address of Ordereli was in Kagiso in Krugersdorp and that is why we specifically were interested in the investigation. It was also a request of the Security Branch at Pretoria.

MR LAMEY: Security branch Pretoria, this is something else than head office?

GEN LE ROUX: Yes that is correct.

MR LAMEY: Do you know whether Captain Kleynhans and or Lieutenant Dunkley had sometime before Mr Nortje had arrived there at Krugersdorp, whether they had gone to Vlakplaas with the request that he at some point in time had to visit Krugersdorp to assist?

GEN LE ROUX: That is correct, Chairperson. The day when we discussed it with regard to the investigation that C1 had to be approached and it was just logical that Captain Kleynhans liaised with Vlakplaas.

MR LAMEY: So according to you it was an appointment that was made that Mr Nortje would join the team at Krugersdorp?

GEN LE ROUX: That is correct, yes. We had to inform head office and that they had specifically requested it.

MR LAMEY: And what would Mr Nortje and his team from Vlakplaas, what would they assist initially? What was the initial idea?

GEN LE ROUX: They did a value estimation after they received information from Captain Kleynhans with regard to the possibility of whether they can find out from Japie where his brother was.

MR LAMEY: But would they do this in Krugersdorp?

GEN LE ROUX: Yes, they had to do it in Krugersdorp.

MR LAMEY: Very well. How was it foreseen that it would happen, by means of questioning or in which manner?

GEN LE ROUX: Chairperson, we used the knowledge of Vlakplaas that they would make a value estimation and this is where the proposal was tabled that they would - that a "askari" a new askari who had recently been "rehabilitated", they would send him to Japie to find out whether he would tell this askari where his brother was and what his movements were.

MR LAMEY: So the initial idea was to use the askari?

GEN LE ROUX: That is correct.

MR MALAN: Excuse me Mr Lamey.

&#9;As I understand the documents the askari was indeed sent to ask where his brother was?

GEN LE ROUX: That was the whole idea, yes Chairperson.

MR MALAN: But if I understand your evidence correctly, an askari was sent to find out if it was worth questioning him if there was any indication?

GEN LE ROUX: No, Chairperson.

MR MALAN: But I think that was the question, the value estimation that was made, is that not what you are saying?

GEN LE ROUX: No, the value estimation was the initial information but sending the askari to Japie was specifically to find out the movements of Ordereli, his brother.

MR MALAN: Your words were and as I wrote it down, a new askari would be sent to Japie to find out if he knew and would disclose the movements of his brother. Now how is this done? The askari was indeed sent wasn't he?

GEN LE ROUX: Yes he was sent.

MR MALAN: To ask him where is your brother?

GEN LE ROUX: That is correct, Chairperson.

MR MALAN: Mr Lamey, maybe you must continue.

MR LAMEY: I must just get clarity from you, what do you mean by a value estimation?

GEN LE ROUX: I can change it to value assessment, to find out what would the investigation method be.

MR LAMEY: But that method would have been discussed at Krugersdorp?

GEN LE ROUX: For sure, yes.

MR MALAN: Excuse me, please clarify this for me, if this askari went to Japie as he did and Japie told him my brother is there, I would just attach this to a value assessment or a needs assessment, you would have had the information?

GEN LE ROUX: No Chairperson, the needs assessment was before the askari was sent, in other words this rounding evidence that was available at that stage would be available and conveyed to the Vlakplaas members and from there it was decided that the logical thing to do was to send another askari to Japie to try and determine where his brother was.

MR MALAN: Why did you initially say that you wanted to send an askari to find out if he would disclose where his brother was?

GEN LE ROUX: Chairperson, it was just another manner in which I put it but the intention was as I have mentioned it now, that was the intention.

MR MALAN: And this you attached to the value assessment not to the execution as to finding out where he was?

GEN LE ROUX: Chairperson, at the end of the day it would be the following step, that one could attach to a needs assessment, in other words what would be the following step after that information was obtained.

MR LAMEY: Then the idea with the assistance, let us refer to it as Section C1, the group from Section C1, to go to Krugersdorp was not to abduct him and to take him to a place and too assault him and to obtain information from him or to force information from him because Krugersdorp was unsuccessful in that manner. There was initially another reason why Vlakplaas was requested to come to Krugersdorp to use an askari to approach him?

GEN LE ROUX: That is correct, Chairperson.

MR MALAN: Excuse me, just clarity, according to the documents I understand that it was hours?

GEN LE ROUX: That is correct. 

MR LAMEY: I would just like to tell you that Mr Nortje with regard to that agrees with you and his version is that and it would be supported by Mr van der Walt and Mr Fourie that there was an initial attempt to obtain information from Mr Maponya by using an askari, that specific askari was Mr Chris Mosiane who approached him at the bank where he was working under the cover that he was also an MK member?

GEN LE ROUX: Yes.

MR LAMEY: Very well, Mr Le Roux, why was this case Krugersdorp's problem, if I may put it in that manner?

GEN LE ROUX: Chairperson, as I've already said the Maponya brothers were from Krugersdorp, in other words they lived in Krugersdorp and that is why the telex that came or the cryptogram that came from Pretoria specifically referred to the murder of Warrant Officer Tswane and the name of Ordereli Maponya was found on the scene, or excuse me, fingerprints of Ordereli were found which attached him to the murder of Warrant Officer Tswane.

MR LAMEY: And where did that murder take place, can you recall?

GEN LE ROUX: It was in Boputhatswana, I cannot recall but it was close to Pretoria, it is in the documents, Chairperson.

MR LAMEY: So the reason of Krugersdorp's involvement was that the family of Ordereli was living and working in that area and Security Branch Krugersdorp was used because it was the responsibility, the area was your responsibility and primarily to obtain the information with regard to Japie or from Japie or from his family?

GEN LE ROUX: That is correct.

MR LAMEY: So it was primarily Krugersdorp's responsibility to obtain that information?

GEN LE ROUX: That is correct, Chairperson.

MR LAMEY: I accept then that you agree that after the attempt was launched to obtain information from Japie was unsuccessful?

GEN LE ROUX: That is correct.

MR LAMEY: And is it correct that afterwards a discussion ensued with Mr Nortje and Mr Kleynhans in your office?

GEN LE ROUX: That is correct, Chairperson.

MR LAMEY: And can you recall, I don't know if you were present there, but I want to ask you if you are aware that Mr Nortje at some stage discussed the matter with his members, with some of the askaris?

GEN LE ROUX: Chairperson, I read this in the documents that a proposal was made by an askari.

MR LAMEY: To abduct him?

GEN LE ROUX: Yes to abduct him.

MR LAMEY: Yes but then the idea was discussed?

GEN LE ROUX: Yes.

MR LAMEY: To abduct him, to interrogate him?

GEN LE ROUX: Yes to interrogate him.

MR LAMEY: And then in your submission you say there was a reason why he was not detained in terms of normal security legislation?

GEN LE ROUX: That is correct, Chairperson.

MR LAMEY: And you agree that during the discussion it was foreseen that during interrogation he would be assaulted?

GEN LE ROUX: For sure, yes.

MR LAMEY: You knew that?

GEN LE ROUX: Yes.

MR LAMEY: My instructions from Mr Nortje are the following, that at this discussion in your office his recollection is that while he was there and while it was being discussed, that he mentioned that, you must recall that if we abduct him and assault him and obtain information from him the possibility exists that he could die? I am not saying that his version is that in your presence that you gave instruction to the effect that he had to be killed after interrogation or that there was a final decision with regard to that, he said that in that regard, he says that that possibility was mentioned by him, it was something that could not be excluded. Now I have read your statement and I cannot ...(intervention)

CHAIRPERSON: Paragraph 40 I think, is it?

MR LAMEY: Yes paragraph 40, you say that Maponya by not co-operating signed his death sentence. In your conscience, did you also foresee that possibility during abduction or can you recall that Mr Nortje did mention that possibility?

GEN LE ROUX: Chairperson, I cannot recall the allegation that was put to me at that stage, the killing of Japie Maponya was not considered by me.

CHAIRPERSON: But you say in paragraph 40 that Japie Maponya in an ironical sense signed his own death warrant because of his unlawful abduction and interrogation and detention, that it would have been extremely difficult to have released him because that would have embarrassed the government. Now when you made the decision or agreed with the decision that he should be abducted rather than detained in terms of Section 29, didn't you realise then that it's all or nothing, if he -well he would die even if he gave that information. Once he's abducted, he would die even if he gave that information. Once he's abducted he couldn't be released without hugely embarrassing the then government? The only way that he probably could come out of it alive would be that if he agreed to become an askari himself?

GEN LE ROUX: That was the whole point of departure Chairperson, that my intention was for sure that obtaining information from Japie and that is why Jan Kleynhans and Dunkley were told to be present if any information would come to our side which we could follow up. That was the total point of departure.

MR MALAN: Are you saying that you delegated them to go to Vlakplaas immediately after the abduction?

GEN LE ROUX: That is correct, Chairperson.

MR LAMEY: I want to return to the question which I dealt but just on this point, was the reason also not that Dunkley and Kleynhans had to be present there because it was primarily they had the knowledge with regard to the Maponya family, the father who was an informant and if I can put it in the following, they had the background dimension that would serve as a interrogation subject to get this information?

GEN LE ROUX: Chairperson, that is why they were specifically asked to be present but Kleynhans also attempted to recruit Japie and the idea was that Kleynhans was not to be seen at that stage by Japie because if he would talk and that would assist further liaison with him.

MR LAMEY: I want to put to you that it is not there at Krugersdorp according to Mr Nortje's version, that it was a fait accompli that if Japie was abducted and assaulted that he would necessarily be killed afterwards but in the discussion and planning phase it was something that was mentioned which had to be considered and if he did not give any information you have to keep in mind that he was abducted and he was brutally assaulted and he knows it is the security police doing it to him and I'm just saying that I am not saying that this is what Mr Nortje said specifically, but I want to ask you if danger existed with regard to charges being laid against security police and the embarrassment it could cause and I want to ask you in this thinking scrum, did this also play a part in your consideration before he was taken away from Krugersdorp and you say you cannot specifically recall whether the possibility was mentioned? Is it possible that it was mentioned but you did not pay much attention to it because it was not a final decision in that point in time?

GEN LE ROUX: Chairperson, I cannot recall that it was so. My reference framework was that he was to be abducted and interrogated and the information that he had given was to be followed so that we could find Ordereli Maponya.

MR LAMEY: Let me ask you in the following, here we had a man with a history where the Security Branch Krugersdorp could not get the information from him and it would seem that he was seen as a sympathiser by the Krugersdorp security branch?

GEN LE ROUX: Yes that is correct.

MR LAMEY: What did you think that if he was abducted illegally and brutally assaulted to obtain information from him and it is once again unsuccessful, what would have happened to him then?

GEN LE ROUX: Chairperson, I believe that Vlakplaas with it's expertise and knowledge would be able to obtain information from Japie.

MR MALAN: Would you like to answer the question? The question was if they did not get information from him, what did you think?

GEN LE ROUX: At that stage I did not think about it Chairperson.

MR MALAN: So you just accepted that they would get all the information and come back with all the information?

GEN LE ROUX: I believed that they we able to do it, Chairperson.

MR LAMEY: Was it your experience as a commander of a Security Branch that the security police in general were always successful during interrogations where assaults were also part of the interrogation?

GEN LE ROUX: Chairperson, the fact that there were many askaris at Vlakplaas is evidence of that.

MR LAMEY: But you did not know anything of the workings of Vlakplaas?

GEN LE ROUX: No but I knew that they were making use of rehabilitated terrorists to gather information for them.

MR MALAN: Were you aware of the fact of how they rehabilitated the terrorists?

GEN LE ROUX: No.

MR MALAN: Now how do you attach that to the interrogation?

GEN LE ROUX: Chairperson, I say once again I believed that they had better expertise to get information from people.

MR MALAN: And then you said that you believed that on the fact that there were many askaris which was evidence to that?

GEN LE ROUX: That is correct.

MR MALAN: But you did not know that they interrogate askaris before they became askaris? They rehabilitated, according to you it could have been people who became saved on their own, they might have said we don't think in that manner any more?

GEN LE ROUX: No Chairperson, these were all people who were for sure had been arrested and had been interrogated.

MR MALAN: Mr Le Roux, we know that, the question is whether you knew it?

GEN LE ROUX: I accepted it as that Chairperson, if I can take you back to a case when I was in Vereeniging? This was in the beginning stages. Head office brought two askaris to us and they addressed us with regard to these people and informed us about the capabilities of these people.

MR MALAN: Did these two men tell you how they became askaris?

GEN LE ROUX: Chairperson, they gave a broad explanation of their total training, what they did and so forth but if they said how they were rehabilitated, that I cannot answer you, I don't think they mentioned it that evening.

MR MALAN: Did they tell you how they interrogate other people?

GEN LE ROUX: No Chairperson.

MR MALAN: Now can you please explain to me on what grounds do you attack the presence of askaris at Vlakplaas and to Vlakplaas' capability of getting information from people, especially on the basis that you never considered that they would not get the information?

GEN LE ROUX: Chairperson, if we go back to the document, the order from head office, you will see clearly that their task was set out there and if I am correct we can get this document that they were involved with identification and tracing. The instruction that came from head office was made known that we may use their services.

MR MALAN: Thank you Mr Lamey.

MR LAMEY: Are you saying that it was because Vlakplaas had used askaris that they would be successful in gaining this information?

GEN LE ROUX: I believe so.

MR LAMEY: Or was it because that Vlakplaas was known for coercion?

GEN LE ROUX: No, I think it was because they used askaris and the fact that we had sent an askari to Mosiane to determine, this is evidence thereof.

MR LAMEY: General I would like to ask you and you must please think carefully about the question, I'm saying once again that Mr Nortje's version is no that you gave a clear instruction if information could not be obtained from him that he had to be killed. What I want to ask you is if you thought that they would be successful, is it not possible that when that possibility was mentioned that he might die during interrogation or had to be killed afterwards, that you had pushed it out of your mind because you trusted that it would not be necessary and for that reason your memory fails you today that he had mentioned it as a possibility?

GEN LE ROUX: Chairperson, this is a case which took place a long time ago and no person has an absolute recollection and I am the last person and I am once again saying the point of departure was that he would be picked up, questioned and I believed that they did have those capabilities.

MR LAMEY: In other words you are saying that the idea did not even come to you as to what would be done with him if they were unsuccessful?

GEN LE ROUX: No Chairperson, at that stage for sure it did not.

MR LAMEY: Is it possible that it was mentioned but at that stage because of the fact that you had thought that possibility was so minimal that that would not be an important moment of the conversation and did not pay much attention to it?

GEN LE ROUX: No Chairperson, I cannot recall it. My memory cannot call it up, I may be wrong, it is easy to make a mistake but I really cannot recall.

MR LAMEY: So we accept that you cannot recall but you would not specifically remember that it was not said?

GEN LE ROUX: No, Chairperson, I would just like to say that my framework of reference was one of arrest or not arrest, abduction for the purposes of interrogation.

MR LAMEY: Did you foresee that the identity of the askaris would be disclosed to Maponya?

GEN LE ROUX: Chairperson, the method that they utilised with the abduction, I don't know how they worked, this was something that I left to the investigative team, how they went about it I don't know, I knew that they were professional people and it was a professional unit and that they would handle the thing professionally.

MR LAMEY: Mr Le Roux, I have touched on it earlier but I would like to put it to you that Mr van der Walt's recollection is that somebody at some stage mentioned to him, he says he cannot recall specifically, but in his mind he has it that at a previous occasion a charge of assault was laid by Japie Maponya against the Krugersdorp police. May it be possible that you cannot recall it or do you not know thereof?

GEN LE ROUX: I don't know thereof.

CHAIRPERSON: If one of your members was involved in an assault incident and a charge was laid against him, would you as the head, as the divisional head, would you have known of it?

GEN LE ROUX: Yes for sure, Chairperson. There's a prescribed instruction where such matters would be handled.

MR LAMEY: Is this an aspect which you might have forgotten and that it could have happened?

