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&#9;TRUTH AND RECONCILIATION COMMISSION
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 &#9;TRUTH AND RECONCILIATION COMMISSION

&#9;AMNESTY HEARING

DATE:&#9;&#9;&#9;14-04-99

NAME:&#9;&#9;&#9;PHILIP RUDOLF CRAUSE

APPLICATION NO:&#9;AM4125/96

MATTER:&#9;&#9;&#9;SILENT VALLEY INCIDENT

DAY:&#9;&#9;&#9; 7

______________________________________________________

CHAIRPERSON: As I was saying, this morning we are going to start with the applications of eight applicants in the incident called the "Silent Valley" incident, involving victims Kruschev, Marx and Moatshe. Is that not so Ms Lockhat?

MS LOCKHAT: That is correct, Chairperson.

CHAIRPERSON: Will the legal representatives who will be appearing in this matter kindly state their names for the record?

MR VISSER: Madame Chairperson, may it please you, my name is Louis Visser for the record. I appear for the applicants in this matter, all seven of them. In fact I may just rectify what I've just stated. There is one applicant, number 6 in bundle 11, W C C Smith for whom we do not appear. We don't know who appears on his behalf.

CHAIRPERSON: I may just probably given an indication that Advocate Roelf du Plessis advised us yesterday in chambers that he will be appearing on behalf of Mr Smith and requested to be excused for this mornings session because of an engagement that he couldn't dispose of and he has been excused by the Committee. Ms Lockhat, are you the evidence leader in this matter?

MS LOCKHAT: That is correct, Chairperson. Just for the record that there are no victims in this matter, Chairperson.

CHAIRPERSON: Thank you. Before we commence may we express our appreciation to you Mr Visser for having made serious attempts to be hear before half past nine, we know your matter was not expected to have been commenced with this morning but you accommodated the Committee when you were requested to do so. Thank you.

MR VISSER: Our gratitude for your kind remarks Madame Chairperson. Before we start with the "Silent Valley" matter and least I forget, may we give you a report back on the efforts of Mr Crause sitting next to me in request to the request by the Committee regarding where the deceased in the "Nietverdiendt" matter might have been buried? What I have is the following to report. Mr Crause, through a person by the name of Prayer spelt as in prayer, Makoane, M-a-k-o-a-n-e of Rustenburg made enquiries and his cell telephone number is 0826990780. What Mr Makoane has found out is the following. He states that he was informed by a Sergeant Lefakane, L-e-f-a-k-a-n-e, of Mogwasi, M-o-g-w-a-s-i, police station apparently, that the remains of the victims were transported to Garankuwa. I have no dates to give you but they were transported to Garankuwa where an Inspector Kgoele K-g-o-e-l-e, who is now a retired police officer, received them and he apparently signed for the receipt of the remains of these people. He was stationed at Garankuwa. Apparently, the information is that the probabilities are that a funeral undertaking by the name of Sopara, S-o-p-a-r-a, is the probable funeral service who buried or which buried the ten activists. For obvious reasons, Chairperson, we didn't pursue the matter any further and we thought it more appropriate that Ms Lockhat would take it up from there but that's what we were able to establish.

CHAIRPERSON: We are indebted to you for this kind of information. We would have expected our investigative unit to have been the one to have made serious - followed up in respect of this kind of information. We do hope that Ms Lockhat will take it up with the unit concerned in order to further the investigation commenced by Mr Crause of his own accord.

MS LOCKHAT: Chairperson, I confirm that I will take this up with our investigative unit to pursue this matter further. Thank you.

MR VISSER: Chairperson if I then may proceed with the "Silent Valley" applications. In the course of the evidence we will be referring to certain volumes and documents which are already before you. May I mention to you which they are. Ms Lockhat this morning placed the relevant bundles before you, not disappointing the efficiency we have come to expect of her. We will refer to bundle 1 - the decisions, to bundle 2(i), to bundle 2(g) and bundle 2(j). I don't know whether I have mentioned it, we will obviously refer to bundle 11, that's the one that contains the applications. Then apart from that, Chairperson, we will refer to Exhibit A. Now Exhibit A, that was the affidavit which was the evidence of Colonel Crause, when he gave evidence in the Nietverdiendt matter. Exhibit B is not really going to be relevant because perhaps for the sake of Mr Lax, the paragraph 10 questions and answers of the application form had been left up of most of the applications of the applicants for whom we appear and they're all identically the same and we just place that before you in case you want to refer to it. It was Commissioner Lax in any event, superseded by the affidavits which contained the evidence so it's not really necessary to refer to Exhibit B. We will however also refer to Exhibit C which is the affidavit of Loots, because he will give evidence again. We will not refer to Exhibit D, E, F or G because those relate to matters in which we're not concerned. We then come to Exhibit H, Chairperson, and perhaps it may be convenient for you to deal with those immediately. You will find a pack of documents placed before you in the same format as the affidavits, Exhibits A and B. They will be the affidavits of Steyn and I'm told that you have now reached the letter Exhibit H and if it would please you, Chairperson, to mark Steyn Exhibit H. 

CHAIRPERSON: The affidavit of General Steyn?

MR VISSER: Steyn, yes, that's Exhibit H. Then we have Senior Superintendent du Preez Smit.

CHAIRPERSON: Yes?

MR VISSER: I don't know whether you have the same objections as Justice Wilson against the letter I, but it can either by I or J, it's your choice.

CHAIRPERSON: I have no objection.

MR VISSER: I. Then we have the affidavit of Nieuwenhuis who will testify next and his will be J. We then come to Van Zyl who will be Exhibit K, which leaves us with Marais. Now we have a problem with Marais because as we informed the Committee yesterday, he will not be here probably today and his affidavit has not been discussed with him or signed and what happened is we had a preliminary consultation with him and then further consultations over the telephone and we have already drawn up a document for him but he'll just have to have the final say as to whether he is satisfied with it and we will deal with that the minute it comes to hand.

CHAIRPERSON: Yes. Are you expecting Mr Marais to be present today at all?

MR VISSER: Not today, probably tomorrow only. Chairperson, if I may commence, we would like to call first of all Colonel Crause because not in a sequence of higher to lower ranking officers but more in the sense of chronological order to make better sense to you to understand the evidence.

CHAIRPERSON: I think it's a good suggestion Mr Visser.

PHILIP RUDOLF CRAUSE: (sworn states)

EXAMINATION BY MR VISSER: Chairperson, I have omitted to refer you also to the fact that for the sake of saving time we will refer to our heads of argument which we handed up. I have made arrangements that those be made available, that a copy by made available to Mr Lax seeing that he hasn't been here and may I say by way of introduction that when we started with the proceedings we led Mr Crause a little bit more extensively and then the rest of the witnesses we led very briefly in their evidence in chief. The idea was that because these incidents that we are now going to deal with all concern the Western Transvaal and Botswana. Of course, as we know, Commissioner Lax has now come into the picture. Knowing him from before I have no doubt that he will catch up very quickly, but perhaps in deference to him, I should perhaps spend a little time with Mr Crause just again to sketch the background a little bit to place Mr Lax into the background. However, we believe Madame Chair that we will comfortably finish today with the evidence, particularly seeing that there is no objection to the applications.

CHAIRPERSON: We would request you to be very brief in leading evidence as to background.

MR VISSER: Yes.

CHAIRPERSON: Mr Lax is to some extent familiar, we have already brought him up to speed with the evidence led in the previous incident.

MR VISSER: Oh, well thank you for indicating that to me, Madame Chair and of course the other answer to that situation is that it's all on paper ready in front of you.

CHAIRPERSON: He has a copy of your heads of argument marked the "Nietverdiendt 10".

MR VISSER: Pardon?

CHAIRPERSON: He has a copy.

MR VISSER: Oh, I see yes, thank you and perhaps if I just -make the last remark? If Commissioner Lax is uncertain about anything, please do feel free to interrupt at any time. We then call Colonel Crause.

CHAIRPERSON: Mr Visser, you probably were too concerned about what you wanted to address us on before you commenced?

MR VISSER: Yes, indeed.

CHAIRPERSON: He has already been sworn in, you may proceed to lead evidence in chief.

MR VISSER: But apart from that I'm also old and getting senile Madame Chair.

CHAIRPERSON: I hope I wish I could agree with you.

MR VISSER: Madame Chair, the application of this applicant you'll find in bundle 11, pages 81 to 85. Again, that has been superseded by his affidavit so unless there is some contradiction which you want to take up with him flowing from that, from the original application, it will not be relevant in any other way.

MR VISSER: Colonel Crause, you are the applicant in this matter and you are requesting amnesty for any illegal or unlawful deed or omission committed by you with regard to ...[intervention]

CHAIRPERSON: May I just interrupt, Mr Visser?

MR VISSER: Yes.

CHAIRPERSON: One of my members does not have Annexure A, I think it's important for him to have Annexure A.

MR VISSER: Oh, certainly. Annexure A?

CHAIRPERSON: Whilst Mr Crause is giving evidence. I do have a copy, there seems to have been a mistake. Maybe we can rotate a copy?

MS LOCKHAT: I've got copies thank you. Can you just, Mr Visser, regarding those annexures, is it Annexure A just to clarify so we can bring Mr Ilan Lax up to speed? Annexure A you referred to? B? - that's Crause's.

CHAIRPERSON: Can you just give Mr Lax all the annexures but for purposes of Mr Crause's evidence just make available Annexure A to Mr Lax. I take it, Mr Visser, that all these annexures are supplementary affidavits to the original applications contained in bundle 11?

MR VISSER: Indeed, Madame Chair, you might from what is stated in the original application form, perhaps attach some value to aspects thereof which you wish to take up with the witness of course that's always a possibility, but what we have attempted to do is to deal in the affidavits which we will hand up to you any matters where they do not follow exactly what is stated in their original application forms and where mistakes were made or there were matters which weren't properly explained, we take it further but we certainly do refer to everything which is referred here. 

