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&#9;TRUTH AND RECONCILIATION COMMISSION 
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&#9;TRUTH AND RECONCILIATION COMMISSION 

&#9;AMNESTY HEARING

DATE:&#9;&#9;5 AUGUST 1998

NAME:&#9;&#9;SOLLIE Z. SHOKE 

DAY :&#9;&#9;3

______________________________________________________

ON RESUMPTION 

ADV PRIOR: Ladies and gentlemen please rise. We move onto the other matter which is the Johannesburg Magistrate's Court Bombing. Today is the 5th of August and the Committee is as formally constituted in the other matter. Maybe for the transcriber's sake again we identify the members of the Committee and the representatives.

CHAIRPERSON: Perhaps we should first identify the application. This is the application of Joseph Kgoele, Solly Zacharia Shoke, William Mabele and Dick Joseph Hlongwane. The Committee consists of myself Andrew Wilson, Chairman, Dr Tsotsi, Mr Sandi, for the Amnesty Committee Evidence Leader Adv P. Prior, for the Applicants Adv A.P. Landman, instructed by Nicholls Cambanis. Mr Chairman I'm Jan Wagner and I'm appearing on behalf of two victims in this incident, the one being Mrs M.S. Wilkens whose son was fatally injured and the other one is Captain C.F. Esterhuizen of the South African Police Services who was at the scene, who was injured and you will find the statement by him in - I'm not sure whether we're referring to the bundles as volume 1 or 2 but ... (intervention)

CHAIRPERSON: Let's optimistically call it the bundle at the present time. At page?

MR WAGNER: It is the volume, not the one containing the applications, it's the other volume, so I assume it's volume 2 then, on page 28 thereof.

CHAIRPERSON: I haven't got a volume 2.

MR LANDMAN: Mr Chairman I have a second volume it contains supplementary documentation, the first one is a statement by William Khutwane (?).

CHAIRPERSON: Well I'm sorry Mr Wagner, in light of the information you have just given us, just call the one volume volume 1 and the second one volume 2. We were not aware of the existence of a volume 2.

MR WAGNER: Thank you judge.

ADV PRIOR: May I simply say that I also have one volume, I - when the volumes were prepared and sent to the committee members - I'm at a loss to explain it, however it seems that the legal representatives received other volumes. I'll make the necessary enquiry and see what ... (intervention)

CHAIRPERSON: Do you know where they came from?

MR WAGNER: Mr Chairman I requested the relevant documents and I was sent those documents from your Committee in Cape Town.

CHAIRPERSON: You probably need your client's statement more than we do at the moment. I don't want to deprive you of the - what page is it, you said 28? Are there any other documents in this volume 2 which the applicant or the victims think we are going to be referring to today?

MR WAGNER: Mr Chairman I doubt very much. You will see that volume contains a number of statements by policemen who were at the scene of the explosion and there's also a number of photo's and plans and so forth and nothing more than that Mr Chairman, so I think at this stage we should be able to proceed with volume 1 only.

CHAIRPERSON: Shall we just get pages 28 to 30 - 28 and 29. Is there any difference between the typed and the hand-written ... (inaudible)?

MR WAGNER: No.

MR LANDMAN: Mr Chairman if I can intervene and just add this, that the photographs are of some significance because ... (intervention)

CHAIRPERSON: We can circulate the photographs amongst ourselves till we get further copies but if we try to photostat the photographs we will not get anything worth looking at I don't think, that has been my experience so let us just rather do this and Mr Prior will be making enquiries with a view to finding out what has happened to the others.

MR SANDI: Can I ask something Mr (indistinct), what is the position about other victims, are they being represented?

ADV PRIOR: I wanted to place all that on record. I have all the correspondence and notices to all the injured persons that were captured in the course of the investigation, there were many. Of all the persons' statements in volume 2 and to the victims, that is the families of the deceased, note, proper notice was sent out in terms of Section 19 of the Act. I have copies of those notices with me. The only response has been via Mr Wagner's two respective clients, his victims and a Mr Erasmus who had his vehicle utterly destroyed. Mr Erasmus responded to the notice sent out to him by the Amnesty Committee. Furthermore there's been no other response.

&#9;In addition to the notices sent out as required, a notice was also put in the local media or via the media advertising the fact of the hearing today and inviting any persons who had not received formal notice to come forward and contact myself or the Evidence Analyst in Cape Town whose name was supplied. 

&#9;Mr Chairman there's another matter, number four, applicant four on the, as it appears on the bundle, Dick Joseph Hlongwane, we will not be proceeding with that application today. He had referred to the Ellis Park Stadium, the tennis stadium and that was confused with the Ellis Park matter to some degree, I don't know, but it appears in the Jo'burg Magistrate's bundle. However, he's not an applicant in this matter, as I understand it.

CHAIRPERSON: I take it someone will be making contact with him to clarify what the position is. Are you representing him?

MR LANDMAN: Mr Chairman ... (intervention)

CHAIRPERSON: Nicholls Cambanis (?) representing him. ... (Inaudible) take what steps are necessary to clarify the position.

MR LANDMAN: Mr Chairman the position is that I was to represent him at this hearing. We consulted with him and it became clear that he is not an applicant in regard to a gross human right violation and that his application could well be dealt with in chambers and therefore we withdraw his application as part of this particular hearing. He is however ... (intervention)

CHAIRPERSON: So his application for amnesty remains but it is not to form part of this public hearing?

MR LANDMAN: That is so Mr Chairman. Mr Chairman can I then also place on record that an implicated person, General Nyanda, has instructed Nicholls Cambanis to appear on his behalf at these proceedings. General Nyanda is present and we then do represent his interests as well. He is here as an implicated person and not as an applicant. Mr Chairman you'll recall the incident in which amnesty was afforded to 37 high ranking ANC members which amnesty was later set aside. General Nyanda falls within that category of 37 applicants and his application, as we understand it, is going to be dealt with on some basis to be agreed upon between his representatives at that stage, or the representatives of the 37 members and the Amnesty Committee, so he is here as an implicated person but not as an applicant. Mr Chairman before we proceed with the leading of evidence in this application itself, Mr Chairman would it be appropriate at this stage for Mr Wagner to point out the basis on which his opposing the application as that might give the applicant some idea as to what aspect of the application needs to be covered in particular detail.

CHAIRPERSON: Do you have any objection to that Mr Wagner?

MR WAGNER: Mr Chairman at present my clients are provisionally opposing these applications on the basis of whether a full disclosure has been made or not, that is Section 20 Sub 1 Sub a of your Act and in the second instance whether the applicants comply with the definition of an act associated with a political motive, as defined in Section 20 Sub 2. Of course Mr Chairman at the end of this hearing, once we've heard the evidence of the applicants, my clients will then decide whether they would proceed with their opposition or whether the applicants have at that stage, whether they can be seen as having complied with these sub sections of the Act.

MR LANDMAN: Thank you Mr Chairman. Then also in regard to this application, we would also ask that the ANC's submission which have come before, that they will too be regarded as part of the record of these proceedings. Alternatively that they could be referred to as if they have been admitted and are considered to be correct for purposes of this hearing.

CHAIRPERSON: As I have indicated we have at other hearings, and it is the practice I think where parties have made submissions to the TRC and they have been properly recorded, that we permit reference to them, but we would ask you to refer us to those portions you wish to refer to, not just say well you can find it in the ANC representations, and I'm quite sure as you have in other matters Mr Landman, you will tell us the pages, the references that you wish us to refer to.

MR LANDMAN: We shall do that Mr Chairman. Mr Chairman in - may we also then request that the applicants be called out of order in order to show the chain of command and the steps that were taken and in that regard I'd ask for leave to call Solly Zacherias Shoke, who has already taken his position at the applicant's microphone.

DR TSOTSI: Thank you Mr Landman, we'll have to swear him in. Can you please rise sir? Your full names please?

SOLLIE ZACHERIAS SHOKE: (affirmed states)

EXAMINATION BY MR LANDMAN: Thank you. Mr Shoke could you possibly, just for purposes of the record, tell the Committee how old you are?

MR SHOKE: 42 years. 

MR LANDMAN: And then also for the assistance of the interpreters, will you be giving your evidence in English or any other language?

MR SHOKE: English.

MR LANDMAN: Mr Shoke in 1987 were you a member of Umkhonto weSizwe?

MR SHOKE: That's correct.

MR LANDMAN: When did you join Umkhonto weSizwe?

MR SHOKE: In 1976, shortly after the June 16 uprising.

MR LANDMAN: ... (Inaudible - beginning of tape).

MR SHOKE: ... (Inaudible) part of the outfit that was serving under the commander, commander chief of (indistinct) Nyanda.

CHAIRPERSON: What - I didn't get the name of the commander?

MR SHOKE: Siphiwe Nyanda.

MR LANDMAN: Mr Chairman that is the implicated person. Now Mr Shoke could you describe your position from 1985 onwards?

MR SHOKE: I can say I held different responsibilities at different times, but however I was part of the collective that was based in Swaziland under Siphiwe Nyanda and responsible for the Transvaal. Thank you.

MR LANDMAN: Does that appear in the ANC's submissions too?

MR SHOKE: That's correct.

MR LANDMAN: Mr Chairman I wish to refer you to the ANC's second submission to the TRC. That submission has various parts and part of that submission is headed "Appendix 1 - ANC Structures and Personnel, 1960 - 1994". Mr Chairman on page 9 of that appendix - possibly if I can just refer to it at this stage and I'll ensure that copies of the relevant pages are made for the Committee in the course of the morning. Mr Shoke have you got page 9 of that appendix before you?

MR SHOKE: Ja.

MR LANDMAN: A copy has been given to you. Now the sub heading there is "Regional Politico-Military Councils, 1983 - 1985", it's under paragraph 5.8. Do you see that?

MR SHOKE: (Indistinct).

MR LANDMAN: And further down the page there's reference to "Transvaal Urban". Do you see that?

MR SHOKE: Exactly.

MR LANDMAN: Would you read that out?

MR SHOKE: "Transvaal Urban lead by Siphiwe Nyanda, Shilo Mthau (?) and Solly Shoke.

MR LANDMAN: And you are the third person Solly Shoke, is that you?

MR SHOKE: Exactly.

MR WAGNER: Mr Chairman sorry, may I interrupt. I have in my possession a document, it's called "Further Submissions by the ANC" dated the 12th of May 1997. Is it this document that Mr Landman is referring to?

MR LANDMAN: Mr Chairman I, the first page of my document I'm referring to in fact has that title as well, yes. Mr Chairman I can just make the point that I down loaded this from the Internet so it's possible that the page numbers and all the Appendices which appear on the Internet might not be part of Mr Wagner's bundle. If that's the case then I can make copies for him.

MR WAGNER: Mr Chairman no I think I will cope. I may add for the record that Mr Landman this document from page 34 onwards, the second part of those annexures headed "ANC Structures, 1960 - 1994" and I assume that the page 9 you are referring to will be somewhere in here and I'll try and find it.

CHAIRPERSON: We'd be obliged to you because I've got a copy of the same document as you and if you could give me the page reference?

MR LANDMAN: Mr Chairman could I then proceed and I'll get back to the documents and provide the Committee with the page references?

MR WAGNER: Mr Chairman sorry, the specific reference I find on page 49 at the top, where it is said "Transvaal Urban" and then the names, inter alia that of this applicant, page 49.

MR LANDMAN: Thank you. May I proceed? Mr Shoke what were your responsibilities as part of the command structure of Transvaal Urban?

MR SHOKE: I think like I said I had different responsibilities at different times. It was involved in training people politically, militarily and otherwise, ensuring the lines of communication between the leadership and the cadres on the ground and other related activities.

MR LANDMAN: When you talk about training people politically, could you elaborate on that?

MR SHOKE: I think it is a known fact that the ANC emphasised more on grounding it's cadres politically before it could engage them militarily and it was politics that guided our arms struggle and even the choice for targets. We therefore had to ensure that a person understand clearly the ANC policies before he could be sent into operation.

MR LANDMAN: How important was it to the ANC and MK that the operatives were fully educated as to what targets were legitimate and what were not?

MR SHOKE: In the first submission dated August 1996, I refer you to page 51 of that submission where the ANC in fact reaffirmed at the (indistinct), reaffirmed in fact, what it called legitimate targets. Page 51 of the first submission.

MR LANDMAN: Mr Shoke could you read that out?

MR SHOKE: "The conference reaffirmed ANC policy with regard to targets considered legitimate, that is SADF and SAP personnel and installations and (indistinct) installations and infrastructure, but the risk of civilians being caught in crossfire when such operatives took place could no longer be allowed to prevent the urgently needed all-round intensification of the arms struggle. The focus of armed operation had to achieve towards striking directly at the enemy personnel and the struggle had to move out of the townships to the White areas". Thank you.

MR LANDMAN: Mr Shoke could you deal briefly with the reasons behind the ANC's policy that the struggle should be extended beyond the Black areas into the White suburbs or what would formally be known as White areas?

MR SHOKE: I would like you also to refer you to page 31 in fact of the main submission.

CHAIRPERSON: 30?

MR SHOKE: 31 of the main submission by the ANC.

MR LANDMAN: That's the first submission?

MR SHOKE: The first submission. In that referred actually we are quoting now the former Minister of Police, Jimmy Kruger. It was an article in fact on the 10th of August 1976 in (indistinct). "Unrest in Soweto still continues. The children of Soweto are well trained, the people, students have established student councils. The basic danger is growing, it's growing Black consciousness and an inability to prevent incidents with what (indistinct) they act. The Minister proposes this movement must be broken and thinks that the police should perhaps act in a bit more drastically and happy handedly, with all it entails more death, it will entail more death". It was the people in the townships who were experiencing police brutality and oppression and it was about time in fact that we had to shift the battle area, the battlefields, in fact into White areas where people actually could experience what's going on in the townships. Thank you.

MR LANDMAN: Mr Shoke in regard to targets such as Magistrate's Courts. What was the ANC policy in that regard during 1987? 

MR SHOKE: It was an apartheid symbol. 

MR LANDMAN: Was it considered to be a legitimate target?

MR SHOKE: Definitely, positive. It represented the interests in fact of the then apartheid government.

MR LANDMAN: Mr ... (intervention)

CHAIRPERSON: I'm not sure of the function - things had changed by then. My recollection is that there were separate entrances to the Courts, there were separate seating areas and matters of that nature. That apartheid was very strongly visible in those Courts. Is that one of the factors that you take into account in is saying it was a symbol?

MR SHOKE: I think everybody in this hall is aware in fact of people who went through apartheid Courts to prisons, sentenced to hang and so forth, but I also want to make it clear in fact in this Commission for the point at issue here is not the Magistrate Court it was the bomb blast. That happened at the Magistrate Court, I think let us be clear on that.

MR LANDMAN: Mr Shoke we'll get to the actual target in a few minutes. Possibly then we can turn directly to the bomb blast that occurred in the vicinity of the Johannesburg Magistrate's Court in 1987. Could you explain to the Committee what your ... (inaudible - problems with mike). Mr Shoke what role did you play in the planning of that incident?

MR SHOKE: As far as I can say I facilitated in ensuring that this operation takes place. We discussed the concept with General Nyanda who then briefed in fact our men on the ground and I had to ensure that they get all the necessary equipment for this operation.

MR LANDMAN: Now Mr Shoke when you say you discussed it with General Nyanda, could you give us more detail as to what you discussed, who the target would have been and how the operation would have been carried out?

