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DATE:&#9;29TH FEBRUARY 2000
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 DATE:&#9;29TH FEBRUARY 2000

NAME:&#9;JOAS MABOKE TSHOMANE

APPLICATION NO: AM6030\97

MATTER:&#9;EXPLOSION ON RAILWAY LINE BETWEEN &#9;&#9;MZIMHLOPE AND POMOLONG STATIONS

DAY:&#9;&#9;2

--------------------------------------------------------------------------CHAIRPERSON: We continue with our roll here in Johannesburg and for today we have two matters that have been set down, that is the application of Mr Tshomane and the applications of Messrs Mathebe, Mathebe, Mathebe and Maake. I'm informed by Mr Steenkamp that we will be commencing with the application of Mr Tshomane but before we proceed, I'd just like to briefly introduce the Panel to you. On my right is Adv Ntsiki Sandi. He is a member of the Amnesty Committee. He is an advocate by profession and he comes from East London. On my left is Mr Wynand Malan. Mr Malan is a Commissioner of the Truth and Reconciliation Commission and he's also a member of the Amnesty Committee. he comes from Johannesburg and I am Selwyn Miller, I am a Judge of the High Court and also a member of the Amnesty Committee and I also come from the Eastern Cape attached to the Transkei Division of the High Court there.

&#9;These proceedings will be simultaneously translated and in order to benefit from the translation you must be in possession of one of these devices. If you don't have one, they will be available from the sound technician and then you've just got to tune into the channel, I'm not sure what they are but there's only about two or three of them, for the language that you require. 

&#9;I would at this stage, with regard to the Tshomane matter, kindly request the legal representatives to place themselves on record.

MS CAMBANIS: Thank you Judge. At the outset may I apologise for not introducing myself earlier. My name is Crystal Cambanis from the attorneys Nicholls, Cambanis. I act for both the applicant in this matter, Mr Tshomane, as well as the implicated person, Mr Jo Khotle, his Commander.

CHAIRPERSON: Thank you very much Ms Cambanis. Mr Steenkamp.

ADV STEENKAMP: Thank you Honourable Chairman. My surname is Steenkamp, I will be the Evidence Leader in this matter. Thank you.

CHAIRPERSON: Thank you. Ms Cambanis, I take it you are going to be calling your client to testify?

MS CAMBANIS: Yes, Chairperson.

CHAIRPERSON: I'll swear him in.

JOAS MABOKE TSHOMANE: (sworn states)

CHAIRPERSON: Ms Cambanis.

EXAMINATION BY MS CAMBANIS: Thank you. Mr Tshomane you are the applicant in this matter and you completed an application form, form 1, in the prescribed form, which appears at page 1 to page 7 of the bundle. If you look at page 6 of the bundle, is that your signature? I'm showing it to you now.

MR TSHOMANE: That's correct, that's my signature.

MS CAMBANIS: Do you confirm the content of your Form 1 application?

MR TSHOMANE: That's correct.

MS CAMBANIS: And then, Sir, at page 8 - Chairman, they weren't paginated, I've just taken the liberty, it's so few pages. At page 8 you received a request for further particulars in terms of the Act. Do you confirm that you received it?

MR TSHOMANE: Yes, that's correct, I received that.

MS CAMBANIS: At pages 9 and 10 of the bundle there's a hand-written letter which contains the answers to the Request for Further Particulars. At page 10 is that your signature?

MR TSHOMANE: Yes, that's correct, that's my signature.

MS CAMBANIS: Do you confirm the contents of page 9 and 10?

MR TSHOMANE: Yes, that's correct.

MS CAMBANIS: And then finally Sir at page 11, you've been given a copy of the letter from Mr Joseph Khotle. Do you see that in front of you?

MR TSHOMANE: Yes, I do.

MS CAMBANIS: Who is Mr Joseph Khotle?

MR TSHOMANE: Mr Joseph Khotle was my Commander in the ANC.

MS CAMBANIS: And you've seen from there that he confirms that he was your Commander and ...

MR TSHOMANE: Yes, I do see.

MS CAMBANIS: Thank you Chair, I have nothing further.

NO FURTHER QUESTIONS BY MS CAMBANIS

CHAIRPERSON: Yes.

ADV STEENKAMP: Mr Chairman, I have no questions. Maybe just to put on record that the only person injured in this matter was a schoolgirl apparently. We have sent out numerous specific advertisements in different newspapers as well as the local newspapers. I've got some copies of them here as well. Unfortunately we could not be able to trace the identity or the person that was injured in this matter so therefore, I would submit, with all the respect, Chairman, that all reasonable steps were taken in relation to Section 19(iv) of the Act.

CHAIRPERSON: Yes, thank you.

ADV STEENKAMP: Thank you Honourable Chairperson.

CHAIRPERSON: Mr Tshomane, just to get some details. You say in your application that you were an MK cadre. Did you receive training?

MR TSHOMANE: That's correct.

CHAIRPERSON: Whereabout did you receive your training?

MR TSHOMANE: In Swaziland.

CHAIRPERSON: And you also mention that you used a vehicle that was stolen for purposes of this operation? In other words to get you to the place where you laid the explosive device on the railway line. Did you yourself steal the car?

MR TSHOMANE: Yes, I'm the person who stole the car.

CHAIRPERSON: What did you do with the vehicle after the completion of the operation?

MR TSHOMANE: After the operation we give these cars to our Commanders.

CHAIRPERSON: And did that in fact happen with this particular vehicle that you used?

MR TSHOMANE: Yes, that's correct.

CHAIRPERSON: And we've heard, well we know from the record and also from what Mr Steenkamp has said, that a girl was injured as a result of the explosion and that you learnt about that from newspaper reports, is that correct?

MR TSHOMANE: That's correct, Sir.

CHAIRPERSON: Did you - when you laid the explosive device, what were your intentions with regard to injuring or killing people, if any?

MR TSHOMANE: I did not have the intention to injure any person, because the time when we put those explosives there, was the time when people were not in that area.

CHAIRPERSON: Yes. Was the intention to derail a train, or just to damage a railway line?

MR TSHOMANE: Our intention was just to damage the railway line.

CHAIRPERSON: Did you - if you blow up a railway line, how can you exclude the possibility of having a huge train crash?

MR TSHOMANE: The time that we put those explosives there was in the morning between 1 o'clock and 2 o'clock in the morning and at that time, trains were empty.

CHAIRPERSON: Yes, thank you. Mr Sandi, do you have any questions?

ADV SANDI: Yes, I have one or two. This vehicle, where was it stolen?

MR TSHOMANE: We stole the car in Johannesburg.

ADV SANDI: Did you know the owner of the vehicle?

MR TSHOMANE: No, I don't know him.

ADV SANDI: Was it - did you find it parked in the street?

MR TSHOMANE: Yes, it was parked in the street.

ADV SANDI: Can you just give us a description of this vehicle?

MR TSHOMANE: If I remember well, it was a Mazda.

ADV SANDI: Do you know the registration numbers and letters?

MR TSHOMANE: No, I do not know them.

ADV SANDI: Thank you. Thank you Mr Chairman.

CHAIRPERSON: Mr Malan?

MR MALAN: Mr Tshomane, you have no idea who this schoolgirl could be? You said you heard it over the news. Was there no name mentioned?

MR TSHOMANE: No, her name was not mentioned.

CHAIRPERSON: And you don't know the - they didn't give a description, did they, of the extent of her injuries?

MR TSHOMANE: No, they did not, Chairperson.

MR MALAN: Can you tell me where this - exactly where this is? You mention on page 3 of the bundle that it was the railway line between Mzimhlope and Pomolong stations. Whereabouts is that?

MR TSHOMANE: That is in Soweto.

MR MALAN: And Ponsola?

MR TSHOMANE: Pongola is the name of the places where I have committed other offences. I was actually answering the question there because the question wants me to state where I have committed other crimes, so I was stating that I have committed other crimes in Pongola Gate.

MR MALAN: Where is that? Is that in Northern Natal, or in Soweto?

MR TSHOMANE: It is in Natal.

MR MALAN: Is that where you stole the car? So it's Pongola.

MR TSHOMANE: No, that is where we were arrested.

MR MALAN: So where did you steal the car?

MR TSHOMANE: We stole the car in Johannesburg.

MR MALAN: Thank you very much. Thank you Chair.

CHAIRPERSON: Ms Cambanis, do you have any questions arising out of questions that have been put by the Panel?

MS CAMBANIS: No, but there is just one aspect please, if I can just ask him?

CHAIRPERSON: Certainly.

FURTHER EXAMINATION BY MS CAMBANIS: Did you derive any personal benefit from this operation? Were you paid for this operation of Umkhonto?

MR TSHOMANE: No, we were not paid.

MS CAMBANIS: Thank you. 

NO FURTHER QUESTIONS BY MS CAMBANIS

CHAIRPERSON: Mr Steenkamp, do you have any questions arising?

ADV STEENKAMP: No questions, thank you Chairperson.

NO QUESTIONS BY ADV STEENKAMP

MR MALAN: Mr Steenkamp, do you have any information whether the Analysts or Investigators communicated with Spoornet?

ADV STEENKAMP: Indeed, Mr Chairman, I was informed yesterday that Spoornet actually did receive a notice as well and their legal department was informed about this process.

MR MALAN: No, that's not my question. I'm concerned about the identity of the victim who would be entitled to that status in terms of the Act, if amnesty is granted and I want to know whether everything had been done to trace and locate the victim.

ADV STEENKAMP: Honourable Chairperson, we did, as far as I am concerned, we did everything, even contacting Spoornet as well to find whether or not we could find any accident reports on that day. We couldn't find any ...(intervention)

MR MALAN: On what day, Mr Steenkamp, because we don't know what the day is?

ADV STEENKAMP: I mean during that year then, during that year.

MR MALAN: Mr Steenkamp, do you have such record there?

ADV STEENKAMP: No, I don't have such records Honourable Chairperson.

MR MALAN: Well will you get it and let us have it please?

ADV STEENKAMP: Chairman, ...(intervention)

MR MALAN: If you tell us that such inquiries were indeed done, I want proof of that.

ADV STEENKAMP: They were done by our analyst and I was informed that not only that, but they did send out notices in all the different newspapers to find out ...(intervention)

MR MALAN: No, I'm not talking about that. I'm not talking about that. I'm asking you about a direct communication with Spoornet in connection with a blast on the railway line between Mzimhlope and Pomolong, somewhere in 1987. You're telling me such ...(intervention)

ADV STEENKAMP: There was communication between our analyst and Spoornet definitely yes.

MR MALAN: Did you see that?

ADV STEENKAMP: I didn't see that, I spoke to the analyst yesterday.

MR MALAN: Who was that analyst? Surely you should remember who that analyst was.

ADV STEENKAMP: If it was - I can't remember her surname now unfortunately, but I spoke to her ...

MR MALAN: What's her first name?

ADV STEENKAMP: Linda.

MR MALAN: Linda Modai?

ADV STEENKAMP: Yes, that's correct. 

MR MALAN: We'll check that and follow up and try to see if we can locate the victim.

ADV STEENKAMP: I will do that.

MR MALAN: Thank you. Thank you Chair.

CHAIRPERSON: Just before you finish, Mr Tshomane, just perhaps to assist in this regard. You know that the incident occurred in 1987. Have you any idea or can you recall perhaps in which month it occurred? If you can't, then just say so.

MR TSHOMANE: I do not remember.

CHAIRPERSON: Thank you. Mr Tshomane, that concludes your evidence. You may stand down now.

WITNESS EXCUSED

CHAIRPERSON: Ms Cambanis, are you calling any other witnesses?

MS CAMBANIS: No other witnesses, except to confirm that I act for Mr Jo Khotle and that he confirms what he's said at page 11.

CHAIRPERSON: Thank you. Mr Steenkamp?

ADV STEENKAMP: Honourable Chair, that will be this application then. I would suggest that maybe if the Panel can just take two or three minutes adjournment, that the rest of the people can just take their seats.