&#9;Colonel, the amnesty application has to do with the murder of two who you describe as uMkhonto weSizwe commanders, those being MK named Kruschev and Karl Marx who were killed as well as one as you have described as a conspiratorial Andries Moatshe, as well as any other unlawful deed or offence which you may have committed during this matter, is that correct?

MR CRAUSE: Yes that is correct.

MR VISSER: And we know that this matter or this incident occurred on the 4th May 1983 in the Derdepoort environment at a place with the name Silent Valley in Thabazimbi area?

MR CRAUSE: Yes that is correct.

MR VISSER: You have your application before you, that is in bundle 11, page 81 to 87. On page 3 of your affidavit you have referred to various other submissions and evidence which have already been submitted to the Amnesty Committee and you request that that evidence be considered in the evaluation of your amnesty application, not only this application but also the Nietverdiendt as well as the McKenzie application which we will hear shortly?

MR CRAUSE: That is correct.

MR VISSER: And you refer on page 3 to the amnesty applications which have already been heard and you request that those decisions be considered with regard to your specific case?

MR CRAUSE: Yes that is correct.

MR VISSER: You have sketched your personal circumstances and background and approach on page 4 beginning at paragraph 1 leading up to page 5 and on page 5 you have referred to a quote from the amnesty decision of Brigadier J H Cronje, which according to you is a synopsis of what was of application to you during your formative years and the situation during the struggle?

MR CRAUSE: That is correct.

MR VISSER: Your police career in South African Police has been set out also on page 5. The relevant aspects thereof are that from 1971 already you were stationed in the Western Transvaal, firstly as a detective and thereafter you went to the Security Branch in 1972 where you became the Branch Commander in 1985 of the Zeerust Security Branch, is that correct?

MR CRAUSE: Yes that is correct.

MR VISSER: The rest speaks for itself, do you confirm all of this?

MR CRAUSE: Yes.

MR VISSER: Then on page 6 you describe the struggle of the past as you experienced it. Once again on page 7 you refer to a summary by the original Amnesty Committee in Brigadier Cronje's decision that you say that you agree with?

MR CRAUSE: That is correct.

MR VISSER: And if we may continue, on page 8 and 9 you provide some particulars which are not contained within the amnesty decision of J H Cronje or any other applicant to whom amnesty was granted and you also discussed this until page 10 and from paragraph 17 onwards you provide a more actual description of the situation on ground level for the ordinary policeman such as yourself and you finish on page 11 where you state that in paragraph 21, where you refer to numerous bomb attacks which took place all over the country during which injury and damage to property took place. You say in paragraph 21 that weapons and ammunition and explosives, let's just call it weapons to be brief, and with that we refer to weapons, ammunition, explosives, limpet mines and anything else associated with that, that such weaponry was smuggled into the R.S.A. into the neighbouring country, is that correct?

MR CRAUSE: Yes.

MR VISSER: There on page 11 you have given your knowledge of the role played by Botswana during the struggle. Then for the sake of Commissioner Lax we would just like to deal with that somewhat more thoroughly, it is true that Botswana from 1977 began to play a more important role with regard to the ANC/SACP Alliance's organisational exercise of their strategies, planning, provision of weaponry and human resources with regard to fighters for the revolutionary struggle in the R.S.A. as you have set it out in paragraph 23?

MR CRAUSE: That is correct.

MR VISSER: General van der Merwe would at the beginning of these hearings have given evidence however as a result of the course of the hearings has not yet testified. However, you do agree with the allegations regarding Marius Schoon approximately in 1977 after he had left the R.S.A. and the network of infiltration routes which was largely established and maintained by him and on page 12 you continue. In paragraph 28 in which you say that as the war - and that would be in the R.S.A. waged on, Botswana began to achieve greater importance with regard to the maintenance of routes, support and assistance to persons leaving the R.S.A., that would be in Botswana, assistance to returning terrorists which included logistical and financial aid as well as the smuggling of explosives and weaponry?

MR CRAUSE: That is correct.

MR VISSER: Madame Chair, may I at this juncture refer you to the written argument where this has been summarised with reference to relevant evidence given before other Amnesty Committees, particularly the Amnesty Committee hearing the amnesty application in regard to Jeanette and Katryn Schoon and Mr Marius Schoon himself, London Bomb etc., which was chaired by Justice Wilson and in which Commissioner De Jager was in fact one of the Commissioners. Chairperson, the relevant portion regarding Botswana you will find at page 3 and the only reason why I now refer you to it is for the sake of the references which we have given there. Now I have broken a promise Chairperson and I hope that you will allow me at this stage to rectify that. I undertook to extract a few short passages from an exhibit which served in the Marius Schoon London Bomb amnesty application which was marked EXHIBIT RR. You might remember I referred to it, unfortunately I've forgotten to refer you to the exact passages and perhaps just for the record, you might allow me just to read a few passages at this juncture. It would make in my submission, would make sense just to keep the matters together. In exhibit ...[intervention]

CHAIRPERSON: Are they long passages Mr Visser?

MR VISSER: I'm sorry?

CHAIRPERSON: Are they long passages?

MR VISSER: No, no, they're very brief, it's just to illustrate the principles of what the witnesses will testify about and where it comes from. Chairperson ...[intervention]

CHAIRPERSON: You may proceed with it.

MR VISSER: Thank you. In Exhibit RR, it starts off with saying, it's a memorandum and it says this memorandum has been prepared mainly as a study piece in or to give an insight into the methods and contacts of Marius and Jeanette Schoon of the ANC/SACP and to should be read in conjunction with another memorandum which I'm not going to bother you with. In the middle of that page on page 4 it says:

&#9;"This memorandum helps to emphasise the lack of knowledge we have of the ANC/CP networks operating from neighbouring States in terms of methodology, couriers, contents of letters, agents within the R.S.A. etc."

Then it speaks of letters that had been intercepted and are attached, Chairperson, and I turn immediately to page 8 where a little bit of history was set out as to the development of infiltration or using Botswana as a springboard and that started in the words of Exhibit RR&#9;as follows:

&#9;"A new ANC Committee has been formed called the 'Internal Reconstruction and Development Department'. People on this Committee included ..."

And then names were mentioned, Oliver Tambo, Alfred Nzo etc, etc, etc, and then it goes on to say:

&#9;"This department is charged with the reconstructing and developing of ANC internal networks and includes the creation of intelligence and Sactu organisation structures".

And then it goes on to say - it refers to Mr Fillers Naidoo and it speaks of the co-ordination with neighbouring countries, which I'm not going to bother you with, Madame Chair, if I may go over the page, it says:

&#9;"It was decided ..."

I'm sorry, may I just find the passage. There's a reference to what Schoon had stated Chairperson, but what I want to refer you to is page 9, paragraph 2, where it states:

&#9;"Most significantly, however, are the letters to Ray Simmons, Henny Makote and Mac Maharaj which make it clear that: 

&#9;(i) the Schoons are building a white underground structure for the ANC/CP, letter to Henry. 

&#9;(ii) that this network is part of a department concerned with the internal reconstruction and refers to the letters, that the network is co-ordinated from Lusaka through Mr Mac Maharaj and it says in (iv) it is clear that the line of command extends rigidly from a group comprising Mr Maharaj, Simons, Matshobe, Mosagi and Indrez Naidoo in Lusaka down to a regional level comprising Magote and the Schoons in Botswana obviously. From the Schoons the lines of control extend into the R.S.A. where white underground workers are responsible for certain ANC/CP tasks."

Chairperson, barring one last reference, but that is what I wanted to inform you about and the last reference is at page 14 and it says this:

&#9;"In 1977, shortly after the arrival of the Schoons in Botswana, Chris Wood reported that the ANC were looking for underground routes into the R.S.A. This included methods of cross-border travel such as illegal routes through the fence, the use of aircraft, private yachts etc. The purpose of such routes was for the conveyance of arms, explosives, pamphlets and receiving sets. i.e. two way radios."

I leave out a sentence and it continues to say:

&#9;"It must be assured that the Schoons and other ANC operatives in Botswana have opened up various routes into the R.S.A."

and then the last sentence is:

&#9;"During June 1977 Jeanette and Marius Schoon left the R.S.A. with the assistance of Cedric Mason who up until this time had been running and escape route out of the R.S.A. for banned persons and those wanted by the police"

And having done that, Chairperson, we can now set aside Exhibit RR because that is all that is relevant for purposes of these applications.

&#9;Might I then return to you, Mr Crause? This has to do then with the significance of Botswana. On page 13 in paragraph 29 you refer to the fact that weaponry and explosives which were used in certain attacks on the R.S.A. were indeed brought in from Botswana such as from example the Robert McBride, Gordon Webster explosion?

MR CRAUSE: Yes that is correct.

MR VISSER: You've then referred to incidents in paragraph 30 and then we get to 1983 and that is the time when the Silent Valley incident took place and you say in paragraph 31 that at that stage the activities of the ANC/SACP alliance within and without Botswana were already very evolved and by that stage the informers of the security branch had infiltrated Botswana and many weapons and explosives were smuggled from Botswana to South Africa. Then you refer to bundle 2 J.

&#9; In the original of annexure A, Chairperson, the bundle had not been renamed but it was renamed later from 2 IL to 2 J, that is why that reference to bundle 2 IL is still there.

&#9;You had personal knowledge at that stage of the activities of eminent and important ANC/MK leadership figures such as for example Aboobaker Ismail, MK name Rashid, Lambert Maloy, Johannes Manisi, Lester Damakude, Lekota Phule and others in Botswana, is that correct?

MR CRAUSE: Yes that is correct.

MR VISSER: You also have personal knowledge of the fact that various complaints came to the knowledge of the Botswana authorities, by name the Botswana Police but there was never any satisfactory management of these complaints?

MR CRAUSE: No.

MR VISSER: And the consequence thereof was that the pressure on you escalated with regard to the insurgence of people and ammunition from Botswana and your attempts to prevent it?

MR CRAUSE: That is correct.

MR VISSER: You refer on page 14 paragraph 35 to the state of emergency and the fact that this was not of much assistance in combating the onslaught from Botswana?