MR SHOKE: First we studied the modus operandi of the police, how do they react to incidents. Based on that we also took into considerations that the target that we choose should be within the proximity where the police would react rapidly and we also took into cognisance that there might be other people who might not be military origin in nature and we felt that we've got to detonate a mini limpet mine so as to clear the area because normally as a procedure the police would have to cordon the area to clear it of unwanted people or civilians and that's when - and when the police are coming to the scene then we were to act against them (indistinct).

CHAIRPERSON: Sorry, am I right in saying (indistinct), first of all you'd employ a mini limpet mine to cause the police to cordon off and clear the area and then you would cause your explosion?

CHAIRPERSON: Exactly, you're correct.

MR LANDMAN: Do I understand your evidence correct that that is the modus operandi of the police that you referred to, namely that if there is an explosion, they then cordon off the area?

MR SHOKE: That's correct, actually the guy that don't do that, they'd be irresponsible.

MR LANDMAN: Did General Nyanda and yourself discuss - Mr Shoke can I just ask you to wait until the question is over before you press your button otherwise my microphone goes off. Did General Nyanda and yourself discuss who should be, who from the ANC or from MK should actually carry out this attack?

MR SHOKE: Correct.

MR LANDMAN: Who was chosen?

MR SHOKE: It's one of the applicants, Joe Kgoele.

MR LANDMAN: How well did you know Joseph Kgoele at that stage?

MR SHOKE: We had been working with him for quite some time and he has been coming to Swaziland for both political and military training and briefings.

MR LANDMAN: Did you have a particular view as to his ability to carry out this operation successfully?

MR SHOKE: We never doubted that.

MR LANDMAN: When planning this operation, what importance did you attach to the possibility of civilian casualties?

MR SHOKE: We were to ensure that we do not in fact inflict civilian casualties and the importance was that it should be in line with the ANC policy that we should minimise civilian casualties, hence the mini limpet mine.

MR LANDMAN: According to the plan, how would the main bomb be detonated?

MR SHOKE: As soon as the police in fact had come in closer to where it is, there will be someone who'll keep watch at the police as they cordon the search area and as soon as they are on the target, you'd ambush them.

MR LANDMAN: How would he detonate the bomb?

MR SHOKE: By remote control.

MR LANDMAN: Did you have discussion with Joseph Kgoele as to how this operation should be carried out?

MR SHOKE: He was brief by General Nyanda at the beginning, but subsequent to that I did have more interaction with him.

MR LANDMAN: During your interaction with him, that's Joseph Kgoele, what did you and he discuss?

MR SHOKE: I trained him on the use of the remote devices. 

MR LANDMAN: Did you supply Joseph Kgoele with the explosive needed for the blast?

MR SHOKE: That's correct.

MR LANDMAN: Could you elaborate as to how you supplied him with these explosives?

MR SHOKE: I gave him a sketch of a DLB that he had to go and empty. 

MR LANDMAN: Is that a dead letter box?

MR SHOKE: That's correct.

MR LANDMAN: The remote control device that he was to use, who supplied him with that?

MR SHOKE: I'm not sure as to whether I supplied it to him or he got it from Mr Nyanda, but I think that is immaterial. He got it from us in Swaziland because he crossed the border with it.

CHAIRPERSON: Can you tell us something about this device. How large was it, was it a small thing?

MR SHOKE: It is, it is a remote control the size of this gadget.

CHAIRPERSON: It's very much like what you use to turn on and off television sets.

MR LANDMAN: Mr Shoke the mini limpet mine that was to be used in order to ensure that the police cordon off the area?

MR SHOKE: That's correct.

MR LANDMAN: What sort of impact would that sort of mine have, would it cause injuries to people?

MR SHOKE: Yes and no. If you are too near, yes on impact in fact yes it can cause some shock waves, but it is something like 200 grams, so it would even cause that much damage that is why actually it had to be used to clear off the scene.

MR LANDMAN: As part of the plan was it intended that injuries or deaths should be caused by the limpet mine, the mini limpet mine exploding?

MR SHOKE: No. I think the ANC policy is clear with regard to that, that we should try to avoid civilian casualties where we can.

MR LANDMAN: Mr Shoke you were not present when the bombs went off. Is that correct?

MR SHOKE: That's correct.

MR LANDMAN: You have however subsequently been told and you have read statements of people who were present when the explosions occurred. Is that correct?

MR SHOKE: That's correct.

MR LANDMAN: Now bearing in mind those descriptions of the incident, can you comment upon the effectiveness of the plan which was planned and executed by amongst others yourself and Joseph Kgoele?

MR SHOKE: My comment can only be that that plan was well executed and the majority or millions of Black South Africans they were happy that at least those in fact who had been unleashing terror against them can also now taste the pain of their deeds.

MR LANDMAN: Knowing now the manner in which the explosions occurred and the casualties that were inflicted, can you inform the Committee as to whether or not that operation and the consequences of that operation fell within the policy of the ANC and MK?

MR SHOKE: It fell perfectly within the policies of the ANC and MK. Maybe we should also remember the fact that the people who were killed by this bomb are the very same people who had been sent to the townships shooting at unarmed innocent children and Black people.

MR LANDMAN: I believe Mr Shoke it's common cause that those killed in the bombing were policemen. Is that your understanding as well?

MR SHOKE: Those were the people in fact who had arms and who were defending apartheid.

CHAIRPERSON: Were they policemen?

MR SHOKE: Apartheid policemen.

MR LANDMAN: According to the statements there were some civilians who were slightly injured. Can you comment upon that?

MR SHOKE: I think in fact it's also stated in the ANC submission that as the struggle intensified, civilians would be caught in crossfire, but however we'll never go out of our own way to go and inflict casualties (indistinct) and I can refer you to page 51 of the main submission by the ANC.

MR LANDMAN: Mr Chairman I'm coming to the end of the evidence in chief as it were. May I enquire from the Committee whether the applicant's application is before the Committee, the signed and sworn application. I believe it is in the bundle from page 14 onwards?

CHAIRPERSON: (Inaudible).

MR LANDMAN: Mr Chairman you will find from page 30 and - on pages 30 and 31 an amplification of the initial application form. I understand that was sent in response to a request by Mr Prior for further particulars. 

ADV PRIOR: Mr Chairman may I just point out, I don't know if pages 30, 31 are the further particulars supplied by Mr Mabele.

MR LANDMAN: Thank you, I apologise for that if that's the case. 

DR TSOTSI: What about the other bundle Mr Prior, is it not perhaps in the other bundle, these further particulars?

MR LANDMAN: Mr Chairman may I should just ask Mr Shoke whether he did supply further particulars, that might just resolve it.

CHAIRPERSON: There is the Annexure A.

MR LANDMAN: Mr Chairman I am instructed that he didn't provide further particulars, all that he did supply was on the application form itself, as well as Annexure A as has been pointed out by the Committee member. And you'll note on page 22, part of Annexure A, he does refer to the Johannesburg Magistrate's Court car bomb. In that case Mr Chairman I have no further questions at this stage.

NO FURTHER QUESTIONS BY MR LANDMAN

MACHINE SWITCHED OFF

CROSS EXAMINATION BY MR WAGNER: Thank you Mr Chairman. Mr Shoke may I refer you to your written application as it appears in Volume 1 from page 14 onwards. Is this document completed in your own handwriting?

MR SHOKE: That's correct.

MR WAGNER: Every part of it?

MR SHOKE: I concur with what is in this document. I don't know whether every part of it has got any relevance to this matter we're discussing here.

MR WAGNER: Mr Shoke will you please answer my question. Is the handwriting in this document yours?

MR SHOKE: I say I concur with the contents of this document and whether it is every part it's got no relevance with the matter under discussion here.

CHAIRPERSON: Will you answer the question Mr Shoke, it is not for you to determine relevance. You have been asked was the whole document filled in in your handwriting.

MR SHOKE: There are some parts that I dictated to someone if you're going to hand a submission that he should fill them in.

MR WAGNER: Mr Shoke can you tell the Committee which parts of this document you completed yourself and which parts were completed by someone else?

MR SHOKE: Page 16, B, C, C.1.i, ii, iii and iv and 10.a, that's it.

MR WAGNER: In other words the paragraphs you referred to now, were they not completed by yourself, is that no your handwriting?

MR SHOKE: I dictated to someone telephonically.

MR WAGNER: Mr Shoke did you sign this statement at a stage when it was completed as it is before us now or did you sign it and was some parts added afterwards?

MR SHOKE: I signed it.

MR WAGNER: Mr Shoke didn't you understand my question?

MR SHOKE: I say I signed it.

CHAIRPERSON: The question was when you signed it, had these paragraphs been inserted or where they inserted later?

MR SHOKE: I signed the statement before and then someone wanted to come to finish, to come and finish certain particulars and asked me questions and then I said fill in those particular details, that's all.

MR WAGNER: Mr Shoke I want to make absolutely sure. Did you complete this form ... (intervention)

MR LANDMAN: 

MR WAGNER: Just give me a moment please. Did you complete this form and sign it and confirmed it under oath apparently and then afterwards you asked someone to amend the document, after you'd signed it and sworn to it under oath, is that what you're telling us?

MR SHOKE: I completed the document and left it in Shell House. Someone phoned me that the document is incomplete. I said could you please fill the following - he asked me portions and I responded to that, he read it to me and I said I concur.

MR WAGNER: Mr Shoke do you have problems in following what I am asking you. I'm simply asking you this, did you sign the form under oath and then afterwards have someone else amend the document? That's all I'm asking you.

CHAIRPERSON: Is the word amend correct Mr Wagner. I don't read these as being an amendment to the document, I read it as an addition?

MR WAGNER: Sorry Mr Chairman we may call it an addition.

MR SHOKE: (Indistinct).

MR WAGNER: I would like you to respond please.

MR SHOKE: I think I've already responded.

MR WAGNER: Mr Shoke I'm going to argue at the end of this matter that you're not prepared to answer my questions.

CHAIRPERSON: He has told us that he went to Shell House, he signed the document, somebody later phoned him up and said it was not complete and he asked them to fill in the following. Hasn't he told us that? Isn't that an answer to your question?

MR WAGNER: Mr Chairman we will argue this. Can I refer you to page 16 Mr Shoke, paragraph b which apparently is not your handwriting. Now what stands there, is it correct in relation to the incident that you are now applying for amnesty for?

MR SHOKE: I think you asked me first (indistinct) which paragraphs were not my handwriting and I specifically told you that so I don't know really what you want now.

CHAIRPERSON: The question was are the averments in that paragraph correct or not? It's a perfectly simple question: "State whether any person was injured, killed or suffered any damage to property as a result of such acts, omission or offences", and what is contained is now: "I have no details thereof because I left the operation scene immediately without verifying whether victims injured or dead". 

MR SHOKE: This does not relate to the case that we're discussing here, it's got no relevance at all. It's some other things that I've applied for indemnity for.

MR WAGNER: So are you saying that regarding other incidents - sorry me Shoke just give me an opportunity. Are you saying that in some other incidents where you committed some other acts, the answer there is applicable but not at all to the bomb at the Magistrate's Court Johannesburg?

MR SHOKE: I think if you could read in fact my Annexure to this application you will understand it quite well. There incidences where I've been directly involved and where I've been indirectly involved and this is one of the incidences where I've been indirectly involved. So there's no way that I can leave the scene in an incident where I've not been directly involved and I told this Commission that I was in Swaziland so I don't understand the nature of your question, maybe you've not read the submission.

MR WAGNER: Mr Shoke who is Julius Madiba?

MR SHOKE: Julius Madiba in fact has nothing to do with this matter and I think just rule him out.

MR WAGNER: Mr Shoke I refer you to page 18 where you stated under oath that you were commanded regarding these activities by one Julius Madiba, who is Julius Madiba?

MR SHOKE: I say Julius Madiba has nothing to do with this particular matter, that what we're discussing. Julius Madiba is Mancheka (?), he was an overall commander of the Transvaal if you want to know him.

MR WAGNER: I thought you said that General Nyanda was the overall commander of the Transvaal. Can you please explain to us where does Mr Julius Madiba fit into your structure?

MR SHOKE: If you could read in fact the ANC structures, the submission by the ANC with regard to structures, I think you'll understand that.

MR WAGNER: Can you please refer us to the relevant page?

MR SHOKE: Sorry.

MR WAGNER: Can you please refer me to the relevant page of the document?

MR SHOKE: I'm sorry I didn't select the page but I'm trying to locate it here but it is in the submission. 

MR WAGNER: Mr Shoke while you're looking I may be of some assistance, I've looked through the document and I couldn't find the name of Julius Madiba there. 

MR SANDI: Does Julius Madiba have any other name Mr Shoke?

MR SHOKE: Mancheka.

MR SANDI: Mancheka.

MR LANDMAN: Mr Chairman maybe I can also be of assistance, unlike Mr Wagner I do find a Julius Madiba who's also referred to Mancheka ... (end of tape)

MR WAGNER: Mr Chairman maybe we should proceed but I would like to state for the record that regarding the part of these annexures referring to ANC structures 1985 - 1990, which should be the relevant part, I can't find the name. 

MR LANDMAN: Mr Chairman possibly one should also bear in mind and Mr Wagner might not be aware, that because this application only deals with the Johannesburg Magistrate's Court bombing, that the present applicant does intend applying for amnesty for other acts, but they don't form part of this particular hearing so Mancheka's involvement might be in respect of other acts, possibly that should be cleared up first.

CHAIRPERSON: The heading of the page that Mr Landman has shown me is, starts "ANC Second Submission to the TRC Part 2, page 6 of 19. The following appointments were made in 1981: Director Mzwaye Pilise (?)", that's at the top of the page and this Julius Madiba is given as one of the - it's 461, paragraph 4.6.1 - "Maputo Senior Organ 1980 - 1983".

MR WAGNER: Yes Mr Chairman that seems to be in respect of the period 1980 - 1983.

MR SANDI: Yes but he says this Julius Madiba had nothing to do with this incident, didn't you say that Mr Shoke?

MR SHOKE: Exactly.

MR WAGNER: Mr Chairman may I enquire from you, do you intend having a short adjournment and if so at what time?

MACHINE SWITCHED OFF

MR WAGNER: Mr Shoke are you ready?

MR SHOKE: Yes.

MR WAGNER: May I refer you to your application page 21, please. You will see there you mention another name where you say that when you served in the Transvaal Urban Machinery you were under the command of a Mr Ramose (?). Can we then accept that he also did not play no part in this incident, or if not what was his position?

MR SHOKE: I think Mr Ramose died a long time ago and I doubt this (indistinct). When I started in the Transvaal Urban Machinery (indistinct) Ramose was the first commander of the Transvaal Urban Machinery and thereafter Siphiwe Nyanda took over from him and I think you should also bear in mind that structures change, people change their responsibilities at different times. Thank you.

MR WAGNER: So do I understand you that we may ignore the reference to him concerning the Magistrate's Court bomb of 1987?

MR SHOKE: I think I've made it clear during the beginning of this hearings and people who was responsible are the ones that I mentioned here and nobody else. Unless if you want to tell me that maybe the commander who died 8 years before an incident happened he can also now be held responsible for an activity that took place after his death. I spoke of Mr Nyanda that in fact he was already a commander and the brainchild to this operation. That's all.