GEN LE ROUX: It is possible Chairperson, this was a long time ago but I cannot recall it.

MR MALAN: Excuse me Mr Lamey, what you are putting to the witness, is this a version of Mr van der Walt that there was indeed such a charge?

MR LAMEY: No, that somebody mentioned it to him that he had heard it during that time from somebody.

CHAIRPERSON: His information is purely hearsay from an unknown source.

MR LAMEY: Yes, yes, I'm just trying to illicit from Mr le Roux what he knows about this.

MR LAMEY: You have said that the day of the abduction you paid a visit to Vlakplaas?

GEN LE ROUX: That is correct, Chairperson.

MR LAMEY: Did you tell anybody that you would visit Vlakplaas?

GEN LE ROUX: No, I cannot recall Chairperson. I can really not recall if I told anybody that I would go there, it is possible because as commander if I leave the office I have to tell the people I am going here or I'm going there. If I did it it's very possible that I could have done it.

MR LAMEY: Can you recall what time the next day you were at Vlakplaas?

GEN LE ROUX: It was the morning Chairperson, the exact time I cannot recall but it was not late morning, I cannot recall the exact time.

MR LAMEY: Would it have been after 8?

GEN LE ROUX: Yes for sure, after 8.

MR LAMEY: And are you saying that at that stage they were still busy with the interrogation?

GEN LE ROUX: Chairperson, the feedback that I received from Captain Kleynhans was that Japie was not talking, that he did not want to cooperate and I did not think otherwise that they were still busy with interrogation.

MR LAMEY: Did you see any of the members of Vlakplaas except for Kleynhans?

GEN LE ROUX: Chairperson, there was nobody there, I didn't see anybody and that is when I turned around and walked back to my vehicle and that is when I heard Captain Kleynhans behind me.

MR LAMEY: Did you see Japie Maponya there?

GEN LE ROUX: No, not at all.

MR LAMEY: Did you know where he was?

GEN LE ROUX: No, not at all.

CHAIRPERSON: So when you went there, General, were you under the impression it was deserted, there were no vehicles parked around as if nobody was there?

GEN LE ROUX: Yes it appeared like that to me, I saw nobody. As I have put it here in the document, it appeared to be a place of old dilapidated buildings and that I was somewhat disappointed and that is when I simply decided that I was going to return to Krugersdorp.

MR LAMEY: What did you want to go and do at Vlakplaas?

GEN LE ROUX: As I have said to you I wanted to go and see, I wanted to get a picture of how things looked there, this along with the fact that Japie Maponya had been taken there.

MR LAMEY: Didn't you know he had been taken there?

GEN LE ROUX: No, I knew that he had been taken to Vlakplaas.

MR LAMEY: I don't really understand why you wanted to see what things looked like there, what was the reason behind that?

GEN LE ROUX: Chairperson, I was a commander and it is always better to know how a place looks especially when people discuss such a place, so I wanted to see for myself where the place was situated and how it looked.

MR LAMEY: Did you see Kleynhans' vehicle there?

GEN LE ROUX: I cannot recall whether I saw his vehicle there.

MR LAMEY: Did you see any other vehicles there?

GEN LE ROUX: I would imagine that there was a vehicle or two but I can't recall precisely.

MR LAMEY: Did you ask Kleynhans where the Vlakplaas people were?

GEN LE ROUX: No, not at all.

MR LAMEY: Did you ask him where the Vlakplaas members were?

GEN LE ROUX: No, not at all.

MR LAMEY: You see I'm just trying to clarify this matter ...(intervention)

CHAIRPERSON: Sorry Mr Lamey, what day of the week was it, was it a weekend or a week day?

GEN LE ROUX: No it was during the week.

CHAIRPERSON: Thank you.

MR LAMEY: Can you recall where you parked?

GEN LE ROUX: Chairperson, where most of the cars were parked, above the rondawel, near the club building.

MR LAMEY: You see, my instructions from Mr Nortje are that he was there the following day, there at Vlakplaas. Colonel de Kock was also there although he did visit head office at a certain point but Mr Nortje was there consistently and he never saw you there? On the contrary, Mr Nortje will give evidence that Kleynhans and Dunkley, the previous evening after the completion of the interrogation returned and that they were not at the farm the following day at all. We're just trying to clarify this aspect because one would expect that if Kleynhans or you were there that he or De Kock would have known about it?

GEN LE ROUX: Chairperson, if my recollection is correct that Captain Kleynhans gave evidence that he did visit Vlakplaas the following morning. This was during the criminal trial if I have it correctly and that is my recollection, that I drove there, as I've told you, that I found the place abandoned and decided to turn around and go back.

MR LAMEY: Do I understand your evidence correctly that you from the moment that the members of Vlakplaas had taken Japie Maponya to Vlakplaas with the purposes of interrogating him, you did not regard this any further as an issue for Krugersdorp branch?

GEN LE ROUX: Because they took him out of my area and because he was now in their custody, I assumed that our responsibility was to follow up information that could emanate from the interrogation.

MR LAMEY: And given that he may have given his co-operation, would he then have also given his co-operation as an informer for the Krugersdorp branch?

GEN LE ROUX: Yes that is correct.

MR LAMEY: So Krugersdorp still had an interest in him?

GEN LE ROUX: Yes they did.

MR LAMEY: So it isn't as if you're saying that Japie Maponya and what happened to him further was no longer Krugersdorp's problem, is that what you're saying?

GEN LE ROUX: No, the method that they followed in interrogating him and so forth is a Vlakplaas matter in my opinion.

MR LAMEY: Can I put it to you as follows, in your version you very clearly have made the point that your conscience has bothered you tremendously regarding this incident and it would appear to me that you did, at a stage, to use the English word, have a problem in coming to terms with the incident and your resultant feelings of guilt and the problematic issues in your mind with regard to your role in this entire matter?

GEN LE ROUX: Yes that is correct.

MR LAMEY: Might I ask you the following, wouldn't it be for that reason that you have also suppressed particular memories regarding this matter?

GEN LE ROUX: It is possible.

MR LAMEY: I want to ask you, it would appear according to Kleynhans' admissions that no further information could be obtained from Japie Maponya? Are you also of the conviction that he purposefully retained information that he had?

GEN LE ROUX: Chairperson, that is what we believed, that he was indeed keeping information.

MR LAMEY: These are not facts which my clients had at their disposal but it would appear that you would have the information that Japie Maponya's brother was also a person who in terms of the terrorism act had served a prison sentence?

GEN LE ROUX: That is correct.

MR LAMEY: Before Japie's abduction, had he already been arrested or was this after the event?

GEN LE ROUX: I cannot recall correctly, I'm speaking under correction but I would say that this was after the event.

MR LAMEY: One of the applicants who I am representing, Mr Dawid van der Veldt, says that he was also under the impression and that somewhere along the line he was brought under that impression that Japie was also someone who had undergone a so called crash course in terrorist activities and that he had received this crash course from his brother. Do you know specifically with regard to Japie Maponya what the case may have been or could this be a reference to Andries Maponya?

GEN LE ROUX: I cannot recall that there was information that Japie had received such training, I really cannot recall that.

MR LAMEY: And then your statement with regard to the post-mortem inquest which took place later, you say with reference to paragraph 53 that the allegation is that you wished the people strength, you say that you cannot recognise that allegation because according to your recollection you never attended those proceedings. Is it possible that you do not remember correctly that you may indeed have attended the proceedings and said something to that effect?

GEN LE ROUX: As far as I can recall, I tried to stay as far away as possible from the Japie Maponya matter and that is why I believed that I would not have done something like that because I really cannot recall it.

MR LAMEY: But you're ascribing this to something other than a definite recollection, you're saying that you don't believe that you would have done something like that because you wanted to stay away from it?

GEN LE ROUX: That is correct.

MR LAMEY: But is it possible that at a stage you may have bee curious or concerned and you may have had the impulse to go there because you were concerned?

GEN LE ROUX: No, I will say it again, as I know myself I would not have gone there.

CHAIRPERSON: So what are you saying here, if someone were to testify that you were in fact there and they can vividly remember that, would you deny that or are you saying I can't remember?

GEN LE ROUX: Chairperson, I cannot recall it and as I have said the way I know myself, I would certainly not have gone, that is just the way I am. I don't believe I would have done something like that.

CHAIRPERSON: So you're saying you can't remember it but the probabilities are that you weren't there?

GEN LE ROUX: Yes.

MR LAMEY: General le Roux, an aspect of your submission here is not specifically about Japie Maponya, at a stage you were in charge of the transformation of the Security Branch when C1 became a C10 and you were involved in security and terrorism activities?

GEN LE ROUX: That is correct.

MR LAMEY: At that stage is it correct that there was still a problem with internal security?

GEN LE ROUX: Chairperson, I can remember that I have personally addressed them in order to move them away from the internal security terrain to a crime oriented terrain. The entire Security Branch made that shift because we underwent a complete revolution in order to attempt to create a space in the new South Africa for all these persons.

MR LAMEY: Yes and I understand that a shift was initiated for the application of former Vlakplaas members in crime or crime oriented cases but that the internal security act had not been entirely abandoned and that they had not entirely been withdrawn from that situation?

GEN LE ROUX: Chairperson, I can recall that our point of departure was for them to be depoliticised and to be made more crime-oriented and that is why a beginners course was presented to these persons to prepare them to serve as detectives.

MR LAMEY: I'm asking you this question with the objective on future proceedings but my position is that a man like Mr Nortje who had been a soldier in Koevoet in Ovamboland that his capacities were applied at Vlakplaas and that he never underwent any reorientation programmes or received the sort of training that you have mentioned after this shift to C10 which took place later?

GEN LE ROUX: Just a correction, Mr Chairperson, the training programmes were specifically geared for askaris and the transformation from C1 to C10 was a computer problem, the computer wouldn't accept a 1 figure so we had to add a zero.

MR LAMEY: If this is relevant later, we will return to it but I don't wish to use any more of the Committee's time. Chairperson, I thank you.

&#9;I beg your pardon, just one more aspect. Might I just put it to you as follows? Did you discuss the possibility of amnesty with Kleynhans and others?

GEN LE ROUX: No I didn't.

MR LAMEY: Do you know why they have not applied for amnesty?

GEN LE ROUX: I have the feeling that their evidence was given during the criminal trial and that I did not wish to liaise with them in this regard.

MR LAMEY: Thank you, I just wish to obtain instructions, Mr Chairperson? Thank you Chairperson, I have nothing further.

NO FURTHER QUESTIONS BY MR LAMEY

CHAIRPERSON: Thank you Mr Lamey. Mr Hattingh do you have any questions you'd like to ask the witness?

CROSS-EXAMINATION BY MR HATTINGH: Yes, thank you Mr Chairman.

&#9;General, just to join with what Mr Lamey, with regard to Kleynhans and Dunkley, you are aware of the fact that they gave evidence against Mr de Kock in his criminal trial as state witnesses?

GEN LE ROUX: Yes that is correct.

MR HATTINGH: And you're also aware of the fact that they were offered indemnity if they gave evidence to the satisfaction of the court in terms of the stipulations of section 200 - 204 of the Act?

GEN LE ROUX: Yes I am.

MR HATTINGH: And are you aware that after the completion of the trial, Justice van der Merwe published a list of names of persons of whom he expected to come and address him before he would grant exception to the idea of them receiving indemnity. Are you aware of that?

GEN LE ROUX: I cannot recall that.

MR HATTINGH: Well I want to put it to you that Messrs Kleynhans and Dunkley, their names appeared on that list and that they did not make submissions and according to the best of my recollection which maybe incorrect but as far as I know, they did indeed not receive indemnity in terms of Section 204?

GEN LE ROUX: That would be part of my framework of reference.

MR HATTINGH: Is that what you think as well?

GEN LE ROUX: Yes, I would accept it if you put that.

MR HATTINGH: Now just to return to your recollection, you have already conceded that this was a traumatic experience for you which you have attempted to erase from your memory, but I want to put it to you, General, that when one studies your application and your statement for your application, it would appear that your recollection was in many aspects rather vague and faulty. Would you accept that?

GEN LE ROUX: Yes.

MR HATTINGH: If one studies page 865 of bundle 1(c), there at the bottom of the page the final paragraph, do you have that?

GEN LE ROUX: Yes that is correct.

MR HATTINGH: You say:

&#9;"After Japie Maponya was picked up De Kock and his team took him to Vlakplaas for further information. Kleynhans reported every day, I don't know for how long that the investigation of Japie Maponya was continuing but not delivering much."

That was your recollection when you made this statement?

GEN LE ROUX: That is correct.

MR HATTINGH: But now you know that Maponya was abducted during the afternoon and was interrogated at Vlakplaas that evening and upon the following day during the evening was taken to the Swaziland border where he was killed?

GEN LE ROUX: That is correct.

MR HATTINGH: So his interrogation did not span over days?

GEN LE ROUX: That is correct, Chairperson, in paragraph 32 I have admitted to making a mistake.

MR HATTINGH: Very well, these are events which took place approximately 14 to 15 years ago, isn't that so?

GEN LE ROUX: Yes that is correct.

MR HATTINGH: The decision that was taken to enlist the assistance of Vlakplaas in obtaining information from Japie Maponya with relation to his brother, Ordereli, that was a last resort. Would it be fair of me to describe it as that?

GEN LE ROUX: No, I think it was part of the investigation, it was the next step.

MR HATTINGH: Well which other step would have remained after this step should this step not have proved successful?

GEN LE ROUX: Chairperson, in the meantime we were occupied with monitoring the family by means of intercepting their letters and telephone calls and general observation of their activities. So in other words there was a whole process which was followed in this matter.

MR HATTINGH: But with specific regard to Japie, let us just leave his family who was being monitored aside for a moment, what else would you have been able to do in order to obtain information from Japie if Vlakplaas could not succeed in this?

GEN LE ROUX: Chairperson no, I must concede that the fact that we approached Vlakplaas meant that we were basically at the end of our capacity.

MR HATTINGH: Very well, because you realised that detention in terms of Section 29 would not prove fruitful?

GEN LE ROUX: No, it would have defeated the ends. Well not only would it have defeated the ends but it would also have meant that he could not be aggressively interrogated.

MR HATTINGH: And these people were medically examined on a regular basis?

GEN LE ROUX: Yes that is correct.

MR HATTINGH: Thus the method of physical torture would not have been viable if he had been detained in terms of Section 29?

GEN LE ROUX: That is correct.

MR HATTINGH: So then a decision was made to enlist the efforts of Vlakplaas?

GEN LE ROUX: That is correct.

MR HATTINGH: And just with regard to the role of the askaris in this context, the askaris fulfilled a very important role because they were capable of identifying persons who had received training with them abroad and they were also able of identifying these persons and assisting in the trial of these persons and bringing them to book?

GEN LE ROUX: That is correct.

MR HATTINGH: And Japie was never a person who received training abroad as far as your knowledge went?

GEN LE ROUX: That is correct.

MR HATTINGH: So with regard to Japie specifically, the askaris could not make any significant contribution with the exception of approaching him?

GEN LE ROUX: As we have put it Chairperson that they could approach him as a returning terrorist under that cover.

MR HATTINGH: And with the exception of that aspect they could not deliver any other contribution?

GEN LE ROUX: I will say it again, the way in which Vlakplaas worked was their working method.

MR HATTINGH: Yes but with regard to the interrogation itself, these askaris had no specific capacity?

GEN LE ROUX: I cannot say that. I will reiterate that the further investigations were conducted by Vlakplaas, they were the professionals and I left it up to them.

MR HATTINGH: If we accept that Maponya would merely be interrogated and that the interrogation would be conducted on an aggressive basis, would you still have been able to maintain that Vlakplaas possessed a better capacity than your members?

GEN LE ROUX: No Chairperson, as I've said the manner in which they operated and the order from head office was for us to make use of their assistance as the method in which they went about their work was not known to me.

MR HATTINGH: Do I understand you correctly that the possibility of abducting Japie Maponya had already been discussed before Mr de Kock arrived there?

GEN LE ROUX: That is correct.