MR CRAUSE: That is correct.

MR VISSER: If we could then go to your summaries on page 15, paragraph 37, for the convenience of the Commissioners, you go to paragraph 16 where you give a summary of the affidavit of Brigadier Loots in Exhibit 2J.

CHAIRPERSON: What page are you at?

MR VISSER: Madame Chairperson, I'm now at page 16, paragraph 38. May I ask you to make a marginal note with a reference to the heads of argument at page 7, paragraph 20 and onwards up to page 9 where we have attempted for your convenience to give a summary of what the witnesses are referring to.

CHAIRPERSON: Yes.

MR VISSER: In bundle 2J and if once you've read that you don't have to bother yourself with reading 2J either, we've done that for you. Now, Chairperson, if I may continue then?

&#9;Mr Crause we then come to page 17, the position of the applicants, you have there stated that you worked extremely hard, that you made desperate attempts to prevent the insurgence of people who came to commit acts of terror in South Africa and smuggled weapons in and so forth. We're not going discuss all of that, you will confirm everything up until page 19, paragraph 45, that what you state there is according to your opinion true and correct?

MR CRAUSE: Yes that is correct.

MR VISSER: It is not necessary for you to state anything further about the smuggling of weapons, we will ask General van der Merwe for a brief explanation regarding that when he comes to give evidence because Trevits for example has been mentioned numerous times before this Committee. We will ask him to place these matters into perspective. The political motivations speak for themselves. Do you confirm what you have stated there in paragraph 52, on page 20 up until page 23, paragraph 63?

MR CRAUSE: That is correct.

MR VISSER: Now that Madame Chairperson really replaces Exhibit B and that is why we didn't really refer to Exhibit B because that passage - that heading refers to all the issues and other issues.

&#9;On page 24, paragraph 64, you have asked for the understanding of the Commission because the matters regarding which you are giving evidence took place quite a long time ago and your memory regarding details may not be precise?

MR CRAUSE: That is correct.

MR VISSER: You've also informed the Committee in paragraph 65 that you had the benefit of discussion with some of your colleagues and perusing the applications and as a result of that there are certain aspects which you may have forgotten about which have been brought back to your recollection?

MR CRAUSE: Yes that is correct.

MR VISSER: And you have included those aspects in the evidence which you are delivering before the Committee?

MR CRAUSE: Yes that is correct.

MR VISSER: If we could then go to page 25, the Silent Valley incident and I refer you to paragraph 68, that's page 25, paragraph 68, you refer to the amnesty application of Brigadier Loots who will be giving evidence and you agree in essence with the facts as they are given by him?

MR CRAUSE: Yes that is correct.

MR VISSER: Would you then look at paragraph 69, begin there and just tell the Committee how you recall the matter and I will interrupt you as we proceed to ask you to explain certain aspects. If you may just begin?

MR CRAUSE: On the 4th May 1983, I and other members of the security branch were busy with an operation with the objective of arresting PAC insurgents as they came over the border at Derdepoort.

MR VISSER: May I just interrupt you there? A good concept perhaps only needs half a word but just to explain, on this day you say that you were busy with an operation because there was information that PAC insurgents were coming into the country?

MR CRAUSE: That is correct.

MR VISSER: And what happened then? Paragraph 17.

MR CRAUSE: Well, Captain Du Preez, Smit and I were under way with an official vehicle to Derdepoort. I heard a radio report, that is on the police radio from the border post commander that there was a person at Derdepoort who wanted to speak to me. 

MR VISSER: Mr Crause, I would just ask you to move somewhat slower just to give time for the interpreters?

MR CRAUSE: Very well. Page 26, paragraph 71, with our arrival at Derdepoort border post I met one Andries Moatshe as well as Colonel Venter who was at that stage still a captain. Moatshe was known to me from previous occasions. He was suspected by me of being an ANC conspirator ...[intervention]

MR VISSER: Would you just stop there please? Madame Chair, may I refer you to bundle 2G?

CHAIRPERSON: That's the evidence of Mr Venter?

MR VISSER: That is the evidence of Mr Venter. Page 861.

CHAIRPERSON: Can you announce to locate 2G, there's a pile of bundles?

MR VISSER: 2G, it's a thick bundle.

CHAIRPERSON: Yes.

MR VISSER: And it is at page 861. 

CHAIRPERSON: You may continue.

MR VISSER: Thank you Chairperson. I will refer you to the middle of the page where Colonel Venter talks about the nature and particulars where he says:

&#9;"An informer of the security branch broke off contact with us and was seen at Derdepoort border post by Crause and myself and we had positive information about this informer, namely that he was involved in bringing in of trained terrorists. He was clearly surprised and shocked to see us and when we asked him what he was doing in the area, he told us that he would bring in trained terrorists that night."

If I may stop there?

&#9;Mr Crause, is that how you recall the situation as Mr Venter has given it here?

MR CRAUSE: No, I was not present when Moatshe arrived at the border post and I was also not present when Venter arrived there.

MR VISSER: So what you're trying to say, are you're saying that if he had appeared to be shocked and surprised it would have been before you arrived there?

MR CRAUSE: Yes.

MR VISSER: Because when you arrived there you were already aware that he had requested to speak to you?

MR CRAUSE: Yes that is correct, I just didn't know who the person was at that stage.

MR VISSER: Very well, can we just refer to the other aspect here and that is the evidence of Colonel Venter in which he says that:

&#9;"An informer of the security branch who broke off contact with us."

What exactly was your knowledge of Mr Andries Moatshe?

MR CRAUSE: I was aware by means of informers that he was involved in Botswana with the transport of trained ANC operatives, that he provided assistance and accommodation to them, that he transported weaponry, that he acted as a courier for them.

CHAIRPERSON: May you be a little slower to enable us to transcribe your evidence and also to enable the translator to be able to translate at a pace that's not going to make her gasp for air?

MR VISSER: Yes, just a little slower. Madame Chair, we're at paragraph 73.

CHAIRPERSON: I'm aware.

MR VISSER: Yes? Could you repeat what you've just said Mr Crause?

MR CRAUSE: I was aware by means of informers that we had in Botswana that Moatshe was involved with ANC, that he provided safe accommodation for MK members, that he transported them, that he concealed and transported weapons for them, that he acted as a courier and that he was also involved in the infiltration of trained MK members to the R.S.A.

MR VISSER: Is it correct that before the 4th May at a stage you had had a discussion with Mr Moatshe?

MR CRAUSE: That is correct.

MR VISSER: Could you tell the Committee what the content of that discussion was?

MR CRAUSE: If I remember correctly, I found Moatshe at a border post. 

MR VISSER: When approximately did this take place?

MR CRAUSE: It was quite sometime before then, approximately five to six months before the incident, approximately if I recall correctly. I then informed him that we were aware of his activities and I also warned him that he would be harmed in the process.

MR VISSER: And what did you mean by that?

MR CRAUSE: I meant that he would be arrested.

CHAIRPERSON: May I interpose Mr Visser on this particular aspect of evidence? 

&#9;When you say that you were informed by your informers of the activities of Mr Moatshe, that amongst others he provided safe accommodation, conveyed weapons as well as conveying MK who wanted to infiltrate the country. Were you not aware of all these activities at the time when you recruited him as your own informer?

MR CRAUSE: I never recruited him as an informer.

CHAIRPERSON: That is your evidence?

MR CRAUSE: Ja.

CHAIRPERSON: He wasn't at any stage?

MR CRAUSE: He was never, at no stage was he an informer of mine.

CHAIRPERSON: Yes.

MR VISSER: Chairperson, that's the point, that's the point.

CHAIRPERSON: It is a point which immediately worried me when he gave this kind of viva voce evidence and as contained in his supplementary affidavit which point was not clearly made in his original application?

MR VISSER: Yes.

CHAIRPERSON: You're obviously aware why I'm worried about this?

MR VISSER: Yes.

CHAIRPERSON: Because this is the evidence given by Mr Venter and this is the evidence that is already before us.

MR VISSER: Yes, I know, yes.

CHAIRPERSON: You will cover this point though, I believe as you progress with your viva voce evidence in chief?

MR VISSER: Well I believe we've already covered it, but may I refer you to page 84 of bundle 11 where Mr Crause describes the situation as follows. It's page 84 (iv) and it's the third paragraph, the second sentence he says:

&#9;"I recognised the person as Andries Moatshe, a suspected ANC conspirator who, only if it suited him, would report certain information. He informed us ..."

And then he goes on. Now if you refer back to Exhibit A, you will see in paragraph 73, and perhaps I should ask you, in your application you have stated that Andries Moatshe would only report certain information if it suited him. Could you inform us about that?

MR CRAUSE: What I meant by that was that if he had been a recruited informer, he would not have been the sort of person that one would be able to trust and that one would be able to receive information from.

MR VISSER: Very well, on this day the 4th May he did indeed provide information?

MR CRAUSE: That is correct.

MR VISSER: And in paragraph 73 you say that this was the first time that he did indeed provide information to you?

MR CRAUSE: Yes that is correct.

CHAIRPERSON: May I just take you back on to page 84 wherein you stated that this Mr Moatshe reported certain information if it suited him. Now in what capacity did he make such reports?

MR CRAUSE: No, he never made any reports.

CHAIRPERSON: But as you're saying he made certain reports when it suited him? It's there is it not, Mr Visser?

MR CRAUSE: I stated here that he was a suspected ANC collaborator who would only report certain information if it suited him. He did not report it, I regarded him as someone, who for his own gain, would report information if it suited him.

MR VISSER: If it suited him?

MR CRAUSE: Yes, if it suited him.

CHAIRPERSON: Now in what capacity did he provide you with information when it suited him?

MR CRAUSE: He didn't, that was the first occasion upon which he provided information to me.

MR VISSER: It's the pointedness of the Afrikaans language, Chairperson, what the witness is saying and I don't want to interrupt but we can take it no further.

CHAIRPERSON: Yes.

MR VISSER: He's saying with hindsight what I know is that only when it suited him would he give us information and this is what happened on the 4th May, that's what he really is saying.