MR WAGNER: Thank you. Can I then refer you to the ANC submission, the one that I have is dated 12 May 1997, and on page - my page 51 Mr Chairman, I think it's paragraph 6 Mr Landman, there's a heading "ANC Structures 1985 - 1990". Mr Shoke if you can get that in front of you. Do you have it there? Can I specifically refer you to paragraph 6.4, it refers to a body called the Politico-Military Committee, PMC. Do you see that in paragraph 6.4? Thank you. And then in paragraph 6.3.1 reference is made to a political headquarters and in 6.3.2 to a military headquarters. Do you see that? What role, if any, did this military headquarters play in this incident that we're here for today?

MR SHOKE: I think I don't understand your question because as far as I'm concerned, the military headquarters is responsible for all military activities in fact committed under ex-cadres and I'd therefore say whether they planned it, the operation, or not there's no political leader or military leader whose got self respect can deny or divorce himself from any activity that has been committed by subordinates and that as far as I'm concerned. When the ANC's made their major submission to the TRC it claimed responsibility for all activities that were committed by it's cadres, but that does not necessarily mean that those people were actually involved in the actual planning, but because they're leaders they've got a moral responsibility.

MR WAGNER: Thank you, so although you didn't answer my question, did I hear you to say that this military headquarters is responsible for the bomb at the Magistrate's Court in Johannesburg in May 1987, all of them, is that what you're saying?

MR SHOKE: I say there's no self respecting leader who can divorce himself from activities committed by his subordinates, whether he was directly involved or not and the ANC in it's main submission to the TRC claimed responsibility for all activities in fact that were carried out by it's cadres, but that doesn't mean, necessarily mean that Thambo, even if he was in London, was involved in the nitty gritty, but yes because he's a leader, he's responsible for that. So what you must also bear in mind that the military headquarters was in Lusaka, we had long lines or channels of communication.

MR WAGNER: Can you explain to us, because we're not military men, an operation like this, this bombing of the Magistrate's Court in Johannesburg, would that have been planned at the level of military headquarters in Lusaka or not?

MR SHOKE: Unfortunately I was not liaising directly with the military headquarters, I had a commander who was liaising with them and if they were maybe, they did play a role with regard to that, I don't know and it was not my responsibility to know.

MR WAGNER: The way I understand your evidence, you were based in Mozambique at the time, or where were you based?

CHAIRPERSON: Didn't he say Swaziland?

MR WAGNER: Sorry Mr Chairman, Swaziland, you were based in Swaziland, is that correct?

MR SHOKE: Yes.

MR WAGNER: And was your unit, was that called the Transvaal Structure or what is meant by the word Transvaal Structure?

MR SHOKE: The structure is appointed to oversee activities in the Transvaal.

MR WAGNER: Which individuals comprised of this Transvaal Structure who oversaw these activities you're referring to?

MR SHOKE: Different individuals at different times.

MR WAGNER: On the 20th of May 1987?

MR SHOKE: Mr Nyanda was the commander by then, I think I've already said so.

MR WAGNER: Did the Transvaal Structure fall under what was called the Swaziland Regional Politico-Military Committee?

MR SHOKE: That's correct.

MR WAGNER: Does that mean that Mr Ronnie Kasrils was your overall commander, in other words was he the senior to General Nyanda at the time?

MR SHOKE: I was not sitting in the structure so I wouldn't know and what you must also bear in mind, people were just coming and going into (indistinct), Swaziland was a battlefield and I think you are aware of the assassinations in fact that were carried out by the South African Police in Swaziland.

MR WAGNER: Mr Shoke can you please tell us was Mr Kasrils the immediate senior to General Nyanda or not?

MR SHOKE: I say Mr Kasrils used to come and go in Swaziland, he used to be in and out. Obviously in the ANC hierarchy Mr Kasrils was senior to Nyanda, but like I told you that, people had different responsibilities at different times and people used to get in and out of Swaziland.

MR WAGNER: Now when Mr Kasrils visited Swaziland from time to time, did he have discussions with amongst others, you as a commander?

MR SHOKE: He had discussions in fact with his Committee and I think General Nyanda, Mr Nyanda was my immediate commander.

MR WAGNER: Mr Shoke I'm not sure whether you understand my question. Did you at times have meet with Mr Kasrils in Swaziland on his visits as the, apparently from page 53 that I read, the overall commander of the structure?

MR SHOKE: I think when you look at that structure I was not sitting in fact in that order group so there was no way that I will go and sit with Mr Kasrils and discuss operations. Yes of course I would meet Mr Kasrils as a person when he's in Swaziland, or even accommodate him, but not go and discuss work because Nyanda was sitting on that structure with Mr Kasrils, not me and then Nyanda will brief us on behalf of the leadership. I think what you must bear in mind when underground organisation operating in fact in what I may call by then, the enemy territory and as far as we were concerned, Swaziland was not a safe area so it was no way that we could just have in fact a mass of people meeting.

MR WAGNER: Mr Shoke I understand, I understand that response, but I'm trying to get a picture of what was happening in Swaziland. You referred the committee to what is called the Transvaal Structure and I'm trying to ascertain what this means. What I know now is that apparently Mr Kasrils was the overall commander, that is on page 53 Mr Chairman, paragraph 6.4.1 and then Mr Nyanda or General Nyanda was the commander and then I'm know that you were somewhere around. Can you help me with this Transvaal Structure, do you know how many commanders were there apart from yourself?

CHAIRPERSON: Does it say Kasrils was the commander or does he say he was the Chairman?

MR WAGNER: The Chairman Mr Chairman. I would assume that would mean he's at the top, not necessarily the commander.

CHAIRPERSON: Merely meaning that he was the Chairman of the committee.

MR WAGNER: Mr Chairman I'm trying to find out how this worked, I'm not sure myself, I'm trying to ascertain from this witness if he can be of some assistance.

CHAIRPERSON: Well this document we have deals with the Regional Politico-Military Committees and dealing with the Regional Politico-Military Committee for Swaziland it lists the Chairman. It says Ronnie Kasrils until 1984, Ibraham Ismail Ibraham until 1986 when he was abducted, Siphiwe Nyanda 1986 to 1987/1988, Selimko Sukupa (?) 1988 to 1989. Do you see that? And then it lists under that what appears to be other members of the committee for various periods.

MR WAGNER: Mr Chairman sorry, maybe I've misread this, ja it seems as if General Nyanda was the Chairman in 1987 and not Mr Kasrils, that's my mistake. Mr Shoke, and I'm referring all the time to May 1987 so that we don't misunderstand one another on that, that is the time of this incident, May 1987. Do I understand you correctly, you were a commander in MK at that stage?

MR SHOKE: Before I answer you I also want to understand you quite clearly. You want to know the period 1987 during the 20th of May also. Is that what you want?

MR WAGNER: (Inaudible).

MR SHOKE: Yes I was a commander but what you must also bear in mind is that I was a commander of a particular area. I had someone above me, in fact who was the overall commander.

MR WAGNER: Thank you and being a commander, does that mean that you had a unit, you had a unit of a number of individuals and you were the commander. Do I understand you correctly?

MR SHOKE: I think you should (indistinct) we were a guerrilla formation, were dealing with people via remote control. A commander in the typical sense or in a conventional sense he will be with his troops in the battlefield but in our situation we were to ensure from the rear that we facilitate the processes ... (intervention)

(?): (Inaudible).

MR SHOKE: Can I continue? What you must also understand that guerrillas as opposed in fact to conventional forces, we exercise what we call command initiative, you rely on the initiative of the individual and everybody in MK was being prepared in fact to become a commander in the (indistinct) on his own. People functioned independently.

MR WAGNER: Thank you but I'm still not sure. Did you have people under your command, were you in command of a number of individuals and you were their commander and you can call upon them to obey your orders or not?

MR SHOKE: Individuals were (indistinct). Yes it's true we had underground units in fact that we had to cater for inside South Africa and people whom we could in fact liaise with on behalf of the ANC leadership.

MR WAGNER: And were you in command of this Mr Kgoele, who's a co-applicant in this matter. Was he one of the individuals under your command?

MR SHOKE: Yes.

MR WAGNER: Now I want to refer you a discussion you had with General Nyanda regarding the planning of this specific operation and I would like to ask you whose idea was it that this specific target should be the target of this operation?

MR SHOKE: Like I said earlier on that Nyanda was the overall commander in Swaziland and in any military situation the concept of operation is a concept of the commander. 

MR WAGNER: Did General Nyanda tell you, Mr Shoke you and your unit should go and put a bomb outside the Magistrate's Court in Johannesburg?

MR SHOKE: I think I said earlier on that Mr Nyanda brief the applicant Joe Kgoele and then after that I had to facilitate the whole process.

CHAIRPERSON: Yes but before that, before you had got to the stage of Kgoele, as I understood your evidence, you had discussion with General Nyanda?

MR SHOKE: Yes he did discuss the concept with me.

CHAIRPERSON: Exactly, that is what you're being asked about now. Who was the first person to suggest it because I can understand a commander saying it is time we did something drastic, it is time we took steps against them and one of the other people saying well what about attacking this place or that place and that is what Mr Wagner is trying to find out, whose idea was it. Not that you should continue to struggle against the apartheid forces, but that you should conduct this particular operation?

MR SHOKE: It was the commander's concept, Mr Nyanda.

MR WAGNER: Did General Nyanda say specifically that the attack should be launched at the Magistrate's Court. Did he suggest that in so much detail. Is it his idea in other words that a small bomb should be placed outside the Magistrate's Court as well as a bigger bomb to lure the police there and to kill the police there at the Magistrate's Court in Johannesburg, was it all the idea of General Nyanda?

MR SHOKE: I think General Nyanda was not working in isolation. If he's got an idea we were there as his staff to say whether he's correct also, but that is his idea. And anyway like I said in any military situation a concept, it is the commander's concept, you cannot divorce that in fact from the commander.

MR WAGNER: Mr Chairman I still don't know whose idea it was but I'll leave it here. The witness doesn't seem to understand or he's not prepared to answer the questions.

MR SANDI: Maybe you can put it this way Mr Wagner. In coming up with the idea that this particular target should be attacked, did Mr Nyanda give the specifics how it should be planned, how people should go about attacking this place or did he only go as far as making the suggestion that this target should be attacked. How far did he go?

MR SHOKE: He came up with the idea and he outlined his concept but now when it comes to the nitty gritty, I think it will be unfair (indistinct) the operation, not even to Nyanda himself that he can tell a person to identify a particular area but to go to particular point and say do the following, he discussed that with (indistinct) anyway and I was not party to that when he discussed the concept (indistinct) with Mr Kgoele.

MR WAGNER: So did you and Mr Nyanda merely discuss in principle that there should be some kind of operation, some attack within the Republic of South Africa and that a man by the name of Kgoele would be tasked and it was left for his discretion as to how the operation should be carried out?

MR SHOKE: I said I was not involved in the briefing so I wouldn't know. Mr Nyanda came up with the concept, like I said.

MR WAGNER: Did you have any discussion with Mr Kgoele regarding this operation?

MR SHOKE: Yes of course but that no, only as far as now giving him, facilitating because you know the material or the explosives that he got and in training him in the using of the remote controls.

MR WAGNER: So at the time of that discussion with Mr Kgoele were you aware that he would be coming to the Republic to, in the first instance detonate a small bomb and when the police were at the scene, detonate a much bigger bomb in order to kill them?

MR SHOKE: Yes.

MR WAGNER: Was the idea Mr Shoke that Mr Kgoele should come to the Republic of South Africa by his own or was he supposed to be part of a group of ... (intervention)

CHAIRPERSON: I don't want to interrupt you unnecessarily, but I understand the witnesses evidence that Kgoele was based in the Republic, that he paid visits to Swaziland, but that he was in the Republic, is that what you've told us?

MR SHOKE: Yes that's what I said.

MR WAGNER: Was Kgoele also a commander in some sense, did he have other individuals under his command that he could call upon to assist him?

MR SHOKE: That was not in my interest to know because it will have been dangerous, too much knowledge in the underground is too dangerous.

MR SANDI: You mean to - sorry Mr Wagner - you mean to say that it was not necessary for you to know who Mr Kgoele was working with?

MR SHOKE: Who Mr Kgoele was working with, yes.

MR SANDI: Would that have been on a need-to, what has commonly been referred to as a need-to-know basis?

MR SHOKE: Yes.

MR WAGNER: Mr Kgoele, was he what we may call an explosives expert and did he have a lot of experience in this specific field of explosives?

MR SHOKE: He had the necessary knowledge to enable him to execute his tasks.

MR WAGNER: Can I take that as a yes?

MR SHOKE: An expert is something different. I wouldn't like you to take it as a yes, yet there is thorough knowledge to allow him to execute his tasks. You question is, is he an expert and by that word an expert, you mean something different, (indistinct), definitely he was not a boffin. 

MR WAGNER: Mr Shoke are you, do you have knowledge of explosives and can you be seen as an experienced, if not an expert in explosives?

MR SHOKE: I've got a fair knowledge to allow me to do what I'm capable of doing with explosives.

MR WAGNER: And did you train Mr Kgoele as to how he should conduct this specific operation?

MR SHOKE: Yes.

MR WAGNER: Mr Shoke what did this training entail?

MR SHOKE: I taught him how to operate, like I said earlier on, remote gadgets of differences in fact and how to place explosives.

MR WAGNER: Did you help him with physical practice or what did this training entail. Was it merely a verbal training session. What did this entail?

MR SHOKE: It was a layman's training.

MR WAGNER: But if I understand you correctly now, wasn't there a great risk to send someone into the republic of South Africa on an operation like this merely based on a layman's training? To me that seems to have been highly risky. What do you say to that?

MR SANDI: Sorry Mr Shoke - a risk to who Mr Wagner, a risk to who?

MR WAGNER: Mr Chairman I'll try and rephrase. What we know now is that Mr Kgoele came to this country with a very powerful explosive device to be exploded in the midst of a big city. I put it to you that to send someone on a mission like this with only a layman's training is of a high risk, if not highly irresponsible. What do you say to that?

MR SHOKE: I think I said to you earlier on that he had been through thorough training to enable him to execute these tasks and that's that and I think that you are fully aware Mr Wagner by now that many people who were internally trained did execute operations and some were caught and sentenced (indistinct) and so forth, so as far as I'm concerned, Mr Kgoele had the necessary training to enable him to do his work.

CHAIRPERSON: It was put to you that he came to South Africa with a large supply of explosives, where was the dead letter box that he was to collect the explosives from?

MR SHOKE: It was somewhere in Soweto, I gave him sketch and I cannot say exactly where it was but I think when he comes he will explain that.

CHAIRPERSON: Somewhere where?

MR SHOKE: Somewhere in Soweto.

CHAIRPERSON: So it was not stuff that he brought in from outside the country is the point I'm making, he collected it here?

MR WAGNER: So if he is saying that the explosives were supplied by you is he lying?

MR SHOKE: He's not lying. I said I gave him a sketch of a dead letter box in my earlier presentation.

MR WAGNER: Can I come back to the exact particulars of this operation. This whole idea of first a small bomb and when there's a number of policemen at the scene, the second more powerful bomb with a specific and I must state it, with a specific intent to kill as many of them as possible, was this the first time that the ANC used these tactics?

MR SHOKE: I don't think I'm (indistinct) in fact to speak that on behalf of the ANC, I don't know if that is (indistinct).

MR WAGNER: Was the attack aimed at the building, the Magistrate's Court or at the individual policemen at the scene?

MR SHOKE: The police were the target.