MR HATTINGH: And indeed you had already expressed or given your approval to such an action before Mr de Kock's arrival?

GEN LE ROUX: That is correct.

MR HATTINGH: So in fact he was merely informed about it when he arrived there?

GEN LE ROUX: That is correct.

MR HATTINGH: And you were also aware of it, General, that abduction in the former dispensation was a capital crime?

GEN LE ROUX: That is correct.

MR HATTINGH: And that the assault of persons in police detention during the past created a great deal of embarrassment for the government and the security forces?

GEN LE ROUX: That is correct.

MR HATTINGH: And this is something that you would have preferred to prevent?

GEN LE ROUX: Chairperson, as I have said I accepted that if they took him they would have dealt with him aggressively.

MR HATTINGH: And you wouldn't have wanted that fact to come to light?

GEN LE ROUX: Definitely not.

MR HATTINGH: Because this would have been a great embarrassment not only to Vlakplaas but for the Krugersdorp police?

GEN LE ROUX: That is correct.

MR HATTINGH: Well then wasn't it obvious that the issue of what was going to happen to Maponya after his interrogation would have been discussed?

GEN LE ROUX: Chairperson, once again I will say that my recollection is that at that stage I definitely did not regard it as a possibility.

MR HATTINGH: Why not, General?

GEN LE ROUX: Because I believed that they possessed the ability to obtain that information from him.

MR HATTINGH: And if they had obtained the information from him, what would then have happened to him?

GEN LE ROUX: Chairperson, then he would have been recruited as an informer.

MR HATTINGH: Why?

GEN LE ROUX: Because he had given us information and I believe at that stage they would have gotten him as far as to cooperate.

MR HATTINGH: Perhaps I could put it like this, that once someone had given information you had a method with which you could bind them?

CHAIRPERSON: Sorry, sorry. General, at that particular time, 25th September, was Japie Maponya's father still on your books? You said he was scratched, was that before or after this incident?

GEN LE ROUX: He had been scratched somewhere along the line, we'll just have to consult the documents. I would imagine that he had already been scratched but I'm speaking under correction, I need to consult the document, I can't recall precisely when he was scratched.

CHAIRPERSON: When you had this discussion with the members from Vlakplaas, that's Colonel de Kock and Nortje, did you mention the fact that the father was involved?

GEN LE ROUX: Chairperson, I believe that they had been informed. Captain Kleynhans I believe would have briefed them, that he was indeed an informer. I do believe so.

CHAIRPERSON: Sorry Mr Hattingh.

MR HATTINGH: General, you have been examined about this numerous times and I'm going to put this to you as well, what would have happened if Maponya didn't want to talk? Did you say that you did not consider this?

GEN LE ROUX: Chairperson, at that stage I did not consider the possibility because I believe firmly that they would have obtained the truth from him.

MR HATTINGH: Well Mr de Kock didn't have that much faith in their abilities because he will give evidence that he said to you "do you realise that if we abduct a man and assault him in order to obtain information from him we might not be able to release him every again?"

GEN LE ROUX: Chairperson, if that was the case then he would most certainly, according to allegation, not have gone to security head office to ask what's going to happen to Japie now, I'm sure he would have had an order already.

MR HATTINGH: You're not really answering my question. Do you dispute that he put a question to that effect to you? I'm not saying that those were his precise words but did he put something like that to you?

GEN LE ROUX: I cannot recall that.

MR HATTINGH: Is it possible that he may have done so and that you may have simply have forgotten about it?

GEN LE ROUX: As I have already said it is a case that I wish to erase from my memory and it is possible for me to make an error, no person is perfect, but my point of departure was that Japie was to be interrogated, that was my point of departure.

MR HATTINGH: Well let me put my question to you on a hypothetical basis, if Mr de Kock had said to you what are we going to do if the man doesn't want to talk, what would your response to that have been?

GEN LE ROUX: Chairperson, now it is easy to put a hypothetical answer but at that stage it wasn't the case, that is what I cannot recall, that he may have mentioned this is something that I definitely cannot recall from memory.

INTERPRETER: The speaker's microphone is not on.

MR HATTINGH: If one were to accept that he had been abducted and afterwards, as we know now, had been brutally assaulted and tortured, then you have already conceded one would not have been able to release him without great embarrassment for the police forces?

GEN LE ROUX: That is correct.

MR HATTINGH: Would the response then not be obvious that if that question was put too you, you would have said he'll have to be eliminated or words to that effect?

GEN LE ROUX: Chairperson, today where we are dissecting the case I must admit that it could be a logical inference that this may have been the answer.

MR MALAN: Is the other logical inference not that you could have said to him, no then we're not going ahead with this thing?

GEN LE ROUX: I will say it again, Chairperson, that is also a logical inference but my point of departure is still that at that stage I did not discount it.

MR MALAN: Will you please look at page 5, paragraph 22 of your evidence which you gave this morning? This is

Exhibit B. The final sentence he says:

&#9;"Lastly I realised that if Japie was to be abducted he would be aggressively interrogated and that there would be a better chance that he would give information."?

GEN LE ROUX: That is correct.

MR MALAN: You didn't say that you had no doubt that they would obtain the information from him? That is the effect of what you are saying now, that in the evidence you spoke of a better chance?

GEN LE ROUX: Chairperson, that is correct. Ones words may have been a better chance, I still believed that they would somehow miraculously obtained the information from him.

MR MALAN: Thank you.

MR HATTINGH: Thank you Chairperson. 

&#9;General, the abduction of Japie took place within your jurisdictional area?

GEN LE ROUX: That is correct.

MR HATTINGH: And according to the circular, the action taken by C1 took place in your area under your command so the abduction took place under your command?

GEN LE ROUX: That is correct.

MR HATTINGH: In your evidence in chief this morning you have given us a reasonably thorough summary of Ordereli Maponya's involvement in the armed struggle of that time. What I want to put to you is did you convey that information to Nortje or De Kock?

GEN LE ROUX: Chairperson, personally I don't believe that I did so, I think Jan Kleynhans did this because he was the investigating officer who held all the information so I do believe that he would have been informed by Captain Kleynhans with regard to the relevant facts.

GEN LE ROUX: And that he would also have informed them as to why you believed that Japie possessed information regarding the whereabouts of his brother?

GEN LE ROUX: Yes that is correct.

MR HATTINGH: Now I would just like to get to your visit to Vlakplaas. Mr de Kock was indeed away on a visit to head office that morning and he knows nothing of such a visit?

GEN LE ROUX: Yes Chairperson, I've already stated that I saw no one and I then because the place appeared to be abandoned, turned around and I was on my way back to my vehicle.

MR HATTINGH: But when you departed from Vlakplaas, did Kleynhans remain behind?

GEN LE ROUX: Yes I left him there.

MR HATTINGH: So one would have expected in the usual course of events that he would have informed whoever else was at Vlakplaas that you had arrived there?

GEN LE ROUX: That is an inference Chairperson, I don't know whether Captain Kleynhans remained there. When I departed I left him there but I don't know whether he departed immediately, I really don't know.

MR HATTINGH: You see, Mr de Kock also doesn't know that Kleynhans was at Vlakplaas the following morning?

GEN LE ROUX: Chairperson, once again, I will say that in the evidence given by Kleynhans during the trial he said that he went to Vlakplaas the following morning?

MR HATTINGH: Yes but we also know what an impressive witness he was there, he didn't even receive indemnity?

GEN LE ROUX: I won't comment on that.

MR HATTINGH: Mr de Kock will indeed give evidence that he made telephonic contact with Kleynhans the following day and that he asked him whether it was still your viewpoint with regard to what was to happen to Maponya and he said that De Kock was to call him back 10 minutes later. De Kock called him back 10 minutes later and he was informed with words to the effect that you still were of the opinion that you didn't want to see Japie Maponya in Krugersdorp ever again?

GEN LE ROUX: With regard to the telephone call, Mr Chairperson, if I recall correctly, I cannot deny it, it is possible that a discussion took place in my office after Vlakplaas with Jan Kleynhans is indeed possible and what I said at Vlakplaas as I can recall is what I said to him at Vlakplaas.

CHAIRPERSON: Sorry, would you have said to Mr Kleynhans that you don't want to see Mr Japie Maponya in the West Rand again?

GEN LE ROUX: No Chairperson, I had no reason to say that. My evidence was that Japie did not present any problems to us on the West Rand.

MR HATTINGH: You also gave evidence, General, that you were under a great level of pressure to obtain information about the whereabouts of Ordereli Maponya?

GEN LE ROUX: No, not specifically about Ordereli Maponya, it was the pressure to combat terrorism in general. We as members of the Security Branch experienced extraordinary pressure and the Ordereli Maponya investigation was simply one of the matters that we were occupied with, it wasn't an isolated event, it wasn't the only investigation that we were involved in.

MR HATTINGH: But it was an important incident?

GEN LE ROUX: Yes, it was certainly important.

MR HATTINGH: And when you obtained the information that Japie Maponya may know about the whereabouts of Ordereli Maponya, you regarded it as important to obtain that information?

GEN LE ROUX: Yes.

MR HATTINGH: And you believed that you could possibly obtain this information from him?

GEN LE ROUX: Yes.

MR HATTINGH: By employing drastic methods?

GEN LE ROUX: That is correct, specifically C1, Chairperson.

MR HATTINGH: Did you know that when Mr Mosiane who presented himself as a member of MK and visited Japie Maponya at the bank where he worked as a security officer had an Eastern Bloc pistol?

GEN LE ROUX: No, I have just seen this in the documents, I think that that was the best or the correct procedure with which to approach him and that he gave the pistol or showed the pistol to Japie Maponya in the bank. I don't know whether he showed him the weapon in the bank but he did show him the weapon.

MR HATTINGH: And it is correct that Japie Maponya did nothing about that?

GEN LE ROUX: Yes, I think that words such as evasive were used.

MR HATTINGH: He did not act as a security officer towards a person who had entered the bank?

GEN LE ROUX: No.

MR HATTINGH: And as far as you know he also didn't take any steps in reporting a person who was apparently involved in acts of terrorism?

GEN LE ROUX: No.

MR HATTINGH: Did this information come to your knowledge?

GEN LE ROUX: Could you please just put this more clearly?

MR HATTINGH: The fact that he showed Japie the pistol and that Japie had done nothing and that he presented himself as an MK member and that Japie had done nothing about this, did all this knowledge come to your attention?

GEN LE ROUX: Yes, I think it was after Nortje had reported back to us.

MR HATTINGH: And did this play any role in your mind with regard to Japie Maponya's attitude towards the armed struggle?

GEN LE ROUX: Yes.

MR HATTINGH: What role did it play?

GEN LE ROUX: Chairperson, it was our information that he was retaining information about the movements of his brother.

MR HATTINGH: Might this be a convenient stage to take the luncheon adjournment, Mr Chairman?

CHAIRPERSON: Yes, I see it's past 1 o'clock, it would be a convenient stage. We'll take the lunch adjournment until quarter to 2.

COMMITTEE ADJOURNS

ON RESUMPTION

CHAIRPERSON: Yes thank you. Mr Hattingh?

GENERAL LE ROUX: (s.u.o.)

CROSS-EXAMINATION BY MR HATTINGH: (cont) 

&#9;Thank you Mr Chairman. General, when you gave evidence before the TRC in terms of Section 29 you were asked by somebody, I cannot recall off the top of my head who it was, but you were asked why you did not come forward when the Harms Commission was appointed and gave information about his matter. But at that stage it would have caused great damage to the security police, is that not true and that is one of the reasons why Japie Maponya could not be released?

GEN LE ROUX: That is correct.

MR HATTINGH: And this would have defeated the whole purpose if you came to the Harms Commission and told them everything?

GEN LE ROUX: That is correct, Chairperson.

MR HATTINGH: Thank you Chairperson.

NO FURTHER QUESTIONS BY MR HATTINGH

CHAIRPERSON: Thank you Mr Hattingh.

&#9;Ms Lockhat do you have any questions you'd like to put to the witness?&#9;&#9;&#9;&#9;&#9;&#9; 

MS LOCKHAT: Chairperson, Ms Bridjlall will start with the cross-examination.

CROSS-EXAMINATION BY MS BRIDJLALL: General le Roux, you say that Japie Maponya's father was an informer. What is the basis for that allegation?

GEN LE ROUX: Chairperson, let me just get the document. 

ADV GCABASHE: What's the reference in 2(a) bundle 2(a)?

GEN LE ROUX: It's bundle 2(a) page 213.

MR VISSER: Mr Chairman, if I may be of assistance, it's page 182 of bundle 2(a). Two thirds down the page, he says:

&#9;"I am source of the security police at Krugersdorp."

It's a statement made by Joseph Moganthla Maponya which starts at 181 of that page - of that bundle.

MS BRIDJLALL: General le Roux, if Mr Maponya was an informer, why did you not make use of him as an informer, why was there a need to approach his son in order to get Japie Maponya, in order to get information regarding Ordereli?

GEN LE ROUX: Chairperson, a telex from my office dated 1985 mentions the following, Jacob Maponya, which must be a mistake, it must be Joseph Maponya as we have said who is the father of Mishak Ordereli Maponya, was that he found a house, his son Mbeki close to Boputhatswana, in order words - excuse me Chairperson - Lieutenant Kleynhans at that stage apparently had an interview with him with regard to the movements of his son.

MS BRIDJLALL: Why was that not taken further, why then the decision to approach Japie Maponya?

GEN LE ROUX: Chairperson, if I recall correctly they conveyed the information to Boputhatswana and the investigation came to nought as far as I can recall.

MS BRIDJLALL: Were you informed that that investigation came to nought?

GEN LE ROUX: Chairperson, it was part of the investigation and it just continued as I said, the date was the 29th of the 5th of the investigation that was sent to Boputhatswana which was an independent country.

MS BRIDJLALL: General le Roux, you said that Kleynhans reported to you that the investigation insofar, after the abduction of Maponya, that he was not co-operating, when did he make such report to you?

GEN LE ROUX: Chairperson, I think it was the following morning.

MS BRIDJLALL: The morning following the abduction?

GEN LE ROUX: That is correct.

MS BRIDJLALL: Did you meet with him personally?

GEN LE ROUX: In my office Chairperson.

MS BRIDJLALL: So you met with him on the morning of the murder?

GEN LE ROUX: Yes, he was on my staff. It was the norm that we had a conference in the morning, it could have been before or after that conference that he gave me the information.

MS BRIDJLALL: That Maponya was not co-operating?

GEN LE ROUX: Yes.

MS BRIDJLALL: General le Roux, you say in your application that once C1 became involved in this operation that the responsibility was shifted onto them, why then was it necessary for you to visit Vlakplaas? You stated two reasons, firstly you wanted to know where Vlakplaas was located, secondly you wanted to know what was happening with Maponya. If that is true, if your first statement is true and that it was now the responsibility of C1, why was it necessary for you to go to Vlakplaas?

GEN LE ROUX: Chairperson, as I've already stated I wanted to know the location of Vlakplaas and as I have said in paragraph 34 of my application on page 6 that Maponya was taken there. In other words I wanted to see what Vlakplaas looked like.

MS BRIDJLALL: General le Roux, you say that on your arrival at Vlakplaas it was deserted, is that correct?

GEN LE ROUX: That is correct.

MS BRIDJLALL: Were there any vehicles around, were there any signs of other people around?

GEN LE ROUX: No Chairperson, I've already said the place was deserted. The possibility that there was a vehicle I cannot recall that, I believe it was but I cannot recall it.

MS BRIDJLALL: Okay.

GEN LE ROUX: The place was deserted, I didn't see anybody.

MS BRIDJLALL: General le Roux, was this your first visit to Vlakplaas?

GEN LE ROUX: Yes, it was my first visit.

MS BRIDJLALL: General le Roux, then in your - I'm not sure whether it was in your cross-examination by one of the other counsel that you said that you parked your vehicle where all the other vehicles were parked?

GEN LE ROUX: No Chairperson, I meant that where the normal parking area was, that is where I was parked.

MS BRIDJLALL: Okay I'm sorry, I may have misunderstood you.