CHAIRPERSON: Ms Cambanis, we prefer to hand down written decisions, so for that reason we shall be reserving the decision, which we hope will be published as soon as possible in the near future. Thank you very much for your assistance in this matter.

MS CAMBANIS: I am most disturbed. I prepared for days, argument on this matter.

CHAIRPERSON: Oh, sorry, well you can have argument.

MS CAMBANIS: But I submit that he complies with Section 20 (a), (b) and (c). Thank you.

CHAIRPERSON: Yes. Thank you. We'll take a short adjournment now so that we can reconvene. Thank you.

COMMITTEE ADJOURNS

NAME:&#9;JEROME JOSEPH MAAKE

APPLICATION NO: AM 7756/97

MATTER:&#9;TSANTSABELA OPERATION, DENNILTON MAGISTRATE'S COURT OPERATION, KILLING OF LIEUT PETRUS FOURIE AND MARK FOURIE AND THE KWAGGA POLICE STATION OPERATION

-------------------------------------------------------------------------- ON RESUMPTION

CHAIRPERSON: Thank you. We will now commence with the application hearings of Messrs E. Mathebe, C. Mathebe, P. Mathebe and J Maake. I've already introduced the Panel. I would at this stage request the legal representatives to kindly place themselves on record.

MR KOOPEDI: Thank you Chairperson. My name is Brian Koopedi. I represent the four applicants before you.

CHAIRPERSON: Thank you Mr Koopedi. Mr Engelbrecht.

MR ENGELBRECHT: Chairperson, my name is Jan Engelbrecht. I represent Mrs Fourie. All the other Fourie people are also present. I do not directly represent them for these purposes.

CHAIRPERSON: Thank you Mr Engelbrecht.

ADV STEENKAMP: Thank you Chairman. My surname is Steenkamp. I'll be the Evidence Leader and just for the record, one of the other victims, one of the other matters, Inspector Sipongwane is present here today. I am not officially representing him, but my request is that if there are any questions that he would like to raise after the testimony, that he can do so. At the moment my instructions are that he is not opposing the application in totality whatsoever.

CHAIRPERSON: But you'll nevertheless look after his interests, should the need arise.

ADV STEENKAMP: If that can be allowed ... (indistinct -speaking simultaneously) Thank you Chairperson.

CHAIRPERSON: Yes thank you. Mr Koopedi.

MR KOOPEDI: Chairperson, I believe we are ready to begin and if the Honourable Committee would allow us, we would like to call the applicants in another order, not as they have been indicated in our documents and the order will be, the first will be Jerome Maake and then followed by Piet Mathebe, the third one be Doctor Mathebe, Charles Doctor Mathebe and the fourth one be Chakie Edison Mathebe.

CHAIRPERSON: Thank you Mr Koopedi. So you'll be commencing with the evidence of Mr Maake?

MR KOOPEDI: That is indeed so.

CHAIRPERSON: Yes.&#9;&#9;&#9;&#9;&#9;&#9;&#9; 

MR KOOPEDI: Chairperson, Mr Maake is seated right next to me. He's ready to be sworn in.

CHAIRPERSON: Thank you. 

JEROME JOSEPH MAAKE: (sworn states)

CHAIRPERSON: Mr Koopedi.

EXAMINATION BY MR KOOPEDI: Mr Maake, is it correct that you are an applicant in this matter?

MR MAAKE: That is correct.

MR KOOPEDI: Is it also correct that the document appearing on page 62 to 68 or this bundle of documents, that is the document I'm showing to you now, is your application form?

MR MAAKE: That's correct.

MR KOOPEDI: Is it also correct that the signature on page 67 is your signature?

MR MAAKE: That's correct.

MR KOOPEDI: Would you briefly enlighten this Honourable Committee as to your activities and perhaps starting first with when did you join the ANC and where?

MR MAAKE: 

&#9;&#9;"My name is Jerome Joseph Maake. I joined the ANC in 1980 Swaziland. I was trained in Angola and then I came back into the country in 1981. I conducted operations in the then Northern Transvaal.

&#9;&#9;In 1982 I was arrested and I was sentenced to 13 years imprisonment and I was sent to Robben Island. In 1985 I made an appeal and I won that appeal and there was a re-trial in Pietersburg and I was given a suspended sentence.

&#9;&#9;In 1985, after the State of Emergency was declared, I left the country again and I attended a refresher course in Angola. In 1986, I infiltrated the country again and I operated in the Mawudse area. There was a problem concerning the incorporation of Mawudse into the then KwaNdebele. My main task was to train the Comrades in the vicinity of Mawudse so that they could resist that incorporation into KwaNdebele. I became the Operational Commander in my unit at Mawudse.

&#9;&#9;In this unit was myself, Piet Mathebe, Doctor Mathebe and Chakie Mathebe and Mike. Our unit was responsible for several operations. The first one was the Tsantsabela or Sansloo operation where our unit received a message that one of our comrades, that is Khala, he has been kidnapped and it was believed that the person who kidnapped him is the same person who threatened him at that day, so our main aim was to go and get that person as Tsantsabela, that is the place where comrade Khala was. 

&#9;&#9;Unfortunately when we arrived there, when we wanted to go with him he said he was afraid to go with us. I remember I fired three to four shots at him and a commotion ensued and there and then we decided to retreat. Our second operation was ...(indistinct)"

CHAIRPERSON: Sorry to interrupt. You say you fired three or four shots at him. Did you strike him, hit him with the bullets?

MR MAAKE: I do not remember because it was at night. I didn't receive a report-back about what happened, but I shot in his direction.

CHAIRPERSON: And did you see him fall, or - could you just give a couple of more details - how far were you from him when you shot him?

MR MAAKE: I could have been about 10 metres from him because he was running away. If I remember well, he did fall.

CHAIRPERSON: And did you have an AK47 or did you have a pistol? What sort of firearm?

MR MAAKE: I had an AK47 and it was on semi-automatic. &#9;"The second operation was Sempupule or Dennilton Magistrate Court. It is known as Sempupule. In that operation we used a limpet mine because people were being harassed in that area. We undertook reconnaissance of that Magistrates Court and we decided that the best way was to put a limpet mine in order to destroy that building. Because that Court always had people, we decided to put that limpet on Friday in the afternoon. According to the delay mechanism of this limpet mine, it was supposed to have exploded within two to three hours but what happened, it did not explode from Friday, Saturday until Sunday and then on Monday we decided that the delay mechanism of ... (indistinct) had a problem and we decided that we have to warn the people that there was an explosive in that building. Our unit decided to send one of us to go and phone to warn the people there that there was an explosive there and I later learnt that that limpet mine was destroyed."

CHAIRPERSON: Sorry, Mr Maake, so when you originally placed and if it had worked according to your plan, at what time of the day would it have gone off, if nothing had gone wrong?

MR MAAKE: It was supposed to have exploded at around half-past three. It was put there rather at half-past three and was supposed to explode around 5 o'clock.

CHAIRPERSON: That is when the work of the Court is finished?

MR MAAKE: That's correct. ...(no translation)

CHAIRPERSON: We're not getting the interpretation coming through.

MR MAAKE: 

&#9;&#9;"The next operation took place at Mothethe, the corner of Mothethe at the T-junction between the road from Marble Hall and Dennilton, that was supposed to have been an ambush. At that corner it was the place where many policemen used to meet, policemen from Kwagga police station, Siabuswa and Dennilton, when they were meeting there to plan their harassment operations, so we decided that that was the right place, so that the police vehicle could not pass there. If I remember well it was at night, at around 9 to 10 o'clock at night. It was the three of us, in fact we were four. Our drive was Chakie Mathebe who waited for us in the vehicle a distance from that corner. We were waiting for any police vehicle that would come. We will identify that vehicle by its numberplate. While we were still waiting there, myself, Mike and Johnny, a vehicle appeared. If I remember well, it was a white car. There was a green lamp on top of that vehicle. He turned at that place and came to a standstill and then we realised that was a police vehicle, then we shot at it and then from there we retreated and we left with our vehicle."

CHAIRPERSON: Sorry Mr Maake again. You said yourself, Mike and Johnny. Now you mentioned Mike earlier as being a member of your unit. Do you know what his name was, or was that just his operative - his war name? Who was Mike?

MR MAAKE: I don't know the real names. We used our pseudo names. I wouldn't know their full names but as far as I know he was from that area and he was trained from outside and the same thing applies to Johnny. He also worked with us in the same unit.

CHAIRPERSON: And you don't know where they are today?

MR MAAKE: I learnt that Mike died in an operation on the way from Swaziland to the RSA. I'm not sure about Johnny because since I was injured I left the unit and went back to Zambia where I received treatment.

CHAIRPERSON: Yes and did all three of you shoot at the vehicle, you, Mike and Johnny?

MR MAAKE: If I remember well, the person who struck the car was Johnny, we were just providing a cover, but also firing. When we were firing we were also retreating.

CHAIRPERSON: And this was - was it with AK47s?

MR MAAKE: That's correct.

&#9;&#9;"Another operation took place at Kwagga police station. At that operation we also used a limpet mine. After we realised that the limpet mine that we used at the Sempupule Magistrate Court had a problem with its delay mechanism, we decided to booby trap this one because its timing mechanism is a plate, then we decided to remove that plate so that immediately you pull out that pin, it explodes. My understanding of the three foot pot was that its material was the same one that is used for hand grenades, so we used that big pot, the biggest one, three foot pot and then we put the limpet mine inside and then we constructed a flag on that pot and we wrote that MK is here. We took that pot and we put it at the corner of the police station. That would mean that if you pull out the flag, the limpet mine would immediately explode. I don't know whether it did explode because it was never reported in the newspapers or radios.

&#9;&#9;Another operation is the Dennilton police station operation. We undertooK a reconnaissance of that police station and our understanding was that the police station could be attacked. We went there on Friday around 8 o'clock in the evening and then we took cover next to the police station. Our aim was to attack that police station around 9 o'clock in the evening, but people were going in and out of that police station, so we could not go there whilst civilians were at the police station. We waited there from around 8 o'clock until the early hours of the morning the following day and at that time there was no civilians at the police station. When we tried to get inside the gates were locked and we shot from outside the fence into the police station and we threw in a mini limpet mine which did not explode and there was also an exchange of fire that ensued. The police were shooting back at us. After that we fled."

CHAIRPERSON: Mr Maake, when you say we, who carried out that operation with you?

MR MAAKE: 

&#9;&#9;"Still on this operation, I was with Chakie who was the driver. He was at a distance of between one to two kilometres away from us. I was with Mike and Johnny again."

MR KOOPEDI: I believe that is the whole detail of the operations which you were involved in, which are the subject of the application for amnesty today. Is that correct?

MR MAAKE: That is correct.

MR KOOPEDI: Now, do you think that you have told this Honourable Committee the whole truth as far as you can recall?

MR MAAKE: That's correct.

MR KOOPEDI: And do you strongly believe that you have dealt with the requirement of full disclosure which is required from you, for you to be able to get any amnesty?

MR MAAKE: That's correct.

MR KOOPEDI: Now did you receive any personal gain, payment or anything of the sort for having participated in these operations?

MR MAAKE: The only thing that I gained is that South Africa is today liberated and all of us can vote.

MR KOOPEDI: Now your actions, do you regard them as having been politically motivated and with a political objective?

MR MAAKE: That's correct.

MR KOOPEDI: Chairperson, that is the evidence for our first applicant. Thank you.

NO FURTHER QUESTIONS BY MR KOOPEDI

CHAIRPERSON: Thank you Mr Koopedi. Mr Engelbrecht, do you have any questions that you would like to put to Mr Maake?

CROSS-EXAMINATION BY MR ENGELBRECHT: Could you explain what political gain, what was the political reasoning for these actions?

MR MAAKE: South Africa was then in a state of war. It was a political war as far as I'm concerned, and all the operations that I was involved in were aimed at the core of the system itself. That is the police, the police stations and those were the people who were at the core of the operation, so I believe that everything that I did was political.

MR ENGELBRECHT: What was the involvement of Chief Mathebe?

MR MAAKE: Chief Mathebe was one of my recruits and he received training from me internally. He was in our command structure.