MR WAGNER: Mr Shoke are you aware that the majority of the policemen killed and injured in this instance were merely doing administrative work within the Magistrate's Court building and specifically the son of my client, he was working as a Court Orderly, nothing more than that. Are you aware of that?

MR SHOKE: So are those kids in fact killed in Soweto, they were just merely students.

MR WAGNER: Mr Shoke can you please refrain from the political statements you're trying to make all morning. Answer my question?

MR SHOKE: That does not matter. The police were defending apartheid and they were up in arms and those were para-military forces as far as we were concerned and they fall within what the ANC describes as legitimate target. As where in fact that person was deployed at that point in time, it is immaterial.

MR WAGNER: Mr Shoke how does a Court Orderly defend apartheid?

MR SHOKE: It is also very difficult to tell how many times that Court Orderly was sent to the townships.

MR WAGNER: Please answer the question.

MR SHOKE: For the mere fact that person is wearing uniform and he's defending apartheid, irrespective of whether he's deployed in court or any other place, is that man, those people are carrying weapons and as far as I'm concerned, anybody here in this country who was up in arms tried to deny us the (indistinct) this new dispensation that we are enjoying today was a target and falls within the category of the (indistinct) described by the ANC.

MR WAGNER: Mr Shoke in your evidence in chief you said that the people killed in this incident were the very same people who went into the townships killing innocent children or youngsters I think you said. Now I put it to you that that is completely incorrect, specifically on behalf of my client. Her son never did that.

MR SHOKE: The fact of the matter is he was a policeman.

MR WAGNER: Mr Shoke I've heard in previous hearings that your organisation, the ANC, specifically regarded the Security Branch of the South African Police as your enemy. Is that correct?

MR SHOKE: I think you are not correct when you say specifically, the special branch were part.

MR WAGNER: But the thrust of your anger, of you feelings were directed at the Security Branch of the South African Police. That's how I understand the evidence in previous hearings. Do you agree?

MR SHOKE: No I don't agree with that. The thrust in fact of the main effort was to deal with the police, in general the army or those people that the ANC in fact defined as legitimate targets. The ANC never specified to people that they must differentiate between a Court Orderly and a policeman because policemen are policemen.

MR WAGNER: Mr Shoke I have to ask you this. Why didn't you and General Nyanda have the guts to attack people who could defend themselves? As a military man, why didn't you do that, why did you elect to commit this crime, to kill people in this fashion, where they've got no way whatsoever of defending themselves, whether they're policemen or I don't care. Why decide on this way of killing innocent people?

MR SHOKE: The police were part and parcel of this conflict. And they were part of the repressive machinery in this country. According to the (indistinct) of guerrilla warfare, you hit at your enemy when he least expects you.

MR WAGNER: Does that mean you attack someone who can't defend himself, is that your policy, is that what you ask us here today to accept?

MR SHOKE: If they're police in fact they were carrying arms, people who are carrying arms and fail to defend themselves in a battlefield situation it's too bad for them.

MR WAGNER: Mr Shoke what did you aim to achieve by this operation?

MR SHOKE: To pump some sense in those who were defending apartheid, that what I tried to defend is indefensible.

MR WAGNER: And who would that be?

MR SHOKE: Starting from apartheid politicians or infrastructure, that is the government of the day and even those that were misled by the previous government, that they were better than others and they've got something to defend as far as the status quo were concerned.

MR WAGNER: Now Mr Shoke if you want it, as you put it, to pump some sense into the politicians, why didn't you attack them? Why innocent people at the Court, I still don't understand that?

MR SANDI: Sorry Mr Wagner, just to ensure that I follow, when you talk about innocent people are you talking about the police who were killed at this incident or the civilians who were caught up in the fire?

MR WAGNER: Mr Chairman I'm referring to both categories. Specifically I'm referring to my clients. I put it to this witness my clients were innocent people who were unable to defend themselves. 

&#9;The question was why didn't you attack the politicians directly then?

MR SHOKE: I think I've got a problem with you Mr Wagner if you describe a policeman in South Africa during the apartheid era as someone who is innocent. Maybe you need to take a (indistinct) into any township here, aware now, you'll have the opportunity to interview the victims of police brutality and get to know (indistinct) in fact police really are indeed innocent.

MR WAGNER: Mr Shoke I'm not going to labour this point, all I'm telling you is the son of my client was never in a township, he was an innocent young man brutally killed by you and your colleagues. The question was why didn't you attack the politician if you wanted to pump sense into their heads?

DR TSOTSI: Mr Wagner you keep on repeating this question. Wasn't it ANC policy to fight against those who were the props of apartheid, including policeman, and wasn't the son of your client an informed policeman? I'm sure there are degrees of involvement of the police and the army in the struggle, some were who were not as deeply involved in the actual fighting (indistinct), but (indistinct). I'm not saying there's any justification in killing the son, it's just because you keep on repeating this question as if there is no policy. The policy of the ANC has been stated here as the policemen and they are legitimate targets. So I just wanted to try and clarify how you get over that definition or are you saying that the definition itself is wrong, the police - the ANC should not have agreed to kill all policemen indiscriminately ... (end of tape)

MR WAGNER: ... and how the mind frames of the murderers of her son work. That's why I'm asking these questions.

DR TSOTSI: (Inaudible).

MR WAGNER: Mr Chairman if the Committee has a problem I will proceed with other questions, but I merely repeated the questions because there was no clear answer forthcoming. Mr Shoke can I refer you to a document, I think Mr Chairman it is the submission of August 1996 by the ANC, I don't know whether you have it there? May I refer you to page 86 of the document with the heading "Umkhonto weSizwe Military Code", at the top. Do you have it there? Now before I ask you the specific questions, this part of the document deals, amongst others, with the word people. Now I'm not sure what is meant by the word people in this part of the submission. Can you perhaps just help me and maybe the Committee where you say the people's army, people's war, word like, phrases like that. What is meant by the word people?

MR SHOKE: I'm sorry I'm unable to help you with regard to that, but my interpretation of the people's army is a army that represents the wishes of the majority of this country and that is Umkhonto weSizwe.

MR SANDI: So Mr Shoke if one understands you correctly that would be members and supporters of your organisation?

MR SHOKE: Can you repeat your question?

MR SANDI: Are you referring there to members and supporters of your organisation and perhaps even those who stand to benefit if those goals are to be achieved?

MR SHOKE: Yes that's what I mean.

MR WAGNER: Then more specifically Mr Shoke I have here on my page 87 a paragraph 5, it is in the top right-hand side. It's got a heading "Umkhonto Insists on a High Standard of Selfless Devotion to the Revolution on the Part of all it's Members". You've got that? On page 87 in the right-hand column at the top. Now what it says here is the following, is that from members of Umkhonto are required at all times to, and then there's an a, b, c, d and e. You see that? Now a says it is required of you to behave correctly to people. Who would that people be?

MR SHOKE: The people in general but not my enemy.

MR WAGNER: and in this instance where the explosion outside a Magistrate's Court in Johannesburg, did you and your colleagues behave correctly to the people?

MR SHOKE: Yes.

MR WAGNER: Even though it seems as if there were victims who could be part of what you classify the people?

MR SHOKE: I think I would like to refer you at this moment to page 50 of the same document that you have got.

MR WAGNER: You've done that earlier, I remember the passage if it's the same passage, I remember that.

MR SHOKE: Then it will seem as if, in you caution you chose to ignore this paragraph in the main submission.

MR WAGNER: Mr Chairman I'm not ignoring it. All I want - I put it to you that to some extent you and your colleagues did not comply to what is said here in 5.a.

MR SHOKE: The answer is in the paragraph that I referred to just now.

MR WAGNER: Yes and in b it says you should have respect for their persons and property and I put it to you that you failed this test also.

MR SHOKE: I think it is your opinion.

MR SANDI: I'm sorry Mr Wagner I've not read this document. Isn't this really a general code of conduct as to how members of the organisation should conduct themselves in their interaction with people and perhaps not really about how military operations should be conducted?

MR WAGNER: Mr Chairman I'm reading from a document of the ANC prescribing standards of conduct by it's members.

CHAIRPERSON: And on the column before it says: "The people support their army by providing it with recruits, their sons and daughters, food, shelter, information about the enemy. The people open the way for our guerrillas make the enemy's path harder. The ANC mobilises the people in support of the revolution through skilful combinations of all forms of struggle", and so it goes on. Mustn't one consider people in that context?

MR WAGNER: Mr Chairman I think you're correct. I asked the witness whether he can assist but the only point ... (intervention)

CHAIRPERSON: ... (Inaudible) now engage in the interpretation of the document and mustn’t you read the document as a whole and there they are referring to the people who support them in saying that you must treat them, respect their property, refrain from molesting or interfering with their legitimate activities, assist them to solve their problems and where possible give material aid in their labour. Now that is surely aimed at a particular class of person in our community. Carry on.

MR WAGNER: Mr Shoke in terms of this Volume 2, the operation seemed to have cause prejudice to what may also be referred to members of the people, your people in that there have been injuries and damage to property, cars, vehicles belonging to individuals that, the way I see it, were members of your people. Do you agree?

MR SHOKE: I think the ANC has made in fact a statement that deals with (indistinct). I think that since this morning I referred you to the relevant paragraph more than 4 times. Please do read that paragraph so that you should understand it in it's proper context.

MR WAGNER: That's why the only reason why I asked you the previous questions was that it seems to me as if you and your colleagues failed to comply with any of these specifications under paragraph 5 a-e as members of Umkhonto weSizwe and this will be argued.

CHAIRPERSON: Which particular piece are you referring to in Volume 2?

MR WAGNER: Mr Chairman if you merely look at page 41 and onwards there seems to be a list of victims and from then on, on the face value, it seems as if they may be, although I'm or I'm still not sure who would be this people, but on face value it seems to the position.

CHAIRPERSON: I take it you're not referring to Anglo American as one of their people?

MR WAGNER: Not at all Mr Chairman.

CHAIRPERSON: What you're referring to is the fact that the list there is of 62 vehicles which were apparently damaged in the explosion? Carry on. I'm just amazed, we've only just been given this book. I hadn't seen it before, about the two way radio that was discovered. Carry on.

MR WAGNER: Mr Shoke while the Chairman mentioned it, in the documentation before the Committee mention has been made to a radio that was found a couple of hundred of metres from the explosion which seems to have been connected to this incident. Would you know anything about that? 

MR SHOKE: No. 

MR WAGNER: Then only one last aspect Mr Chairman. What do you say Mr Shoke to this suggestion. I heard you to testify this morning that you wanted to, the way you put it, to pump some sense into the heads of the politicians, I think that's more or less what you said or rather I would like to ask it by way of a question. Why then to achieve that result, was it necessary to detonate a bomb of this magnitude in a public area, killing a number of individuals and injuring even more?

MR SHOKE: I think what you must bear in mind that the South African Government was at war with it's citizens, particularly the Black majority of this country and there were those on the side of apartheid who resorted to arms to sustain that system that was declared a crime against humanity and in our quest for freedom, we had to deal with them because they were in the frontline of apartheid defence. 

MR WAGNER: Mr Chairman I have no further questions.

NO FURTHER QUESTIONS BY MR WAGNER

CROSS-EXAMINATION BY ADV PRIOR: Mr Shoke sitting here listening to you it seems to me that you were a committed person within the MK structure and the way you're giving your evidence you, it's something that struck me, have you ever at any stage at the time of the bombing or subsequent thereto, had any thought or regard for the people that were left afterwards, the families of the people that were killed and murdered, the people that were injured, be they White people or Black people. It seems to me that - have you had any regard for those people at all or not?

MR SHOKE: I think as a Black person in this country I have shed fountains of tears and we, were we are we've crossed rivers of blood and the blood that was spilt by the South African Police.

ADV PRIOR: May I just follow that up. You have no thought or regard for the people who actually suffered as a result of this particular operation. Is that, do I understand you correctly. You say you've shed all the tears that you can shed, so do I understand from that that you have no feeling, no thought for the victims, whether they be White or Black, but the families that were left after the killing of their children, do you have any regard for them?

MR SHOKE: It is unfortunate that the government of the day allowed the situation in fact to be what it was by them. 

ADV PRIOR: I hear you, but you as an individual before the Amnesty Committee today, you've applied for amnesty. We know what happened in the past, we've heard many accounts and many many witnesses have testified. I just invite you at this stage to indicate whether you had any regard for such victims who were also victims of the madness or do you have no feeling for them as you sit here today?

MR SHOKE: Like I said (indistinct) it was unfortunate that I was trying in fact to take that route but if you were in my position I think you'd have followed the same route.

ADV PRIOR: Alright. Was there any consideration during the planning stage when General Nyanda was involved, when you were involved, Mr Kgoele was involved of the possibility that even the supporters of the struggle, supporters of the ANC may well be killed if you detonate an explosion at the Magistrate's Court and seen against the background that the Magistrate's Court was also frequented by people involved in the struggle, your supporters, your sympathisers. Were there any consideration given to that possibility that those people may well be killed in such explosions and if that was done, if that was considered, let me ask the second part, were they just expendable in the circumstances?

MR SHOKE: That possibility was considered.

ADV PRIOR: And the second part is, having considered that possibility, were they expendable in your achieving your ultimate goal, that was to pump sense into the apartheid government or their representatives?

MR SHOKE: To the best of my knowledge, precautionary measures were taken to minimise any civilian casualty and civilian in the true sense of the word of civilian because by then, Blacks in the townships were not regarded as civilians, people only spoke of civilians when there were White casualties.

ADV PRIOR: Yes I hear that but answer the question specifically if you can. Having made the assessment, as you've now conceded that possibility existed and there were precautions to minimise the casualty figure among civilians and there by civilians I include people from all walks of life not related to the army or police, private people who went to the Court for business or they were called there, were those people simply expendable in the overall objective of the operation. In other words if those people, despite the precautions, were in fact killed or injured, they were simply casualties of war, they were expendable. Is that how you saw it?

MR SHOKE: I think that aspect is also covered in paragraph 51 of the main submission. The ANC at strategic level did consider that.

ADV PRIOR: And you embraced that strategy in the specific planning of this event. Did you make it part of your mind set, your thought processes and the way you accepted it. You see you keep referring to what the policy was. Do you embrace that as part of your mind set in the planning of this operation?

CHAIRPERSON: Let's put it more simply. You saw that people might be killed, innocent people might be killed, you realised that?

MR SHOKE: Might be hurt ja or killed, that possibility existed and hence we took the necessary precautionary measures.

ADV PRIOR: Thank you Mr Chairman I have no further questions.

CHAIRPERSON: Re-examination?

MR LANDMAN: No re-examination.

CHAIRPERSON: Thank you. Sorry, rather let me put a question arising perhaps from Mr Prior's last question. Is the position that on, in any warfare situation both sides accept the fact that when they carry out operations, some of their own supporters might get involved in the crossfire?

MR SHOKE: To the best of my knowledge all wars throughout the world in fact civilians have been caught in crossfire.

CHAIRPERSON: Thank you.

WITNESS EXCUSED 

&#9;TRUTH AND RECONCILIATION COMMISSION

&#9;AMNESTY HEARING

DATE:&#9;5TH AUGUST 1998

NAME:&#9;JOSEPH KGOELE

DAY :&#9;3

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MR LANDMAN: Mr Chairman we are in a position to call the second applicant, I don't know what the lunch arrangements are?

CHAIRPERSON: We don't propose to adjourn until 1 o'clock so we've got 20 minutes, we might as well ...