ADV GCABASHE: But are you saying, Mr le Roux, are you saying that you got to know where all the other vehicles parked on subsequent visits?

GEN LE ROUX: Yes.

ADV GCABASHE: On a subsequent visit?

GEN LE ROUX: No, it was clear that that was where vehicles stopped because it was an open place just above the hut and the clubhouse.

MR MALAN: How did you know it was a clubhouse?

GEN LE ROUX: Chairperson, they might have told me that a facility was there, I cannot recall but I must have heard it when somebody mentioned it.

MR MALAN: Would you recognise it as a clubhouse?

GEN LE ROUX: Yes at that stage, there's a Lapa now, but at that stage there was the building and I just briefly looked at the whole situation. As I've said it looked very deserted and I just turned around.

MS BRIDJLALL: General le Roux, you said that you thought at the time of Maponya's abduction that he would cooperate or if he co-operated that he would become an askari, he would be rehabilitated so to speak. General le Roux, did you see beyond that, did you contemplate the possibility that he may not cooperate or if he co-operated that he would not want to become an askari and what then? Did you not foresee that it still may be a possibility that he would be murdered?

GEN LE ROUX: No Chairperson, as I have said that I did not foresee it and I believed that Vlakplaas would be able to obtain information from him and that was my conviction.

MS BRIDJLALL: What made you believe that Vlakplaas would succeed in getting information from Mr Maponya when members of your staff had made numerous attempts and you knew of other attempts that were made and Maponya was just not budging, he was not giving you the information that you needed. What was it that convinced you that C1 would be successful?

GEN LE ROUX: That they were specialised unit who specifically worked with such matters and I believe that they had the capabilities which we did not have to our availability.

MS BRIDJLALL: Did you foresee that they may assault him?

GEN LE ROUX: Yes I did foresee it.

MS BRIDJLALL: You didn't see them going beyond assault, you didn't foresee that ...(intervention)

GEN LE ROUX: No I did not.

MS BRIDJLALL: General le Roux, I may have to ask you to repeat something that you explained earlier on. What caused you to believe that Japie Maponya had information regarding his brother?

GEN LE ROUX: Chairperson, that Captain Kleynhans who investigated the matter informed me that he was convinced that Japie Maponya was withholding information from us.

MS BRIDJLALL: Did you not ask him what caused him to be convinced, what was he basing that assumption on?

GEN LE ROUX: Here I think the fact that Captain Kleynhans, they reported it to me as the investigative officer and I accepted what he told me.

MS BRIDJLALL: So you didn't go beyond and ask him why exactly he thought - but surely that is an important consideration when you're targeting - when you say that the reasons for you targeting Mr Maponya was that he had information regarding the whereabouts of his brother?

GEN LE ROUX: Yes, I think the fact that he also approached him and did not give the information was the fact that Jan Kleynhans felt that he was not co-operating.

MS BRIDJLALL: The fact that you approached Mr Maponya for that information and he was not forthcoming, is that a reasonable ground - in your opinion, is that a reasonable ground for the belief that he had the information?

GEN LE ROUX: Captain Kleynhans was sure that he did have this information which we wanted with regard to the movements of his brother.

MS BRIDJLALL: But Captain Kleynhans did not discuss with you the reasons for that belief?

GEN LE ROUX: I cannot recall it as such, I just believed that Captain Kleynhans was an experienced investigator and what he told me I accepted it.

MR MALAN: Sorry for interrupting you, if you're moving onto something else, pursuing this? Okay.

MS BRIDJLALL: No, I may move on to something else.

MR MALAN: Mr le Roux, if I understand your evidence correctly, this was the first time that you called in the assistance of Vlakplaas?

GEN LE ROUX: Yes for sure, Chairperson.

MR MALAN: Did you request their assistance afterwards again?

GEN LE ROUX: There is one instance where I went to head office, I didn't go to Vlakplaas and I spoke to Brigadier Schoon. 

MR MALAN: Was that the only time when you called in Vlakplaas' assistance?

GEN LE ROUX: Yes.

MR MALAN: And you called them in on the grounds that Kleynhans informed you that Maponya was withholding information which he believed Maponya did have?

GEN LE ROUX: Chairperson, it was Captain Kleynhans' proposal that we call in Vlakplaas.

MR MALAN: But it's the first time that you call in the special list unit but it sounds like an absolute routine thing which you were not even concerned about the merits of the matter?

GEN LE ROUX: No Chairperson, the Maponya investigation was for sure a very important investigation and as we have seen in the documents there was another brother who was found guilty of terrorism.

MR MALAN: You've said that it was probably later so that's not relevant here but the fact is that the Maponya investigation was a very important aspect, the fact that he himself was killed in an explosion.

MR MALAN: That was in 1992, Mr le Roux, or much later in any case?

GEN LE ROUX: No Chairperson, the fact that I want to mention was that Ordereli Maponya was a trained terrorist and matters were investigated against him with regard to a bomb explosion and terrorism and as well as the murder of Warrant Officer Tswane. 

MR MALAN: The only information that you, according to documentation and the evidence, had with regard to the Maponya investigation was the murder of Tswane, all the other information which you added in the document was dated after Japie's death, you don't give us any examples as to why they were dangerous, you just say that they were active and dangerous in the Pretoria, Vaal Triangle area, but the examples that you give is how he blew himself up, you refer to the Stanza Bopape evidence which was also a later incident.

Let me not argue about that but my question is but it strikes me as very strange that you have been in the Security Branch for many years and Kleynhans comes to you and tells you here is a brother of one of the people of whom we are looking for because Ordereli Maponya was not the only man whom you had tried to trace. He says "this brother, I cannot get any information from him but I believe that he has information and I believe that we must call in Vlakplaas" and you say "very well" without any further investigation of the merits, without asking him what evidence does he have, what witnesses does he have, on what grounds? Can you explain that to me? It is extremely difficult for me to understand that you would tell a subordinate "Ja, call in Vlakplaas" when you know it's a specialist unit, you've never used them, they will solve the whole thing, they will pose a question to Japie and he will answer all of the questions that they put to him.

GEN LE ROUX: Chairperson, we have to look at the information with regard to the telex which we received from Northern Transvaal, Pretoria, where there's a whole set out with regard to the circumstances of the murder of Tswane and then in a statement that we have here from Captain Kleynhans, that's 203 appendix 21 where he says on the 29th of the 5th, it is bundle 2(a), page 203, paragraph 3, where he amongst others speaks of Japie Mkele and according to Captain Kleynhans in a statement which I have seen of his, this Japie Mkele in this document was received at security branch, Pretoria, where he said that there was a note with these particulars of Japie Mkele, or the telephone number so and so was in a room, which was allegedly used by Ordereli Maponya and this information according to Captain Kleynhans was that Japie Mkele is identical to Japie Maponya.

GEN LE ROUX: What is the date of this statement?

GEN LE ROUX: The 29th of the 5th, '85 and his statement was on the 15th December 1989.

MR MALAN: That is correct, Mr le Roux, my question to you is, referring to the discussion there in 1985 when he told you "let's call in Vlakplaas", now you are reading a document from 1999 to me. Give me the information if something like that did exist which was given to you in 1985 by Kleynhans as to why Maponya had to be transferred or given to Vlakplaas. Was there any discussion with regard to the merits?

GEN LE ROUX: Chairperson, let me repeat what I have said. Kleynhans was an experienced investigative officer and during those years as I said initially, this was not the only investigation which we were dealing with, it was indeed and we have to refer to the documents. I have said that this was a most difficult period where I was a commander. It was indeed a time period where unbelievable violence was the order of the day, bomb explosions, murder of police officers. The documents are available to that effect and Captain Kleynhans came to me and he told me he recommends and in the circumstances surrounding this telex which we received from Northern Transvaal it is only logical that I would accept it that he would have the information and that Maponya knew of his brother and that he had that suspicion and that he believed it.

MR MALAN: Mr le Roux, you mustn't have any doubt and I speak of myself that I have a feeling about the intensity of the struggle in 1985, early 1986 but that is not the question, the question is, a specialist unit, Vlakplaas, was involved for the first time with an investigation where you are aware of by the Krugersdorp Security Branch of which whom you are the commander of?

GEN LE ROUX: Yes where I was the commander of.

MR MALAN: But a recommendation comes from someone of your staff that we have to get somebody else from outside for Vlakplaas and you know of Vlakplaas' existence and circulars and you ask no questions and you tell him "if you think so, very well then" but you don't even ask him "Kleynhans, what makes you think that Maponya would be able to give us information that he his withholding?"

GEN LE ROUX: Chairperson, if a field worker comes to you and he says that he has such a request, it would only be the logical thing for me to do to accept it and say because this case, it was the second time that I booked him out because it was a VW system and he felt that he needed some outside assistance and that is when he proposed that we make use of Vlakplaas who have the capabilities as I've already mentioned.

ADV GCABASHE: If I could follow up on the same point?

&#9;Mr le Roux, my impression thus far is that there are two separate matters here, there is the Ordereli Maponya matter, that's what you were really trying to investigate and one you were investigating that was by finding out from Japie Maponya where his brother was to be found. Now as I understand your evidence and correct me if I'm wrong, the only thing you wanted to hear from Japie was where the brother could be found?

GEN LE ROUX: That is correct.

ADV GCABASHE: And that was the only brief that you called in C1 for, to ask a man where his brother was to be found?

GEN LE ROUX: That is correct.

ADV GCABASHE: Nothing else?

GEN LE ROUX: That is correct.

ADV GCABASHE: Because he was no threat to you, political threat at all, that was your own assessment from the information you had?

GEN LE ROUX: That is correct, Chairperson.

ADV GCABASHE: And you say still for that reason you called in the special unit?

GEN LE ROUX: Yes Chairperson.

ADV GCABASHE: Thank you.

MS BRIDJLALL: General le Roux, when Kleynhans reported to you that Maponya was not co-operating, what exactly did he tell you, did he just say Maponya is not co-operating, did he not take it further?

GEN LE ROUX: Yes, that he was not co-operating, that's how I recall it.

MS BRIDJLALL: Is that all, did he not tell you what attempts were made to get him to cooperate?

GEN LE ROUX: No.

MS BRIDJLALL: Did you not enquire as to what attempts were made to get him to cooperate?

GEN LE ROUX: Not at all Chairperson.

MS BRIDJLALL: I'm having difficulty understanding that, are you saying that a person who is under your command comes to you and says he's not co-operating, the person we abducted is not co-operating and you take it no further than that? You do no ask him what means were used to encourage Mr Maponya to cooperate, what did you do, what did you intend doing with him? At that stage you do not foresee that Mr Maponya may be killed?

GEN LE ROUX: No Chairperson, I've already said that Vlakplaas was a specialist unit and that they would launch the investigation and that their methods of investigation, they do their own investigation, I left it up to them, I did not concern myself as to what methods they would use or whatever the case may be. I was just interested in the information which was of cardinal import to me.

MS BRIDJLALL: So you were not interested in the means you used to get this information and you didn't ask any questions as to how he was interrogated, where he is, what his state is?

GEN LE ROUX: Not at all Chairperson.

MS BRIDJLALL: And you didn't ask any questions as to where do we go to from here, he's not co-operating, what do you do?

GEN LE ROUX: No I did not ask those questions, Chairperson.

MS BRIDJLALL: Why didn't you ask those questions?

GEN LE ROUX: Because I believed that the investigation would continue at that stage.

MS BRIDJLALL: What did you foresee happening, you say the investigation would continue, what did you foresee happening?

GEN LE ROUX: That the interrogation would continue and I believe that one does not speak immediately when you are interrogated.

MS BRIDJLALL: And if you didn't cooperate, did you foresee that ...(intervention)

GEN LE ROUX: At that stage no because the investigation was continuous, it was ongoing.

MS BRIDJLALL: Okay and you said that this conversation you had with Kleynhans was sometime during the course of the morning after Mr Maponya's abduction?

GEN LE ROUX: Yes it was the next morning if I recall correctly Chairperson.

MS BRIDJLALL: Okay and you then go to Vlakplaas a couple of hours later, is that correct?

GEN LE ROUX: Yes I cannot tell you what time after that but it was during the course of the morning.

MS BRIDJLALL: But on the same day?

GEN LE ROUX: Yes.

MS BRIDJLALL: And Kleynhans then reports to you that Maponya did not cooperate and he had to be eliminated and what is your response to that?

GEN LE ROUX: What are you talking of now?

MS BRIDJLALL: Is it on the day that you go to Vlakplaas, when you're turning around, when you see that the place deserted you, you turn around to come back, Kleynhans calls out to you and what does he tell you?

GEN LE ROUX: That he does not want to talk and he briefly informed me that Maponya did not want to cooperate and that he had to be taken out to protect Vlakplaas and the members identity.

MS BRIDJLALL: And you don't ask him any questions, even at that stage your attitude is that it's not your problem?

GEN LE ROUX: No Chairperson, I've already said that this caught me offside, this information and at that stage the death of Japie Maponya was not an aspect that was discussed with me or which came to me. If I recall it was not a problem and I just left Vlakplaas at that stage.

MS BRIDJLALL: I'm sorry, I don't follow you, you say it was not a problem? I'm not sure if there is a problem with the interpretation but you said that at that point that was not a problem, what do you mean by that?

GEN LE ROUX: That it was not a problem, it was not my problem, it was not a problem, it was something that as I have said initially to you that I had suppressed in my own being.

MS BRIDJLALL: General le Roux, General le Roux, my problem with that is that you called in a specialised unit who you know are going to abduct and interrogate?

GEN LE ROUX: That is correct.

MS BRIDJLALL: You say that you do not foresee anything beyond that interrogation because you have utmost confidence in C1 and you think that they're going to be successful and rehabilitate or convert Mr Maponya into an askari?

GEN LE ROUX: Yes that is correct.

MS BRIDJLALL: And after having taken all of these steps and having gotten C1 into the picture and into the operation, when you are told that Mr Maponya had to be eliminated you say that "that is not my problem"?

GEN LE ROUX: That is correct, Chairperson.

MS BRIDJLALL: Okay. Mr le Roux, if I can take you back to your application which is on page 685 in volume 1. 

CHAIRPERSON: That's Volume 1(c).

MS BRIDJLALL: Yes. In the third paragraph it reads:

&#9;"De Kock and I were not in each other's presence for long and probably discussed terrorism in general."

Did you at that point in time not discuss the Maponya, so called Maponya operation with De Kock?

CHAIRPERSON: No Chairperson, we did as I already said in my submission, in which paragraph was it, that - let me just find it? It is paragraph, if I see it correctly, 24 on page 5 of my statement which we have handed up today that Colonel de Kock later arrived there and I also had a discussion with him in my office, the discussion was about Vlakplaas' help and to find out from Japie Maponya where his brother Ordereli was so that he could be arrested and the matters where he was involved with would be investigated further.

MS BRIDJLALL: Okay, so your discussion with De Kock went only insofar as Maponya was to be arrested and he was to be interrogated, is that correct?

GEN LE ROUX: Yes.

MS BRIDJLALL: I have no further questions.

NO FURTHER QUESTIONS BY MS BRIDJLALL

CHAIRPERSON: Thank you Ms Bridjlall.

&#9;Mr Visser - sorry, Ms Lockhat, do you have any questions?

CROSS-EXAMINATION BY MS LOCKHAT: Thank you Chairperson, I do.

&#9;You say that Japie Maponya was interrogated by your Security Branch previously, Could you just comment on that?

GEN LE ROUX: Yes, I would say if I recall correctly that an interview was had with him.

MS LOCKHAT: And who interviewed him?

GEN LE ROUX: It was probably Captain Kleynhans if I recall correctly Chairperson.

MS LOCKHAT: I see that Japie Maponya's father was an informer for your branch since 1977 to 1985, is that correct?

GEN LE ROUX: I think in 1983 he was scrapped if I understand the documents before me correctly.

MS LOCKHAT: Well, there is on page 247 where 1985, between 9th of the 5th month 1985 there's a request in payment for R20, so?

GEN LE ROUX: It was once again when Jan Kleynhans approached him with regard to this investigation.