CHAIRPERSON: Yes, but is my question that difficult to understand, because what I'm basically wanting to find out is when he would come to him to give him certain information, he would give such information as what? As an honest Botswana citizen, given information to a member of the security branch? This is what I want to find out from Mr Crause.

MR CRAUSE: I regarded him as a person who would only provide information, this was the first information and he would only provide it if he could draw some kind of benefit from it for some or other reason. That is why I put it in my original application, where I described him as someone who would report certain information only if it suited him.

MR LAX: Can I assist here? What we have here is a grammatical problem and it's as Mr Visser says a matter of language. The word "sou" in that context is "would have" "might have" "could have been an informant in certain circumstances". Your evidence is that he never gave you personally any information prior to that day?

MR CRAUSE: That is correct.

MR LAX: But you saw him as a person who potentially could have been an informant but under circumstances that were not very trustworthy because you didn't trust his motives, you thought well maybe he's in it for his own gain. That's the impression that I'm getting of your evidence.

MR CRAUSE: That is exactly what I meant.

MR VISSER: Yes, we're indebted to Mr Lax.

CHAIRPERSON: Mr Visser, may I just take this further because I understand what Mr Lax is saying and to make speculation, that's not what Mr Crause has said. This person might have given information to you for his own benefit. What benefit would he have derived by giving such an information?

MR CRAUSE: It would be rewards, that he would not be arrested.

CHAIRPERSON: Mr Visser?

MR VISSER: Madame Chair?

CHAIRPERSON: Don't put words into Mr Crause's mouth.

MR VISSER: Certainly, thank you.

CHAIRPERSON: Yes, let him speak for himself, he is a witness and you are his counsel.

MR VISSER: Yes.

CHAIRPERSON: Yes, you may proceed Mr Crause in explaining to us the benefit that he might have derived?

MR CRAUSE: As I've stated, he would be able to escape arrest, he may have received financial rewards and he could have abused me to bring people in, to bring weapons in and he could also have provided disinformation to me.

CHAIRPERSON: But your evidence is that prior to this incident you had never had any kind of contact with Mr Moatshe?

MR CRAUSE: No.

MR VISSER: No Madame Chair, he spoke to him before, perhaps he should just repeat that evidence?

CHAIRPERSON: Yes.

MR VISSER: He spoke to him before, he was aware of his activities.

CHAIRPERSON: Yes.

MR VISSER: Just repeat that?

MR CRAUSE: Approximately five to six months before the incident at Silent Valley I encountered Moatshe at a border post, I think it was a border post. I knew who he was but he didn't know who I was. I introduced myself to him and explained to him that we were well aware of his activities and that he would run the risk of arrest.

CHAIRPERSON: Thank you. You may proceed Mr Visser.

MR VISSER: Thank you Chairperson.

MR LAX: Can I just interpose for one second? Did Moatshe provide, to the best of your knowledge, prior to this time information to any other of your colleagues who may have been working in the area alongside of you?

MR CRAUSE: Not as far as I'm aware, it is not impossible.

MR LAX: Thank you.

MR VISSER: If you would then continue with paragraph 74:

&#9;"Moatshe informed us, that would be me and Venter, that he was to infiltrate two armed ANC MK commanders that evening to the R.S.A. Upon enquiry he said that he would pick up the two insurgents with a red Toyota bakkie next to the border"

Next to the border on what side? The R.S.A. or Botswana side?

MR CRAUSE: It would be the R.S.A. side, that would be after they had climbed over the border fence. The point of pick up would be approximately ten kilometres North East from the Derdepoort border post. He would drive with them to a shop at the Swartklip Mine in the vicinity of Saulspoort where he would drop them off. He wanted me to wait in the vicinity for him so that he could inform me about where he had dropped off the terrorists so that I could arrest them there. 

MR VISSER: This information which you received, what did you do with it?

MR CRAUSE: I immediately contacted my commander, Colonel Steyn, telephonically. He came through along with Colonel Loots to Derdepoort and there it was decided that the plan to attempt to arrest the terrorists at Swartklip was to risky do to the approximate distance of about 100 kilometres from the border where Moatshe would pick them up. Anything could happen during that time and the possibility that we could miss them was too dangerous from the view of the terror which they could commit in the R.S.A.

MR VISSER: So you maintain that it was too far, they could turn away, anything could happen? Would you attempt something closer to the border?

MR CRAUSE: That is correct.

MR VISSER: And what would you do? Paragraph 76?

MR CRAUSE: Consequently it was decided that a roadblock would be established closer to the border at an appropriate position and that then it would be attempted to arrest the persons.

MR VISSER: With this aspect I would just like to pose the following to you. From the second that the information was made known to you what was the intention with these persons.

MR CRAUSE: From the very beginning it was decided that they would be arrested. 

MR VISSER: You had already received information according to your evidence that they would be armed?

MR CRAUSE: That is correct.

MR VISSER: Proceed, paragraph 77?

MR LAX: Where did you get this information that they'd be armed from? It hasn't come out at all. What is the source of that information?

MR CRAUSE: From Moatshe himself.

MR LAX: That they would be armed?

MR CRAUSE: Yes.

MR VISSER: Thank you Chairperson, for the benefit of Commissioner Lax at page 84 in the original application, you will see in that same paragraph which we've just dealt with, the next sentence:

&#9;"He informed us that on that night he would be infiltrating two armed terrorists to the R.S.A."

Very well, you may continue on page 27, paragraph 77?

MR CRAUSE: A roadblock was established with Colonel Loots as the Commander. At this point various members of the security branch gathered. Persons that I recall being present were myself, Major General Steyn who was then still a Colonel, Colonel W J Loots, Commissioner Jan Truter who was at that stage still a Major, Senior Superintendent C J du Preez Smit who was still a Lieutenant at that stage, Colonel A J Venter then still a Lieutenant, Superintendent G J van Zyl at that stage still a Sergeant, Captain I J Marais also still a Sergeant, Warrant Officer Smit and then there may have been other members who I cannot recall.

MR VISSER: Yes, if we could just return to what you said in paragraph 77, you said that a roadblock was established with Colonel Loots as Commander. Perhaps that is somewhat misleading. Colonel Steyn was the overall commander, correct?

MR CRAUSE: Yes that is correct.

MR VISSER: Was he present during the incident which you are about to describe?

MR CRAUSE: No he was not present during the incident. however, during the establishment of the roadblock he was present.

MR VISSER: Who was your commander during the incident itself?

MR CRAUSE: Colonel Loots.

MR VISSER: Very well, please go to page 28, paragraph 78?

ADV DE JAGER: At this stage when the discussion or the planning of the roadblock took place he was present?

MR CRAUSE: Yes he was present.

ADV DE JAGER: Was he present when it was decided not to arrest?

MR CRAUSE: No he was not present.

MR VISSER: Who are you speaking of? Colonel Steyn?

MR CRAUSE: No, he was not present.

CHAIRPERSON: Was he present when a decision to make Captain Loots a commander was made?

MR CRAUSE: Yes.

CHAIRPERSON: And that was before a decision was made with regard to the setting up of a roadblock?

MR CRAUSE: Could you please repeat your question?

CHAIRPERSON: Was General Steyn present when a decision was made to make Captain Loots a commander?

MR CRAUSE: Yes it was Colonel Loots. At that stage he was a Colonel and he appointed him as the Commander at the roadblock.

CHAIRPERSON: Yes and when it was decided to set up the roadblock where was General Steyn?

MR CRAUSE: He was also there.

CHAIRPERSON: Yes, I just wanted to correct the reading of paragraph 77 which would give an impression that whilst he was there, Captain Loots was in command which obviously only happened after he had left and after somebody had appointed Captain Loots a commander of the operation to be carried out further?

MR CRAUSE: That is correct.

MR VISSER: Yes that is indeed as we tried to explain it, it does seem to give the wrong impression and it's more my fault than anyone else's Chairperson. I drew the document.

CHAIRPERSON: I'm aware, that's why I wanted to have Mr Crause setting the position straight.

MR VISSER: Thank you Chairperson.

&#9;If you would then continue, what happened on the scene which you had selected? This is paragraph 78.

MR CRAUSE: On the scene, which had been selected by Lieutenant du Preez, there was a farm gate in the road which we could swing in order to close approximately three quarters of the Mariku Draai Dwaalboom Road in order to block off a section of the road just after a bend. The remaining section we obstructed with stones and branches that Moatshe's vehicle would have to stop as it came around the bend.

MR VISSER: So what you are trying to say is that a vehicle which was moving in the direction of the border in the direction of the Swartklip Mine, on that road, if it came around the bend it would have to stop there and it would not be able to go anywhere else?

MR CRAUSE: Yes that is correct. Colonel Steyn and Major Jan Truter then left to undertake observation closer to the border in order to warn us when the vehicle of Moatshe would be approaching the roadblock. After Colonel Steyn had departed an exercise was undertaken.

MR VISSER: How many exercises, was it one exercise or various exercises?

MR CRAUSE: No, we undertook numerous exercises as far as I can recall. Colonel Loots, myself, Captain Roelf Venter and Captain du Preez Smit, once again discussed the entire action and after thorough consideration decided that it was way to dangerous for the members to attempt to arrest these persons. The reason for this was that there was too little shelter for the members and that the members would necessarily have to fire upon one another should the terrorists open fire. It was clear to us that we would have to shoot before the terrorists realised what was happening. This meant that the plan was abandoned to arrest and instead it was decided to eliminate the persons.

MR VISSER: Can we stop there? The picture is now that the decision had been made to arrest them, the gate was positioned, stones and branches were placed, Steyn and Truter departed, you practised the whole operation, according to your expression, what exactly did it involve, this exercise with the objective to arrest, how would you have exercised it, what did you do?

MR CRAUSE: There were members on both sides of the road where the vehicle would have to stop. Persons would also stand in front of the gate, we had a very strong light system there.

MR VISSER: How would this have worked?