MR LANDMAN: I then call Joseph ... 

MACHINE OFF

MR SANDI: Are you going to take an oath or an affirmation?

MR KGOELE: (Inaudible).

MR SANDI: Are you going to take an oath or an affirmation?

JOSEPH KGOELE: (sworn states)

EXAMINATION BY MR LANDMAN: Mr Kgoele in 1987 were you a member of MK?

MR SANDI: Sorry Mr Landman I thought I would ask him in what language is he going to testify?

MR LANDMAN: Mr Chairman he's indicated to me that he will testify in English. If you could just possibly confirm that?

MR SANDI: English will be on channel 2 Mr Kgoele

MR LANDMAN: Mr Kgoele are you going to give your evidence in English?

MR KGOELE: Yes.

MR LANDMAN: Mr Kgoele in 1987 were you a member of Umkhonto weSizwe?

MR KGOELE: Yes.

MR LANDMAN: When did you join MK?

MR KGOELE: 1982.

MR LANDMAN: Between 1982 and 1987 had you received political training from MK members in neighbouring countries?

MR KGOELE: Yes.

MR LANDMAN: Had you been instructed as to the policy of the ANC and MK in regard to what were legitimate targets?

MR KGOELE: Yes.

MR LANDMAN: Now you've heard Mr Shoke testify this morning as to what that policy was in regard to targets. Do you confirm that?

MR KGOELE: Yes I do.

MR LANDMAN: You were involved in the bomb blast that took place outside the Johannesburg Magistrate's Court in 1987. Is that correct?

MR KGOELE: Yes it is correct.

MR LANDMAN: Would you explain to the Committee how you first became involved in that particular incident?

MR KGOELE: As a member of Umkhonto weSizwe. Prior to my joining the African National Congress I had endured a lot of suffering, that suffering stems primarily from the fact that I was denied a vote in my own land of birth. Furthermore, all the Blacks in South Africa were made (indistinct) in their own land of birth so after joining the African National Congress and undergoing their military training I was assigned by General Nyanda to do a surveillance of possible targets or military targets that would be targeted by a member of Umkhonto weSizwe and in that regard me also. So after that General Nyanda made reference to me about the Johannesburg Magistrate's Court so I surveyed that place to verify the validity or the legitimacy of our target and after that I brief General Nyanda who then told me that that would be the legitimate target for us to attack.

MR LANDMAN: Could you explain at this stage what would have been the object of attacking that target?

MR KGOELE: The object would have been to send a message to the South African regime of that time that though - that they were not only one people who could not die. Previously the South African regime had attacked African National Congress bases in the neighbouring countries, i.e. Mozambique, Madola and Maseru and the South African Forces killed our cadres and at times civilians in those attacks so by us staging this attack, was to send a message to them and to send a message to the people of South Africa that Umkhonto was there and Umkhonto weSizwe would liberate them.

MR LANDMAN: And who was to be specifically targeted at the Johannesburg Magistrate's Court?

MR KGOELE: The military personnel or any person who had to do or who was involved in the State organs like the police or the military.

MR LANDMAN: After you had surveyed the area at the Johannesburg Magistrate's Court and had reported back to General Nyanda, what further discussions did you have with him?

MR KGOELE: The discussion centred around trying to avoid civilian casualties as far as possible and he even made insinuation or suggested that we use a decoy bomb that we had learned from past experience that whenever there was an explosion, the police will sort of cordon off the area and they will all be isolated by themselves and they would be the main target.

MR LANDMAN: Could you just explain when the police would put up a cordon, where would the civilians be?

MR KGOELE: After a cordon civilians will always be far away because the main purpose of the cordon, as far as I'm concerned, is to keep civilians away from a particular area so the only people who would have been around there would have been the police.

MR LANDMAN: In connection with this particular operation, how were you to be sure that there were only police within the cordon?

MR KGOELE: After the decoy bomb went off I stood somewhere watching the whole place, I think I was about 100 or 150 metres away from the actual place so I had to make sure that it was only the police who would seem to be around the particular area and the way the target was chosen was that we did not choose at a busy street, we choose the back street of the Johannesburg Magistrate's Court and the time also had an effect or had a factor on this because we knew that during a particular time people would be at work or the Court would be in process so the people coming in and out of that particular place will be the police so we had to ensure that we targeted solely the police.

MR LANDMAN: Was this discussed between yourself and General Nyanda at the time?

MR KGOELE: Yes that is so.

MR LANDMAN: Were any plans made as to how the main bomb was to be detonated?

MR KGOELE: Yes, it was to be detonated after the limpet mine had gone off and the police had cordoned off the area and they were the only people within that proximity.

MR LANDMAN: Was it discussed what the vice should be used to detonate the main bomb?

MR KGOELE: Yes as Mr Shoke had previously indicated, I was given some remote control devices.

MR LANDMAN: Now Mr Kgoele after you and General Nyanda had discussed this plan, did you have any discussions with Mr Shoke?

MR KGOELE: The discussions I had with Mr Shoke related to the usage of the remote control devices and the location of the DLB, that is the dead letter boxes where I would be able to retrieve the explosives that I was going to use on that particular day.

MR LANDMAN: Were you given any training in the use of the devices and the explosives?

MR KGOELE: Yes.

MR LANDMAN: Who gave you that training and what did that training consist of?

MR KGOELE: The training of using the explosives was given to me by totally different people. Mr Shoke took me along the paces of using the remote control device. 

MR LANDMAN: By the - did you then return to Johannesburg from Swaziland?

MR KGOELE: As stated earlier I'd been in and out of Swaziland on a number of occasions, not precisely to go and talk about the Magistrate Court, but to talk about various things, things I was engaged in, Umkhonto weSizwe activities.

MR LANDMAN: But on the occasion when you had received the instructions with regard to the Johannesburg Magistrate's Court bomb and had received the piece of paper indicating the location of the dead letter box, did you then return to South Africa?

MR KGOELE: Yes I did.

MR LANDMAN: Did either General Shoke or General Nyanda know about the fact that you may use other people to assist you in this operation?

MR KGOELE: The method of operation lay solely or entirely upon the discretion of the particular cadre and like Mr Shoke did indicated earlier, we were all commanders. One could at least or recruit people who could help serve in the MK structures.

MR LANDMAN: Did you recruit anybody to assist you in this operation?

MR KGOELE: Yes I did.

MR LANDMAN: Who was that?

MR KGOELE: William Mabele.

MR LANDMAN: What assistance did he give you?

MR KGOELE: William Mabele only assisted me in driving the backup or vehicle that, when I had to go and park the bomb laden car outside the Johannesburg Magistrate's Court.

MR LANDMAN: We'll come to that a little bit later. Did you collect the explosives from the DLB?

MR KGOELE: Yes I did.

MR LANDMAN: The initial explosion which was to create a situation where a cordon would be put around the area, what device did you intend using to cause that explosion?

MR KGOELE: I used a mini limpet mine.

MR LANDMAN: Where did you obtain that mine from?

MR KGOELE: From the DLB that I had retrieved.

MR LANDMAN: After you'd retrieved the explosives from the DLB did anybody assist you in assembling the bomb?

MR KGOELE: No I did it all by myself.

MR LANDMAN: When did William Mabele become aware that he may be involved in an MK operation?

MR KGOELE: I think after hearing the news on the radio or after the Johannesburg Magistrate explosion.

MR LANDMAN: Can you tell the Committee what happened on the morning of the bombing?

MR KGOELE: On the day in question I asked William Mabele to accompany me to town. It was about six, past six in the morning. So I told William Mabele to drive the other car, the straight car which was mine and I drove the bomb laden vehicle to the Magistrate's Court. After parking the car at the identified place I went back to the car and drove William back to Soweto. I then went back ... (intervention)

MR LANDMAN: If I could just interrupt you at this stage Mr Kgoele. Why did you go to the scene so early in the morning?

MR KGOELE: I went there early in order to be able to locate a place where I would be able to park the car. This had stemmed primarily from my previous visit to that area that if people - the cars were always parked around the street there and it was like a free parking so I wanted to go there early to be able to secure a parking place for the car.

MR LANDMAN: You said that William Mabele took you back to Soweto. What happened after that?

MR KGOELE: I went back to my hiding place, changed the clothing that I wore that particular morning, got hold of my Makarov pistol, armed myself with two hand grenades, retrieved the remote control devices and went back to the Magistrate's Court.

MR LANDMAN: What time did you arrive back at the Magistrate's Court?

MR KGOELE: I arrived at the Magistrate's Court at about half past eleven.

MR LANDMAN: Yes, what did you do there?

MR KGOELE: I surveyed the place because I had to make sure that I was not being followed and I wanted to make sure that when I started my mission or my operation that there were not a number of people around that area, so I moved around and at about ten past twelve I placed the mini limpet mind underneath another vehicle and the intention of that was to make that limpet mine act as a decoy.

MR LANDMAN: What time was the mini limpet mine expected to explode?

MR KGOELE: I had a time delaying element within that, it was timed to go off within fifteen minutes.

MR LANDMAN: Did you watch as the mini limpet mine exploded?

MR KGOELE: Yes I did.

MR LANDMAN: Where were you at that stage?

MR KGOELE: Not far from where I had parked the car, there was a dry cleaners and a little kiosk I think about 30/40 metres from where I parked the car, so by that time I was sitting in the cafe and then when the bomb went out I went out and then I saw the police who were cordoning off the area. I went back to where I had parked my car, retrieved the remote control device and when I realised that the police had already cordoned off the are and there were no at least civilian within the cordoned off area, I let go of the device.

MR LANDMAN: By that you mean you detonated the device did you?

MR KGOELE: Yes I did.

MR LANDMAN: Did you notice any policemen within the cordon at that stage?

MR KGOELE: Yes.

MR LANDMAN: Should there have been civilians within the cordon, what would you have done?

MR KGOELE: Like the ANC had submitted earlier, in a war situation casualties may be expected, but I would have tried to minimise loss of civilian life. Like I indicated earlier, through past experience, whenever there was an explosion, the police will cordon off the area and the only people who would remain within that cordoned off area would be the police.

MR LANDMAN: Would it then be correct to say that the police behaved as you had expected on that day?

MR KGOELE: Yes they did.

MR LANDMAN: After the main explosion took place, what did you do? Mr Chairman it might be a convenient time to break.

CHAIRPERSON: Do you think three quarters of an hour will be sufficient for you?

MR LANDMAN: It ought to be.

CHAIRPERSON: We will adjourn until ...

COMMITTEE ADJOURNS

ON RESUMPTION

MR LANDMAN: After you had detonated the explosion using the remote control device, what did you then do?

MR KGOELE: I left the scene and proceeded down I think Fox or Main Street and then when I reached Boland Bank I concealed the transmitter that I had held in my hand that I used to detonate the bomb.

MR LANDMAN: When you say you concealed it, did you leave it in a flower pot or the like?

MR KGOELE: Yes I left underneath some flowers.

MR LANDMAN: What did you do after that?

MR KGOELE: I went back to my hiding place.

MR LANDMAN: Now if I can refer you to your application for amnesty, and in particular to page 11 of that bundle, ... (end of tape)

MR LANDMAN: ... those are the further particulars that you supplied?

MR KGOELE: Yes.

MR LANDMAN: Ja. Under the heading "Johannesburg Magistrate Court Attack" you have under certain sub headings, a) "Planning", then b) you say "The remote control devices were given to me by Kabusa (?). Could you explain that?

MR KGOELE: Yes Kabusa, when I say Kabusa I'm referring to General Siphiwe Nyanda. The remote devices were given to me and the other explosives I had to retrieve from the DLB, only a sketch was supplied to me by Mr Shoke.

MR LANDMAN: The remote control devices given to you by Mr Nyanda, did you actually use them at the end of the day in this attack?

MR KGOELE: No the initial devices given to me were not used because I realised when testing them that I think they were mixed so I had to go back to Swaziland and exchange them with one that I got from Mr Shoke.

MR LANDMAN: When carrying out the attack upon the policemen at the Johannesburg Magistrate's Court were you acting in your capacity as a member of MK?

MR KGOELE: Yes I was.

MR LANDMAN: Mr Chairman I just confirm again that the application itself has been handed up to the Committee and forms part of the bundle. It has also been signed under oath by the present applicant. That then is the evidence in chief.

MR WAGNER: Thank you Mr Chairman. On the last point raised by Mr Landman, the application was not signed under oath.

MR LANDMAN: Yes it has been pointed out to me, that is correct, I was looking at Mr Shoke's application. If I might then just, at this stage, ask Mr Kgoele to look at the application which begins on page 3 of the bundle to page 9. Do you confirm the contents of that application?

MR KGOELE: Yes I do.

MR LANDMAN: I have no further questions.

NO FURTHER QUESTIONS BY MR LANDMAN

ADV PRIOR: Mr Chairman may I just possibly inform the Committee that that fact of non attestation had been brought to or came to our attention earlier on in the preparation and there is no attested form of Mr Kgoele in the original file in Cape Town. We were unable to find an attested copy of the application.

CHAIRPERSON: Was his attention drawn to this as is the practice as I understand it of the Amnesty Committee?

ADV PRIOR: I was unable to find correspondence to that effect.

CHAIRPERSON: Is the normal practice or was the normal practice was it not that were forms were not attested, the attention of the applicant was drawn to it and it was remedied?

ADV PRIOR: I understand that that was followed in a number of cases, yes. 

CROSS EXAMINATION BY MR WAGNER: Can you just help me with the pronunciation of your name, is it Kgoele. Is that the correct, I heard Mr Prior referring to it as Kgoele, is that that correct pronunciation?

MR KGOELE: No it is not.

MR WAGNER: Can you please help me?

MR KGOELE: Kgoele.

MR WAGNER: Okay Mr Kgoele forgive me then if I err in this respect at times. Can I ask you are you also at present a member of the National Defence Force?

MR KGOELE: No.

MR WAGNER: What position do you hold at present?

MR KGOELE: It is difficult for me to divulge the position I hold but I'm working under the Inter-corruption Unit of Johannesburg (indistinct).

MR WAGNER: And I see on page 11 of your application you refer to William Mabele as Sergeant Mabele, is he a member of the Defence Force or the police or don't you know?

MR KGOELE: NO he's a member of the South African National Defence Force.

MR WAGNER: Mr Kgoele and once again my questions will be concerning the period May 1987, at the time of this incident so if I don't repeat myself every time, please keep in mind that I'm referring to that period, May 1987, okay? Were you at this time also regarded as a member of what is called the Transvaal Machinery?

MR KGOELE: I would say yes but like Mr Shoke indicated, we had different structures within Umkhonto weSizwe and each with a different mission, so I would say yes I was a member but falling directly under General Nyanda.

MR WAGNER: Now we have heard or I have heard in a previous hearing of an MK unit called Special Operations. Were you and your unit working parallel to what is called Special Operations?

MR KGOELE: It will be difficult for me again to explain because like I say we are not supposed to know about the others' operations so my operations was mine, what the others did so I wouldn't know, I wouldn't say I was part of any one.

MR WAGNER: Why I'm asking this question is that I heard testimony in a previous matter that this unit called Special Operations, they were given all the big, if I may call it the spectacular, the controversial operations to conduct and it is against that that I would like to ask you do you know why you and your unit were tasked for this very big operation?

MR KGOELE: I should think that General Nyanda might have realised my potential so independently he might have taken that decision to assign me that task.