MS LOCKHAT: So basically you can say that he was an informer until 1985?

GEN LE ROUX: Yes, he approached him again to receive some information surrounding the story but according to the documents which I told you earlier it says he was scratched in 1983, the 10th November.

MR MALAN: What document?

GEN LE ROUX: Chairperson, the second one was that he approached him again, he spoke to him again and he determined that the man was indeed a source and he thought that he could approach him again.

MR MALAN: And if you take him money do you not register him again as a source?

GEN LE ROUX: No Chairperson, this was incentive money.

MS LOCKHAT: And tell me, for Japie Maponya, on page 248 of the bundle, that is - there are so many bundles, bundle 2(a) page 248, was that incentive money for Japie Maponya or was that also as an informer?

GEN LE ROUX: I would say it was the same and over on that day, if it says hand over, it would once again be incentive money.

MS LOCKHAT: So he wasn't registered as an informer per se, is that correct?

GEN LE ROUX: No, I cannot see here, I think the WR number is left open.

ADV GCABASHE: Sorry Ms Lockhat, can you very quickly distinguish incentive money from informer money. Are you saying incentive money is a once off payment for information given on that particular visit whereas an informer gets a regular cheque?

GEN LE ROUX: Yes.

MS LOCKHAT: Was your first prize for Japie Maponya just to get his brother's whereabouts or was it your first prize to actually make him an askari?

GEN LE ROUX: No Chairperson, the information that we wanted was where his brother was.

MS LOCKHAT: Did you specifically tell your members that this was exactly what you required, that you just want to know this information and that was it?

GEN LE ROUX: Yes, that was the main purpose Chairperson.

MS LOCKHAT: And according to your knowledge all you wanted to do was just for them to abduct him, to get the information however necessary but your intention was that he was not to be killed, is that correct?

GEN LE ROUX: That is correct, Chairperson.

MS LOCKHAT: I'll just ask you this again, did you know of the activities of C1?

GEN LE ROUX: No Chairperson, as I have said I know of the existence of Vlakplaas, in other words the exchange of letters and the circulars and that they had the capabilities of tracing and identifying and arresting terrorists.

MS LOCKHAT: Who suggested to call in Vlakplaas?

GEN LE ROUX: Captain Kleynhans.

MS LOCKHAT: So did Captain Kleynhans and Dunkley fall under your command?

GEN LE ROUX: Yes that is correct.

MS LOCKHAT: When you say that once Maponya was taken to Vlakplaas it did not fall under your jurisdiction?

GEN LE ROUX: Yes, the moment they took him out of my area I felt that our responsibility ceased.

MS LOCKHAT: But is it not so that actually people under your command, Kleynhans and Dunkley actually went to Vlakplaas, so doesn't that mean that they were still under your command and that they were still falling under your jurisdiction?

GEN LE ROUX: Yes, Captain Kleynhans and Dunkley were under my command, yes.

MS LOCKHAT: So when you actually went to Vlakplaas on that particular day, that was the day after Maponya was abducted and you spoke to Kleynhans, he was still under your command?

GEN LE ROUX: Captain Kleynhans was under my command, yes.

MS LOCKHAT: So why on that particular day did you actually distance yourself and say that this was not your problem when he was still under your command when they informed him?

GEN LE ROUX: The fact remains Chairperson that the investigation was to be continued by Vlakplaas.

MS LOCKHAT: But surely Kleynhans was still there at Vlakplaas and knew exactly of everything that was happening there?

GEN LE ROUX: Chairperson, I believe that he was aware of what happened there he was the investigative offices so they would have informed him.

MS LOCKHAT: Are you saying General that you had no command over your staff, is that what you're saying?

GEN LE ROUX: No Chairperson, over Captain Kleynhans or Warrant Officer Dunkley, I did have command over them, yes.

MS LOCKHAT: So why did you as their commander ask them exactly, seeing that this was your operation in the true sense from the outset initially, you initiated this operation with Kleynhans, why didn't you follow it through, why didn't you ask what happened to this man, is he still alive, what did you do to him? Why did you just leave it at that?

GEN LE ROUX: Chairperson I've already stated that at that stage when I was confronted with this specific information - where did I write it here - Maponya, I was caught offside with this information, it hit me like a bucket of cold water and then I realised that and I just said that it is my problem but it is not my problem and I left Vlakplaas, I wanted to get away from there.

MS LOCKHAT: How far is Vlakplaas from your Security Branch in Krugersdorp?

GEN LE ROUX: Chairperson, I speak under correction, about 50 or 60 kilometres, I really don't know how far it is.

MS LOCKHAT: How many minutes would it more or less take to get there or how many ...(intervention)

GEN LE ROUX: I cannot recall that Chairperson, I cannot recall how long it took me to drive there but it was not very far, it was close to Pretoria, in other words how long did it take to drive there, it was less than an hour, it's much less than an hour to drive from Krugersdorp to Vlakplaas.

MS LOCKHAT: Well it seems really that you were interested in this matter, actually driving to Vlakplaas, surely you were just not going there just to have a browse and to look at the place and but actually that one of your projects were there and that was Japie Maponya, surely ...(intervention)

GEN LE ROUX: Yes that's what I said Chairperson, that on page 6 paragraph 34 I said that on the one side I was curious to see where the farm was and what it looks like there and on the other side it was an opportunity to have a look to see whether Japie Maponya was taken out of my area.

MS LOCKHAT: It just seems that someone that had driven so far that it was your project that you could just turn around right there almost in the next minute and say well fine I'm washing my hands off from this incident and off you go although you don't really know what was really happening?

GEN LE ROUX: No, I said that it appeared to be completely deserted to me and that I was disappointed and that was when I decided to turn around.

MS LOCKHAT: Did you follow this up with Mr Eugene de Kock's commander?

GEN LE ROUX: No I didn't.

MS LOCKHAT: Why didn't you do that General?

GEN LE ROUX: Do you mean the initial request or from which date or time are you speaking?

MS LOCKHAT: Well on that specific day De Kock then took over the operation and in your mind it was his operation?

GEN LE ROUX: Yes.

MS LOCKHAT: Who was his commander at the time?

GEN LE ROUX: It was Brigadier Schoon if I recall correctly.

MS LOCKHAT: Would you say that you foresaw that there was a possibility that Japie Maponya could have been killed?

GEN LE ROUX: No Chairperson.

MS LOCKHAT: So you just left it at that and you took it, you left it in the hands of Eugene de Kock?

GEN LE ROUX: That is correct.

MS LOCKHAT: Did you report any information regarding this incident to the Commissioner of Police regarding the Japie Maponya incident?

GEN LE ROUX: No Chairperson.

MS LOCKHAT: Why didn't you do that?

GEN LE ROUX: At that time I was in Krugersdorp and I felt that I had already been speaking to a division of Security Branch and it was no longer my responsibility.

MS LOCKHAT: It seems General that nothing is really your responsibility?

GEN LE ROUX: No Chairperson.

MS LOCKHAT: If Vlakplaas did not succeed in getting the information from Japie Maponya, what should have been done, what was your instructions to them afterwards if they didn't succeed in getting the information if any?

GEN LE ROUX: Chairperson, the moment when I was confronted with that fact was the moment that I was there at Vlakplaas, that is the first time that I had been confronted with that fact.

MS LOCKHAT: You didn't think of telling Kleynhans to stop this process?

GEN LE ROUX: No Chairperson.

MS LOCKHAT: Why not, General?

GEN LE ROUX: As I have written here I was caught completely unawares and I simply realised at that stage that Japie Maponya was going to be killed and I just wanted to get away from that.

MS LOCKHAT: What was your role regarding the information during the Harms Commission?

GEN LE ROUX: Chairperson, I withheld information from the Harms Commission, that is what I did, I did so purposefully and that is what I've also applied for amnesty for.

MS LOCKHAT: Just give me one minute Chairperson?

&#9;General, one last question. Why is it that Eugene de Kock, Nortje, Van der Walt, all these people in their evidence in the criminal trial, in their amnesty applications continue to say that you were the one that gave the instructions. Why all the - is it a conspiracy? Kindly explain this to us?

GEN LE ROUX: Chairperson no, I don't that that is the case, I think that it is a case according to what I have written here, let's just see? 

MR MALAN: Mr le Roux, don't you just want to tell us without having to consult the document? 

GEN LE ROUX: Could you please put the question once more, you've confused me with this matter now, I would just like to know the question again? 

MR MALAN: Would you like to hear the question again?

GEN LE ROUX: That there was a conspiracy, in other words from Vlakplaas to my side, is that what it boils down to?

CHAIRPERSON: No, no, the question, General, put by Ms Lockhat herself is, why at this stage, at this stage now, do Mr de Kock, Mr van der Walt, Mr Nortje and the others say that the order came from you that Mr Maponya should be killed. Is this a conspiracy against you now at this stage?

GEN LE ROUX: I don't believe that it's a conspiracy, I think the members can give their own evidence as to their issues. The attitude towards Kleynhans that I have made known is that he may have drawn the inference and the fact that I did not unequivocally state myself that they were not permitted to do it or go ahead with it means that I basically associated myself with it and I think that he took all of this into consideration and made the conclusion which he certainly did.

MS LOCKHAT: Thank you Chairperson, I have no further questions.

NO FURTHER QUESTIONS BY MS LOCKHAT

CHAIRPERSON: Thank you Ms Lockhat. Mr Visser, do you have any re-examination?

MR VISSER: None thank you Chairperson.

CHAIRPERSON: Advocate Gcabashe, do you have any questions you'd like to ask General le Roux?

MR LAMEY: Mr Chairman, I just want to just on the question of Ms Lockhat, I just want to convey just clearly that it's not the instructions and the version of the clients that I represent that there was an explicit instruction from General le Roux to kill Maponya as such. What we try to convey is that that possibility was erased at Krugersdorp and my instructions are that it was sort of from Nortje received in a tacit sort of way. Thank you.

CHAIRPERSON: Thank you.

ADV GCABASHE: Thank you Chair.

&#9;Mr le Roux, I just want to confirm this with you, when you had your meeting with Mr de Kock who you knew would be in command of the interrogation, you gave him one instruction, Japie Maponya must simply tell us where to find Ordereli Maponya?

GEN LE ROUX: That is correct.

ADV GCABASHE: Thank you. Secondly, Kleynhans, when you had your discussion with Kleynhans, he fully understood that that was his brief, that was what you were authorising, just getting information?

GEN LE ROUX: That is correct.

ADV GCABASHE: Further he knew that you felt that Maponya, Japie Maponya, was not a political threat at all?

GEN LE ROUX: That is correct.

ADV GCABASHE: So the inference being that there would be no reason to eliminate him?

GEN LE ROUX: That is correct.

ADV GCABASHE: The visit to Vlakplaas, I know you've been asked quite a few questions about that, but it still bothers me a bit, I don't understand the sequence of events for starters, leading to that. My understanding is that you met Kleynhans at your office some time in the morning of the 26th, you then went to the farm some time after 8 o'clock?

GEN LE ROUX: That is correct.

ADV GCABASHE: Where you once again encountered Kleynhans?

GEN LE ROUX: That is correct.

ADV GCABASHE: In the morning you discussed Japie Maponya's non-co-operation?

GEN LE ROUX: Yes.

ADV GCABASHE: Then you met Kleynhans?

GEN LE ROUX: Yes.

ADV GCABASHE: When you met him again at the farm you discussed it once again?

GEN LE ROUX: Chairperson yes, that's correct. He said that he didn't want to cooperate.

ADV GCABASHE: Yes but what was the difference in the content of the discussion, the morning discussion, discussion at Vlakplaas?

GEN LE ROUX: No Chairperson, here it was about the fact that he had to be taken out because the members identity would become known as well as the Vlakplaas activities.

ADV GCABASHE: The elimination had not been discussed or mentioned in the morning?

GEN LE ROUX: No.

ADV GCABASHE: But as you understand it, the interrogation had more or less come to an end by the morning because Mr de Kock had gone to head office when you were at Vlakplaas?

GEN LE ROUX: Chairperson, at that stage I didn't know, that is when he confronted me with this statement that I had just read to you, that is when I realised that the interrogation had been concluded.

ADV GCABASHE: Tell me a little about the reasons for going to Vlakplaas. Sorry, I actually just want to narrow it down because you've said quite a bit about that. You wanted to see the place?

GEN LE ROUX: That is correct.

ADV GCABASHE: And to find out a little bit more about the interrogation and I read that to mean just to see if progress had been made, I'm just summarising your evidence.

GEN LE ROUX: That is basically what it boiled down to, my idea was that I wanted to know what the place looked like.

ADV GCABASHE: Whom did you discuss your visit with? Somebody gave you directions according to ...(indistinct)

GEN LE ROUX: It was Captain Kleynhans.

ADV GCABASHE: So he was expecting you at Vlakplaas that morning?

GEN LE ROUX: No, I decided myself to drive there.

ADV GCABASHE: Having seen Kleynhans in the morning you decided on your own that you wanted to visit Vlakplaas?

GEN LE ROUX: That is correct.

ADV GCABASHE: Without notifying anybody?

GEN LE ROUX: That is how it was, I decided on my own to go.

ADV GCABASHE: But the one reason being you wanted to see the place, that's something you could have done at any other time, yes?

GEN LE ROUX: That is correct.

ADV GCABASHE: The more important reason, just extracting from your evidence, the more important reason being you wanted some basic progress report really?

GEN LE ROUX: Yes due to the fact that Japie Maponya was taken there from my area.

ADV GCABASHE: Now my difficulty is this, Mr le Roux, having just about decided to leave Vlakplaas, Kleynhans calls you?

GEN LE ROUX: That is correct.

ADV GCABASHE: But you don't ask to see the commander, the man who has been in charge of the interrogation, the man who can give you a proper report on what progress has been made. Why not?

GEN LE ROUX: Chairperson, once again, the fact that he confronted me about the possible exposure of the members of Vlakplaas and Vlakplaas activities, hit me like a bucket of cold water and after that I just wanted to get away, I didn't want to be at Vlakplaas any longer.

ADV GCABASHE: You see, that is the second leg to my difficulty because you are here disassociating yourself completely with what happened at Vlakplaas but none of what did happen at Vlakplaas would have taken place had you specifically not agreed and authorised C1 to get involved in the interrogation?

GEN LE ROUX: That is so. The fact remains that at that stage I didn't tell Kleynhans that it did not enjoy my approval, in other words I associated myself with the fact that he would be taken out and that is why I turned around immediately and left Vlakplaas.

ADV GCABASHE: No, no, you see - let me slow down - the disassociation with Vlakplaas is something that happened as soon as C1 took Japie Maponya away from Krugersdorp. You disassociated yourself completely, you said it was no longer your responsibility, that's essentially what's in your document here?

GEN LE ROUX: No, my responsibility was still to remain part of the investigation so that if any information should emanate from this investigation I should follow it up.

ADV GCABASHE: You see that's not the impression I got, is it paragraph 7 now? Let's just see where I got this from. My impression, you know at the end of both your examination in chief and all the cross-examination was that you let go of this thing once the man was taken out of your jurisdiction and again the impression I have following on your not trying to find out from Kleynhans where Mr de Kock was, whether you could see Japie Maponya at all, you know, those actions in themselves say to me you really had no real interest in what was going on vis-a-vis your person, Japie Maponya?

GEN LE ROUX: Chairperson, once again I will say that once I received the information regarding the fact that he had to be taken out, to me it was a very difficult situation and I simply decided that this was something that I wanted to get away from.

ADV GCABASHE: You mention in the paragraph 7 I was referring to now, there's a different point I'd noted there, that you had received information from Pretoria about the importance of investigating Ordereli Maponya matter?

GEN LE ROUX: That is correct.

ADV GCABASHE: Did you go back to Pretoria at any stage and say we have made progress, we have made no progress, I mean what was your relationship vis-a-vis that initial contact?

GEN LE ROUX: No Chairperson, I was the commander and the investigating officers were investigating a matter and how they handled it by means of telephonic conversations or whichever methods that was possible because they spoke to each other often. I told them to investigate the matter and that was their job.