MR ENGELBRECHT: Was he anyhow involved with the operation pertaining to the Fourie police people?

MR MAAKE: Because we planned together as the command structure for each and every operation, as far as I'm concerned he was involved because he was part of the people who undertook the planning.

MR ENGELBRECHT: Were there any people supporting your action and your operation who were members of the police at that particular station at that particular time and stage?

CHAIRPERSON: Which station are you talking about, the Dennilton or Kwagga? Just Dennilton station?

MR ENGELBRECHT: Yes Chair.

MR MAAKE: There were no policemen in our unit.

CHAIRPERSON: I think the question was not whether they were in your unit, but whether there was any assistance received from any policemen in your operations.

MR MAAKE: No. As far as I remember, we never received any support from the police.

MR ENGELBRECHT: How long in advance before this operation took an event, has it been planned and decided and who were the people involved in the planning?

MR MAAKE: Which operation are you referring to? Are you referring to the police station operation, or the Fourie operation?

MR ENGELBRECHT: I am referring to the Fourie operation.

MR MAAKE: There was no specific time frame that you could put for planning and the time of implementation of the plan or the operation itself. It is difficult for me to say that we planned that for two days or so, but because it was at the corner, that we knew that police will definitely come at that place. I don't think that it took us a long time to undertake the planning.

MR ENGELBRECHT: What I need to know is, was it an impulsive decision on that particular date, to, at that particular date that evening go down and do the operation, or was the operation planned before the evening?

MR MAAKE: We made a plan before that time.

MR ENGELBRECHT: Sir, could you lead me on how long before the incident occurred did you do the planning? Certainly you should remember that?

MR MAAKE: Like I've said earlier on, I would not be able to estimate when we did the planning and when we implemented the plan but we decided that that was a good spot for ambush.

MR ENGELBRECHT: I learnt from your testimony that ...(intervention)

MR MALAN: Sorry just before you proceed. On this point, Mr Maake, is it possible that you got to that decision on that same afternoon or evening and decided simply to go to that spot to see if you could find a police vehicle stopping there that night and implement the operation? Could it have been on the same day?

MR MAAKE: Like I said, on deciding about the ambush spot, we might have decided about that long ago, that that was the appropriate spot. We didn't plan for a specific person or for a specific car, we just planned that at that spot, the police would definitely pass there.

MR MALAN: I'm not sure that you understand my question. I asked you whether it was possible, because you are saying you can't remember at all when the planning was done, if I understood you correctly. My question is, is it possible that you planned on that afternoon? You see, if you'll bear with me Mr Engelbrecht, I can's see what much planning you had to do because it seems all you had to do was to take the AK47s and move to the spot and if you do find a vehicle, to shoot at the police. That's not planning, that's simply a decision and implementing it. There's no logistics that you have to attend to, so my question is simply, is it possible that the decision to carry out such an operation was made on the same day? Is it possible?

MR MAAKE: Yes, that's correct.

MR MALAN: Thank you. Thank you Mr Engelbrecht.

MR ENGELBRECHT: Thank you Chairperson. Why would it have been beneficial to kill the police or pardon me, to do the operation in which police people were evidently killed? Why would it have been beneficial for your operation, for your whole enterprise which you had there, Sir?

MR MAAKE: As I said earlier on, policemen were the symbol of oppression and in the vicinity of Mawudse, there was ...(indistinct) and other members of the police were involved in harassing the people, searching their houses, assaulting them and they were seen by the community as enemy number one of the people. Shooting of them would depose to the morale of the people and it would also show that we could fight back and that would demoralise the police themselves.

MR ENGELBRECHT: Sir when I listen to your testimony pertaining to the limpet planning or the second operation more specifically, I got the impression that it is your policy not to have caused harm or injury to women and children, is that correct?

MR MAAKE: That's correct.

MR ENGELBRECHT: On the particular evening when this incident occurred during the third operation, there was a young person together with Lieut Fourie, accidentally happening to be his son, were you aware of that fact, or not?

MR MAAKE: I know today.

MR ENGELBRECHT: On the particular evening, had you had any notice of who the in sitting people of the vehicle were?

MR MAAKE: Our understanding was that they were policemen because the registration number of the vehicle indicated that the vehicle belonged to the kwaNdebele police and it also had a green light on top.

MR ENGELBRECHT: There might be some technical issues pertaining to my next question and I would wish the Chair to direct me on these matters, but on page 74 of the transcription, there is a statement, a report by the Chief PM, Mathebe, in connection with the amnesty application of Charles Mathebe and if I may refer your attention to paragraph 4 of the said statement, on to page 74 and I quote there, it reads as follows:

&#9;&#9;"The second operation which was also sanctioned by our structure, was that of Lieut Fourie and his son, at Mothethe."

It seemingly, or the impression one gets from reading this report is that it was known that the Lieutenant, together with his son, would have been there. If you could just explain the seeming contradiction which I find here, Sir.

MR MAAKE: Now I have explained that the people who were in the vehicle, we only knew about them after the operation, that is when we read that in the newspapers. According to our plan, it was to ambush the police vehicle at that spot. There was no way that we could have known earlier on who would be the occupants of the vehicles at what time. We only learnt that after.

MR ENGELBRECHT: Could you explain to the Tribunal that the location of your self, Mike and Johnny on this particular evening pertaining and regarding the vehicle, where was each one of the people standing, where were they shooting at, and more particulars regarding that, please.

CHAIRPERSON: Just before you get onto that, Mr Maake, this intersection to Marble Hall and Dennilton, is it in a rural area? Is it in the countryside or is it within a village, or what is the situation? What does- at that time what did the T-junction look like? Where was it, in a built-up area or was it out in the country somewhere?

MR MAAKE: It is outside the village. The village is about 500 metres from the T-junction.

CHAIRPERSON: So there's no buildings right at the place, no houses or shops, or petrol stations or anything like that, right at the intersection?

MR MAAKE: I remember there was a garage but it is at a distance from the T-junction itself. It can be about 500 metres from the T-junction.

CHAIRPERSON: Thank you. Now Mr Engelbrecht has asked if you could just give some detail as to the actual attack, you know, where the vehicle was where you attacked it, where you positioned yourself, Mike and Johnny, Chakie, if you could just describe how the actual attack was carried out.

MR MAAKE: Okay. What happened was that myself and Mike, I think that the best way would be for me to make a sketch, but I can try it in this way. The car was coming from the Marble Hall direction and then it turned as if it was going towards Dennilton and then it turned around, made a u-turn and then in the direction of Marble Hall again and then we were on the left-hand side of the car. Where I was standing with Mike, I was at the corner but along the road to Dennilton and Johnny was on the other side next to the road to Kwagga.

MR ENGELBRECHT: Could I get some more indication Sir, yourself together with one person on the left-hand side of the vehicle and Johnny on the other side of the vehicle?

MR MAAKE: I say the car came and made a u-turn at that T-junction, as if it was going to Dennilton and it made a u-turn and it stopped on the left-hand side of the road to Marble Hall, we were on the opposite side.

MR ENGELBRECHT: Did you shoot at the car when it was in a stationery position or when it was still in movement?

MR MALAN: I think he said it had stopped, Mr Engelbrecht.

MR ENGELBRECHT: The other people who accompanied you, where did they - are you familiar with where they got their training and how they became members of the structure?

MR MAAKE: I know they were trained outside the country and they were members of the MK.

MR ENGELBRECHT: When did you take command of the operations in that particular area? I learnt that you came there that particular year, did you immediately take command or was it only after some time and how long had you been in command when this operation pertaining to the Fouries, took an ...(indistinct)?

MR MAAKE: I have explained this earlier on and I said that most of the people that I worked with were internally trained by myself, so that means that I was their Commander.

MR ENGELBRECHT: I have no further questions at this particular time and stage, Chairperson. 

NO FURTHER QUESTIONS BY MR ENGELBRECHT

CHAIRPERSON: Thank you Mr Engelbrecht. Mr Steenkamp, do you have any questions that you would like to put to the witness?

ADV STEENKAMP: Thank you Honourable Chairman. My instructions from the victim is not to ask any questions at this stage. Thank you.

NO QUESTIONS BY ADV STEENKAMP

CHAIRPERSON: Thank you. Mr Sandi, any questions? Mr Malan any questions?

MR MALAN: Mr Maake, I just want to go back to the question about the planning. You will appreciate it that this has been the subject of speculation as to who had ben responsible now for the best part of 15 years and it created a major question in the minds of the next of kin, but really everyone. There were all kinds of innuendos and let me just put it to you that the impression led there is that this was a kind of almost on the spot decision. It was - it couldn't really have been a long term planning thing as you have conceded that the decision could have been taken on the same day. Can you remember where this decision was taken?

MR MAAKE: The decision for the operation, like I said earlier on, was the identification of that particular spot as a good ambush spot, that meant if we were to undertake an ambush, that would be an ideal sport. I would not be sure as to when we decided about that because we sit down and think about possible targets. Sometimes possible targets will be police stations, Magistrate's Courts and others and this spot was one of the areas on which we could ambush. I cannot say that on a specific day we sat down and planned the operation, but as far as I remember, what we used to do, somebody will go there under the instruction of the unit to reconnoitre the place and thereafter we would take a decision on the basis of the information that we'd received from him.

MR MALAN: I don't want any explanation as to how you would normally have planned. I want you to speak only to your recollection and if you can't recollect it, then just say so. I'm not trying to put you on the spot. I'm trying to get some clarity for the sake of the next of kin of the Fourie father and son. My question really was, can you remember where you were when the planning was done, when this decision was taken and can you remember who was present?

MR MAAKE: I cannot remember the place where we took the decision, but I remember that Chakie and Kgoshi were there.

MR MALAN: Chakie and?

MR MAAKE: Chakie Mathebe and Petros Mathebe, they were part of the Command structure of this unit. That is when we were coming to identify that spot as an appropriate spot for ambush.

MR MALAN: Now a follow-up question from that, why did you decide to involve only Johnny, Mike and Chakie? Why did you not involve the other decision makers in the command structure, in your unit, in carrying out this operation?

MR MAAKE: I don't think I remember your question well. If you had a three AK47s, that would mean that you are going to use three people. We involved Chakie as a driver, there was no need to have many people, three people were enough for the operation, if I understood your question well.

MR MALAN: No. Are you saying that you had only three AK47s at the time, or did you say that you thought three people would be enough?

MR MAAKE: Three people were enough for that type of an operation.

MR MALAN: So you can't recall why you decided on the specific three people? Why Johnny and Mike and not, for instance, Charles Doctor or Piet Mathebe?

MR MAAKE: Okay. Mike and Johnny were trained outside the country. At that time, the other people were only internally trained.

MR MALAN: Thank you, that it explains it to me. Thank you very much, Mr Maake. Thank you Chair.

CHAIRPERSON: Mr Maake, with regard to the incident where Khala was abducted and then you went and there was the shooting. The victim there who's been referred to variously as Mr Mishi or Mnisi, from the papers its not 100% clear whether he was injured. I've seen some statements saying that he wasn't injured and I've seen other statements saying that he was shot in the leg because he was seen on crutches. Did you see him after the incident?

MR MAAKE: No, I haven't.

CHAIRPERSON: So you don't know yourself personally whether he was injured or not?

MR MAAKE: No, I don't.

CHAIRPERSON: But it would seem that if he was injured, the extent of the injury was a shot in the leg?

MR MAAKE: That's correct.

CHAIRPERSON: With regard to the attack on the Dennilton police station where you waited till the early hours of the morning and you started shooting from the fence because the gate was locked, did you just shoot at the building, or were you aiming at policemen that you could see? What was the situation there? Was it just random shooting at the building or were you sharp-shooting? Sniping at policemen?

MR MAAKE: We were shooting through the windows. From where we were standing at the gate to the entrance of the police station, my estimation is that it can bee 25 metres, so we were shooting through the window and the door.

CHAIRPERSON: Do you personally know, we know from the papers, but at the time of that attack when you terminated it and left, were you aware that you had injured anybody at all, or didn't you know at that time?

MR MAAKE: I did not know, even today I do not know whether a person was injured in that shooting.