MR CRAUSE: As the vehicle stopped ...[intervention]

MR VISSER: How would you have started it up?

MR CRAUSE: Two members of the unit would have activated it for us.

MR VISSER: With a generator?

MR CRAUSE: Yes, with a generator.

MR VISSER: Then?

MR CRAUSE: The initial planning was for us to hit the windows out and to arrest the persons, that was the initial plan.

MR VISSER: Now you have exercised it or practised it and with this practise session, the people that you have referred to conferred and started a discussion and realised that there was somewhat of a problem?

MR CRAUSE: That is correct.

MR VISSER: This decision not to arrest but to start shooting immediately upon the bakkie's arrival, that was an order which ultimately was given by Brigadier Loots?

MR CRAUSE: That is correct.

MR VISSER: Before that you have already referred to a discussion, was this discussion among all of you and was it agreed by all of you that it would be like that or what was the situation?

MR CRAUSE: That is correct, at first it was four of us then we informed the rest of the members on the scene and they also agreed with it.

CHAIRPERSON: May I just get clarity, when you say that the decision not to arrest but to shoot as opposed to kill was taken by Captain Loots? Was it taken by him alone or was this a joint decision taken by Captain Loots in consultation with you amongst others?

MR CRAUSE: It was the four of us who discussed the matter. All four of us decided upon this, Colonel Loots, me, Captain Venter and Captain Smit. However, seeing as Colonel Loots was the commander, he was the ultimate decision maker.

CHAIRPERSON: He ultimately approved but the four of you had decided?

MR CRAUSE: Correct.

CHAIRPERSON: Thank you.

MR VISSER: However, you also involved the other members and discussed the matter with them in order to test their sentiments?

MR CRAUSE: That is correct.

MR VISSER: And they all agreed that it was too dangerous?

MR CRAUSE: That is correct.

MR VISSER: Can you tell us, Andries Moatshe was not one of the insurgents as far as you were aware because on that day he had become an informer of yours and he had provided the information to you. Then why was he also shot dead?

MR CRAUSE: I suspected him and we decided that he was of no worth for us in future terms and then I would like to mention one thing which also contributed to the decision and I have mentioned this in my affidavit, that is the fact that he wanted to drop off the people at the mine and that I would have to wait alone at a distance and that he would then inform me. 

MR VISSER: Why did this create suspicion in your mind?

MR CRAUSE: Because he didn't want us to work together to arrest the people before the time.

MR VISSER: What were the words that you used, you stated that you didn't think that he would be of any value to you in the future. In what sense did you mean this?

MR CRAUSE: I didn't trust him.

MR VISSER: Very well, you've also said that the order was given by Colonel Loots ultimately and you received the message that the bakkie was under way from the vehicle of Colonel Steyn and Truter. When the bakkie arrived there the generator was activated, the lights were switched on and the members immediately opened fire on the bakkie. Did you fire?

MR CRAUSE: Yes I also fired.

MR VISSER: How many shots?

MR CRAUSE: Approximately two.

MR VISSER: Could you have hit some of the passengers?

MR CRAUSE: Yes.

MR VISSER: What did you shoot with?

MR CRAUSE: An R1 rifle.

MR VISSER: Was it set on automatic fire or on individual shots?

MR CRAUSE: Single shots.

MR VISSER: And all three passengers in the bakkie were killed?

MR CRAUSE: That is correct.

MR VISSER: Do you recall whether any weapons were found which they had in their possession before the incident? 

MR CRAUSE: That is correct, they had weapons.

MR VISSER: And while we are dealing with the matter of weapons, bundle 2G, Chairperson, page 862, I'm sorry - it's at the foot of page 861, there's a sentence which reads in the evidence of Colonel Venter which says:

&#9;"We were given arms to plant on the terrorists should they not be armed."

Now can you comment on that?

MR CRAUSE: I cannot deny that there were weapons but I cannot remember the incident and I'm being very honest regarding that.

MR VISSER: If we discuss weapons, we know that there were weapons on the scene and we are discussing weapons which would usually be used by MK fighters, ANC MK soldiers, namely Russian manufactured weapons, limpet mines, hand grenades and the usual AK47s, Makarov pistols and so forth. Those are the weapons which we are discussing now?

MR CRAUSE: That is correct.

MR VISSER: Did you give an order to anybody to take weapons to the scene?

MR CRAUSE: No, I gave no such order.

MR VISSER: Is it correct that during the time of the struggle members of the security forces or certain members of the security forces did indeed have such weapons at their disposal?

MR CRAUSE: Yes that is correct, they did, there were members who had such weapons.

MR VISSER: And who might have even had it on the scene?

MR CRAUSE: Yes, that's possible.

MR VISSER: So you did not exclude that as a possibility?

MR CRAUSE: No, I don't.

MR VISSER: Did you see any such weapons on the scene?

MR CRAUSE: No, none.

MR VISSER: Then may I just refer you in case you don't understand me entirely correctly? On page 84 of your application, the last paragraph underneath (iv) you have stated the following. Could you read it please?

MR CRAUSE: I would just like to amend something. Where the two persons who sat in the middle and left were armed I misunderstood.

ADV DE JAGER: Mr Visser, you discussed weapons which were taken with and you referred to such weapons.

MR VISSER: I beg your pardon, I was just busy stating that I was confusing the witness. Let me begin again. We're talking about weapons which were not taken along. You've already given evidence to that effect. I'm at the point whether you saw any other weapons other than the normal standard issue police weapons, in other words, the sort of weapons which we have discussed, Russian, Eastern Bloc manufactured weapons which were not brought along by you but arrived there in another manner.

MR CRAUSE: Yes that is correct, they were there.

MR VISSER: And what were they according to your recollection?

MR CRAUSE: As far as I recall they were hand grenades, I don't recall if they were four or six and two Makarov pistols.

MR VISSER: And you saw these weapons with the person sitting in the middle and on the left, these were the two persons other than Andries Moatshe?

MR CRAUSE: Yes that is correct.

MR VISSER: And you also mentioned this in paragraph 84 on page 29?

MR CRAUSE: Yes that is correct.

MR VISSER: After the incident the scene was cleaned up. Can you tell who cleaned up the scene?

MR CRAUSE: I can't say who was there. I would like to refer you to paragraph 86 at this stage. If I might read this I would like to?

MR VISSER: Yes.

MR CRAUSE: Colonel Venter and I immediately left the scene after the shooting incident to the Swartklip Mine in order to investigate the possibility of other terrorists being there and the result of this investigation was negative. Upon my arrival at Derdepoort the scene had already been cleaned up.

MR VISSER: What class of person would be the type to clean up a scene where a shooting incident had taken place? What qualifications would this person have?

MR CRAUSE: Usually someone from the mortuary, the experts, photographers and an investigating officer who would undertake the inquest. A demolitions expert would be the first person on the scene.

MR VISSER: Who on that scene would have been the demolitions expert?

MR CRAUSE: Captain Venter was one.

MR VISSER: And Brigadier Loots will give evidence that he was an expert. There was a post-mortem inquest under the title "Dwaalboom GO's 1, 2 and 3." Where was this inquest held?

MR CRAUSE: After the incident I did not support or provide any statements, I was not involved in any inquest and I cannot give any evidence regarding that.

MR VISSER: I would just like to place it on record that this was held at Thabazimbi.

&#9;Madame Chair, the relevant passage where the Amnesty Committee dealt with this aspect in it's decision in the Cronje matter is in bundle 1, page 52.

&#9;Thank you Madame Chairperson, that's the evidence of Mr Crause.

NO FURTHER QUESTIONS BY MR VISSER

CHAIRPERSON: Thank you Mr Visser. Ms Lockhat do you have any questions to put to Mr Crause?

CROSS-EXAMINATION BY MS LOCKHAT: I do Chairperson. 

&#9;I refer you to bundle 2G, page 869 of the transcripts where Judge Wilson asks Venter:

&#9;"This informant, where did you know him from?"

and his response was:

&#9;"The informer was known to me because he had contact with Captain Crause who was the commanding officer in Zeerust. He was one of Crause's informers."

Can you respond to that?

CHAIRPERSON: What line are you reading from?

MS LOCKHAT: It's the ...[intervention]

CHAIRPERSON: It's the first line?

MS LOCKHAT: That is correct, it starts with the first line of 869.

MR CRAUSE: He was not an informant of mine and at that stage I was not the commander at Zeerust.

MS LOCKHAT: Are you saying that Venter has got the wrong end of the stick here?

MR CRAUSE: Yes.

MS LOCKHAT: Because it's further down, he also says, the seventh line on page 869:

&#9;"He would usually pass on information"

and the words "usually pass on information" relating to the movements of ANC activists and trained terrorists in Botswana. So to me, in my mind, it means that this was normal circumstances, that he was an informer and he would usually pass on information. Please comment on that?

MR CRAUSE: Not to me and he was not an informant of mine?

MS LOCKHAT: So where does Venter get this information from?

MR CRAUSE: I don't know.

MS LOCKHAT: One other question, why did he ask for you at the border post, why did he specifically contact - why did Venter contact you?

MR VISSER: No, no Venter didn't contact him. Just to make this clear so that we don't become confused. Venter did not contact this witness.

CHAIRPERSON: His evidence was that somebody radioed him. 

MR VISSER: The commanding officer at the border post contacted him.

MS LOCKHAT: My question is then why did they contact you specifically?

MR CRAUSE: Because he asked for me, Moatshe asked for me.

MS LOCKHAT: So why would he ask for you?

MR CRAUSE: Because I had met him at a previous instance and I had discussion with him where I warned him.

MS LOCKHAT: You didn't perhaps guarantee that he would be paid for certain information like a normal informer?

MR CRAUSE: No.

MS LOCKHAT: Was it necessary to eliminate Moatshe as well seeing it was possible that he might become an informer?

MR CRAUSE: There was no other choice.

MS LOCKHAT: Why didn't you just arrest these people?

MR CRAUSE: As I've already described what the dangers were.