CHAIRPERSON: Just on this point, General, you received the brief from Pretoria to look for Ordereli because his last known address was in your area. When you were unsuccessful in doing that, instead of calling in Vlakplaas, why didn't you just get back to Pretoria and say well look, we've tried but we haven't got anything and then let Pretoria get hold of Vlakplaas?

GEN LE ROUX: Chairperson, the proposal came from Captain Kleynhans to enlist the assistance of Vlakplaas and I associated myself with that.

ADV GCABASHE: Thank you Chair.

&#9;Then a final aspect, the cover story. Oh no, before we get to the cover story, what I was going to ask was, who was your superior at the time Mr le Roux?

GEN LE ROUX: I beg your pardon, I didn't hear the question?

ADV GCABASHE: Who was your superior at the time, whom did you report to at the time of the Japie Maponya incident?

GEN LE ROUX: I was the Divisional Commander of West Rand, in other words I was in command of it. Automatically the head office person, I cannot recall whether it was General Schutte or Frans Steenkamp at that stage, I cannot recall that.

ADV GCABASHE: What were your responsibilities in relation to reporting on what you had authorised and the effects and consequences of what you had authorised?

GEN LE ROUX: As I have told you, Chairperson, I had already requested Captain Kleynhans to liaise with head office and I felt that I had liaised with security head office and that any further liaison had to be undertaken by they themselves.

ADV GCABASHE: You know, you talk of the briefing sessions that you had every morning, yes? Did you have any responsibility at all of sharing with those people what you had found out at Vlakplaas that Japie was about to be eliminated?

GEN LE ROUX: No Chairperson, I don't believe that that was the case. I cannot recall that, I don't think that that was the case.

ADV GCABASHE: Then finally to get to the cover story. What role did you play in that, if any at all?

GEN LE ROUX: I gave orders and I undersigned C67 information documents.

ADV GCABASHE: And again you had no obligation to account to any of your superiors whoever they may be as to the actions that you had taken and the effects thereof? To tell somebody what the truth of the matter was?

GEN LE ROUX: No Chairperson, I abstained from telling anybody about this.

ADV GCABASHE: Thank you. Thank you Chair.

CHAIRPERSON: Thank you. Mr Malan do you have any questions?

MR MALAN: Thank you Chair.

&#9;Mr le Roux, you abstained from informing anybody about it, that was your response to the final question. According to the best of your knowledge was it never the custom or the authorisation to take people out?

GEN LE ROUX: No, I did not have such knowledge.

MR MALAN: When you were informed by Kleynhans according to your recollection at Vlakplaas that Japie Maponya was not co-operating and that he would have to be taken out, that he would have to be killed, you cannot recall precisely but it would appear that you understand correctly, you said it's not a problem or it's not my problem, you said one of those two expressions, is that correct?

GEN LE ROUX: Yes.

MR MALAN: Just to follow that up, if you say it's not my problem, then you are distancing yourself from the matter, then you're saying no, don't come to me, it's out of my area, it's out of my jurisdiction, it's Vlakplaas' baby?

GEN LE ROUX: Yes that is correct.

MR MALAN: Then why would you have associated yourself with the killing?

GEN LE ROUX: Because Chairperson, I did nothing and I also didn't tell Kleynhans that they were not allowed to go ahead with it. I then definitely associated myself with his killing.

MR MALAN: But your evidence is not that you associated yourself with it, you nearly died of fright? You turned around and you walked away, it was as if a bucket of cold water hit you, you used a great variety of expressions?

GEN LE ROUX: On page 39 I say that I associated myself with the plan to kill Japie.

MR MALAN: Yes but you're drawing an inference, you're saying it's a fact. I'm asking you about your specific reaction. I don't want to correct your inference to find out whether or not you associated yourself, what I'm asking you is if you said "it isn't my problem" then you are definitely not giving any authorisation to go ahead, the worst that you could do then is that you were aware of an offence that was going to be committed and you did nothing and you did nothing to prevent it.

GEN LE ROUX: That is correct.

MR MALAN: But I don't think that one can read into that that you actively voted for the murder?

GEN LE ROUX: No, I then realised that that man was going to be killed and I did nothing, in other words I did associate myself with it.

MR MALAN: Okay, let's examine the second possibility. You said "it's not a problem", it is said to you he'd have to be taken out and you say "it's not a problem", what would the inference be then? Then it would be an active order, it would be active approval?

GEN LE ROUX: That is correct.

MR MALAN: You'd be saying that you approve of the proposal, go ahead and kill him. You can't say which of the two approaches you adopted?

GEN LE ROUX: No, I can't recall at all.

CHAIRPERSON: But can you recall using the word "problem"?

GEN LE ROUX: Yes definitely.

CHAIRPERSON: So the only thing that you can remember is the word "problem" but not the specific context?

GEN LE ROUX: That is correct.

MR MALAN: I know that you have had to give evidence numerous times about this, but it's very difficult to understand it and then also to understand whether with the first scenario, this is perhaps a question of argument, whether you could really then apply for amnesty for the offence of murder or at the very most defeating the ends of justice or other associated delicts?

GEN LE ROUX: The fact of the matter is, Japie is dead and I did nothing to stop it and I associated myself with it and that is why I am applying for amnesty.

MR MALAN: You see, according to your evidence and I'm moving very close to entering an argument about this with you but it would not appear to me that you associated yourself. On the face of your evidence it would appear as if you said "I was disgusted by this, it almost nauseated me, I just had to get away."?

GEN LE ROUX: That is correct, Chairperson. It is a fact that when I was confronted with the matter it was definitely and undoubtedly a shock to me and I said "it's not a problem" and "not my problem" and through that and the fact that I did nothing to prevent it and the fact that I knew that he was going to be killed. I truly left it open for myself that I indeed associated myself with it.

MR MALAN: I would just like to return to something that I have discussed earlier, just one or two questions about this particular aspect and that is which information did you think Japie would have?

GEN LE ROUX: The whereabouts of his brother.

MR MALAN: In the document which you have referred us, page 247, it appears in claim number 8, that's bundle 2(a), the name of the informer there is Jacob Mapoma which appears to be Japie and then in front Joseph has been inscribed there. 

GEN LE ROUX: No, I think that may just be an error on behalf of Captain Kleynhans but it was definitely Joseph Maponya, the father.

MR MALAN: Is this also Kleynhans' handwriting?

GEN LE ROUX: Yes that is correct.

MR MALAN: You see there that he says the R20 is an advance claim because the information has been provided with regard to the residence of Ordereli?

GEN LE ROUX: And furthermore Chairperson, it says in order to encourage him to obtain the subject's current address.

MR MALAN: Yes that is correct but that is what the R20 was paid for, in order to provide this but that he also provided that information?

GEN LE ROUX: Yes.

MR MALAN: He says here "I obtained the address from Ordereli or of Ordereli and this R20 was to encourage him to give me the address." Isn't that what the advance claim says?

GEN LE ROUX: It says "in order to encourage him to obtain subject's current address."

MR MALAN: Well then please explain the former bit to me?

GEN LE ROUX: Well, he must have given information which we sent to Western Transvaal and head office at that time. 

MR MALAN: Information with regard to his residence?

GEN LE ROUX: In Ga-Rankuwa, that information led to nothing apparently.

MR MALAN: I am struggling to understand this because to me it appears to be one payment for one thing. It is an incentive to obtain an address and he did obtain the address, that is how I understand this document. It cannot be read that he gave him an old address and that he hoped to obtain a new address, that's not how I've interpreted this document? 

GEN LE ROUX: The words are clear, "in order to encourage him to provide subject's current address."

MR MALAN: Mr le Roux, let us not focus only on one text, let us look at this holistically, read the two to me in relation to each other, the entire sentence. The "in order to" implies the purpose for which he applied the address. He says that he obtained an address from him?

GEN LE ROUX: Yes that is correct, that would pertain to the address in Ga-Rankuwa.

MR MALAN: Which address is that?

GEN LE ROUX: That is in bundle 1(c) on page 699, in paragraph 2.1 he says that he found him at a specific address in Boputhatswana, the date is 29/5/1985, the same date which appears on this informer claim, so he must have obtained that information from him.

MR MALAN: To which portion do you refer?

GEN LE ROUX: Paragraph 2.1. Here it says:

&#9;"During November 1984 information about Jacob Maponya was obtained that he had seen his son near Boputhatswana. He did not speak to him because he and the mother of the subject were divorced and there was discord in the family."

MR MALAN: So now you're telling me that in December 1984 the father provided this information to you and R20 was drawn on 20th May 1985 for that information?

GEN LE ROUX: No, what I'm saying is that this information may have been contained in a report that Kleynhans sent through and I believe that Kleynhans once again went to see this man on the 20th May and that is when he gave him the incentive money.

MR MALAN: After he had written the letter?

GEN LE ROUX: Possibly, it may have been before that, I can't say with certainty.

MR MALAN: Thank you Chair.

CHAIRPERSON: Thank you. General, at what time of the day was Mr Maponya abducted, kidnapped?

GEN LE ROUX: It think it was the 25th.

CHAIRPERSON: What time?

GEN LE ROUX: It was during the afternoon, I don't know at exactly what time, it must have been after he had returned from work.

CHAIRPERSON: And then you went to Vlakplaas you said during the morning the next day, it would have been earlier morning rather than later morning?

GEN LE ROUX: I would say mid-morning, I can't say precisely.

CHAIRPERSON: Were you at all surprised that when Kleynhans said well look, this man hasn't co-operated, he'll have to be taken out, were you at all surprised at the speed at which this whole process had taken place to arrive at such a decision after one night?

GEN LE ROUX: Chairperson, as I have said I was caught completely unawares by this information.

CHAIRPERSON: But were you surprised by the speed of it?

GEN LE ROUX: Yes, that is why I've said that I was caught completely unawares by the information. In retrospect today it was very swift.

CHAIRPERSON: Because sometimes these interrogations can take place over days or weeks or even months?

GEN LE ROUX: That is correct, Chairperson.

CHAIRPERSON: Were you informed at all at any stage of the methods used during the interrogation?

GEN LE ROUX: No Chairperson.

CHAIRPERSON: Thank you. Mr Visser, do you have any questions arising out of questions that have been put by the panel?

MR VISSER: No.

CHAIRPERSON: Sorry, I'll be asking everyone if they've got questions arising.

FURTHER CROSS-EXAMINATION BY MS BRIDJLALL: &#9;Sorry, this is actually a question that I omitted to ask when ...(intervention)

CHAIRPERSON: Yes alright, you may go ahead and put a question.

MS BRIDJLALL: Okay. Mr le Roux, I have been informed by Andries Maponya who is present today on behalf of the victim's family, that after the abduction of Mr Maponya, various members of the family were detained by the security police. He is not sure exactly who they were detained by, but by the security police and members of your staff. Have you any knowledge of this? 

GEN LE ROUX: I cannot recall that Chairperson. The fact that there were investigations into terrorism, among others against this person that you have mentioned but I can't recall that a group of people was arrested. The reason, Chairperson, is because many people were arrested during those times. It was not a singular investigation.

MS BRIDJLALL: Yes but immediately following on the abduction of Japie Maponya, various members of the family were taken into custody?

GEN LE ROUX: Chairperson, no, I cannot recall at all that that was the case.

MS BRIDJLALL: Would Mr Kleynhans have knowledge of this if there was any such person who had knowledge under your command? Would it be Mr Kleynhans?

GEN LE ROUX: Ultimately, I would have undersigned the warrants.

MS BRIDJLALL: And you have no knowledge of that?

GEN LE ROUX: No, I can't recall it at all.

NO FURTHER QUESTIONS BY MS BRIDJLALL

CHAIRPERSON: Thank you. On that last question, Mr Visser, do you have any re-examination?

MR VISSER: No thank you Mr Chairman.

CHAIRPERSON: Do you have any questions arising out of questions put by the panel?

MR VISSER: No thank you Mr Chairman.

CHAIRPERSON: Any other counsel or attorney's legal representatives have any questions arising out of questions put by the panel? Mr Lamey?

FURTHER CROSS-EXAMINATION BY MR LAMEY: Thank you Mr Chairman.

&#9;Mr le Roux, you gave evidence upon the question of the Chairperson that you were surprised at the speed with which these events took place. You must, at that stage, when Kleynhans communicated to you that no information had been given by Japie Maponya when he told you that he would have to be taken out, you must have understood that he provided no information?

GEN LE ROUX: That is correct.

MR LAMEY: Now there were previous attempts by your unit to obtain information from him, is that correct?

GEN LE ROUX: Yes.

MR LAMEY: Now is it correct that due to the history of attempts which were made and the one resort that you saw being the Vlakplaas resort which you felt would be successful when they were not successful, you saw that the unavoidable was going to happen?

GEN LE ROUX: That is correct.

MR LAMEY: Just one further aspect which I noted while reference was made to bundle 2(a), I coincidentally noticed this, I don't know whether it has been noticed before. If you will look at page 252 of bundle 2(a) and perhaps along with that take a look at page 251, it would appear to me to be a report which was circulated when Ordereli Maponya was killed in the explosion in Beatrix Street?

GEN LE ROUX: That is correct.

MR LAMEY: If you look at page 252 there is a paragraph, 5.2 and the context appears to me that the Maponya who is wanted is Ordereli Maponya and it says:

&#9;"Maponya is wanted in the following matters: Ga-Rankuwa MR265/05/85 Murder."

That would be the murder of the policeman?

GEN LE ROUX: Yes, Tswane, I believe so.

MR LAMEY: But then there's a second aspect and that would be that he was also wanted in Krugersdorp for terrorism and the date there is MR249/07/85, that is July 1985?

GEN LE ROUX: Yes that is correct.

MR LAMEY: Now what I want to put to you is did the information not exist that it went further than merely obtaining information from Japie as to the whereabouts of his brother but that you suspected that Ordereli Maponya was specifically involved in the Krugersdorp area when it came to terrorism because it would appear that there was a file on that?

GEN LE ROUX: Yes according to this there was definitely a file and what you are saying is highly possible.

ADV GCABASHE: Sorry, I've missed what you saw highly possible. I thought that what you were saying, Mr Lamey, is there's the one leg, Japie Maponya can tell them where the brother is. Ordereli Maponya is the person who is involved in all types of things. What different evidence now is so highly probable or just help me?

MR LAMEY: All I wanted to indicate Chairperson, to Commissioner Gcabashe, is that it would appear from this page 252 that it was more than mere gaining information from Japie Maponya ...(intervention)

ADV GCABASHE: Can I stop you Mr Lamey. "It", what's "it" please just be specific then I'll understand you. What's "it" because we're talking of two different Maponyas here. "It"?

CHAIRPERSON: I think the position is, just correct me if I'm wrong, prior to you raising this point up, the brief received by West Rand was from Pretoria to try to establish the whereabouts of Mainstay, because the brother lived there, because of incidents that occurred outside the West Rand area. Now you're saying that actually West Rand had a very much their own interest in the matter because according to this information a file was opened in September - sorry in July, prior to September.

MR LAMEY: That is indeed, yes.

CHAIRPERSON: And they also had their own interests to find the address rather than just acting on behalf of Pretoria.

MR LAMEY: Ja, it is not as if the impression is that Ordereli Maponya was somewhere in the Republic and that because his family was in Krugersdorp that they wanted information from the family.

CHAIRPERSON: They had their own interests to find.

MR LAMEY: There's indication here that there was indeed activities in Krugersdorp.

CHAIRPERSON: Yes.

MR LAMEY: Regarding Ordereli Maponya.

CHAIRPERSON: Yes, at that stage, yes. Yes and General le Roux has said well that's highly possible, that he agreed with what you put.

MR MALAN: Sorry, but if I understood him correctly he said that's highly possible in terms of a deduction to be made but his evidence was that he had no such knowledge. His only knowledge related to finding the address of Ordereli from Japie.

GEN LE ROUX: That is correct, Chairperson.

MR MALAN: And that the activities of the Maponya gang was in Pretoria and Vereeniging area, nothing in Krugersdorp to your knowledge?