CHAIRPERSON: With regard to the attack on Lieut Fourie and his son at the T-junction, whereabout did Chakie park your vehicle in relation to the T-junction?

MR MAAKE: He was at the next village, about three to four kilometres from where we were, that is from the T-junction.

CHAIRPERSON: Was that the first time ...(intervention)

INTERPRETER: The speaker's mike.

CHAIRPERSON: Sorry. Was that the first time that you or members of your unit had gone to that intersection to wait for police or had you or any of your members been there previously and waited unsuccessfully when no police turned up?

MR MAAKE: It was for the first time besides the reconnaissance.

CHAIRPERSON: Now, how long had you been waiting there before the vehicle arrived, the vehicle that you ultimately shot at?

MR MAAKE: I would not be sure, but it can be around 30 minutes because where we were standing was something like a taxi rank or a bus stop because taxis used to stop there. We were waiting there just like any other people and there were also other two people waiting there, waiting for the taxi.

CHAIRPERSON: Yes, and I don't know if you had thought about it, but had you made up your minds or discussed how long you would have waited, I mean, if that vehicle didn't come, would you sit there the whole night, or what did you say to Chakie when you left him, when will you see him again? How long was he expected to wait for you? If nothing happened, let's assume nothing happened, how long would you have waited for a vehicle?

MR MAAKE: We didn't plan as to how long we were going to wait there, we just told Chakie to wait for us until we come back. Because of the movements of police in that area at that time, we didn't expect to be there for a long time.

CHAIRPERSON: Thank you. Mr Koopedi, do you have any questions arising out of questions that have been put by members of the Panel?

MR MALAN: Chair, just before Mr Koopedi proceeds, flowing from an answer given to one of your questions. You said you were waiting at the taxi rank and there were other people there and you specifically remember two people waiting. Where did you keep the AK47s when you were standing at a taxi rank, taxis are stopping and departing?

MR MAAKE: They were in the bag, we put them in the bag.

MR MALAN: Thank you.

CHAIRPERSON: Any questions arising Mr Koopedi?

MR KOOPEDI: No questions, thanks Chairperson.

NO RE-EXAMINATION BY MR KOOPEDI

CHAIRPERSON: Mr Engelbrecht, any questions arising?

MR ENGELBRECHT: Please Chairperson.

FURTHER CROSS-EXAMINATION BY MR ENGELBRECHT: My question only relates to the organisational aspect of the structure. Sir, would you agree that an operation is complete when the aim is achieved?

MR MAAKE: I don't think I understand your question well.

MR ENGELBRECHT: I'll put it to you more directly. It strikes me peculiar that after the shooting of the police station, no follow-up was done to see who was struck and who was not struck. Only after the shooting of the Fouries had already taken place, you learn in the newspaper that there was a son involved and it strikes me surprising that something is planned, but it seems not, to me, whether yourself in your capacity then as the leader of the structure, follows up whether what has been planned has been actually executed and completed, so can you explain to me then, if not to the Tribunal, how come that afterwards assessment of what has been achieved, has never been done properly?

MR MAAKE: In this operation involving Mr Fourie and his son, it was reported in the City Press newspaper. It was explained that it was Mr Fourie who was a Commander of the KwaNdebele police and his son, who was an instructor in Pretoria police college. That was what appeared on the City Press report.

MR ENGELBRECHT: Within your organisation, how many people should be present when a meeting is chaired? How are the decisions made? Is it done per consensus, or are you actually guiding the people to give them instructions and they must execute that? Can you just explain to the Commission how the organisational aspects of your command structure look like?

MR MAAKE: Are you referring to the plans?

CHAIRPERSON: I think what Mr Engelbrecht is asking is, how did you arrive at decisions? When I say you, your unit or your command structure, how did you work? Did you work by consensus or would you as a Commander say: "Well, this is it" and everybody would go along with you? He just wants to know how you functioned and what procedures you adopted, if any, in arriving at decisions regarding operations.

MR MAAKE: It would depend on the type of the operation, but usually we would sit down as the command structure and decide and then we will send somebody to go and undertake a reconnaissance and then thereafter we will agree on the operation. On the operational part, two people would be given the task of planning on the type of material that would be used in the operation, that happens after the reconnaissance. It was not just a one-man show.

MR MALAN: I think the question, just also for my sake, is when you sit down on the command structure and you come to a decision, do you vote, do you simply all agree, if someone would be dissenting would you discuss it further, how - was there any prescriptions as to how you had to get to a decision? That's how I understood Mr Engelbrecht's question.

MR MAAKE: We take a decision and everybody has a right to air his views. Every person has a right to disagree with the operation, so we will discuss that and debate about it before we arrive at a decision, whether this is an appropriate target or not.

CHAIRPERSON: And then was your decision usually on a consensus basis, where everybody then would agree, or would you go ahead with an operation where two of your members would say: "No, we're very much against it", but because three have said: "Yes, we're for it", you would carry it out, or did you work on a consensus basis where you all at the time of making the decision, were in favour of it?

MR MAAKE: As far as I can recollect, I don't remember any disagreement amongst ourselves, but we wouldn't simply go for an operation if there was no agreement about it.

CHAIRPERSON: Mr Engelbrecht.

MR MAAKE: The decisions made by the unit you were the Commander of, did that have to be ratified or sanctioned by a higher office, a higher unit, a higher command structure, before operation and if so, did that in particular happen, pertaining to the shooting of the police people at the T-junction?

MR MAAKE: No, we were the last people to take the decision. The general order that was given from PMC in Lusaka was that because people were being harassed, they were forced to - the people of Mawudse were forced to be reincorporated into KwaNdebele and they resisted that so the decision about a specific operation was taken by us.

MR ENGELBRECHT: I wish to ask you ...(intervention)

ADV SANDI: Sorry, Mr Engelbrecht. I'm not sure, will you be moving on to something else? Just on this, did you give any report subsequent to this operation? Did you give any report to anybody in Lusaka about this operation?

MR MAAKE: That's correct.

ADV SANDI: Who was the report given to and when was that?

MR MAAKE: I reported to members of the PMC in Lusaka. If I remember well there was Chris Hani, Ronnie Kasrills and JJ Jele and Sue Rapkin.

ADV SANDI: Was that immediately after the operation had been carried out?

MR MAAKE: I'm not sure whether it was immediately after the operation, but it could be three to four months thereafter.

ADV SANDI: Just explain one thing to me, who was the first person in your group to suggest that you should go to this T-junction and wait for a police vehicle? Whose initial idea was this?

MR MAAKE: I would not be able to remember because we worked as a unit. I don't remember who specifically suggested that.

ADV SANDI: Thank you. Thank you Mr Engelbrecht.

MR MALAN: Sorry. Just flowing from this again. I'm sorry Mr Engelbrecht. If my mind serves me, or my memory serves me correctly, the ANC did not, in their submission to the TRC, accept responsibility for this Fourie operation. Now if you did report to them, why did they not do it? Who specifically did you report to? And I'm open to correction, but to the best of my memory, they did not accept responsibility. They didn't know how this happened. Who did you report to? You gave four names, did you do it telephonically? Did you go over there?

MR MAAKE: I went in person to Lusaka. I reported to them in Lusaka. 

MR MALAN: Can you tell us why they would not have accepted the responsibility, this having been reported to them?

MR MAAKE: Well, I don't have an idea why.

MR MALAN: Thank you.

MR ENGELBRECHT: Chairperson, my question has been taken by the person from the Council. Thank you Chairperson.

NO FURTHER QUESTIONS BY MR ENGELBRECHT

CHAIRPERSON: Thank you. Mr Steenkamp, any questions that you'd like to put?

ADV STEENKAMP: No questions, thank you.

NO QUESTIONS BY ADV STEENKAMP

CHAIRPERSON: Mr Maake, thank you. That concludes your testimony. You may stand down now.

WITNESS EXCUSED

MR KOOPEDI: Chairperson, if allowed by this Committee, we would like to call Mr Piet Mathebe, the second applicant.

NAME: &#9;PIET MOHLAMME MATHEBE

APPLICATION NO: AM 5696\97

MATTER: &#9;TSANTSABELA OPERATION, DENNILTON MAGISTRATE'S COURT OPERATION, KILLING OF LIEUT PETRUS FOURIE AND MARK FOURIE AND THE KWAGGA POLICE STATION OPERATION

--------------------------------------------------------------------------MR KOOPEDI: Chairperson, Mr Mathebe, Kgoshi Mathebe is seated here ready to be sworn in.

CHAIRPERSON: Thank you. 

PIET MOHLAMME MATHEBE: (sworn states)

CHAIRPERSON: Mr Koopedi.

EXAMINATION BY MR KOOPEDI: Thank you Chairperson. Mr Mathebe, we have an application here on page 29 of the bundle of documents. Would this be your application form?

MR MATHEBE: That's correct.

MR KOOPEDI: And at the back of this application, there is a signature which is on page 34, would that be your signature?

MR MATHEBE: That's correct.

MR KOOPEDI: Now you've heard the evidence given by your co-applicant, Mr Jerome Maake and would you confirm the contents of his evidence in as far as it affects you, particularly you know, in terms of him having trained you?

MR MATHEBE: That's correct.

MR KOOPEDI: Now would you briefly tell this Honourable Committee where and when did you join up with the MK structures?

MR MATHEBE: I joined the ANC in 1987 in South Africa. I was trained internally by Jerome Maake. After the training, I was in the command structure of the same unit. I was involved in all those operations that he has mentioned. I was also involved when we planned them and when we took decisions and in other operations, I was personally involved, like it Tsantsabela in the one and the police station. From there, at the end of 1987 I went to Botswana via Zimbabwe and to Zambia. From Zambia I went to Angola for further training and then from Angola, I came back in 1980. At the beginning of that year, I was infiltrated into the country and then I was in the unit of Ntjabeleng, where I was the Commander of that unit.

MR KOOPEDI: Regard being had to the lengthy evidence been given by your co-applicant, Mr Maake and the brief evidence you've just given, would you say that you have told the whole truth, in as far as these operations are concerned?

MR MATHEBE: The way I know all these operations in our unit, he has disclosed all the facts about them.

MR KOOPEDI: Did you receive any personal gain out of your involvement with these units and the operations? Did you receive anything at all?

MR MATHEBE: No, I did not.

MR KOOPEDI: Now the political objective, what would you tell this Honourable Committee would have been the political objective of your operations? What did you hope to get politically?

MR MATHEBE: Our aims were to help the people of South Africa who were harassed by the police at that time, specifically at Mawudse, they were the people who resisted the incorporation into KwaNdebele, so we were there to help them.

MR KOOPEDI: Chairperson, that is the evidence by this applicant.

NO FURTHER QUESTIONS BY MR KOOPEDI

CHAIRPERSON: Thank you, Mr Koopedi. Mr Engelbrecht, do you have any questions that you would like to ask Mr Mathebe?

MR ENGELBRECHT: Thank you Chairperson. 

CROSS-EXAMINATION BY MR ENGELBRECHT: Mr Mathebe, I believe that you are the same person who made the testimony which is recorded and captured in the compilation from page 29 forward in the compilation, is that correct? 

MR MALAN: Sorry, no, it can't be 29. You're referring to page 36.

MR ENGELBRECHT: Thank you, I rephrase Chairperson. Is that correct?

MR MATHEBE: Can you please repeat the question?

CHAIRPERSON: I think the question is, do you confirm, if you take a look at page 36 of the papers through to page 61, this is apparently a transcript of evidence given by yourself before the Human Rights Violations Committee of the TRC during 1996. Mr Engelbrecht just wants to confirm whether that is so.

MR MATHEBE: That is correct.

MR ENGELBRECHT: Now, Sir, are you also the author of the report which is captured in the compilation on page 74, which reads, Report by Chief PM (I think there's a typing error), Mathebe, in connection with the amnesty application of Chakie Mathebe?

MR MATHEBE: That is correct.

MR ENGELBRECHT: Sir, with reference to this documentation I referred to just now, on page 74, paragraph 4, it reads that:

&#9;&#9;"The second operation which was also sanctioned by our structure, was that of Lieut Fourie and his son, at Mothethe."