MR WAGNER: Can I take it from your answer that you were an experienced explosive operator and that therefore you could be entrusted with this very big and I would say difficult operation?

MR KGOELE: I wouldn't say experienced, I would say he realised my potential. There were various cadres who would have performed better than I, but on this particular case they might have been involved on other missions, so this mission here perhaps General Kabusa saw something in me and chose me to do it.

MR WAGNER: Mr Kgoele can you tell this Committee what your experience was at the time concerning explosives and explosions?

MR KGOELE: My experience varied because one was not trained on one particular aspect. My training or our training as MK cadres was broad. We were trained politically, trained in the usage of arms, rifles and explosives, what we termed to as military engineering so it was general training, no that one was an expert in anything.

MR WAGNER: Yes but what I would like to know, this training you received was it practical, did you have practical experience of working with explosives, of detonating explosives and so forth. Was that part of your experience at the time?

MR KGOELE: No.

MR WAGNER: Can I take it then that this was the first time in your life that you actually detonated an explosive device?

MR KGOELE: No.

MR WAGNER: Well what's the answer then?

MR KGOELE: It was not the first time, I had detonated some explosives somewhere but not of this magnitude.

MR WAGNER: Maybe I can ask you this, is that part of some other amnesty applications of yours and that I should therefore not question you in this regard?

MR KGOELE: I think so.

MR WAGNER: Mr Kgoele the final instruction to go to Johannesburg and cause this explosion in the way it happened, was that instruction from General Nyanda only?

MR KGOELE: Yes because as it was indicated earlier, there is only one main command so I received instructions from General Nyanda. Mr Shoke might have helped facilitate with the explosives, what we termed ordinance or logistics at the time and maybe made an input during the, but it is the brainchild of General Nyanda.

MR WAGNER: Now Mr Kgoele you also testified that you as the operative, if I may call it that, you had a discretion to some extent as to how the operation should be carried out. Do you remember that?

MR KGOELE: I don't remember saying that but the briefings that we had we interacted and General Nyanda never sort of imposed himself. We discussed go out there, survey the area come back and tell me, so we discussed and I felt it was opportunity which was right to do so but an order is an order.

MR WAGNER: Why I'm asking you this is in the final execution of the operation, what was left to your own discretion and what was the specific instruction of General Nyanda?

MR KGOELE: The instructions were for me to go out there, set the decoy bomb and then ultimately trigger the remote control bomb. Then after that I had to go and report back to Swaziland.

MR WAGNER: So am I right in saying then that your discretion would then be aspects like exactly where the car had to be parked and exactly where you had to stand when detonating the device and so forth?

MR KGOELE: Yes.

MR WAGNER: Did General Nyanda instruct you regarding the amount of explosives to be used for instance?

MR KGOELE: No he never made mention of the explosive to me. All I can say is after getting the sketch from Mr Shoke I used all that I retrieved from the DLB, I think those materials precisely meant for this particular operation.

MR WAGNER: And can you tell this Committee what was the amount of explosives used specifically in the big explosion if I may call it that, the second explosion?

MR KGOELE: I would say it was around about 100 kgs.

MR WAGNER: Are you sure of this fact, 100 kilogram, more or less?

MR KGOELE: I am not certain because I didn't have to weight them, I'm just making an approximation by the weight of the things that I had that it could have been approximately around + 100 kgs.

MR WAGNER: Why I'm asking this is I'm definitely not an explosives expert, but we've heard evidence in previous matters and in terms of that, 100 kilograms of explosives that is a huge bomb, if I may call it that.

MR KGOELE: Well that's your interpretation. Like I'm saying I didn't weigh them so I'm just making a - it could be a poor judgement, could have been less than that.

MR WAGNER: Now can you tell us very briefly when you fetched these explosives from the DLB, what did you have to do to convert this, if I, to convert this into a bomb?

MR KGOELE: Okay, I think I must put things into proper context. These explosives were already made. All I had to do was to put in the detonators, that's all, the explosives were there. 

MR WAGNER: And I assume you had to put in a certain triggering device as well or a time device or am I wrong?

MR KGOELE: On the limpet mine yes. With the other explosives I depended entirely upon the remote control device.

MR WAGNER: Now please help me Mr Kgoele and I'm referring now to the big bomb if I - you're with me, the big bomb. When you parked our car outside the Magistrate's Court early in the morning - maybe I should first ask you, can you remember at what time did you park your car there?

MR KGOELE: Past six, somewhere there, past six to seven because it was early I had to find parking space as I indicated earlier.

MR WAGNER: So when you parked this car, say between six and seven in the morning, was this bomb in the car, was it already primed - is that the word you people use - was it already primed, ready to explode?

MR KGOELE: No not yet.

MR WAGNER: What was still required to cause the explosion, apart from the triggering of the remote control the, what else was still required and I'm referring now to the moment when you parked your car between six and seven in the morning outside the Court?

MR KGOELE: What was required of me was just to install a battery in when I came back.

MR WAGNER: So are you saying that you parked your car there in the morning, you went back to Soweto, at a later stage you came back and you had to go to this car again and to do something to activate the bomb by putting in a battery or something. Is that what you're saying?

MR KGOELE: Yes, that battery controls the time mechanism which was installed within the explosives and that time mechanism was further activated by the remote control device.

MR WAGNER: Was this done so that the bomb could not be detonated in the meantime, during the course of the morning by some accident, radio frequency or something, is that what you're saying?

MR KGOELE: Yes it is, without the battery it's just as dead as anything.

MR WAGNER: I'm quite relieved to hear this because I was under the impression that there was this very very dangerous sort of activated bomb standing there for six and a half hours in the street. Is that not the position?

MR KGOELE: Yes.

MR WAGNER: Your accomplice Mr Mabele, was he not informed at all beforehand what this whole coming to town and driving back to Soweto early in the morning was all about?

MR KGOELE: No he was never informed, but as a human being he might have had his own suspicions, why then he was a supporter of Umkhonto weSizwe.

MR WAGNER: Maybe you can tell the Committee this, where exactly, were did you construct this bomb because 100 kilograms, this is, this must have been huge. Was that in your own house or in your garage or where did you do all this?

MR KGOELE: In my own hideout.

MR WAGNER: And I assume then you alone and you had no one to help you there?

MR KGOELE: Yes.

MR WAGNER: Did Mr Mabele at any stage see the explosives?

MR KGOELE: Let me correct you, it's not Mabene it's Mabele. He saw what was in the boot of the car but I don't think by that time he could explain what it was.

MR WAGNER: This specific car with the big bomb, whose care was this?

MR KGOELE: As was MK practice, we used to purchase this so-called "hot" cars from the (indistinct) people who stole them for use in such operations so I had previously purchased that car and concealed it in my hiding place and then the day I had to do what was required of me.

MR WAGNER: So this was a stolen car?

MR KGOELE: Yes.

MR WAGNER: The specific time of the explosion, I think it was, both explosions were round about twelve thirty, round about midday according to the documentation. I think you agree to that?

MR KGOELE: Yes I do.

MR WAGNER: What was the reason or what was the motivation that that was the correct time for the explosion?

MR KGOELE: It was not the reason, the purpose was that, the timing was that during that time a lot of people are already at work and the Court will be in session by that time and there will only be fewer people moving around and the exact location, after our own surveillance was that there was a lot of traffic except the police who came into the Court from Johannesburg, John Vorster Square by then, so the time was to lure the police who came from John Vorster Square.

MR WAGNER: Mr Kgoele was the idea to kill as many policemen as possible?

MR KGOELE: By then yes.

MR WAGNER: And that is regardless of race or gender or type of work they've been doing, merely being a policeman they should be killed?

MR KGOELE: Yes.

MR WAGNER: In fact I can remember seeing a video where you gave an interview, I don't know who the people are where you actually made statements to this effect that you would have been more happy man had there been killed a hundred or so policemen, I can't remember the exact word but words to that effect?

MR KGOELE: Yes I did say.

MR WAGNER: Does that mean that you regard this operation as a failure?

MR KGOELE: Not that I regard it as a failure. When I uttered those words I spoke from the perspective of a Black man who had no vote then in South Africa. I spoke on a perspective or from a point of view of a man who had endured all the sufferings in Soweto. That I had to skip this country and go for training, it was not due to a reason of my own making, it was because of the apartheid policy and all the experience that one had experienced from 1976 and lastly a thing that became a turning point in my life, when we were shot at burying the late Tshasivane (?) at a cemetery in Doornkop. So those are incidents that may have compelled me to utter those words.

MR WAGNER: Sorry did I get it right, were you shot at and I assume then by the police, and were you hit in the process?

MR KGOELE: No I was not hit but a lot of people died that day. We were in a funeral, conducting a peaceful funeral and the police came in and shot at us.

DR TSOTSI: Which year was this - sorry Mr Wagner - which years was this?

MR KGOELE: If I remember vividly it was when we were burying Mr Tshasivane, 1978 I think (indistinct) somewhere.

MR WAGNER: Mr Kgoele - do I pronounce it correct?

MR KGOELE: Yes.

MR WAGNER: Do you regard yourself as a military man?

MR KGOELE: No I'm not a military man. To become militant was through circumstances. I'm an ordinary South African, a human being just like everybody, anyone else.

MR WAGNER: Because I put it to you that to attack your enemy in the way that you did on this specific day, is an act of cowardice and nothing more?

MR KGOELE: I appreciate that very much and that what I term guerrilla warfare, because we were not a conventional army, we did not (indistinct) within which to fight so we had to conduct our attacks in that fashion.

MR WAGNER: Does your answer mean that in a guerrilla war a person who regards himself as a guerrilla, he must only attack defenceless people who can't defend themselves. Is that your answer?

MR KGOELE: I think in this case the South African Police were armed 24 hours a day so I don't think they were defenceless.

MR WAGNER: Please Mr Kgoele do you suggest that these policemen who were brutally killed on this day, they were able to defend themselves against the explosion. Is that what you're saying?

MR KGOELE: Well in guerrilla warfare it's not a question of ready or not ready, it's an ambush so an ambush never announces itself or an ambusher so I take you by surprise. So if I win so be it.

MR WAGNER: That's what I actually meant by my question so maybe I should repeat myself. In a guerrilla war all the guerrillas do is they attack people who can't fight back, put it that way?

CHAIRPERSON: It's not what he says, you attack them when they cannot fight back, not people who can't fight back. You ambush them, you take them by surprise when they're looking the other way. But they're not people who can't fight back, they're armed men. If you study any guerrilla war Mr Wagner you will see numerous attacks on armed men from ambushes, from surprises.

MR WAGNER: I'm sorry Chairman maybe my use of the English language was inadequate, what I was trying to convey is that you attack someone who can't fight back at that moment in time.

MR KGOELE: If I had the means to announce myself that time I would have, but I don't think I would be standing in front of you today if I did that so I had to surprise them like they did when they surprised us (indistinct).

MR WAGNER: Sorry I didn't get the last part, what was the last part of your response?

MR KGOELE: When they attacked us in Maseru and Madola they never announced themselves, they took us by surprise in the middle of the night.

MR WAGNER: Did I understand you correctly that the smaller mine, the limpet mine was only placed by you later that morning, in fact when you came back from Soweto and not early in the morning when you left your parked car there?

MR KGOELE: Yes that's what I mean.

MR WAGNER: Weren't you scared that someone may see you, I assume it was broad daylight. So you walk with this mine in your hands and you put it down next to or under a car there in daylight. Weren't you scared that you could have been detected?

MR KGOELE: At least if I was going to be detected it would have saved the triggering of the major explosion, but because I was armed to the teeth I think I would have taken some casualties.

MR WAGNER: Is that why you took your pistol and hand grenades with you?

MR KGOELE: That is so.

MR WAGNER: Was that the only reason why you took it with you, to fight back should you be detected and as you've just said to take some casualties with you?

MR KGOELE: Here we were in a state of war or undeterred war so my placing a bomb there did not mean that I was only going target the enemy via a bomb only. If they could present themselves and I had an opportunity to use my pistol I would have done it.

MR WAGNER: I'm not sure Mr Kgoele if I understand you now. What was the idea of the pistol, what did you intend doing?

MR KGOELE: I intended shooting anyone or any policeman who might have detected me or confronted me.

MR WAGNER: When you stood watching after the first small bomb, you watched the area, if I heard you correctly you saw police approach, cordon off the area, were you sure that it was only police within that area and no private civilians?

MR KGOELE: In any war situation we do expect casualties. My main target there was to, was aimed solely or entirely at the police. If by any chance there were have been any civilians, well it was most unfortunate.

MR WAGNER: What would you have done had there been for instance medical personnel in that area busy with perhaps casualties - I know this is somewhat hypothetical, but what would you approach have been then?

MR KGOELE: Why I stood there when the first bomb went off was to guard against those things so when I stood there I had a view of all the place and all the happenings down there so I observed everybody down there so if I could have seen medical personnel, well because a mission is a mission and I had an objective to achieve.

MR WAGNER: Sorry I interrupted you, I didn't get the last part?

MR KGOELE: I wanted to say it would have been most unfortunate because I had a mission to accomplish.

MR WAGNER: And the mission being to kill as many policemen as possible?

MR KGOELE: Yes.

MR WAGNER: You heard the statement I put to the previous applicant that the son of my client, Mrs Wilkens, was working in the court building as a Court Orderly and he was in the process doing an administrative functions, nothing more. Does that have any influence on you approach to this whole operation?

MR KGOELE: To us a police was a police and a police so whether he was working as a Court Orderly or at a mortuary, because he was in uniform and enforcing apartheid laws upon the Blacks of South Africa, I wouldn't have any choice but to trigger the bomb.

MR WAGNER: And is your answer the same concerning Black policemen?

MR KGOELE: In fact I would say the ANC never fought a racist war because if I remember my (indistinct) tell me that an enemy could take any colour so what we were fighting here was injustice so anybody who was seen to be enforcing unjust laws upon the Black majority were regarded as an enemy, be he Black, White, Yellow, Green or whatever.

MR WAGNER: The fact that the explosion took place at the Magistrate's Court building, what was the significance of that to you?

MR KGOELE: The significance was that at least we did send a message to the South African regime that time that they also could be killed.

MR WAGNER: Mr Kgoele are you proud of this act of yours?

MR KGOELE: If we start (indistinct) being proud, I don't think there's any sane person who could ever be proud about war because war can take anyone. I would have died that particular day and I won't be here to be facing this so anything could have happened so I can't say I was proud. I was merely sending a message to the South African regime.

MR WAGNER: Why I'm asking this is, although it's not evidence before this Commission I refer you to the video that I saw and I got the distinct impression that you were boasting, you regarded yourself as a hero for committing this atrocious act.

MR KGOELE: You know circumstances sometimes can determine a man's attitude. When that documentary was made one had a different view of South Africa and why I said that is because of the arrogance shown to me by some of the applicants today. As a human being my patience are not endless. 

MR WAGNER: Sorry Mr Kgoele I'm not sure that I'm with you. The arrogance shown to you by some of the applicants. I'm not sure what you're referring to.

MR KGOELE: I'm sorry I wanted to say the families of the victims, because the people who made the documentary wanted us to meet so that I should extend a hand of friendship and tell them and try to reconcile with them so they refused. Even one of them I think, the father of the person you are defending today, he's on record as saying on that very same documentary that he wanted me for a year so that I could feel the pains that he felt. So based on that, as I've indicated to you, no man's patience is endless. We tolerated this but if somebody does not want to reconcile, so I'm not a Messiah.