MS LOCKHAT: But it just puzzles me that here's this informer that possibly could become one of your informers, tells you he's bringing two MK's into the country and usually you say your procedure is usually to arrest these people. Why so different in these circumstances? Please elaborate on that?

MR CRAUSE: Because firstly he wanted to meet with me alone at Swartklip and because we did not want to apprehend these people so far from the border and the initial decision was to apprehend them. After we came to the conclusion what the circumstances were we decided to eliminate them.

MS LOCKHAT: You were so many policemen on that scene of the incident and they were only three people, do you think it was necessary to eliminate them and did you think it was necessary to actually feel that your lives were in danger at that time?

MR CRAUSE: I think so, I have been in contacts before.

MS LOCKHAT: Didn't you all have weapons as well?

MR CRAUSE: Yes we did.

ADV DE JAGER: In such an instance it depends on who shoots first?

MR CRAUSE: That is correct.

ADV DE JAGER: If he fires the first shot one of you would be killed, if you get in the first shot one of them would be killed?

MS LOCKHAT: I also want to refer you to page 870 of the bundle 2G. Just line 22, Chairperson, where Judge Wilson asks:

&#9;"They did not open fire, they were stopped at a roadblock you told us, is that correct?"

and then Venter says: "yes"

&#9;"and yet you fired, killing everybody in the vehicle, knowing one of them was the informer?"

Can you just comment on the first part, that they stopped at the roadblock and they did not fire, is that correct?

MR CRAUSE: That is correct, they did not have a chance.

MS LOCKHAT: So why at that stage didn't you attempt to just shoot one or two of them and then arrest them, why eliminate them seeing that they were not firing?

MR CRAUSE: If they had thrown a hand grenade at us, then four or five of us would have been killed, then we decided then that you will eliminate them and we stuck to that decision.

MS LOCKHAT: But did they throw out hand grenade?

MR CRAUSE: No but they were ready.

MS LOCKHAT: But these people did not shoot, they didn't throw out hand grenades and yet you thought it was possible to still eliminate them although there were no facts pointing to the fact that they were actually going to shoot upon you?

MR CRAUSE: Yes we shot them.

CHAIRPERSON: You shot because you had already made a decision to kill them?

MR CRAUSE: That is correct.

CHAIRPERSON: Prior to the insurgents coming into the country. Once you and the others which included Captain Loots ultimately approved of your decision had met and conceded the risks which confronted you as policemen in that you could be fired at by the insurgents. You then acted in accordance with your decision. So there was no question of you holding fire for having fired some - few shoots in order to arrest whoever might have still been alive after somebody had fired a few shots? A decision had already been made, is that not so?

MR CRAUSE: That was the decision, after General Steyn had left the scene and the four of us conferred and that was the decision, to eliminate them.

MS LOCKHAT: Tell me, who was calling the shots, who said fire, surely there was one person who had to initiate that instruction?

MR CRAUSE: I cannot recall.

MS LOCKHAT: Tell me and the commander, the Commissioner Smit - Steyn, please forgive me, it's Steyn, did he know of the operation, to eliminate these people?

MR CRAUSE: He had no knowledge thereof, that decision was taken after he had left.

MS LOCKHAT: Do you think he would have authorised this action?

MR CRAUSE: I believe so.

MS LOCKHAT: Thank you Chairperson, no further questions.

NO FURTHER QUESTIONS BY MS LOCKHAT

CHAIRPERSON: Mr Crause, you're saying General Steyn was not aware of your decision to eliminate the insurgents, you are still labouring under the impression that you would make an attempt to arrest them?

MR CRAUSE: That is correct but after he arrived at the scene he said that - and we would have explained the situation to him - he said that he agreed with us.

CHAIRPERSON: Did he make contact at any stage with you before the shooting started?

MR CRAUSE: Not at all.

MR VISSER: To your knowledge he never spoke to any of you before the shooting started?

MR CRAUSE: The only contact that he had made and I apologise, is that he let us know that the vehicle was on its way and that was by means of the radio.

CHAIRPERSON: And who did you speak to?

MR CRAUSE: I don't know, I did not man the radio and I cannot recall who he spoke to.

CHAIRPERSON: So he never spoke to you?

MR CRAUSE: Not with me personally.

CHAIRPERSON: In which group were you in?

MR CRAUSE: We were all in the same group, I was with Colonel Loots' group at the scene.

CHAIRPERSON: So you would not be aware that General Steyn at one stage spoke to Captain Loots to advise him of the position of the car and to update him of his observation whilst he was at the border, you wouldn't be aware of that?

MR CRAUSE: The point where I was at there was no radio so I cannot say what radio contact there was or what was discussed there.

ADV DE JAGER: In whose division did this incident take place and in which division is this border post.

MR CRAUSE: The border post and the whole incident took place in division Western Transvaal. If I could explain further, Zeerust area runs up to Derdepoort and this resorts under the division of Western Transvaal and the place where the incident took place was resorted under Thabazimbi and at that stage that also resorted under Western Transvaal under the command of General Steyn.

ADV DE JAGER: Because Venter was also at that stage, although he was stationed at Thabazimbi but he was in the region of Western Transvaal?

MR CRAUSE: That is correct.

ADV DE JAGER: At which border post did they come through?

MR CRAUSE: They came through a Derdepoort border post.

ADV DE JAGER: You may answer?

MR CRAUSE: And approximately 10 kilometres to the north they came across the fence.

MR LAX: How did you people get to that point where the ambush was set up, where the roadblock was set up?

MR CRAUSE: We drove with our vehicles.

MR LAX: Were these your normal vehicles that you used?

MR CRAUSE: Yes.

MR LAX: They would have all been fitted with radios, two way radios as would have been normal practise?

MR CRAUSE: Not all of them, not all security vehicles at that stage had radios.

MR LAX: But there certainly would have been vehicles with two way radios?

MR CRAUSE: That is correct.

MR LAX: It's clear that you were in radio contact with General Steyn? I'll refer to him as he is presently.

MR CRAUSE: I have said that we did have radio contact. I did not man the radio myself but we did have radio contact.

MR LAX: Did you not radio him once you four had made a decision that instead of arrest there would be an elimination?

MR CRAUSE: If we had done that then all the other police vehicles, border post, police stations, would have all been on the same frequency and they would have heard this.

MR LAX: Would that have posed a security risk for you?

MR CRAUSE: Absolutely.

MR LAX: Now I have some understanding of how roadblocks are set up and participated in many of them myself and how did this practise runs of yours, what did you actually do?

MR CRAUSE: We drove through with a vehicle of our own and later when it was dark we used a vehicle that the local had used had come through.

MR LAX: So a local vehicle came through and you stopped it as if it was an ordinary roadblock.

MR CRAUSE: It had to stop because the gate was closed. I have to say that nowhere did we have signs that there was a roadblock ahead, we just used the gate as a stop.

MR LAX: Yes, obviously, that would have been very counter-productive to alert anyone that you were there. You also chose a place where they couldn't see the roadblock, it was on a corner as you've indicated?

MR CRAUSE: That is correct.

MR LAX: Now what was - you say General Steyn's - you didn't speak to him after the event, you said you'd left the scene immediately afterwards, is that right?

MR CRAUSE: I know after the shooting he arrived there just before I left.

MR LAX: You didn't speak to him, did you?

MR CRAUSE: I did.

MR LAX: You did?

MR CRAUSE: Yes.

MR LAX: And what was the contents of your discussion with him? Not word for word obviously, it was many years ago.

MR CRAUSE: He asked me what had happened and I told him that all three had been killed.

MR LAX: You've indicated already in your evidence that you felt there was no other alternative but to eliminate these people?

MR CRAUSE: Correct.

MR LAX: Now I just want to come back to the issue of these firearms and weapons as they are referred to by Venter in his testimony which you've already heard and which is just for the record confirmed again on the following page. The first reference was on page 861 and then again on page 862 he refers to it again. He gives a distinct impression and we've heard of this in many, many other operations both before this Committee, not this panel but this Committee and before other Committees in the Truth Commission, that there were numerous incidents where police would plant weapons on the people they had eliminated. It was a fairly standard practise, it was a way of showing how effective they were being to the media to creating an impression, to creating the right amount of evidence to justify their actions?

MR CRAUSE: That is correct.

MR LAX: Venter in his evidence and of course I wasn't present when he was testifying so I can't talk about his demeanour but the impression one gets from reading the record is that he is adamant that this was part of the plan that these weapons were taken along with a view to, if there weren't weapons on these people, to ensuring that there would be seen to be weapons on them. You have no knowledge of that?

MR CRAUSE: I do not want to deny it, I cannot recall it.

MR LAX: So it's possible that that might have been part of the plan, it just hasn't formed part of your recollection of the events?

MR CRAUSE: That is correct.

MR LAX: And it may be something you've just forgotten about?

MR CRAUSE: That is correct.

CHAIRPERSON: Are you sure about that? I thought in your earlier evidence you said that it was practise of the security police to carry these weapons with them and it's possible that, you known, there might have been with the police in their cars when the incident occurred? That's the impression I got.

MR CRAUSE: No.

CHAIRPERSON: Well there was a potential of this matter having been discussed when you decided to carry out the elimination.

MR CRAUSE: At that stage I was not aware of any weapons that were there that would be planted. What I do recall is that some members of the security branch did have AK47s and communist weapons.

CHAIRPERSON: But when you say now to a question put to you by Mr Lax that it's possible that this was part of the plan, that this was discussed, it paints a different picture altogether?

MR CRAUSE: No, it could be that it was discussed and it was without my knowledge.

CHAIRPERSON: While you were there and discussing this operation and you were there Mr Crause, the four of you were there, when you decided that you'd rather eliminate than to attempt to effect an arrest. To your knowledge and to your recollection, would this have been something that was discussed that arms would be planted on these insurgents?

MR CRAUSE: With all honesty I can say that it did not happen in my presence.

CHAIRPERSON: No but you were there at all times when a decision to eliminate was taken?

MR CRAUSE: That is correct.

CHAIRPERSON: So that is the period what we are interested in, whilst you were there and when the decision to eliminate was taken. Could this have been discussed?