And then on page 57 of the compilation there is recorded, your testimony which has been transcribed, it's approximately line 15 I believe, which says:

&#9;&#9;"I would not have the truth about the Fourie incident. I was just a member of the MK, but I did not play a role there."

Could you explain what seems to me to be a conflict in the two statements here, to the Commission please?

MR MATHEBE: The day they were asking me in this document, they were asking me about Mr Fourie and his wife. I didn't know any operation that involved Mr Fourie and his wife.

MR MALAN: Can you just point that to me? Where was the question asked about Fourie and his wife?

MR KOOPEDI: Page 57, Honourable Chairperson, page 57.

MR MALAN: Okay. You're referring to the question by Dr Allie?

MR ENGELBRECHT: That's correct.

MR MALAN: Is that your explanation?

CHAIRPERSON: Yes, this is at page 57, line 11, which says, and this is a question that was put by Dr Allie:

&#9;&#9;"I am sure you know the incident of the policeman Fourie and his wife?"

And then the statement there, these allegations,

&#9;&#9;"But I just wondered if you could enlighten us about some of the things that were happening during that period?

MR MATHEBE: When they were asking me questions that day, they were asking me about Mr Fourie and his wife, that's why i told them that I don't know about that operation. The only operation that I know did not involve Mrs Fourie.

MR ENGELBRECHT: Sir, I might have my reservations about your explanation now because clearly the only - any reference to the Fourie people could only have been to the operation intended to, as has been testified by the first witness today, any police people and evidently from page 74 of the compilation, it is recorded under your handwriting and signature, that you were well familiar with the second operation, sanctioned by your structure. Certainly you couldn't have thought anything else could have been referred to when you wee questioned by Dr Allie. Is that your explanation?

MR MATHEBE: There were many MK operations, so I would not accept an operation that I did not know. If they talked about his wife, there could have been maybe another operation that involved Mrs Fourie. When there were operations that involved the police, they were not publicised because they knew that would boost the morale of the people. It could have happened that there was an operation that involved a Mr Fourie and Mrs Fourie, that I did not know. If they had asked me about the operation that involved Mr Fourie and his son, I would have agreed.

MR MALAN: Sorry, Mr Engelbrecht. Mr Mathebe, I don't want to specifically assist you or set a trap for you, but I want to remind you that we have to be satisfied that you've made a full disclosure and a truthful disclosure. May I take you back just one page from 57 to 56? And then consider before you answer. About two thirds down the page. You answer to a question of Dr Allie about the involvement of MK, and you specifically state:

&#9;&#9;"The involvement of MK, I would not know because I was not there then. I joined MK later."

You see your whole evidence here and I don't want to nit pick, but I want to give you an opportunity to seriously consider this before you again respond. The whole, what's the word I'm looking for, gist of your evidence was that you joined MK only after all this happened in Mawudse. you were not involved at all. You were a member of the community. You were the good guys, the others were the bad guys. You can read your evidence again, if you haven't done it now, but you denied any involvement in MK, so I'm just pointing it out to you, until later after your external training, you did not mention anything and you're now telling us that you were part of the planning before you went into exile. So, please consider it and then you can respond further to Mr Engelbrecht's question.

MR MATHEBE: I trained outside later, that's when I became a full member of the MK, but I was trained inside by Mr Maake, which was not the MK training. That is one that I received in 1987.

MR MALAN: Mr Mathebe, read your answer on page 56 again. You say you would not know about the involvement of MK, yet you had full knowledge of Mr Maake's involvement and you were part of his unit, with internal training.

MR KOOPEDI: Chairperson, with respect, may we be given some time to read this because the context in which I understand this answer stems from the fact that there has been a long history of the turmoil in the area. There has been a situation in terms of the evidence we have here, where people would be abducted by the supporters of incorporation and he has in this very statement, that is Kgoshi Mathebe, referred to the fact that: "At that stage, I was still a young person and only an elderly chief was taken away." I am not sure whether this question answers the question whether: "Were you involved at this particular time?"

CHAIRPERSON: Yes, I think so. It might save some time to take a short adjournment now. We didn't take the tea adjournment so perhaps we can just take it at this stage and you could use that opportunity to just go through that again as you suggested, Mr Koopedi, to just establish what context that statement ...

MR KOOPEDI: Thank you Chairperson, I appreciate that.

CHAIRPERSON: We'll take a short adjournment now and if you can let us know as soon as possible when you are ready.

COMMITTEE ADJOURNS

ON RESUMPTION

PIET MOHLAMME MATHEBE: (s.u.o.)

CHAIRPERSON: Thank you. Mr Koopedi, have you had opportunity to read?

MR KOOPEDI: Yes, Chairperson, we have, not only I did I read, but the applicant under cross-examination also has read. If I may, we would take this back to page 54, line 12 and perhaps for completeness sake, I will try and read this. 

&#9;&#9;"I tried to explain that in short, that the police and the soldiers had a greater part which they played during the violence at that time."

Now this is the part I like, Chairperson:

&#9;&#9;"The meeting which I spoke (I believe it should have been about), was called by Kgoshi Mathebe. They threw teargas. It was the police and the soldiers together."

This is after, when people were dispersed at different areas, they began shooting with live bullets. At this stage, Chairperson, there was a person who was the chief and he's the person who had called this meeting which the applicant is talking about. He also explained that actually he was shot at. He goes on on page 55: This applicant was arrested and taken to the Dennilton police station. He gave them a name. He didn't use his real name, he used a nick-name. he was released with the others, the other youth who were released. They even went to his home to look for him.

&#9;Now we go to page 56, where, right in the middle, where Dr Allie starts. He says:

&#9;&#9;"Chief Mathebe, earlier you heard Ephraim Mogale speaking about the ANC and the role of MK and underground structures in the resistance of Mawudse. Could you comment on that? Do you know of any involvement of the ANC or underground structures in that struggle, or it was just the youth and the UDF?"

May I point out, Chairperson, that the hearings, the Human Rights Violations, Mawudse hearings, the evidence was divided in this fashion, that Mr Ephraim Mogale would give evidence relating to a certain period, because this applicant who's chief in the area, was still a very young person when the incidents started and after giving evidence up to a certain stage, this is when this applicant then gave evidence about the things he knows. But I wish to read further the page 56, where Dr Allie asks, that is after the question: The involvement of MK I would not know. Dr Allie asks:

&#9;&#9;"Sorry, you say you joined MK later?"

He says: "Yes."

Dr Allie asks again:

&#9;&#9;"What period are you speaking about when you joined MK?"

He says: "1987, Sir."

Now my submission is that the answer which says he did not know about MK, this was purely something that was being referred to to an earlier stage not after 1987 and my submission would be further that if Dr Allie was asking anything pertaining to 1987 onwards, he would have aptly showed that to the applicant, and that is it, Chairperson.

CHAIRPERSON: At that stage Mr Koopedi, just for my own knowledge, was your client, Mr Mathebe, was he a chief at that stage?

MR KOOPEDI: What stage are we referring to?

CHAIRPERSON: 1987 when he joined.

MR KOOPEDI: No. No, he wasn't.

CHAIRPERSON: When did you become a chief, Mr Mathebe, or when did ...

MR MATHEBE: In 1992.

CHAIRPERSON: Thank you. Mr Engelbrecht.

CROSS-EXAMINATION BY MR ENGELBRECHT: (Cont) 

&#9;Thank you Chairperson. Sir, you were involved in the events that occurred during 1987, is that correct?

MR MATHEBE: That's correct. 

MR ENGELBRECHT: It was also during 1987 that the operation took place in which the Fourie people were killed? It was during 1987, is that correct?

MR MATHEBE: It happened in 1987.

MR ENGELBRECHT: That's correct. It was during September 1987. Now certainly I still do understand your statement on page 56 and 57 to relate also to 1987, because on line 29 on page 56, you answered a question of Dr Allie to say what are they talking about when you are speaking about - when you say you joined MK later and then your answer is 1987. It then goes on:

&#9;&#9;"And after that period 1987, what role did the underground structure of the ANC play?"

proceed, proceed and only the second question after that, the question is asked about Fourie and most definitely it couldn't have related to any other incident than the operation in which Fourie was killed, because there was nothing else happening regarding Mr Fourie and if there was, I would ask you to brief the Commission on what other things did happen with the Fouries of which you did have knowledge of.

MR MATHEBE: I have said this earlier. When Dr Allie asked me questions he asked me about Mr Fourie and his wife. That is why I said I won't commit myself about that because that will be an operation that I don't know, but if they had been specific about the operation that involved Mr Fourie and his son, I would know and I would be able to answer, because I had already joined MK then. When he asked me this question, he asked me the question following the evidence given by Mr Mogale, because Mr Mogale gave evidence about events before 1987. I wouldn't know about those events because I was not yet a member of the MK, I only became a member of the MK in 1987.

MR ENGELBRECHT: I'll reserve my comments for argument, Chairperson. Mr Mathebe, I'd like to ask you about your statement as reflected on page 74 of the compilation. Could you indicate to the Commission all the details pertaining to the operation of Fourie and his son, when was it decided, how was it decided, who proposed it, who commanded it? Everything pertaining to that of which you do have knowledge personally Sir.

CHAIRPERSON: Yes, I think what Mr Engelbrecht wants to know Mr Mathebe is what your own personal knowledge of the operation is, not what you were told about it, how it went, but what you know personally about the operation.

MR MATHEBE: We planned this operation as command structure. We were not planning the operation for the Fourie family. Our planning involved the spot where the police would meet when they decide to attack the people of Mawudse. Our plans were to go and attack them there at that spot, so it just happened that the Fouries came there at that point when we were there.

MR ENGELBRECHT: So Sir, when was the planning done?

MR MATHEBE: I would not remember when the planning took place before the operation.

MR ENGELBRECHT: Were you a member of the Command structure who decided that this operation should take place?

MR MATHEBE: I was a member of the command structure.

MR ENGELBRECHT: Sir, so certainly you must remember something regarding the planning. Can you tell the Commission about who was present, who made the proposals, how it was decided upon, everything pertaining to that please?

MR MATHEBE: If I remember well, I was present myself. Maake was also present. Chakie was also present and Doctor Mathebe was present as well and Mike. As to who came up with the suggestion, I would really not recall, but I remember that we discussed about that and we reached a consensus in the end.

MR ENGELBRECHT: Sir, can you recall how long in advance of the operation had the decision been made and the planning been done?

MR MATHEBE: I would not remember because this took place a long time ago.

CHAIRPERSON: After the decision was made, was reconnaissance work carried out at that particular T-junction or was the decision made with you or some of you having full knowledge of the police presence at that T-junction?

MR MATHEBE: We had a reconnaissance unit who would be in charge of identifying targets, so we received information that the police meet at that spot and we decided that because they meet there, that will be the appropriate place where we could attack them. This followed the reconnaissance undertaken by the reconnaissance unit.

MR MALAN: Just to elaborate, who was that reconnaissance unit?

MR MATHEBE: Amongst ourselves, we would choose anybody, one person or two, to go and undertake reconnaissance, but I do not remember specifically who undertook that reconnaissance for that particular operation.

MR MALAN: But it consisted of one - the existing unit, one or two of the people of the existing unit? It's not an outside unit, it's a group within your unit, is that what you're saying?

MR MATHEBE: That is correct.

MR MALAN: Can you recall whether you went out during the reconnaissance?

MR MATHEBE: I did not go.

MR MALAN: You did not go. Thank you Mr Engelbrecht.

MR ENGELBRECHT: Sir, how big is your unit? How many people does it comprise of? Is it the four or five of you or were there more people involved in the unit?

MR MATHEBE: Apart from us, because there was this problem at Mawudse, there were other people who were members of the MK, who would come and be with us for a few days, for example Johnny was not with us all the time, he would come and go at times. Those were the people who would just be sent to come and assist us.

CHAIRPERSON: Correct me if I'm wrong, Chief Mathebe. The unit consisted of the core, the core of the unit if I can call it that, consisted of the four of you who are before the Committee today as applicants, plus Mike.