GEN LE ROUX: Chairperson, if I look at this Krugersdorp MR there was also another matter there, I cannot recall specifically what but that Maponya was of cardinal importance to us and that we definitely wanted him is a fact.

MR MALAN: But according to your recollection not with regard to primary activities in Krugersdorp?

GEN LE ROUX: I cannot recall that, I have seen this document before but it has not been incorporated into my application for this matter.

ADV GCABASHE: So you're not changing your evidence, the evidence is as it was until the last question about it?

GEN LE ROUX: Yes Chairperson, as I've said terrorism investigations went on consistently and anybody who was a terrorist was constantly sought after by us.

MR LAMEY: Mr Chairman, why I've raised this, I've got a recollection that one of my clients actually also referred to this that Ordereli Maponya was also active as far as he can recall and the information that was conveyed to him in the Kagiso area. I'm just trying to establish which one of these ...(intervention)

CHAIRPERSON: I think we know from later and Mr Visser knows that certainly the so called Maponya, the group, were active there, it's just they don't know how active they were in that area prior to September but certainly at some stage there were bombs in Randfontein - where was it, Randfontein I think and Krugersdorp as well? Ja, we know Pretoria but we're talking West Rand now but I don't know whether it was prior to September '85 or not but we know at some stage they were operative there.

MR LAMEY: May I just take an instruction here Mr Chairman? Thank you.

&#9;So what you're saying Mr Le Roux is that you don't have an independent recollection thereof?

GEN LE ROUX: No Chairperson and with regard to the Maponya group specifically, apart from murder, in my application I only refer to the murder because that was the initial telex that we received.

MR LAMEY: But if this telex states that Maponya is wanted in the following matters, Krugersdorp MR, for terrorism, a dossier is opened with the name Krugersdorp and an MR description, it would be an act of terrorism which took place in that area to which the suspect is connected?

GEN LE ROUX: That is correct.

MR LAMEY: I will later return to that specifically but I want to put it to you that one of my clients recalls that the connection with Ordereli Maponya was discussed at some point.

Thank you Mr Chairman, I've got no further questions.

NO FURTHER QUESTIONS BY MR LAMEY

CHAIRPERSON: Thank you. Are there any other questions arising?&#9;&#9;&#9;&#9;&#9;&#9;&#9;&#9;&#9; 

MR HATTINGH: No thank you Mr Chairman.

CHAIRPERSON: Thank you General le Roux, that concludes your testimony, you may stand down.

GEN LE ROUX: Thank you Chairperson.

WITNESS EXCUSED

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

NAME:&#9;&#9;EUGENE ALEXANDER DE KOCK

APPLICATION NO: AM0066/96

--------------------------------------------------------------------------CHAIRPERSON: Mr Hattingh, I know that you have an appointment you say at half past 4. Are you going to be calling Mr de Kock now?

MR HATTINGH: Mr Chairman I will be calling Mr de Kock.

CHAIRPERSON: If we stop at quarter to 4 would that....?

MR HATTINGH: I doubt it, I'll just ask my attorney staff to phone the doctor and tell him I won't be able to keep my appointment.

CHAIRPERSON: Thank you, you're going to call Mr de Kock?

MR HATTINGH: Yes.

MR VISSER: Sorry Mr Visser, do you have any other witnesses to call in your application regarding General le Roux?

MR VISSER: Mr Chairman, we don't intend calling any other witnesses thank you.

CHAIRPERSON: Mr Hattingh?

MR HATTINGH: Thank you Mr Chairman, I call Mr de Kock.

EUGENE ALEXANDER DE KOCK: (sworn states)

EXAMINATION BY MR HATTINGH: Mr de Kock, you are an applicant with regard to this matter?

MR DE KOCK: That is correct.

INTERPRETER: The speaker's microphone is not on.

MR HATTINGH: You have at previous instances given evidence before other Committees with regard to amnesty, is that correct?

MR DE KOCK: That is correct, Chairperson.

MR HATTINGH: And at one such opportunity you gave evidence with regard to a supplementary affidavit which was prepared on your behalf and is now bundle 1(d) in this matter, is that correct?

MR DE KOCK: That is correct, Chairperson.

MR HATTINGH: And there you deal in general with Vlakplaas, is that correct?

MR DE KOCK: That is correct, Chairperson.

MR HATTINGH: Do you confirm the correctness of that document?

MR DE KOCK: Yes I do, Chairperson.

MR HATTINGH: You have also as a general introduction to all your amnesty applications, you have given background to your career in the South African Police, is that correct?

MR DE KOCK: Yes Chairperson.

MR HATTINGH: And this is also embodied in bundle 1(a) I think?

CHAIRPERSON: It comes as a separate bundle, perhaps we can call it 1(e), I think. Is this the testimony?

MR HATTINGH: No, that's not what I'm referring to Mr Chairman, no. May I just enquire from you, Mr Chairman, should we mark this document that is just referred to, the supplementary affidavit, should it become an affidavit or can ...(intervention)

CHAIRPERSON: I think we keep it as bundle 1(d), it's got the number already.

MR HATTINGH: Thank you Mr Chairman. Now I'm referring actually, Mr Chairman, to - I had it in front of me just now, 1(a), pages 49 to 105 and then the annexures 120 - 278, Mr Chairman. Thank you.

&#9;The general introduction and background to your career is embodied in bundle 1(a), do you confirm the correctness thereof?

MR DE KOCK: Yes I do, Chairperson.

MR HATTINGH: And then there was also many other documents attached to that which also form part of this bundle?

MR DE KOCK: That is correct, Chairperson.

MR HATTINGH: And for purposes of these proceedings, Mr de Kock, I would just like you to give the Committee a very brief summary as to when you joined Vlakplaas?

MR DE KOCK: Chairperson, with the end of my period of service at the end of May 1983 at Oshakati in Ovamboland in the north of South West, I was transferred to Vlakplaas Section C1, attached to head office and I worked there under Brigadier Cronje right up to the end of July 1985 whereafter I became the commander of Vlakplaas and I was the commander up to the end of March or end of April 1993.

MR HATTINGH: So when the Maponya incident took place you were only the commander of Vlakplaas for a few months?

MR DE KOCK: That is correct, Chairperson.

MR HATTINGH: And what was your rank then?

MR DE KOCK: I was a captain then, Chairperson.

MR HATTINGH: And your immediate commander to whom you had to report was who?

MR DE KOCK: It was Brigadier Schoon from security head office.

MR HATTINGH: He was at head office?

MR DE KOCK: That is correct, Chairperson.

MR HATTINGH: Now as the commander of Vlakplaas, did you in the morning directly go to Vlakplaas or did you have to pass by head office first?

MR DE KOCK: Chairperson, in the mornings at 6.30 you had to be at the commander's office, this is Brigadier Schoon's office, to discuss certain aspects which may have come about or which have been concluded and this was continuous and thereafter, after this meeting, one could move to Vlakplaas.

MR HATTINGH: Depending on the meeting and this would depend on the time that the meeting took there?

MR DE KOCK: That is correct, Chairperson.

MR HATTINGH: With regard to the Maponya incident you were approached by the Security Branch of Krugersdorp to be of assistance in this instance?

MR DE KOCK: Yes Chairperson, in 1985 during one of our deployments, Captain Kleynhans whom I met the first time and Lieutenant Dunkley, I think he was a Warrant Officer then, whom I'd already met in Ovamboland, he was attached to the security branch, they indeed arrived at Vlakplaas and they were in possession of photos, it might have been between 10 and 15 photos of MK members and suspects for the purposes of identification which would have been done by the askaris and amongst others during that meeting Captain Kleynhans asked for askaris for a group and I informed that I could not give him a group.

MR HATTINGH: For what purpose did he want a group?

MR DE KOCK: Chairperson, he did not have a specific purpose, he asked for a group, he said that they had a need, there were terrorists in the vicinity and that is the essence. There was not specific reference made by him but what I did not have was a telex from his commander which had to go to Brigadier Schoon for approval that I could send a group to the West Rand. I informed him, this is to Captain Kleynhans, that I have already drawn up my deployment list and I did not have a group available for him.

MR HATTINGH: Did you tell him that you might possibly be of assistance later to him?

MR DE KOCK: Yes Chairperson, I did him tell him that at a later stage I would be able to be of assistance to him but not with that deployment.

MR HATTINGH: Can you recall, Mr De Kock, how long before the Maponya incident did he visit you?

MR DE KOCK: Chairperson, it was just before we deployed and if I cast my mind back, it must have been a day or two before, it was not a week before the time, it was a day or two before we deployed.

MR HATTINGH: If you are referring to deployed, who was deployed where?

MR DE KOCK: Chairperson, it depends on the needs of the different regions, people would be deployed to Mafikeng or Zeerust so that they could cover the Botswana border. We had a permanent group around the Swaziland border, that was the Eastern border, we sent groups for example to Durban and there was a dire need at that stage to deploy a group in the area of northern Zululand because of terrorist activities or rural terrorist activities and close to Josini and Dumu and close to Kwasi Bay.

MR HATTINGH: Were people deployed there to the last mentioned area?

MR DE KOCK: Yes Chairperson, I sent a reasonably large group there.

MR HATTINGH: And you as commander, did you accompany any of the groups whom you sent? What was the position?

MR DE KOCK: No Chairperson, these groups were deployed and the method that was followed was that the group leader, the people who were in command of these groups, would report to the commander of the region and if it's too far from the regional head office they would go to the branch commander of the Security Branch who had requested them and then they received instructions there as to what the nature was of their work that they want, whether it's observation or whether they have to search for somebody or whether it was an infiltration and usually the branches would arrange accommodation and then the members would be taken to places where they would be accommodated and they would be informed with regard to the security and social structure so that it would not interfere with the existing security structure.

MR HATTINGH: Can we just diverge from what we are busy with now Chairperson, I'm just afraid that I might forget about it. Exhibit A which was handed up by Mr Visser this morning, General Background to Amnesty Application, you have already studied this beforehand, is that correct?

MR DE KOCK: That is correct, Chairperson

MR HATTINGH: And do you confirm it insofar as it has relevance to you?

MR DE KOCK: Yes I do, Chairperson.

MR HATTINGH: To return to what you were busy with, you had deployed people. Where did you go after these groups were deployed?

MR DE KOCK: Chairperson, after this deployment I moved to Mafikeng where I had a group who worked in the Boputhatswana area. They moved in co-operation with the Boputhatswana Internal Intelligence Service and we assisted them and they liaised with the Security Branch at Zeerust and at Potchefstroom.

MR HATTINGH: Did any of your members contact you while you were there?

MR DE KOCK: Yes, I was contacted by Warrant Officer Willie Nortje who asked me to come to Krugersdorp to the Security Branch of Krugersdorp. They wanted to launch an operation, they needed me there.

MR HATTINGH: Did he call you from Krugersdorp?

MR DE KOCK: Yes Chairperson and I then enquired from him what they wanted there. He mentioned to me that he had received a call from security head office who rescheduled their deployment there and then moved them to Krugersdorp.

MR HATTINGH: And as far as you were concerned, where was he supposed to be at that stage?

MR DE KOCK: He should have been a Josini, Chairperson.

MR HATTINGH: Such a request for assistance, you say this had to be asked by the commander and the request had to be directed at your commander?

MR DE KOCK: That is correct, Chairperson. What would happen is that the officer or the investigator who wants askaris would draw up such a telex or he would direct such a request at the regional commander who will send it on his part to the commander who will give it to Brigadier Schoon who was the commander of C1 and this would be sent down to the commander of Section C1 and from there I will do the deployment as quickly as possible depending on how they needed the deployment.

MR HATTINGH: Did you see such a telex with regard to the request from Krugersdorp?

MR DE KOCK: Yes Chairperson, but after the deployment was concluded for that month, I received the telex from Captain Martin Naude, the commander of Section C2, he made an entry there or a note there on the telex that he had discussed the matter with Brigadier Schoon and that he had made the call to Josini for the redeployment of the group at Josini.

MR HATTINGH: What happened to the telex, Mr de Kock?

MR DE KOCK: Chairperson, the telex was among the Vlakplaas documents, it was the original telex as it had arrived at head office and in 1990 with the Harms Commission's enquiry many documents arrived at Vlakplaas when we cleaned out the storerooms and at that stage I thought that we had destroyed all our documents but this particular day two metal containers, we refer to it as police containers, was there and there were sensitive documents in there and source reports and we burned all these reports and we burned them in a 44 gallon drum and one of these people, I don't know whether it was Bellingan or somebody else, showed me this document and told me "look at this" and this was the telex where a request was directed at us for askaris to be sent to Krugersdorp and that was the cause of the redeployment of the Vlakplaas group.

MR HATTINGH: And the document, what happened to it? Was it burned?

MR DE KOCK: Yes but it was first shown to General Engelbrecht. He was at Vlakplaas that day, if I recall correctly, there was a social event there, it was a Friday afternoon. We were not very far from the area where we socialised and we were busy burning the documents.

MR HATTINGH: And you say that you showed it to General Engelbrecht first?

MR DE KOCK: Yes it was shown to him because the Japie Maponya matter was related to me and at that stage it was a very sensitive situation.

MR HATTINGH: You received a call from Mr Nortje to go to Krugersdorp. Did you go there?

MR DE KOCK: Yes Chairperson, I did not go there immediately. The next morning Sergeant Fourie and I departed and we went to Krugersdorp from Mafikeng. 

MR HATTINGH: Can you recall more or less at what time you arrived there?

MR DE KOCK: Chairperson, I have to judge it very broadly but it must have been around 10 o'clock.

MR HATTINGH: And where did you go when you arrived in Krugersdorp?

MR DE KOCK: I met with Warrant Officer Nortje, he went and introduced me to Captain Kleynhans and from there Captain Kleynhans and I and Nortje went to Colonel Johan le Roux.

MR HATTINGH: This was there at the security offices of Krugersdorp?

MR DE KOCK: That is correct, Chairperson, we went to his office to Colonel le Roux's office.

MR HATTINGH: And what happened there?

MR DE KOCK: Chairperson, there was a discussion there that the brother of Ordereli Maponya, Ordereli Maponya's name was mentioned and it was mentioned that his brother was working as a security guard at a bank and the information was to the effect as far as I can recall was that he was aware of his brother Ordereli's activities and that he was involved or had given assistance in some or other manner to Ordereli Maponya and that Japie Maponya was withholding this information and that this information had to be obtained from him.

MR HATTINGH: Did they know where Ordereli Maponya was?

MR DE KOCK: No Chairperson, I did not know and I don't think anybody else knew where he was at that stage.

MR HATTINGH: But did they think that Japie knew where he was?

MR DE KOCK: Yes Chairperson, that was the information that we had, the information was that Japie Maponya knew where Ordereli was.

MR HATTINGH: And was any information given to you with regard to Ordereli's activities, what he was sought for?

MR DE KOCK: Chairperson, it was mentioned that he was involved with acts of terrorism, a member of the force was shot, I don't recall Warrant Officer Tswane, with my trial this came about and that he was a trained member of MK, he was a trained member of the ANC's military wing.

MR HATTINGH: Can you recall anything else which was told to you in this regard?

MR DE KOCK: No Chairperson, it was a long time ago, I would like to recall things that were said verbatim but I cannot recall right now.

MR HATTINGH: Did you accept that Japie Maponya knew where his brother was?

MR DE KOCK: Yes Chairperson, I accepted it.

MR HATTINGH: On what grounds?

MR DE KOCK: On the grounds of the information that they gave to me.

MR HATTINGH: And what was the request which was directed at you in this regard?

MR DE KOCK: Chairperson, the discussion was to the effect that there was no other information to find Ordereli and the information had to be obtained from Japie Maponya. It seemed very clear to me and I think also for the rest of my members was the only manner to obtain this information from him would be in an unnatural manner or in other words an illegal manner.

MR HATTINGH: And in which manner would that be, in which manner would this be illegal? 

MR DE KOCK: Chairperson, the discussion led to the fact that we had to steal Japie Maponya, abduct him, this was the terminology, some people refer to it as a grabbing operation but here we refer to the fact that he had to be stolen.