MR CRAUSE: Not while I was present. I cannot remember anything of these weapons and I'm totally honest about that.

CHAIRPERSON: A discussion to eliminate the insurgents was taken in one meeting. This is what your evidence suggests so far, so there couldn't have been other discussions involving the elimination of the insurgents where you couldn't have been present.

MR CRAUSE: The initial plan was to arrest these persons. After General Steyn left we planned at the scene to eliminate them. Nobody else drove away, nobody left, so if there were any weapons I don't know who brought it there, it was not discussed where I was present. If we had decided to eliminate them beforehand we would have taken weapons with us but it was at that stage not yet planned.

CHAIRPERSON: You may proceed Mr Lax.

MR LAX: Thank you. So in fact your answer to my question, just before Chairperson interposed, is not in fact correct, is not a matter that you don't remember, as far as you're able to say it never happened that such a possibility might have been part of the plan?

MR CRAUSE: That is correct.

MR LAX: You see in Venter's evidence he makes it very clear that General Steyn was present when you made the discussion and the decision to eliminate these people?

MR CRAUSE: I have to deny that, General Steyn was never in my presence, present where we decided to eliminate these persons.

MR LAX: It also then makes more sense, his evidence at any rate, that if he knew about the elimination, the fact that weapons were taken along according to him to possibly plant in the eventuality of there being nothing to show, that all then hangs together much more reasonably.

MR CRAUSE: I cannot agree with that, our plan was initially to arrest these persons, not to eliminate them. That was a decision that was taken after General Steyn had left, after he had already departed.

MR LAX: Then you can't explain why Venter should make such a mistake about the issue where his impression is such a totally different one to yours?

MR CRAUSE: It's the same what he said with regard to Moatshe that I was there and he was surprised.

MR LAX: You see, there's a perfectly reasonable understanding for how he might have made a mistake about Moatshe, he might have - it's quite conceivably he could have got the wrong impression about your and Moatshe's interaction and that's clear, one can see, Moatshe asked for you, you'd had some contact with him, he may have assumed that was a much greater contact than actually was. That's an easy thing to see how he might have made a mistake there. This is a very different kettle of fish here though, because we're talking about his perception of the planning of the operation, his perception of the decision making of the operation and those are very different things. The basis and the possibilities for being confused and misconstruing the situation is quite different. Do you concede that?

MR CRAUSE: All that I can that I was not aware of weapons, there was no planning where I was present, I cannot comment any further about these weapons.

MR LAX: Thank you Chairperson.

CHAIRPERSON: Mr Crause, how soon after General Steyn had left with Mr Truter did you and the others which included Captain Loots was then put in command, take a decision to eliminate the insurgents?

MR CRAUSE: I will estimate about half an hour after they departed.

CHAIRPERSON: And how soon after he had left did the shooting commence?

MR CRAUSE: Approximately 45 minutes.

CHAIRPERSON: So if you had intended to inform him of the order that he had given you and that you had decided to amend for the reasons that you have already testified to, you would have been able to do so?

MR CRAUSE: He was quite a distance from there, I don't know exactly where he was, as I have said that we did not want to contact him by radio because our radio network had contact with the border posts, with neighbouring border posts, other police vehicles and we accepted that if we took the decision we will bear the consequences.

CHAIRPERSON: But he was able to make contact with you and relay sensitive information about the movements of the insurgents?

MR CRAUSE: All that he would have said was that the vehicle is on it's way.

CHAIRPERSON: And that wouldn't have been sensitive information?

MR CRAUSE: No.

CHAIRPERSON: Mr Venter has already testified as to quite a number of reasons why Mr Moatshe was killed. Before I exploring that, let me again emphasise that his recollection which to us seemed quite clear, was that Mr Moatshe was an informer and that you personally handled him and that was the information that was within his knowledge and you have stated to us that that is not so, he was mistaken when you he said that you were Moatshe's handler, that is your evidence, isn't it?

MR CRAUSE: That is correct.

CHAIRPERSON: Now he has advanced a number of reasons why Mr Moatshe was killed, he stated that it was initially not your intention to kill Mr Moatshe, he then changed his testimony to say, no in fact Mr Moatshe was killed because he was caught in a crossfire, which in a way went on to support his earlier reason that your intention was not to kill him, so he was not intentionally killed because he was your informer. But he went on to advance another reason, that he was killed because you no longer trusted him, that he didn't give you some information that came to light when you questioned some other people who also were from Botswana. What is your comment to that?

MR CRAUSE: I think, with all respect, Venter is confused. Amongst others he said Moatshe sat in the middle and he was shot in the crossfire. Moatshe was not in the middle he was driving.

CHAIRPERSON: So he was incorrect in his evidence?

MR CRAUSE: That is correct.

CHAIRPERSON: In fact all the evidence he gave before us would therefore be incorrect?

MR CRAUSE: I would not say all of it but certain facts are not correct, he does not have certainty to certain facts.

CHAIRPERSON: But the material aspect of his evidence which impinges on whether we are to grant amnesty or not seems to be not what you agree with, because he says the decision to eliminate the insurgents was taken in the presence of General Steyn and your testimony is that that is not so?

MR CRAUSE: Not in the presence of General Steyn.

CHAIRPERSON: Thank you Mr Crause. Mr Visser do you have any re-examination?

MR VISSER: Madame Chair, no re-examination except that I do want to refer you to bundle 2I, page 127 to page 129 where at page 128 you will find where Crause dealt with the Silent Valley matter on the top of the page in paragraph 3. Just before we take the adjournment, if you will allow me one thing perhaps Madame Chair and I know I'm probably out of turn to say this now because it's really a question of argument. The point has been made before that the fact that Cronje, Venter and others had given evidence before you first before other people had does not make their evidence a holy cow and I'm sure that you'll remind yourself of that and you will also remind yourself that there was an argument before the full Committee, the original Committee, which I participated, which led to a ruling that we will not allow to cross-examine. So the result of that was that it was decided by the Committee that the appropriate way of dealing with the evidence that was going to be led was by way of affidavit and it was stated that as long as that contains a denial, well then that's it, and we will not allow to cross-examine at all. So it is a bit of a difficulty and I do not by saying what I did just said, attempt to curtail any cross-examination of any of the witnesses on the basis of what anyone else said, clearly not, but we must just remind ourselves that Venter gave evidence which was unchallenged and you will hear evidence here which is going to be in conflict. Thank you.

CHAIRPERSON: Yes, we are aware of that, it is actually something that's presenting us with a difficulty and you will recall that that application was actually dealt with on the basis that it would be a window application for the Truth Commission, the Amnesty Committee was a little reluctant to proceed with that application in view of the fact that there was a possibility of further applicants, making applications in relation to the same incident that were contained in the applications of Cronje and Mr Venter and others. So we are aware what we are simply doing is that to afford Mr Crause an opportunity to respond to evidence which already is before us.

MR VISSER: Yes and to that we certainly have no objection and in fact we make a point of pointing out the conflicts to you.

CHAIRPERSON: Yes.

MR VISSER: Chairperson, do you wish to take the adjournment now?

CHAIRPERSON: We will take a tea adjournment and we'll reconvene in 15 minutes time.

WITNESS EXCUSED

COMMITTEE ADJOURNS

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

NAME:&#9;&#9;&#9;JOHANNES ALBERTUS STEYN

APPLICATION NO:&#9;AM4513/96

______________________________________________________

ON RESUMPTION

MS LOCKHAT: Chairperson, we'll commence with General Steyn's evidence.

MR VISSER: Chairperson, we are sorry that you have no clothing to discard because of the heat but we didn't ask you formally but would you mind if we did not sit with jackets before you?

CHAIRPERSON: Yes I do mind if you remove your jacket because that would entail my having the only clothing which I have on my body.

MR VISSER: Which is your dress.

JOHANNES ALBERTUS STEYN: (sworn states)

EXAMINATION BY MR VISSER: Chairperson, with your leave, just before I lead the evidence of General Steyn, may I refer you to volume 2G, page 875 and let me introduce the reference to you by saying the following. It appeared to us during your questioning of Mr Crause that you might be under the impression that Venter stated that the decision to eliminate rather than to arrest was taken in the presence of General Steyn, that at this page Venter deals with that issue, he starts at the third line on page 875 by saying:

&#9;"Yes, that was my evidence that myself, Captain Crause, Captain Smit and Colonel Loots who was in charge there at the roadblock, we just decided that we were to eliminate the terrorists and him as well. If I remember correctly, Loots or Crause said that they could not sacrifice the lives of the security people and therefore that all three had to be eliminated."

&#9;"No, I understand that" says Commissioner de Jager. 

&#9;"But as I understand the situation from your application, you already that afternoon decided to kill him?"

&#9;"Colonel Venter: No, no, it was that evening at a roadblock where we set up a roadblock, it was only then because Colonel Steyn who was the overall commander, he was not at the roadblock but his express instructions were to arrest these people and we decided differently at the roadblock."

&#9;"Commissioner de Jager: But Colonel, if that was the decision then, it wouldn't have mattered whether he was still in the middle of or in the back of the bakkie or wherever, you would have killed him?"

&#9;"Colonel Venter: Correct."

And we submit to you, Chairperson, that it is quite clear from that passage as well as from another passage at page 871, the middle of the page, the last sentence of that paragraph:

&#9;"Colonel Venter: And at the scene the decision was made by myself, Colonel Loots, Captain Crause and Captain Smit."

That it is clear that he never intended to convey the impression, that is now Venter, that Steyn was present.

CHAIRPERSON: I concede Mr Visser.

MR VISSER: Thank you.

&#9;General Steyn, you are also applying for amnesty in the Silent Valley incident and that is the only case which you are applying for amnesty within this hearing of the Amnesty Committee?

MR STEYN: That is correct.

MR VISSER: You have referred once again to previous submissions and evidence which you request to be incorporated with your evidence in the evaluation of your application?

MR STEYN: That is correct.