MR MATHEBE: Not only the four of us including Mike as well.

CHAIRPERSON: Yes, the four of you and Mike, and who else were members? Was that the basic unit?

MR MATHEBE: Basically it was the five of us and other people would come and go.

CHAIRPERSON: Yes. That's such as Johnny?

MR MATHEBE: That's correct.

MR ENGELBRECHT: Sir, I'm going back to the previous question which you answered, but I'm not satisfied as to learn when, before the operation took place, was the decision made to do the operation because certainly it couldn't be so hard to recall whether it was a day, a week or a month, whatever and the previous witness also suffered to remember, so how come - if you can just explain, when was it and why is it so difficult to recall that Sir? If you can explain why it is difficult to recall when the planning was done?

MR KOOPEDI: Chairperson, may I interrupt, with due respect to the Committee and my learned friend? I think in all fairness the applicant has answered that question and he has said he cannot recall exactly when.

CHAIRPERSON: Well perhaps, if we could put it this way. Was the decision to use that T-junction as a target area, taken within a month of the attack, or don't you know that? Do you know whether it was a question of days before the attack, or months before the attack? Some sort of indication.

MR MATHEBE: It could not have been a long time because after taking that decision, we decided who would be involved in that. It could not be more than a month, although I'm not sure about the time, but it could have been a month.

MR ENGELBRECHT: Sir, it is known to me through the next of kin of the victims, that Lieut Fourie used to liaise with a Chief and other Chiefs Mathebe, are you familiar with that and do you have any knowledge about the relationship that existed between the deceased and those Mathebe people, who used to be the chiefs then?

MR MATHEBE: That is not the truth that Mr Fourie had a relationship with Mr Mathebe. Most of the time when we held meetings, the police would come and attack us with teargas, so there was no way that there could have been a relationship between the Mathebes and the police.

CHAIRPERSON: Yes, what I was going to say is, Mr Engelbrecht said that Lieut Fourie used to liaise with a Chief Mathebe. That doesn't necessarily mean that there was a relationship. He might, in his capacity as a policeman, have to communicate with the chief on various aspects, I don't know, but do you know whether Lieut Fourie had any, let's use the word contact, not necessarily a relationship or any sort of conspiracy, but any official contact with each other, or don't you know?

MR MATHEBE: What is the truth is that we did not allow people to come and see the Chief, so there was no way that we could allow him to come and see the Chief.

CHAIRPERSON: Sorry, Chief. At that time, who was the Chief in the area, in 1987?

MR MATHEBE: It was Gibson Klokwe Mathebe, that is my uncle.

CHAIRPERSON: Thank you. Mr Engelbrecht.

MR ENGELBRECHT: Chairperson, I wish to use the statement made by the presiding Panel with the previous witness and to ask the witness at present whether he has knowledge whether the ANC did accept responsibility for the Fourie incident and if so, why and if not, why not?

MR MATHEBE: I'm not sure about that.

MR ENGELBRECHT: I have no further questions Chairperson.

NO FURTHER QUESTIONS BY MR ENGELBRECHT

CHAIRPERSON: Thank you Mr Engelbrecht. Mr Steenkamp, do you have any questions you would like to ask Chief Mathebe?

ADV STEENKAMP: No questions, thank you Chairperson.

NO QUESTIONS BY ADV STEENKAMP

CHAIRPERSON: Do you have any re-examination, Mr Koopedi?

MR KOOPEDI: Nothing in re-exam thanks Chairperson.

NO RE-EXAMINATION BY MR KOOPEDI

CHAIRPERSON: Adv Sandi, do you have any questions you'd like to ask?

ADV SANDI: Thank you Mr Chairman, no questions.

CHAIRPERSON: Mr Malan?

MR MALAN: No questions.

CHAIRPERSON: Chief, just if the - we've heard Mr Maake describing various incidents, the land mine at Kwaggafontein, the attack on Elvis Mishi Mnisi, the attack on the Dennilton police station, the limpet mine that didn't go off, were you personally involved in all of those in the decision-making process?

MR MATHEBE: I took part in making the decisions, At Tsantsabela, I was there in person and the one at the T-junction, I was there in person.

CHAIRPERSON: The one at the - what did you do at the T-junction? Oh you mean, when you say you were there in person, what do you mean? When the decision was made or when the operation was carried out?

MR MATHEBE: I mean I was there physically at Tsantsabela and the Kwaggafontein police station. I have explained before that in other operations I only participated in decision-making, but in this one that concerned Kwaggafontein and Tsantsabela, I was there physically.

CHAIRPERSON: What did you do at first of all, Tsantsabela?

MR MATHEBE: I didn't do anything, we were just waiting to abduct that man, but unfortunately he ran away.

CHAIRPERSON: So you didn't shoot or anything?

MR MATHEBE: No.

CHAIRPERSON: And at Kwaggafontein?

MR MATHEBE: I was one of the people who were taking that pot next to the police station.

CHAIRPERSON: Mr Maake said he didn't know the outcome of that operation. Do you have any knowledge what happened with the pot, whether it blew up or anything like that? Did you hear anything about it afterwards?

MR MATHEBE: The information was suppressed at that time, so we don't know whether it did explode, because that never appeared on newspapers, so we don't know what happened to it.

CHAIRPERSON: Thank you. Any questions arising, Mr Koopedi?

MR KOOPEDI: No questions, thank Chairperson.

NO QUESTIONS BY MR KOOPEDI

CHAIRPERSON: Mr Engelbrecht?

MR ENGELBRECHT: No questions.

NO QUESTIONS BY MR ENGELBRECHT

CHAIRPERSON: Mr Steenkamp?

ADV STEENKAMP: No questions.

NO QUESTIONS BY ADV STEENKAMP

CHAIRPERSON: Thank you, Chief Mathebe, that concludes your testimony. You may stand down now.

WITNESS EXCUSED

MR KOOPEDI: Thank you Chairperson. May we call Mr Chakie Mathebe, the next applicant?

NAME:&#9;CHAKIE EDISON MATHEBE

APPLICATION NO:&#9;AM 5696\97

MATTER:&#9;TSANTSABELA OPERATION, DENNILTON MAGISTRATES COURT OPERATION, KILLING OF LIEUT PETRUS FOURIE AND MARK FOURIE AND THE KWAGGA POLICE STATION OPERATION

--------------------------------------------------------------------------MR KOOPEDI: He is ready to be sworn in, Chairperson.

CHAIRPERSON: Thank you.

CHAKIE EDISON MATHEBE: (sworn states)

CHAIRPERSON: Mr Koopedi.

EXAMINATION BY MR KOOPEDI: Thank you Chairperson. Mr Mathebe, I'm referring you to page 15 of the bundle of documents before this Honourable Committee and the document appearing on page 15, is this your application form?

MR MATHEBE: That's correct.

MR KOOPEDI: Now at the back of this document on page 20 of the bundle, there is a signature on this document, is this your signature?

MR MATHEBE: That's correct.

MR KOOPEDI: Now you've heard the evidence given by the two applicants before you. 

MR MATHEBE: Yes, I did.

MR KOOPEDI: Now is there anything you would want to add to the evidence they have given and in particular enlightening this Honourable Committee about who you are, when did you join the ANC?

MR MATHEBE: 

&#9;&#9;"I am Chakie Edison Mathebe. I joined MK in 1987. I was trained internally. I was trained by Comrade Jerome Maake. I was also involved in identifying the targets within our unit. Most of the time I would be the driver during the time of the operations. Most of the time, I was the driver, but I'm aware of these operations."

MR KOOPEDI: Now the incident that happened in Tsantsabela, the one that involves Mr Mishi or Mnisi, would this be one of the incidents where you were driving?

MR MATHEBE: At that time I was not the driver, but I was in another car when we were going to Tsantsabela.

MR KOOPEDI: The incident that involved the Fouries, what do you know about that incident and in particular and referring to what you did personally? I believe the Committee is aware of the fact that the unit had discussed about this spot, but I want you to specifically enlighten this Honourable Committee as to your role, what you did on that day, on that evening.

MR MATHEBE: My task was to drive like they already explained. That we identified that place at the T-junction as the ambush spot, so I dropped the comrades there and I went with the car and waited for them at a distance, not far away from that spot and then after that operation, I came back and collected them and we went away.

MR KOOPEDI: Now when you say you collected them, where did you collect them?

MR MATHEBE: I came and collected them at that T-junction and I drove towards Mtwane.

MR KOOPEDI: I think it should be Mtwana, M-T-W-A-N-A.

CHAIRPERSON: How did you know when to collect them? You say you went to collect them.

MR MATHEBE: I could hear the sound of AK47 and I became aware that they would delay to move from that spot to where I was waiting for them, so I decided to go and collect them immediately.

MR KOOPEDI: Now after you heard these shots, you say you proceeded and collected them. Is there any other thing that you did, that is in relation to this operation?

MR MATHEBE: My task was just to drive them after the operation. Because of the traffic at that area, I realised that they will struggle to come to the place where I waited for them, so I rushed to collect them.

MR KOOPEDI: Okay. Perhaps let's move away from this incident. The incident at Kwaggafontein police station, is there any role that you played?

MR MALAN: Just before you proceed there. Were you involved in the reconnaissance of that spot at the T-junction?

MR MATHEBE: I was not involved.

MR MALAN: Mr Koopedi.

MR KOOPEDI: Thank you. The incident at Kwaggafontein, what was your involvement there?

MR MATHEBE: We went, there was material that has already been explained, that is the limpet mines with three foot pot, with a flap, like they have already explained about that. Because it was a big pot, so we would help each other to carry it from the car.

MR KOOPEDI: Now regard being had to the brief evidence you've just given and the evidence given in particular by the first applicant, your Commander, Jerome Maake, do you think that on your part you have told this Honourable Committee the whole truth in as far as the activities of your unit were concerned?

MR MATHEBE: I think I have told the truth, unless maybe I have forgotten something, but I think I have told them the truth.

MR KOOPEDI: Now were you paid, or did you receive any personal gain for having involved yourself in these activities?

MR MATHEBE: As people who were fighting for liberation, we knew what we were fighting for. We were not expecting any reward, our only reward was liberation.

MR KOOPEDI: Now what would have been then the political objective?

MR MATHEBE: They are all self-explanatory because the police were attacking people on many occasions, together with the Mbokhoto Vigilante Group, even at Mothethe, Gobokwane and many other areas in the then KwaNdebele Homeland, so we needed to protect the people in those areas. It was a political issue because people were being killed and they had to be protected.

MR KOOPEDI: Chairperson, that is the evidence-in-chief for the applicant, thank you.

NO FURTHER QUESTIONS BY MR KOOPEDI

CHAIRPERSON: Thank you Mr Koopedi. Mr Engelbrecht, do you have any questions you would like to ask the witness?

CROSS-EXAMINATION BY MR ENGELBRECHT: Sir, were you involved in the planning of the incident of the Fouries?

CHAIRPERSON: When you say the police, we'll call it the Fourie incident, the T-junction. Were you involved in the planning of the operation that took place at the T-junction in which Lieut Fourie and his son were shot?

MR MATHEBE: What I do not understand is whether I was involved when we made the planning concerning the Fouries, because at that time we were not focusing on the Fourie family.

CHAIRPERSON: What Mr Engelbrecht wants to know is were you involved - were you present when the decision was taken to conduct an operation at that particular T-junction?

MR MATHEBE: Concerning the planning at that T-junction ambush, I was present.

MR ENGELBRECHT: Sir, can you relate to the Commission what the other people forgot, on who made the proposal, when was it made, where was it done, please?

MR MATHEBE: I don't remember who came up with this suggestion in the unit, but what I remember is that the police, the KwaNdebele police together with the South African police were driving fast cars, faster than our cars, so we discussed about this and we decided that we have to ambush them and in our discussions we discussed about that place at thee T-junction because that is a place where the police from Kwagga and kwaMshlanga were meeting, so we agreed that could be the appropriate spot where we could ambush them.

MR ENGELBRECHT: How long before the operation occurred did you do the planning?