MR WAGNER: Mr Kgoele we're somewhat straying from the real issues but I put it to you that that can hardly be seen as arrogance from this victim whose son died, the answer that you've now given. I can't see in any way how ... (intervention)

CHAIRPERSON: As you've said, we're straying from the scene, is it of any relevance?

MR WAGNER: Mr Kgoele the remote control radio, why did you leave it at the scene?

MR KGOELE: I didn't want to carry it around, it was too heavy for me because I had a pistol and some hand grenades with me.

MR WAGNER: But you had transport there I assume or weren't your car in the vicinity?

MR KGOELE: I was a guerrilla so I had to change my ways. That I had a car it was not necessarily meant that I should use it because maybe somebody might have spotted me in that car, so I had to change.

MR WAGNER: After the explosion, did you remain in South Africa or did you return to Swaziland to report back?

MR KGOELE: I returned to Swaziland.

MR WAGNER: Was that immediately afterwards or did you stay for some time?

MR KGOELE: No I stayed for some time.

MR WAGNER: And during that time did you spend time with Mr Mabele and did you the two of you discuss the operation that you've just committed?

MR KGOELE: It seems that by then Mr Mabele was aware of the operation, I had to make him skip the country.

MR WAGNER: So did he skip the country immediately but you remained?

MR KGOELE: Yes.

MR WAGNER: And to whom did you report back in Swaziland at the time when you did so?

MR KGOELE: General Nyanda.

MR WAGNER: And what was his reaction?

MR KGOELE: No it was just a normal report back. We were in a war situation so I reported that I've accomplished my mission, that's all.

MR WAGNER: And did he congratulate you on this performance?

MR KGOELE: We were not in the struggle to receive congratulations, because like I indicated earlier, I would have died. You don't go into a struggle and think and hope that you'll attack others and you in turn never be attacked.

MR WAGNER: Thank you Mr Chairman.

NO FURTHER QUESTIONS BY MR WAGNER

ADV PRIOR: Thank you. Mr Kgoele in preparing for your evidence today you were shown the bundles that were prepared, the documents that were prepared, the statements including those photographs of Fox Street and the Magistrates Court. In other words have you seen ... (intervention)

MR LANDMAN: (Inaudible).

CHAIRPERSON: Mr Prior.

ADV PRIOR: Thank you Mr Chairman. From pages 117 to 138, Mr Chairman that is of the supplementary documents, that is the second - we can call it the second bundle.

CHAIRPERSON: Of which I have a copy but my two Committee members do not as yet.

ADV PRIOR: ... (Inaudible) your question Mr Chairman, we'll have those made available. I just need to establish, you've seen the photographs and the documents put up in this bundle of documents?

MR KGOELE: Yes.

ADV PRIOR: And it's been explained to you that various people were injured other than police personnel?

MR KGOELE: No it was not explained to me, all I know is that, from what I could gather from the news that policemen were injured and some died.

ADV PRIOR: According to the lists that appears or a key that appears at page 50, one lady, Colchetty, an Indian lady was injured and there was a lady Mashode Magubane was injured, just to name two. What I'm, what the question really is driving at Mr Kgoele do you accept that as a result of the bomb that people that are listed in this document were injured and/or suffered damages in respect of their property. Do you accept that?

MR KGOELE: Yes.

ADV PRIOR: Am I correct in suggesting that the bomb in that vehicle went off in Fox Street, that is the Fox Street entrance to or the Fox Street side of the Magistrate's Court building?

MR KGOELE: No it's not in Fox Street. I know Fox Street runs from east to west.

CHAIRPERSON: ... (Inaudible) photograph that appears at 117, page 117, photograph 2 and if you turn the page 118, photograph 4 and the photograph that appears at page 123, that is photograph 14 as marked on that photo, that shows where the bomb exploded, is that correct?

MR KGOELE: Yes on page 123?

ADV PRIOR: What street is that, could you just tell us the name of the street. Do you know?

MR KGOELE: I don't know the name of the street but it's not Fox Street.

ADV PRIOR: Alright. And if you look at page 123 we see the entrance to the Court there, is that no the main entrance, is that the rear entrance to the Court?

MR KGOELE: Yes.

ADV PRIOR: ... (Inaudible - beginning of tape) area surrounding the position where you detonated the bomb. In so far as, there seems to be many vehicle parked there?

MR KGOELE: Yes I know there was a car park around there, they are still there today.

ADV PRIOR: And people ... (intervention)

CHAIRPERSON: Would people be there parking when they go to work in the morning and collecting their cars when they left in the afternoon?

MR KGOELE: Yes Mr Chairman.

ADV PRIOR: As would people be entering or leaving the Court premises?

MR KGOELE: Repeat your question.

ADV PRIOR: As would people who had business at the Magistrate's Court, they would park in that area and use that entrance if that was the entrance they decided to enter the building by?

MR KGOELE: I should think so.

ADV PRIOR: The vehicle in which the bomb was planted, was this a Golf, a Volkswagen Golf?

MR KGOELE: Yes.

ADV PRIOR: I simply tie that up to page 33 of the same bundle, it seemed to be the vehicle of Mr Kinzey, whose vehicle was reported missing on the 17th of May of that year. And just one last aspect, you - as I understand your evidence you were acting under orders, is that correct?

MR KGOELE: (Inaudible).

ADV PRIOR: Were you acting under orders?

MR KGOELE: Yes.

ADV PRIOR: What would have occurred, what do you think would have happened if you disobeyed those orders?

MR KGOELE: It was unlike for me to disobey the orders.

ADV PRIOR: I didn't catch it, it was unlike you?

MR KGOELE: (Inaudible).

ADV PRIOR: If you had decided not to carry out those orders and kill policemen there what would have happened to you, would you have been reprimanded, would there have been some punishment?

MR KGOELE: I'm having a problem with the hearing, I think there's something wrong with the lines.

ADV PRIOR: Could the witness be given another headset please? 

MR KGOELE: You may repeat your question.

ADV PRIOR: Yes, can you hear me now?

MR KGOELE: Yes.

ADV PRIOR: All I want to know, you were carrying out orders, you were a member of the MK structure, you were answerable to, we've heard General Shoke and General Nyanda. Were you under some compulsion to carry out orders within your military set-up? My question is what would have happened if you didn't carry out the orders?

MR KGOELE: The problem is with your question is that we entered Umkhonto weSizwe voluntarily because of the circumstances of (indistinct) so it was unlikely for me to disobey the orders so I wouldn't have disobeyed the orders.

ADV PRIOR: Right let me ask you more generally. Was there any process within the MK structure for people who disobeyed orders?

MR KGOELE: Yes there was.

ADV PRIOR: What was that, that's what I'm getting at. Please tell us?

MR KGOELE: What's the relevance of this Mr Prior, there has been no suggestion that he was under any compulsion.

MR SANDI: And he didn't disobey those orders anyway Mr Prior.

ADV PRIOR: In your application at page 6 of the bundle, you indicate that the Johannesburg Magistrate's Court was a justified target because the institution was perceived and seen as one that enforced the laws of apartheid or the apartheid laws. Is that correct?

MR KGOELE: Yes.

ADV PRIOR: So if I understand your motivation, primarily it wasn't only just to kill policemen but it was also to cause possible damage towards that institution. In other words it wasn't only aimed at policemen, it was aimed at the Magistrate's Court or the judicial system operable at the Magistrate's Court at that time?

MR KGOELE: Cognisance was taken of the fact that as a result of the explosion, damage might be caused to the Magistrate's Court and on that basis that's why I say that.

ADV PRIOR: Thank you Mr Chairman.

MR WAGNER: Mr Chairman, sorry may I interrupt. Regarding the question of Mr Prior on the disobedience and perhaps in fairness to this witness you can look at the document of the ANC of August 1996 on page 87, in the right-hand column at the bottom, there's reference to this aspect.

CHAIRPERSON: (Inaudible).

MR WAGNER: August 1996, I think it's called the first submission, page 87 right-hand column at the bottom. Sorry Mr Chairman Mr Prior has asked me to read it. 

CHAIRPERSON: (Inaudible).

MR WAGNER: Ja it's not, this is not backing my case but it says here: "Outright disobedience and failure to obey an order ...", this is now part of the MK Code of Conduct, "Outright disobedience and failure to obey an order promptly may have serious consequences. A soldier who thinks that he has been given a wrong order must obey it first and if need be complain afterwards to his commander".

CHAIRPERSON: Re-examination? 

RE-EXAMINATION BY MR LANDMAN: Thank you Mr Chairman. Mr Chairman before I ask any questions, can I put on record that the street or road in which the explosion occurred was Bezuidenhout Road, which is on the western side of the Johannesburg Magistrate's Court. Mr Kgoele did you know at the time you decided to park the car outside the Magistrate's Court that a major police station, John Vorster Square, was about two blocks away?

MR KGOELE: Yes.

MR LANDMAN: From your observations of people parking their cars in the parking area close to the scene of the explosion, did you get the impression that these people were shoppers who would return to their vehicle after a short period of time or was it people who had parked their vehicles there for the day?

MR KGOELE: My impression was that it was, the people had parked vehicles there for the day.

MR LANDMAN: In regard to people who may have left the Magistrate's Court through the back entrance at about the time the first explosion occurred, what did you expect those people to do when the mini limpet mine went off?

MR KGOELE: I had expected that the police would be the first people to come in and cordon off the area and the people who were leaving would run away.

MR LANDMAN: Then just lastly in regard to Mr Mabele, why did you ensure that he left the country after the explosion?

MR KGOELE: I feared for him, he was still young and I knew by then if he was known to have - the police would have discovered that he had supported that I'm, he might not be here today.

CHAIRPERSON: Was there also a danger if the police arrested him that he would disclose your identity and details about you?

MR KGOELE: Yes.

MR LANDMAN: Mr Kgoele before the explosion occurred that day, did Mr Mabele know what you were going to do?

MR KGOELE: No he didn't know anything.

MR LANDMAN: Thank you Mr Chairman.

NO FURTHER QUESTIONS BY MR LANDMAN

DR TSOTSI: (Indistinct) you parked a stolen car laden with a bomb next to the Magistrate's Court which was crawling, some police crawling all around the place, wasn't that amateurish?

MR KGOELE: By then the police didn't know that the car had bombs in it.

DR TSOTSI: This was a stolen car, weren't they looking for stolen cars?

MR KGOELE: You know we had studied the police modus operandi. They only looked for a stolen car in Soweto, not in town.

WITNESS EXCUSED

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

&#9;TRUTH AND RECONCILIATION COMMISSION

&#9;AMNESTY HEARING

DATE:&#9;5TH AUGUST 1998

NAME:&#9;WILLIAM MABELE

DAY :&#9;1

--------------------------------------------------------------------------

MR LANDMAN: Mr Chairman in regard to the third applicant, William Mabele, in the light of the evidence which he'll give about his limited knowledge of what was going to happen and his limited role in the matter, may I ask for a short adjournment to discuss the matter with Mr Prior to see whether it is necessary to recall him at this opening?

ADV PRIOR: Mr Chairman we don't need to adjourn. I mean it's clear from the evidence, which hasn't been challenged, Mr Mabele had a very limited role but I think the act requires that he gives some evidence relating to his role.

CHAIRPERSON: He did play a part in a gross violation of human rights, this was quite clearly resulted in a gross violation.

MR LANDMAN: Mr Chairman in that case I'll then call William Mabele.

DR TSOTSI: Can you please give your full names Mr Mabele?

MR MABELE: (Indistinct).

DR TSOTSI: Can you give your full names?

WILLIAM MABELE: (sworn states)

MR LANDMAN: Mr Chairman may I just confirm what language he's going to speak in, he may not have understood the ... (intervention)

MR SANDI: What language are you going to speak Mr Mabele?

MR MABELE: Tswana.

MR SANDI: Okay, are you going to take an oath or an affirmation, you said an oath?

MR LANDMAN: Mr Chairman as I understand the position he will give his evidence in Tswana.

MR MABELE: I will take an affirmation.

WILLIAM MABELE: (affirmed states)

EXAMINATION BY MR LANDMAN: Thank you Mr Chairman. Mr Mabele how old are you?

MR MABELE: I am 30 years old.

MR LANDMAN: During 1987 did you know Mr Joe Kgoele, the previous witness?

MR MABELE: Yes I knew him.

MR LANDMAN: How did you get to know him?

MR MABELE: He came to where we were repairing cars, he came to repair his car.

MR LANDMAN: When you first got to know him did you know that he was an MK member, an operative?

MR MABELE: I did not know.

MR LANDMAN: Do you recall an incident when he asked you to drive a car to the Johannesburg Magistrate's Court?

MR MABELE: I remember.

MR LANDMAN: Can you describe to the Committee what happened the day before you were asked to go to the Magistrate's Court?

MR MABELE: The day before we went to the Magistrate's Court Joseph Kgoele came to me at home and he collected me and we went to his hiding place. When we arrived there there was a car, a white Golf. Because I had a knowledge of certain issues on a car we checked as to whether the car would not stuck and give us problems on our way to the Johannesburg Magistrate's Court. As I was busy checking the car he was busy putting some few things in the boot of the car. I saw the things that he had in putting them in the car. I stood aside and he got himself busy with some wiring. After that he took me back home. He said I should not leave home early the next morning I should wait for him, which I did. He arrived the next morning, he took me to his home. He gave me his car keys and he ordered me to follow him, to drive after him. He drove in a Golf and we headed for the Johannesburg Court. On our way he stopped me, he said I should stop somewhere and he would come back. He went to park the car and he came back, took the car from me and we went back to Soweto. He dropped me off at home.

Before he left he said I should watch television during the news and I was not used to watching the news but on that day I stayed at home and when it was the time for the news, I saw the spot where a car was parked and when I realised how things were, I realised that it was the car that was driven by us.

MR LANDMAN: Mr Mabele if I can just deal certain &#9;aspects of your evidence. When you saw Mr Kgoele

putting things in the boot of the car, of the Golf and doing certain things to some wiring in the vehicle, what did you think that was?

MR MABELE: I had a suspicion that there was something going on but I was not aware as to what exactly was happening, but I suspected that something was about to happen.

MR LANDMAN: Do you have any idea as to what it might be that might happen?

MR MABELE: I did not know what could happen, but sometimes when we were watching television we would get reports of incidents that took place. My suspicion was to that effect.

MR LANDMAN: What sorts of incidents are you referring to?

MR MABELE: I'm referring to bomb blasts, there were reports such as bomb blasts at certain places and I was not used to such things, but I just suspected that it might happen but I did not even see the necessity of putting that into the car, to me it didn't sound - he would, at time he would come to me and say I bumped my car please help me and I would help him repair the car, I didn't suspect anything when he put things into the boot.

MR LANDMAN: By the morning of the explosion when you drove the vehicle in the direction of the Johannesburg Magistrate's Court, were you aware that Mr Kgoele was an MK operative?

MR MABELE: No I did not know.

MR LANDMAN: Were you informed of that fact at a later stage?

MR MABELE: Yes afterwards I came to know that he was an operative.

MR LANDMAN: What time in the morning did you drive to the Magistrate's Court?

MR MABELE: It was in the morning, between six and seven o'clock, if I remember well.

MR LANDMAN: Now precisely what did you see on the television that day?

MR MABELE: I saw many cars that were destroyed.

MR LANDMAN: Were those cars in the vicinity of the Magistrate's Court were you had drive to?