MR HATTINGH: And this is equal to abduction. Yes and what happened then?

MR DE KOCK: Then we would take him to Vlakplaas where we would interrogate him.

MR HATTINGH: What was the understanding with regard to the term "interrogate"?

MR DE KOCK: It would mean that we would assault him and not assault him in the manner that you would slap, hit or kick him but this would include torture as well.

MR HATTINGH: These members of Krugersdorp, did they tell you that they had previously attempted to obtain information about Ordereli from Japie Maponya?

MR DE KOCK: Chairperson, I cannot recall now that they had approached Japie, they had indeed said that they have sources but they did not get the information from the sources which could find Ordereli.

MR HATTINGH: Very well, what was your reaction when it was made clear to you that Japie had to be abducted and be interrogated and questioned by means of torture and so forth?

MR DE KOCK: Chairperson, my reaction was that seeing that everything else had failed, not by means of information, not by means of interceptions by radio or telephone or post or infiltration with friends and family, that this would be the only solution and I agreed with it, I did not have a problem that they wanted us to execute such an action and have us assist them, then I was prepared to do it.

MR HATTINGH: Was Mr Maponya the very same afternoon abducted?

MR DE KOCK: Yes Chairperson, he was.

MR HATTINGH: Were you in the vicinity when the abduction took place?

MR DE KOCK: Yes Chairperson, I was in control of it, on the ground itself, I sat in a vehicle and if I recall correctly Captain Kleynhans and Sergeant Fourie was with me. There was another vehicle where Warrant Officer Nortje and another person, I'm not sure who it was, but it would have been one of the Vlakplaas members. And then there was a vehicle with three Black members of whom Nofomela was one, another person was Nsimande. I cannot recall the third person.

MR HATTINGH: Can you recall whether Mr Mbelo was there?

MR DE KOCK: If he was there I would concede to that, if he says so. I have read his statement but I cannot recall him in my mind there but I would not dispute it. 

&#9;And then there was a fourth vehicle which was a Volkswagen Minibus with a raised roof. This was waiting outside Krugersdorp on the Krugersdorp/Pretoria Road. I am not too familiar with that area so I just refer to it as the Krugersdorp/Pretoria Road and just for clarity, the persons who would pick up or steal or abduct Japie would drive up to that point. I think there was an exit which turned off to the left, in other words in a westerly direction, if one drove along that road, they would turn in there and they would transfer Japie to this kombi and the abductors would drive back to Pretoria on their own. If anybody followed them or cut them off they would not find Japie in that vehicle. There was additional members from Vlakplaas at this Kombi, some Black members, and interrogation already took place in the Kombi when they left from that rendezvous point on their way to Vlakplaas. 

MR HATTINGH: So I would assume this was what was told to you, you were not in the Kombi?

MR DE KOCK: No Chairperson but later I understood that at the scene where we assaulted Japie there at Vlakplaas the interrogation had already started in the Kombi.

MR HATTINGH: Was it a normal Kombi with windows right around or was it a panel van?

MR DE KOCK: It was a panel van, there were no windows.

MR HATTINGH: So one could not see who was sitting in the back?

MR DE KOCK: No, one could not.

MR HATTINGH: Did you see the real abduction from where you were observing the whole thing?

MR DE KOCK: Yes Chairperson, two persons climbed out of the vehicle, I can recall Nofomela specifically, I am not sure of the second vehicle and if I had it correctly, Nofomela showed him an appointment certificate similar to the ones that police used. 

MR HATTINGH: This appointment certificate which you refer to, does this contain the person's name?

MR DE KOCK: Yes, it's a photo, your name, your force number and then there's also a police star on it. 

&#9;And then Japie climbed into the vehicle, the members took him by his arms and took him to the vehicle and he climbed in.

MR HATTINGH: And did you see from there what happened to him?

MR DE KOCK: No Chairperson, they departed then and they would join up with this panel van, this Volkswagen Kombi.

MR HATTINGH: You did not observe that rendezvous?

MR DE KOCK: No I did not.

MR HATTINGH: Did you go to Vlakplaas?

MR DE KOCK: No Chairperson, I went to the Security Branch there at Krugersdorp. We dropped off Captain Kleynhans so that he could collect his vehicle because they also had to come to Vlakplaas.

MR HATTINGH: Now why did they have to come to Vlakplaas?

MR DE KOCK: Chairperson, they had all the questions which they wanted to put to Japie, they would amongst others have questions which would solve any troublesome points or would join up with any other questions that was asked. We did not have all the information which was gathered with regard to Maponya.

MR HATTINGH: And you departed thereafter to Vlakplaas?

MR DE KOCK: Yes I did, Chairperson.

MR HATTINGH: And when you arrived there?

MR DE KOCK: Chairperson, I arrived there and from there I moved to the part next to the river which was about 8 or 900 metres away from the buildings where I found the Kombi and the members of Vlakplaas.

&#9;Not long after my arrival, shortly thereafter if my memory serves me correctly, Dunkley and Kleynhans arrived there as well.

MR HATTINGH: And what ensued then?

MR DE KOCK: Chairperson, Japie Maponya was questioned and with my arrival questions were already put to him, he had already been assaulted, he was slapped, he was hit with a fist, he was kicked, questions were asked.

MR HATTINGH: Did you participate in the assault?

MR DE KOCK: Yes I did, Chairperson.

MR HATTINGH: And what did you do?

MR DE KOCK: Chairperson, amongst others I hit him with a clenched fist and at some stage I sprayed teargas into the Kombi and placed him in the Kombi and I gave it some time to reach the desired effect and we opened the doors again.

MR HATTINGH: May I just ask you with regard to the effect of the teargas, how strong is it, if one is in an enclosed area, if it is sprayed into an enclosed area, what would be the effect thereof?

MR DE KOCK: Chairperson, it would have a tremendous limiting effect on breathing and in restricted area like the Kombi it would nauseate him, his eyes would burn, anywhere where it is moist, it would burn, a feeling of burning, one coughs and one sneezes and one starts drooling and your eyes tear and if you take it in, in a high concentration, it could be fatal.

MR HATTINGH: It is not a very pleasant experience?

MR DE KOCK: No it isn't.

MR HATTINGH: So you used it so that he would give you the information?

MR DE KOCK: That is correct.

MR HATTINGH: Somewhere somebody said that you sprayed teargas into his mouth?

MR DE KOCK: No Chairperson, that may be the persons perception but that would be fatal because the gas would go directly into the lungs and the mucous membranes would burn very seriously. That is my experience of concentrated teargas.

MR HATTINGH: This assault, how long did it take place in all it's different forms?

MR DE KOCK: Chairperson, I would say it was between 30 and 45 minutes, it may have been a little bit longer but it was no less than that.

MR HATTINGH: And was it very serious?

MR DE KOCK: Yes Chairperson, it was indeed serious.

MR HATTINGH: So why did you discontinue?

MR DE KOCK: Chairperson, Japie Maponya refused to say any word, he refused to answer any question, not only in Afrikaans, in English, but indeed to bring it home to him and to ensure that he understand us, some of the Black members also spoke to him. They spoke in his home language, the most of the Black members at Vlakplaas were multi-lingual, they could speak two or three of the Black languages and at the end I decided that there would be no purpose in interrogating him further, we could kill him right there.

MR HATTINGH: Was that your conviction?

MR DE KOCK: Yes Chairperson, I also realised that and I thought back to what Nortje had told me. They sent in Mosiane, they tried to lure him by means of an askari. An askari is not a person who presents himself as a terrorist, he is a person who is a terrorist, he was a terrorist before, and Japie Maponya refused to refer to the askari who approached him and showed the gun to him.

MR HATTINGH: Did you give any instruction then?

MR DE KOCK: Yes Chairperson.

MR MALAN: Before you continue, why would he have to refer to the askari?

MR DE KOCK: Chairperson, with this interrogation and I was present at many interrogations, hard interrogations and proper interrogations like this one, is that if he received a hiding as he did there, he could have referred and said "two or three days earlier I was approached by a terrorist but it was not my brother, he even showed a gun to me but it was not my brother, I don't know where my brother was." He did not even use that, he just refused to say anything, to say a single word. It just pointed out to me one aspect that he would be prepared to die before he rats on his brother.

INTERPRETER: The speaker's microphone is not on.

MR HATTINGH: So you decided that there would be no purpose to continue the assault on him, you would not get any information from him, so you gave instruction that the assault be stopped?

MR DE KOCK: That is correct.

MR HATTINGH: And what were your further instructions?

MR DE KOCK: Chairperson, we went to the house, to the facilities that we had there. I told the members - we had a storeroom there before we developed the farm and I told them to give him a mattress there. There was a steel bed there and he was cuffed to this steel bed and he was given a blanket and I think they took him food, if I recall correctly, and as I far as I know he did not even eat the food.

MR HATTINGH: Very well, did you give any further instructions to the members who were present there, working with Japie Maponya?

MR DE KOCK: Chairperson, the door was locked, we had guards at Vlakplaas and I cannot recall specifically that he had to be taken out during the night, he had to be kept secure and the following morning we did not take him out immediately but later that day I have a recollection that we brought him out to have a shower. There were shower facilities. He did have a shower but he dressed himself in the same clothes he was wearing the previous day, we didn't have any clothes for him.

MR HATTINGH: Did you already decide what would happen to him then?

MR DE KOCK: Chairperson, I already knew in Krugersdorp what would happen to him because after the first discussion with Krugersdorp's members and the colonel, the commander. There was a second discussion where Warrant Officer Nortje and I went to General le Roux's office and I mentioned to General le Roux that we can abduct this person, we can steal him but I want to know what we have to do then and this does not mean that I did not know that we would assault him, we all knew we were going to assault him but General le Roux's attitude was that, and he also said that he does not want to see this man in Krugersdorp.

MR HATTINGH: And what was your attitude with this regard, would you be able to simply release him once it seemed that he would not disclose the information that you wanted?

MR DE KOCK: No Chairperson. Despite the identification of the Vlakplaas members, the askaris which would necessarily have happened and we realised before, this was realised before the abduction, we knew that we were guilty of a capital crime, before that you would receive the death penalty and we knew what would happen there if it did come out that there was a reference to the security police and in particular to Vlakplaas. It would not be a serious embarrassment to the force.

CHAIRPERSON: Sorry Mr de Kock, are you saying that the abduction you realised - the kidnapping was a capital crime?

MR DE KOCK: Yes Chairperson.

CHAIRPERSON: Couldn't you have got away with an unlawful arrest? I mean you were policemen, hundreds and hundreds of people in history have been arrested without a proper warrant or without proper cause, they don't think of the death sentence? It's just an unlawful arrest? Okay, it's not nice, it's not good, but it's hardly a capital crime?

MR DE KOCK: Chairperson, an unlawful arrest is where I take a man, I identify him or I identify myself to him and I choke him and I give him a hiding and one tries to treat him and then you just deny it afterwards. In this instance we went out and we stole a man from the street in broad daylight in Krugersdorp.

CHAIRPERSON: And is there any reason why you used askaris for the abduction and thereby risk exposure of their identity? Couldn't you have just used regular members of the unit who were not askaris?

MR DE KOCK: Two of the persons who executed the abduction they were not askaris, Chairperson, the one was, this was Moses Nsimandi, the other members were members of the SAP. They were properly recruited by Hammanskraal. These were normal members of the SAP.

CHAIRPERSON: So there you weren't worried about askaris being exposed, the identity of askaris being exposed?

MR DE KOCK: No I was also concerned about that but that was a risk one ran with such an operation and with the first meeting at Krugersdorp where this operation was discussed it was clear that we would abduct him and there were specific risks attached to that.

MR MALAN: May I just make a follow up question? You have already said that you knew at Krugersdorp already what would happen to him, meaning that he would not come back alive?

MR DE KOCK: No Chairperson, the instant when one begins to abduct people and it is within circumstances as was in Krugersdorp, I don't know how we will release this man and get away with it. This was not a matter that we went at night and wore Balaclavas where nobody was close to him, not a woman or a child and then he disappeared and beat him up and then just drop him somewhere, a kilometre from there. 

MR MALAN: I just want to ensure, do I understand you correctly, when you planned to grab him, did you then know that eventually he will disappear, he will be killed?

MR DE KOCK: Yes Chairperson, that was the essence of the discussion to qualify. After the first discussion and we did the reconnaissance and to find out whether it was possible to take the man from his workplace and we went to Colonel le Roux. It was clear to me that I want to know what does Colonel le Roux want us to do with this man? What does he want us to do with this man after he was abducted. He wants us to abduct him but what must we do afterwards and he says that he does not want to see this man again and I had no doubt in my mind, that I drive from a place from Mafikeng to Krugersdorp where I had never been before, where I never worked before, I hear of a man who is to be abducted whom I have never heard of and I don't know him personally, and by nature of the type of work that we did, I had no doubt that this person would eventually be killed.

MR MALAN: Excuse me?

MR DE KOCK: That this person would be killed.

MR MALAN: Before any discussion with Le Roux?

MR DE KOCK: No Chairperson, this was during the first and second discussions with Le Roux, that is where I had no doubt that Japie Maponya will not survive this.

ADV GCABASHE: Can I just ask whether he gave you the information or not, you knew he was not going to survive? Help me with that?

MR DE KOCK: No Chairperson, I come from Mafikeng, I go to Krugersdorp, I have no information with regard to this person. There I am informed that a submission was already made, it was already decided that this person will be kidnapped. I am brought in to arrange the abduction. I have to execute the abduction.

ADV GCABASHE: Yes but then you had the two meetings which confirmed to you that the man would have to be eliminated, now ...(intervention)

MR DE KOCK: Yes Chairperson and that is why I went and I wanted to be convinced. I went to Colonel le Roux and I asked him after we have abducted this person, what must we do with him?

ADV GCABASHE: Yes, this is my question, did you know he had to be eliminated even if he gave you all the answers that you required from him, that's the question, because there's been talk of turning him and recruiting him and him being an askari, but what was your understanding after the second meeting with Mr le Roux?

MR DE KOCK: Chairperson, at that stage we did not know whether we would get any answers from him and afterwards I asked myself the question "if he gives us all the answers, would we be able to release him" and I thought about an example, if he gives us the information to where his brother is, we fetch his brother or we abduct his brother, will we take him to court? There's a myriad of combinations in this situation.

ADV GCABASHE: Which combinations you did not discuss with Mr le Roux as such?

MR DE KOCK: No Chairperson, the situation with the abduction with regard to Japie Maponya was not a long situation, long discussion. With my arrival in Krugersdorp, the very same day, the abduction was executed. I arrived at about 10 o'clock and about 4 o'clock we abduct this person, there was no long planning session, three, five day planning sessions that we have to lie around and wait, it was something that they needed urgently and they wanted immediately.

CHAIRPERSON: Sorry, just one question while we're dealing with this, Mr de Kock. Did you go and ask General le Roux when you went the second time, just out of courtesy or respect because he's your senior, what should we do with him when we've finished? Because if he said "oh well, look, if you're finished with him whether you're successful or not, please just drop him off at his work at the bank in the morning", would you have done that?

MR DE KOCK: If the general had said to me that we were supposed to drop him off we would have done this as well and the assault would probably have taken place in a different manner but at that stage I fell under the command of Colonel le Roux, it was in his area, he was the divisional or area commander. The written instructions from head office to all regions was that a member would report to the regional commander of a specific region and for the purposes of work and discipline, they fell under the command of that commander. That was the line of command. There was no way that I could drive into Krugersdorp, abduct a man and simply disappear with him. There was no such a possibility, it never existed.

CHAIRPERSON: Mr Hattingh, when it's convenient we can adjourn for the day. I don't know if you want to carry on now?

MR HATTINGH: It would be convenient to take the adjournment now, Mr Chairman.

NO FURTHER QUESTIONS BY MR HATTINGH

CHAIRPERSON: Thank you. We'll now adjourn until tomorrow morning. At 9 o'clock? We'll try 9 o'clock, start 9 o'clock in the morning, tomorrow morning at the same venue when we will continue with the hearing. Thank you.

COMMITTEE ADJOURNS