MR MATHEBE: Because this happened a long time ago, I would be lying if I talk about specific day or specific days before the operation, I really don't remember.

CHAIRPERSON: If you could perhaps give us an approximation then, we don't need to know the exact number of days or hours before, but if you could give us an approximation, more or less how long before the carrying out of the attack, did the decision-making process take place?

MR MATHEBE: I think it can be between two to three weeks, although I am not sure about that.

MR ENGELBRECHT: And who made the proposal?

MR MALAN: Just before you proceed. You've heard that Mr Maake responding to a question of mine said that it could be, that it was possible that planning and decision was only taken on the day of the incident. Would you dispute that as a possibility?

MR MATHEBE: I would not dispute that because I am not sure. Like I have said, I don't have a clear recollection as to when this decision was taken.

MR MALAN: Thank you.

MR ENGELBRECHT: Can you recall who made the proposal, Sir?

MR MATHEBE: I do not remember, Sir.

MR ENGELBRECHT: To lean on a question posed by the presiding Panel earlier on, how long would you have been waiting there, Sir, on that particular evening? When would you have left, or not left?

MR MATHEBE: We waited there, but that could not be an hour, it can be around 45 minutes. It could not be a long time, because that is the place frequented by the police.

MR ENGELBRECHT: What I'm referring to, Sir, is not what was the actual time spent waiting for the operation to come off, but what were your instructions? How long did you have to wait, in view of your instructions, your operational instructions on that particular evening?

MR MATHEBE: In my instructions, I was not given the time, we agreed as a unit that I will wait for them at a specific place. It's me who took the initiative to move from the spot where I was to go and collect them because I realised that there was too much traffic there, so I didn't want them to be caught by the police who were coming for reinforcement. That is why I decided to go there and collect them.

MR ENGELBRECHT: No further questions.

NO FURTHER QUESTIONS BY MR ENGELBRECHT

CHAIRPERSON: Thank you. Mr Steenkamp?

ADV STEENKAMP: No questions thank you Honourable Chairman.

NO QUESTIONS BY ADV STEENKAMP

CHAIRPERSON: Mr Koopedi, any re-examination?

MR KOOPEDI: Nothing in re-exam thanks Chairperson.

NO RE-EXAMINATOIN BY MR KOOPEDI

CHAIRPERSON: Adv Sandi any questions?

ADV SANDI: No questions, Chair.

CHAIRPERSON: Mr Malan?

MR MALAN: No questions.

CHAIRPERSON: Just for clarity purposes, Mr Mathebe, were you involved in the decision-making process of all the incidents that have been referred to this morning, that is the one involving Mr Mnisi, the limpet mine that didn't go off at the police station, the Kwaggafontein one, the attack on the Dennilton police station where it was shot at, the incident at the T-junction, were you involved in the decision-making process of all of those incidents, or only some of them?

MR MATHEBE: Yes, I did.

CHAIRPERSON: All of them?

MR MATHEBE: Yes, in all of them.

CHAIRPERSON: Were you the driver in which ones? You were the drive in the T-junction incident, you went to Kwaggafontein and helped with the pot?

MR MATHEBE: Yes.

CHAIRPERSON: The Dennilton police station where the shooting took place, were you the driver?

MR MATHEBE: That's correct.

CHAIRPERSON: The one with the limpet mine that didn't go off, where the mechanism didn't, the timing mechanism referred to by Mr Maake, did you assist in taking the operatives there, or the material there?

MR MATHEBE: In this operation that involved the limpet mine, I'm the person who took that limpet mine there and I was the person who committed him on Monday, as we agreed as a command structure, so I would say that is the operation in which I was physically involved.

CHAIRPERSON: And the one involving Mr Elvis Mnisi? What did you do in that one, if anything besides being involved in the decision-making?

MR MATHEBE: We heard that this Mr Mnisi, he knew about the abduction of Khala and the members of the community had a suspicion that the abduction was done by Mr Mnisi, so when we went to fetch him, I was there.

CHAIRPERSON: So you were there when you went, I think you said you went in another vehicle, didn't you, you weren't the actual driver?

MR MATHEBE: That's correct. We had a silencer problem, so we didn't enter the village with that car because of the silencer.

CHAIRPERSON: Yes. Now I notice from the documents before me here Mr Mathebe, that Khala's name is spelled in about four different ways. Do you know the correct spelling of it? I've seen it spelled Carla, Khala, Cala, I don't know maybe Mr Koopedi could assist in the spelling because ...(intervention)

MR KOOPEDI: If I may, Chairperson, Khala is in this hall, Chairperson. I inquired from him. It is spelled K-H-A-L-A.

CHAIRPERSON: Thank you very much. That was the one that I thought was the correct one, but I just wanted to make sure. Any questions arising from my questions Mr Koopedi?

MR KOOPEDI: No questions, thanks Chairperson.

NO QUESTIONS BY MR KOOPEDI

MR MALAN: Sorry, can I just on this last question. I had the impression and from the question of the Chair too, that in this operation involving Elvis Mnisi, that you went there in two cars. Were you saying that you went in one car, but not your usual car, because you had silencer problems with the usual car? How many vehicles did you travel in?

MR MATHEBE: I think we used two or three cars. I remember a private car and a kombi.

MR MALAN: Thank you, that answers it.

CHAIRPERSON: Yes, thank you. Any questions arising Mr Engelbrecht? Mr Steenkamp?

NO QUESTIONS BY MR ENGELBRECHT

NO QUESTIONS BY ADV STEENKAMP

CHAIRPERSON: Thank you Mr Mathebe, that concludes your evidence. You may stand down now.

WITNESS EXCUSED

MR KOOPEDI: Chairperson, I will look to the Committee for direction. I see its cruising on for 13h00. I also know that the evidence to be given by the last applicant is relatively, very short. I would ask the Committee to allow us to lead his evidence. Thanks Chair.

NAME: &#9;CHARLES DOCTOR MATHEBE

APPLICATION NO:&#9;AM5698/97

MATTER:&#9;TSANTSABELA OPERATION &#9;

--------------------------------------------------------------------------MR KOOPEDI: The applicant before you is Doctor Mathebe, Chairperson, he is ready to be sworn in.

CHARLES DOCTOR MATHEBE: (sworn states)

CHAIRPERSON: Mr Koopedi

MR KOOPEDI: Thank you Chairperson.

EXAMINATION BY MR KOOPEDI: Mr Mathebe, I'm referring you to a bundle of documents which is before this Honourable Committee and a document which starts on page 1 of this bundle is an application form. Is this your application form?

MR MATHEBE: That's correct.

MR KOOPEDI: At the end of this application form and that is on page 6, there is a signature appearing at the bottom. Would that be your signature?

MR MATHEBE: That's correct.

MR KOOPEDI: Now this Honourable Committee and every one in here has heard the evidence of your three fellow applicants. I would like you to briefly tell this Honourable Committee what your involvement was and perhaps start by indicating when you joined the ANC, how and where were you trained.

MR MATHEBE: I joined the MK in 1987. I received my training from JJ Maake who was our Commander. I was involved in operations, other operations, those that have been mentioned here today and I agree that I was a full member of that unit that they have been talking about.

MR KOOPEDI: Your evidence is that you were involved in some of the operations. Can you explain that, or at least that's what came through the translation. In which operations were you involved? Perhaps let me rephrase the question. In the operations which have been referred to by your co-applicants, is there an operation where you were not present, particularly the planning thereof?

MR MATHEBE: Yes, for instance the operation in Mothethe, that involved Mr Fourie, I was not present, but I heard about it later and the other operation that took place at the police station in Dennilton, I wasn't present and the operation that involved a limpet mine at the Administration offices, I was not involved, but I was involved in an operation that took place at Kwagga police station. I was the driver in that operation. I was also involved in the operation at Khala, I was also there the driver. That is Tsantsabela.

MR KOOPEDI: Now regard being had to the evidence given by the three applicants before you, your application form and the brief evidence you have given before this Honourable Committee, is there anything that you think that you have not told this Honourable Committee in as far as your involvement?

MR MATHEBE: I have told this Committee everything.

MR KOOPEDI: Now, did you receive any personal gain for having involved yourself in the activities of this unit?

MR MATHEBE: No. There was no intention, or it was not our intention to receive rewards after the operations and there is no one who received a reward.

MR KOOPEDI: It then seems that there are basically really two operations, I speak under correction, where you were really involved.

MR MALAN: Mr Koopedi, just before you proceed with that, looking at his amnesty application, he discloses only the one incident which is the Elvis Mnisi/Khala incident. Do you need an amendment or can you just point us, where in the application does he apply for the other incident?

MR KOOPEDI: I have seen his application, Chairperson and also noted that it also referred to the Khala incident.

MR MALAN: Can you just help me? Where is that referred to?

CHAIRPERSON: It's the same one.

MR MALAN: Khala and Mnisi is the same incident and he now accepted some responsibility for involvement in this Kwaggafontein incident.

MR KOOPEDI: Yes, Chairperson.

MR MALAN: Where is Kwaggafontein referred to in his application?

MR KOOPEDI: In his application, I have not seen Kwaggafontein and I discussed this matter with him this morning. This was done as a precautionary measure as to whether one should apply for amendment of his application. The explanation that was given to me was that he does not know even today whether there was an explosion or not and basically that is why he did not include that incident in his application.

MR MALAN: I think then we must accept that that's not before us. It's not in his application, it wasn't timeously done, except if you come with a substantive application for an amendment.

MR KOOPEDI: I must say, I'm not bringing an application in that, like he said, he does not know if there was an explosion. I've asked around, it doesn't seem to me that anyone was injured by the ...

CHAIRPERSON: None of the other applicants know whether there was an explosion or not.

MR MALAN: So we accept Kwaggafontein is not before us as far as this applicant is concerned?

MR KOOPEDI: That is right.

MR MALAN: Thank you.

MR KOOPEDI: That's okay. Now I wanted to establish and perhaps let's read the, as guided by the Committee, the incident involving Mishi or Mnisi, what would you think was the political motivation? What would you say was the political motivation?

MR MATHEBE: At that time, we received a message from the members of our community that there is somebody called Mishi who usually comes and abducts comrades. He was working in cahoots with the police and they explained or described him to us and then we decided that we should go and fetch him. That's when we made a decision that we'll go there and fetch him.

MR KOOPEDI: Chairperson, that's the evidence-in-chief for this applicant.

NO FURTHER QUESTIONS BY MR KOOPEDI

CHAIRPERSON: Thank you. Mr Engelbrecht, do you have any questions you wish to put?

MR ENGELBRECHT: No questions, Chairperson.

NO QUESTIONS BY MR ENGELBRECHT

CHAIRPERSON: Mr Steenkamp?

ADV STEENKAMP: No questions, Honourable Chairman.

NO QUESTIONS BY ADV STEENKAMP

CHAIRPERSON: Adv Sandi?

ADV SANDI: No questions, thank you Chair.

CHAIRPERSON: Mr Malan?

MR MALAN: No questions thank you.

CHAIRPERSON: Yes, thank you Mr Mathebe, that concludes your testimony. You may stand down. 

WITNESS EXCUSED

CHAIRPERSON: Mr Koopedi, are you calling any further witnesses?

MR KOOPEDI: Chairperson, that is the application. We are calling no witnesses. We have with us, like I indicated earlier, the person being referred to as Khala. We have looked at the facts and the suggestion from our side is that we do not need to call him as a ...(intervention)

CHAIRPERSON: There's nothing to even suggest a contradiction to the fact that he may have been abducted ...

MR KOOPEDI: Precisely Chairperson, and that is our application.

CHAIRPERSON: Thank you. Mr Engelbrecht, are you calling any witnesses?

MR ENGELBRECHT: We are not calling any witnesses, Chairperson.

CHAIRPERSON: Mr Steenkamp?

ADV STEENKAMP: Chairman, we are not calling any witnesses.

CHAIRPERSON: Are you prepared to make submissions at this stage?

MR KOOPEDI: I can make very brief submission, Chairperson and I'm prepared to do it now.

CHAIRPERSON: Thank you Mr Koopedi, you may proceed.