MR MABELE: Yes they were near the vicinity.

MR LANDMAN: Did you at that stage, after watching television, believe that the vehicle which Mr Kgoele had used that morning was used for the explosion?

MR MABELE: Yes I saw the car and I realised it was the one driven by Mr Kgoele.

MR LANDMAN: What did you do about that, did you speak to him or anyone else about it?

MR MABELE: I did not discuss this with anyone. I concluded as to what was happening because he had told me earlier on to watch television, but I never discussed this matter with anyone.

MR LANDMAN: Did you consider going to the police to inform them of what you knew about this?

MR MABELE: No.

MR LANDMAN: Why not?

MR MABELE: I would have done the same as well but unfortunately I was not affected. It happened one day that we attended a funeral to bury one of our students at school and the police arrived and they assaulted us, they shot rubber bullets and they arrested one of my friends and they assaulted him until he lost his eye. Even to this day he doesn't have an eye. That is why when I saw that on television I had no doubts because I was happy that the Whites would realise that as Black people we are in a position to revenge.

MR LANDMAN: Did you then, once you became aware of what had happened, support Mr Kgoele in what he had done?

MR MABELE: I was not supporting him, I was supporting the ANC.

MR LANDMAN: Did you later leave the country for training?

MR MABELE: Yes I left the country to get training outside.

MR LANDMAN: Which organisation provided you with training?

MR MABELE: ANC.

MR LANDMAN: Were you told by anybody that you should leave the country?

MR MABELE: Joseph Kgoele came to me and told me that there was a need for me to leave and he told me that at any given moment it was possible for them to come and pick me up so it was necessary for me to leave because I also wanted to train.

MR LANDMAN: Thank you Mr Chairman.

NO FURTHER QUESTIONS BY MR LANDMAN

CROSS EXAMINATION BY MR WAGNER: Mr Mabele when the amnesty process was announced, did you yourself decide that you should now apply for amnesty or were you told by someone else that you should apply for amnesty?

MR MABELE: Shell House did not have a contact with me, they had to contact Joseph Kgoele, that was when I applied for amnesty.

MR WAGNER: Does this mean that you were approached by Joseph Kgoele and told that you should apply for amnesty?

MR MABELE: Yes, I did not have information to come here.

MR WAGNER: May I refer you to your written application, it is in Volume 1 from page 23 onwards. Merely for the record Mr Chairman I see that this was also not a sworn statement. May I refer you specifically to page 26, that is paragraph 10.b there at the top. Do you have it in front of you?

MR MABELE: Yes I have it.

MR WAGNER: Only one question and I'm not sure what you're saying here. Maybe I should ask you this. Is this your own handwriting or did someone or did you tell someone else what should be written into your application?

MR MABELE: This is my handwriting. 

MR WAGNER: Then can you please tell me in the second last line, the letters WM there, what does it stand for?

MR MABELE: This is not WM, it's with.

MR WAGNER: So is the sentence then: "To us Black people at that time ..." - maybe I should read it then complete - "The Magistrate's Court is one of the government institution which was used to enforce apartheid laws to us as Black people at that time with policemen", is that the word, "with policemen"?

MR MABELE: Yes.

MR WAGNER: Now if I may take you back to page 23 you say that you were a member of Umkhonto weSizwe. When did you joint Umkhonto weSizwe?

MR MABELE: In 1987.

MR WAGNER: Was that before or after this operation which was also in 1987?

MR MABELE: After the incident.

MR WAGNER: Was that when Mr Kgoele told you that you should leave the country and then you left the country and you joined Umkhonto weSizwe in some foreign country?

MR MABELE: Yes.

MR WAGNER: On what day did you leave the country in relation to the bomb explosion, was it the same day, the next day, a week later. Can you just help me there?

MR MABELE: I do not remember the day quite well, I do not even remember the date, but it was after a few weeks. I do not remember whether it was after three or four weeks.

MR WAGNER: And in those three weeks did you and the people you were with discuss what happened at the Magistrate's Court?

MR MABELE: I did not speak to anyone in those weeks. This issue was known by myself and Joseph Kgoele.

MR WAGNER: Were you a member of SOYCO (?) at the time?

MR MABELE: No.

CHAIRPERSON: What?

MR WAGNER: Mr Chairman I think it stand for Soweto Youth Congress. SOYCO. Did you attend any meetings of SOYCO in that period immediately after the explosion?

MR MABELE: No.

MR WAGNER: Mr Chairman so as not to confuse you, those questions were merely asked, I have information that the explosion was discussed in some detail at such a meeting, but I can't take it any further with this witness, there was nothing else intended by the question. I have no further questions Mr Chairman.

NO FURTHER QUESTIONS BY MR WAGNER

ADV PRIOR: No questions thank you.

DR TSOTSI: Mr Mabele when Mr Kgoele said to you that you should watch TV news that evening, what did you think about that, didn't that surprise you someone telling you that you should watch news on TV tonight?

MR MABELE: I asked him why and he told me about his hatred to the "Boers" and I asked him why he targeted that place. What he told me was the Magistrate Court was sentencing the Black people and he was a trained person, he knew that a policeman was an enemy and the government buildings were also targets.

CHAIRPERSON: When did he tell you this?

MR MABELE: That was after days, when he came to repair a car.

CHAIRPERSON: The question was, when he told you that morning to watch television, didn't you think it surprising?

MR MABELE: Yes it surprised me because I did not know what to expect on the news. I asked him why do I have to watch television today.

DR TSOTSI: And what did he say?

MR MABELE: He said watch television, I did not actually ask him, he said watch television today.

DR TSOTSI: Did it ever happen to you before that someone asked you to watch television?

MR MABELE: It was the first time.

MR SANDI: Did you say you found that surprising?

MR MABELE: It surprised me because he told me to watch television at night, he didn't used to tell me to watch TV, but when he told me on that day to watch the news it surprised me and when I watched the news I got more surprised when I saw what happened.

MR SANDI: At that time were you a member of any kind of organisation?

MR MABELE: I was an ANC supporter?

MR SANDI: How did you go about supporting the ANC?

MR MABELE: When we had funerals I would attend the funerals and I would attend night vigils. Sometimes at school, because of the harassment by the Whites, there were times where we would conduct discussions and there would be people among us who had knowledge about the ANC and Joseph Kgoele used to talk to me about the ANC at times, but not stating in details all the facts.

MR SANDI: But I understand the ANC was still a banned organisation in 1987 Mr Mabele?

MR MABELE: Yes it was banned, but we knew about the ANC and I've already told you that there were people who had knowledge about the ANC and they passed it on to others and as they were talking one gained interest as to why is the ANC fighting and these are issues that we would be discussing and I realised that ANC was the right organisation to join.

MR SANDI: Did you support any other organisation besides the ANC, I'm not talking about membership?

MR MABELE: No other.

MR SANDI: Thank you Mr Mabele.

CHAIRPERSON: As I understand your evidence, and correct me please if I'm wrong, after you saw the television you realised that Mr Kgoele had set off the bomb which had damaged many cars and killed several policemen. Is that right?

MR MABELE: I did not see the policemen at that time, they only showed, only the damage to the cars was shown.

CHAIRPERSON: You learned that many policemen had been killed and others injured?

MR MABELE: I did not know about the police. I learned that when I applied for amnesty. I did not know how many of them died.

CHAIRPERSON: I'm not saying you knew how many, but you knew there had been an attack?

MR MABELE: Yes I know.

CHAIRPERSON: And you did not report it to the police because you supported what had been done?

MR MABELE: Yes.

CHAIRPERSON: You yourself had suffered at the hands of the police and you felt that this was a justifiable action. Is that the position?

MR MABELE: That is correct.

CHAIRPERSON: That is was politically justifiable, it would teach them a lesson?

MR MABELE: Yes I agree.

ADV PRIOR: I'm sorry Mr Chairman there's one aspect that arises before my learned friend, I notice that at page 30 of the bundle in a letter to the Amnesty Committee Mr Mabele supplied certain further particulars and I just possibly, in fairness to him if he can comment on the first paragraph where he seems to suggest that he knew that the car that went to Jo'burg city had explosives in it. 

CHAIRPERSON: Well he did know when he wrote this letter didn't he Mr Prior?

ADV PRIOR: Yes.

CHAIRPERSON: He's not saying I knew at the time.

ADV PRIOR: Oh I see, I beg your pardon.

CHAIRPERSON: ... (Inaudible) he left with the other car .. (inaudible).

ADV PRIOR: Yes but it doesn't seem clear. His evidence is that he didn't know at the time.

CHAIRPERSON: Thank you. Any further witnesses?

WITNESS EXCUSED

MR LANDMAN: No further witnesses.

MR WAGNER: Mr Chairman may I raise an issue. I was requested by a gentleman here in the audience, although I don't formally represent him, to raise a quick aspect with you. If you look at Volume 2 Mr Chairman, page 43, there's a list of vehicles damaged. Actually the list starts at page 41. Now this gentleman he's number 27 on page 43, Mr Erasmus and he is here and if I may refer you to page 57 as well Mr Chairman, the top photograph apparently that is his vehicle directly in front of the vehicle with the bomb, that is immediately to the right-hand side of the gentleman standing there. His vehicle was extensively damaged and he's here to, he doesn't really know what he should do. I said to him I'll raise this point on his behalf if he want to give evidence to you to tell the damages he suffered he's here. I only said to him I'll raise the issue.

ADV PRIOR: Mr Erasmus did speak to me and I indicated that because he had sustained damage that would be highlighted before the Committee. His vehicle was a write-off. Apparently it was under HP and he had to pay, for some or other reason the insurance never paid and he sustained loss of approximately 

R20 000,00. I understand that's virtually common cause and ... (intervention)

CHAIRPERSON: I doubt that the extent of the damage can be common cause. The fact that many vehicles were damaged I think is.

MR LANDMAN: Mr Chairman we don't contest that evidence. 

ADV PRIOR: If that can be conveyed, obviously Mr Erasmus is within earshot and is listening. I don't believe that unless, that's it's necessary to lead viva voce regarding this aspect, it's common cause as I've suggested.

CHAIRPERSON: Well because Mr Erasmus is present that he indicated that his vehicle had been damaged, as is shown in the photographs, and that it was not contested on the part of the applicant that the damage could have been in the region of R20 000,00.

ADV PRIOR: I'm indebted to the Chair.

MR WAGNER: Mr Chairman ... (intervention)

CHAIRPERSON: Any of your other victims wish to say anything or ...

MR WAGNER: Mr Chairman no, my clients they don't intend giving evidence here so I've got no witnesses to lead or evidence to tender.

ADV PRIOR: Mr Chairman I have no further evidence to place before the Committee. As I indicated earlier, except for Mr Erasmus, no other victim or witness has come forward in this matter so I ... (intervention)

CHAIRPERSON: Not even the Chief Magistrate of Johannesburg?

MR LANDMAN: Mr Chairman can I possibly just enquire via the Chair as to Mr Wagner's position at this stage. I don't know whether at this stage he's reached any conclusions as to whether he continues to oppose the application?

CHAIRPERSON: I don't know if Mr Wagner's in a position to tell us that now or whether he wants to talk to his clients?

MR WAGNER: Mr Chairman one aspect remains. I was told by Mr Landman that he also represents General Nyanda. Now to me that is the only outstanding issue and I'm not sure how we should go about this, but if General Nyanda for instance disputes the evidence given here today it may influence the matter even to the extent that we may request him to come and testify but if he is not in dispute, I would like via you to request my learned friend whether it can be put on record because that may have a very relevant bearing on the outcome of this hearing. That's my personal view.

CHAIRPERSON: I don't know if you're in a position to?

MR LANDMAN: Mr Chairman we in fact are in a position to comment on that. We appear for General Nyanda as an implicated person. He is aware of the evidence, he's been present and has listened to the evidence and he does not contest the evidence which has been led about his role and about the rest of the incident.

CHAIRPERSON: He is obviously, if represented by your instructing attorney, fully aware of his rights and that is that as an implicated party he can choose, if he so desires, to give evidence, to make representations, which through you he has indicated to us he does not do so and he does not wish to dispute the evidence that has been led here.

MR LANDMAN: That is so Mr Chairman, as we've indicated earlier on, he has an application which still has to be dealt with and certainly it is correct he doesn't dispute what has been said today.

CHAIRPERSON: I think that meets your problem Mr Wagner.

MR WAGNER: In that instance Mr Chairman if Mr Landman will bear with me, I will in fact just have to take instructions on the question of opposition and I will revert to him and Mr Prior.

CHAIRPERSON: Well I'm going to suggest further that much as the thought of spending a day away from here attracts me, would it not be possible in this matter for us to hear addresses tomorrow morning and to dispose of this matter at least without the necessity of written arguments later?

MR LANDMAN: Mr Chairman we don't have any objection to that at all. Would it be possible to start a bit later than 9 o'clock?

CHAIRPERSON: Certainly because I don't think any of you are going to be very long in your addresses, I hope I'm not being unduly optimistic, but we could certainly start later. What time would you suggest, 11?

MR WAGNER: Mr Chairman if I would obtain instructions to the effect of not opposing the application, would you still require me?

CHAIRPERSON: No certainly if you notify Mr Prior he can notify us on your behalf. It's only if you wish to oppose that you should have to be here.

MR WAGNER: Thank you.

MR LANDMAN: Mr Chairman would half past eleven be (indistinct)?

CHAIRPERSON: Certainly.

MR LANDMAN: Mr Chairman the other aspect which my attorney has raised, is that certain of the other Chairpersons of the Amnesty Committee have, before their addresses, indicated what areas the representatives ought to concentrate in particular, areas that might bother them. Now I don't know whether the committee wants to make any comments in that regard.

CHAIRPERSON: I think this ... (inaudible).

MR LANDMAN: Certainly Mr Chairman.

CHAIRPERSON: It is not a matter whether ... (inaudible).

MR LANDMAN: That is so yes.

ADV PRIOR: ... (Inaudible) well to the extent that we reconvene tomorrow, it seems from the nature of these proceedings that the arguments are certainly not going to take up any length of time at all.

CHAIRPERSON: No let us ... (inaudible) some other day?

ADV PRIOR: No not at all, just whether we needed to actually reconvene as a body?

CHAIRPERSON: Mr Prior what we're seeking to avoid is further written argument which we have in hearing after hearing after hearing, which we get weeks after the hearing when we've all forgotten what it was all about. Here we want to dispose of the hearing that's it's over and I think Mr Wagner has a great deal of experience with that and I see him nodding and I think Mr Landman would also like to be able to say at the end of this well that's over.

MR LANDMAN: I certainly would Mr Chairman.

CHAIRPERSON: If we go on with the other matter on Friday we don't want to delay that do we, because we could perhaps say we'll start this one for argument at nine o'clock on Friday morning and start the other one at ten, but if we start the other one at ten will we finish it?

ADV PRIOR: Mr Chairman it might be more convenient in fact.

CHAIRPERSON: It might be for everybody here ... (inaudible).

MR LANDMAN: Mr Chairman there is another variable fact and that is whether Mr Van den Berg's going to come back and say that he's ready to proceed. On the basis that he does proceed I think it's a very limited area where he'd have to lead his clients and there had be some cross examination. I would imagine within 2 hours that could be disposed of.

CHAIRPERSON: (Inaudible). We will not adjourn until tomorrow, we will now adjourn till 9 o'clock on Friday morning.

COMMITTEE ADJOURNS