MR KOOPEDI IN ARGUMENT: Thank you Chairperson. 

&#9;Chairperson, Honourable Committee Members, you've had four applicants before you. It is my first submission that the applicants before you have complied with the requirement of full disclosure. Chairperson, Honourable Committee Members, according to the evidence and the documents before you, all the operations or the incidents for which amnesty is being sought, were not done under pressure. That is to say, none of these applicants was in prison for those operations and was then asking for or applying for amnesty to try and get out of prison. 

&#9;It is my submission that in the spirit of full disclosure and reconciliation, these applicants, on their own, applied to be granted amnesty. 

&#9;It is my further submission Chairperson, that there was a question asked, I think two or three times, as to why did the ANC not accept responsibility for this operation. Unfortunately I do not have with me the submissions made by the ANC, but from my head I can recall that this incident was not referred to, but my argument is that failure to refer to this incident as one of the ANC's operations, would not necessarily mean that the ANC was repudiating that operation.

MR MALAN: No, but Mr Koopedi, you don't have to argue that any further. That's accepted.

MR KOOPEDI: Thank you Chairperson.

&#9;It is my further submission that it has been unclear as to when, how, the operation which we have I think perhaps badly referred to as the Fourie operation, planned. My submission, Chairperson, Honourable Committee members is that having listened to the evidence and perhaps even consulted with the applicant, it is very clear that there was no single person targeted or identified as a target. The unit had decided at some stage, the evidence is that perhaps two or three weeks ago they identified a spot as a favourite spot for the police and then, which spot would then become a suitable spot for an ambush, but it was not decided that is then and there as to when to go and stage this ambush. This place was like earmarked as an ambush, looked at and assessed as an ambush place at some stage. It is also unclear, I wish to submit Chairperson, that the applicants would have elected to have given you time and said we planned today, we planned on the day of the operation, three days ago, but because the applicants could not recall, they honestly told you that they did not recall exactly when was it then agreed that people should move to the area and execute this operation.

MR MALAN: Mr Koopedi, nothing really hinges on this but does the evidence not tend to favour an explanation that from the moment of this decision to implementation, minimal time would have elapsed because there was no logistic preparation, they had the AKs available, evidence was they knew that the police were regularly stopping there every night. On the night of the implementation of the operation, they did not expect to wait long for a police car to stop. Nothing indicates that there would have been any long-term planning, or detailed planning.

MR KOOPEDI: I seem to agree with that suggestion and perhaps I was making this submission in an attempt to try and clarify the issues which seemed not very clear when evidence was being given.

&#9;It is therefore my final submission, Chairperson, Honourable Committee Members, that the applicants before you here, have to the best of their ability, told you all they could remember and have complied or tried to comply with the requirements of the Act, to enable you to consider their applications and that's my submission in brief, Chairperson.

CHAIRPERSON: Thank you Mr Koopedi. Mr Engelbrecht, do you have any submissions?

MR ENGELBRECHT: Chairperson, I do have submissions, but I think it will only be appropriate if I quickly for five seconds, we need not stand down, learn from my clients whether they have any other ....(intervention)

CHAIRPERSON: Yes, certainly Mr Engelbrecht. I'll give you longer than five seconds.

MR ENGELBRECHT IN ARGUMENT: Thank you Chairperson.

&#9;Chairperson, my submission and that of my clients, or my client, more specifically Mrs Fourie now Willers, is that we have difficulty to accept the credibility of the witnesses and when it concerns those elements of Section 20, then it concerns more specifically the full disclosure part of it. When it was testified today, there was testified, amongst others, that no decision approvals were required for the operations, but the operations had to be reported to Lusaka and to the best of my remembrance, like four months or three months afterwards.

CHAIRPERSON: I think in that regard, Mr Engelbrecht, the usual procedure, although it hasn't been said here, was the reporting was usually done orally. You know, they didn't see telegrams or letters because of fear of there being interception etc, so reporting would be done when one of the operatives, usually the Commander, actually went back to Lusaka or wherever his superior was, it might have been Mozambique or even in Botswana. In this particular case, Lusaka. That would explain the delay, and then when they were there they would then mention the operations sort of thing.

MR ENGELBRECHT: Thank you Chairperson. However, Chairperson, on page 33 of the compilation, it is recorded that by Mr Mathebe:

&#9;&#9;"Yes, the ...(indistinct) unit Commanding structure identified and approved these operations. Furthermore, higher levels of MK were informed and approved such operations" 

and there is definitely, to my understanding chairperson, a conflict in doing operations without getting prior approvals and what is recorded here and there might be an explanation for that, this is not the core of my argument, but I wish to put it on record.

&#9;Secondly ...(intervention)

MR MALAN: May I just ask you on this point, could approval not come after the fact?

MR ENGELBRECHT: It certainly could, Chairperson.

&#9;Chairperson, furthermore, only in view of the normal credibility tests, it is my submission that the credibility of the witnesses is questionable in view of the following. Conflicting statements and probabilities. When it concerns the conflicting statements, I did put on record that I will argue about that. In the statement of the Chief Mathebe as it is captured on page 74 of the compilation, where he says that he had:

&#9;&#9;"the second operation which was also sanction by our structure, was that of Lieut Fourie and his son at Mothethe"

and then what is recorded on page 56, Chairperson and 57, to my opinion definitely is conflicting. That is for the Panel to decide upon, but it's my submission that those are not the same statement, that it definitely conflicts and that it casts, in my mind, some questions about the credibility of that particular witness.

&#9;Concerning the probabilities, Chairperson, it is my submission that there were not 400 or 4 000 operations, but only 4 operations, of which the Commander testified. The first, second and the third one were that of the Fourie people.

CHAIRPERSON: I think there were five, weren't there?

MR ENGELBRECHT: Yes, Chairperson, but in any event they were not so numerous that, in my mind, a person would not recall such drastic decision with the consequence that it has up till today and the same counts for all the other witnesses that testified, who seemingly have huge problems to recall when the planning was done and the thing is, Chairperson, in my mind the, in whatever way one phrases it, the making dead of people is such a serious conduct and operation that certainly it must have had minds applied to that decision. It has to have been well considered and it should be possible to recall that and in light of probabilities it strikes me amazing that this cannot be recalled by any of the witnesses. Then there are three approximates, either the same day, or two or three weeks before, or more or less a month before.

&#9;As for the events, also many scenarios are possible, but the whole issue of the planning and operational side and then also the follow-up, the operation is done, but the operational Commander as well as his operational members, do not know what happened after that, they only learn that long time after the operation has been completed and Chairperson that definitely is peculiar, that a person will do an operation and not assess the achievement of that, or not at earliest convenience. 

&#9;So therefore Chairperson, it is my submission that in the light of these credibility issues and probability issues, I call upon the Panel to be cautious to just believe the testimonies as they have been testified and I wish to put it that I believe there was political unrest and uncertainties and that whatever happened, could have been politically motivated. I have no doubt about that, but even so, Chairperson, the disclosure is such that I am concerned that it might move the presiding Panel to regard the political vial as such dominant thing that what has happened factually might be forgiven in the light of politics and it definitely is an element that full disclosure has to be made to this Panel and on basis of this, Chairperson, I wish to request that the testimonies of the first, second and third witnesses be regarded cautiously by the presiding Panel. If however the Presiding Panel decides that there has been, it is indeed fulfilment of Section 20, then I wish to put it to the Panel that Mrs Fourie already testified what her - the consequences for here were, immediately after this operation had taken place and it is recorded on page 126 and to regard whatever is to be done afterwards in view of that.

CHAIRPERSON: In the event of amnesty being granted, we are obligated to express our opinion as to who are victims and then refer such victims to the Reparations Committee, which we would do and in that regard I think we would appreciate it if you could speak to Mr Steenkamp and give particulars of who are victims. In a matter like this it would normally be the immediate family at the time of the deceased or injured persons. 

MR ENGELBRECHT: Thank you Chairperson. That is my submission, Chairperson.

CHAIRPERSON: Thank you. Mr Steenkamp, do you have any submissions?

ADV STEENKAMP: Mr Chairman, just one or two things.

ADV STEENKAMP IN ARGUMENT: In regard to the Fourie family, I think they've already been report to the HRV Committee as being victims.

CHAIRPERSON: But still, I know that the fact that they've testified before the Human Rights Violations Committee, but it still for us to - we're actually obligated by the Act to express our opinion as to who are victims.

ADV STEENKAMP: Mr Chairman, I've already discussed with my learned colleague this morning and we are in agreement that such information will be forwarded to the Honourable Committee.

&#9;Mr Chairman, Honourable Members, as far as Insp Freddy Sipongwane, this is now in relation to the Dennilton police station attack, he is present here today and was present during the whole presentation of applicants' testimony. My instructions are that he is not opposing the application of any of the applicants, neither did he want to pose any questions and he is of the view in the circumstances, amnesty can be granted as far as the Dennilton police station attack is concerned.

CHAIRPERSON: Thank you Mr Steenkamp and Mr Sipongwane. Do you have any reply, Mr Koopedi?

MR KOOPEDI IN REPLY: I'll try and have a very brief one.

&#9;I will refer to what my learned friend has referred to as conflicting statement. My submission Chairperson that the statements are not conflicting at all. It was - there was a whole hearing where the history of the conflict in Mawudse was being spoken about and when the question was answered by Chief Mathebe in terms of MK's involvement, what he said to me that is when we consulted, is that he was answering the question in the light of what Mr Mogale would have said, referring to an earlier period, so my submission is there are not conflicting statements and perhaps it's worthy to mention that the statement on page 74 which seems to carry this contradiction, this statement was only drawn up last year, after ...(intervention

CHAIRPERSON: I think on that one, because one wouldn't expect him to write "the incident that took place at an unknown date at a T-junction in which we don't know who was injured", it wouldn't have made sense to write it at that stage. To refer to the Fouries at that stage was the obvious thing to do.

MR KOOPEDI: I'm not sure I understand you correctly, Chairperson.

CHAIRPERSON: ...(indistinct - no microphone) Fourie by name was referring to the incident at the T-junction. I mean, it wouldn't have made sense to write that and say: "at which an unknown policeman was killed".

MR KOOPEDI: Yes. The point I'm ...(intervention)

CHAIRPERSON: I mean, I'm sure that any person who wrote this, the second operation was also sanctioned was that of Lieut Fourie, I mean he's just identifying the operation. He could have said the second operation, which was also sanctioned, was that of two unknown policemen. One wouldn't expect them to have said that when this document was written.

MR KOOPEDI: Chairperson, the point I was trying to make is that when Chief Mathebe gave evidence in the Human Rights Violations Hearing, this statement was not drawn up. I believe it would have been a completely different picture, if he had written this statement and he then testified in the HRV hearings and was asked a question and he responded as he did, so I thought it will be prudent you know, in reply to what my learned friend was saying, to show and shed light to the fact that this statement only came after when people were preparing for a hearing and that is why people could have been specific here and not in that hearing.

&#9;The last fact or point which I want to deal with is the fact that my learned friend has referred to what is only five operations. From the evidence an my consultations, these are not the only operations. However, these are the only operations which we are asking amnesty for. The Commander was involved in recruiting and in training people and various other things. I am not sure whether one needs to go into the type of operations MK cadres would go into, but perhaps to enlighten my learned friend, people would distribute pamphlets, people would do all sorts of things, however it is only these five that we come before this Honourable Committee for. Thank you, Chairperson.

CHAIRPERSON: Thank you Mr Koopedi. We shall reserve our decision in this matter and our decision will be made in the near future in written form.

&#9;I'd like to thank you Mr Koopedi and Mr Engelbrecht and Mr Steenkamp for your assistance in this matter.

&#9;This then brings us to the end of the hearing and Mr Steenkamp, the next matter we have will only be tomorrow? Is that correct?

ADV STEENKAMP: Mr Chairperson, that will be the role for the day. The other two matters, or actually one matter is still standing down.

CHAIRPERSON: Yes, so that's one hearing with two applications. Thank you. Yes, thank you very much. We will now adjourn.

COMMITTEE ADJOURNS