MR VISSER: On page 2, paragraph (e) you've also referred to evidence which you have heard or delivered in other amnesty applications so that the Committee can be aware that you have already been placed on record under oath with regard to amnesty applications and you have listed the applications there?

MR STEYN: That is correct.

MR VISSER: Your personal particulars and background and circumstances as well as your police career, do you confirm this?

MR STEYN: Yes.

MR VISSER: That which is relevant is that you were in the Western Transvaal until December 1983 and that from 1983 onwards up until 1986 you were in the Western Transvaal as the commander of the Western Transvaal, is that correct?

MR STEYN: Yes.

MR VISSER: And in 1986 you went to Port Natal?

MR STEYN: Yes that is correct.

MR VISSER: You repeated what has already been said by various applicants with regard to the struggle, on page 5?

MR STEYN: Yes.

MR VISSER: And you have elaborated somewhat on page 11 in order to refer the Committee Members to certain aspects in Sitchaba in order to support your submission which you continue with until page 13?

MR STEYN: That is correct.

MR VISSER: With regard to the role played by Botswana, before 1983 you didn't really know much about it but it was within the knowledge of the security branch due to information that what you say in paragraph 29 and following, according to your opinion this is correct?

MR STEYN: That is correct.

MR VISSER: If you could bear with me just a moment, I've received a note, Chairperson. At December 1982, at page 5 - oh, I'm sorry there's a typing error. There's a typing error, it's December 1982 to May 1986 in the third line at page 5.

MR LAX: I was just checking the date of this incident to confirm because it suddenly struck me that this was '83 and then if this wasn't corrected he wouldn't have been there.

MR VISSER: Right. It slipped my attention and I apologise for that.

&#9;And on page 19 you reiterate what the other applicants have also stated before this Committee with regard to the position within which members found themselves. We don't have to discuss the exchange of intelligence, neither do we have to discuss the political motivations, you confirm what you have said in your affidavit regarding all these aspects?

MR STEYN: Yes that is correct.

MR VISSER: And you also confirm the application form that you filled in and the information which you set up within that form insofar as it is confirmed in Exhibit H?

MR STEYN: That is correct.

MR VISSER: You pointed out in your form and I omitted to say, Chairperson, that this is in bundle 11, page 15, you have pointed out that your recollection is not of the best and that you are trying to obtain documentary information but that not much documentary information was still available in order to supplement your recollection?

MR STEYN: That is correct.

MR VISSER: And just as Mr Crause, you were able to have the benefit of the applications and evidence of others?

MR VISSER: Can we get to the Silent Valley incident, General, and if I may, let me lead you. You referred to Loots and Crause's applications on page 27, paragraph 80 and you state that when you filled in the Amnesty Application you had Colonel Venter's application before you and you suspected that his recollection could be better than yours and consequently you referred to this application with agreement. Later, in retrospect, and after having had more time to improve your recollection regarding the facts, you realised that there were certain aspects of Colonel Venter's evidence which according to you were incorrect?

MR STEYN: Yes that is correct.

MR VISSER: And you will deal with this in the course of your evidence?

MR STEYN: Yes.

MR VISSER: Might I then lead you further? To sketch the background to this incident as set out in paragraph 81 that during the course of the 4th May 1983 you received a telephone call from Colonel Crause during which you were informed about a planned illegal infiltration of two armed MK commanders to the R.S.A. You and Brigadier Loots, who was then a Colonel, thereupon departed for Derdepoort?

MR STEYN: That is correct.

ADV DE JAGER: Where were you physically, in which town or city?

MR STEYN: Chairperson I was in Potchefstroom.

ADV DE JAGER: And this Derdepoort, how far away from Potchefstroom would that be, approximately?

MR STEYN: If I had to make a quick approximation, I'd say 250 kilometres, perhaps a bit more.

MR VISSER: I should perhaps have highlighted that when you at that stage were in the Western Transvaal you were the Divisional Commander?

MR STEYN: Yes that is correct.

MR VISSER: And then from paragraph 82 onwards, on page 28, could you please submit to the Committee what your recollection is to the best of your memory regarding what took place on that day?

MR STEYN: Chairperson, Brigadier Loots and I went to Derdepoort where we found Colonel Crause as well as Colonel Venter. Colonel Crause informed us that a suspected collaborator of the ANC had spoken to him at the border post, Andries Moatshe was his name, and that this Andries Moatshe had said that during that night two armed ANC MK commanders would infiltrate the R.S.A.

&#9;He further informed us that according to Moatshe, the two insurgents would be picked up next to the border in a red Toyota bakkie after they had climbed over the fence. It was some distance north or north east from the Derdepoort border post. These suspected collaborators or MK commanders would then be taken to a point in the vicinity of Swartklip where he would drop them off. He would then contact Colonel Crause and inform him of where he had dropped them off upon which Colonel Crause would be able to act against them. 

&#9;I was not satisfied with this plan seeing as there was great danger that the insurgents would have too much time over such a distance to climb off at any point or give other instructions to the driver. It was a very risky plan to me in the sense that these persons could disappear, we could miss them and I gave the instruction that a roadblock be established with the purpose of attempting to arrest these persons.

MR VISSER: Did you yourself go to the point where the roadblock would be established?

MR STEYN: Yes I did.

MR VISSER: And what happened?

MR STEYN: At this point we used a gate that was in disuse to place it over the road as well as branches from trees and stones in order to close off that section of the road which was situated around a bend with the consequence that when the vehicle with the insurgents arrived there they would necessarily have to stop there upon which this action would be executed by our members. 

MR VISSER: In order to save time and with the indulgence of the Committee, your recollection was that the persons who were there were Major Jan Truter, Lieutenant Colonel Loots, Captain Crause, Lieutenant du Preez Smit, Warrant Officer van Zyl and then Marais and that your memory has been refreshed and that you also accept now that the following people were also present and that would be - or at least this is a repetition of some names who have been mentioned such as Senior Superintendent C J du Preez Smit, but Colonel R J Venter was there, Warrant Officer Smith and D J Nieuwenhuisen, you say that is correct?

MR STEYN: Yes.

MR VISSER: We also know that there was a generator on the scene which was manned by the counter-insurgency unit of the South African Police. It belonged to TIN the counter-insurgency unit?

MR STEYN: That is correct, Chairperson

MR VISSER: We are now on page 30, paragraph 87, you say that the scene was selected by Lieutenant du Preez Smit, you've already indicated that there was the farm gate. If you would just proceed with paragraph 88.

MR STEYN: After the roadblock had been established and the situation had been analysed, Commissaris Jan Truter and I left Brigadier Loots at the scene in command and we took up position near the Botswana border in order to observe the infiltration.

MR VISSER: What was the objective with that?

MR STEYN: The objective was that as soon as we had observed the infiltration we would then inform Brigadier Loots and other persons on the scene that the vehicle was under way.

MR VISSER: So you would then be in radio contact with the persons on the scene?

MR STEYN: Yes that is correct.

MR VISSER: Before you get to paragraph 90 would you just explain to the Committee Members what exactly you did with the vehicle and what you and Truter did?

MR STEYN: Chairperson, Truter and I concealed the vehicle that we were driving in the bushes a little way away from the road and we lay in the grass near the road so that we would easily be able to observe the vehicle going past.

MR VISSER: So in other words you were not with your vehicle, you were near to the road and your vehicle was hidden in the bushes?

MR STEYN: Yes that is correct.

MR VISSER: How far away from where you were was the vehicle?

MR STEYN: It's difficult to say but I would say that it was approximately 30 to 40 metres. 

MR VISSER: Very well, proceed, you saw the bakkie?

MR STEYN: Yes, we observed the bakkie and we ran to our vehicle after which we followed the bakkie and if I recall correctly we contacted either Brigadier Loots or somebody else on the scene by radio that the bakkie was under way and that we would follow this bakkie in our vehicle without the lights switched on.

MR VISSER: When you arrived upon the scene what did you find?

MR STEYN: Upon my arrival I found that all three passengers of the vehicle had been shot dead. I also established that weapons, pistols and hand grenades had been found in the bakkie.

MR VISSER: General, your evidence or your application form which runs from page 15, began on page 17 to deal with this incident and on page 18 of bundle 11, the final paragraph, you stated:

&#9;"I was informed after the shooting incident that weapons had been taken to the scene because should it be necessary, these weapons would be planted on the terrorists. I did not discuss this aspect in relation to said weapons further because the terrorists were indeed armed."

Would you forgive me a moment Chairperson? Thank you Chairperson.

&#9;Now we are discussing specifically the final paragraph on page 18 and we're discussing weapons that were allegedly taken to the scene. To which information are you referring here? Who would have given this information to you or from where would you have obtained this information because you say that you were informed?

MR STEYN: Chairperson, I later studied the application of Colonel Venter in which I drew the inference about the weapons.

MR VISSER: And that is what you are referring to here?

MR STEYN: Yes that is correct.

MR VISSER: What is your recollection today if we were to discuss not the weapons which were brought along with the infiltrators but specifically weapons which were taken by security branch members to the scene? What would be your recollection today, did you see anything there or not?

MR STEYN: Chairperson, according to my recollection, I gave the order, I did not give the order that any weapons be taken to the scene to plant on the persons. I cannot exclude the possibility that some of the members themselves may have decided to take weapons to the scene.

MR VISSER: And to plant them?

MR STEYN: Yes that is correct. I do indeed recall that during the incident that evening on the scene after the incident I found an AK47 on the scene.

MR VISSER: An AK47 assault rifle?

MR STEYN: Yes that is correct.

MR VISSER: Can you recall where you saw it?

MR STEYN: No, I can't remember precisely. I'm really not certain.

MR VISSER: General Steyn, just to explain to the Committee, Brigadier Loots will give further evidence regarding this AK47 which you have mentioned. If we can then return to the passengers of the bakkie, what can you tell the Committee regarding weapons in the bakkie itself. If you look at page 30, paragraph 90?

MR STEYN: Chairperson, upon my arrival on the scene I established that there were weapons in the vehicle of these three persons. I was informed that the two MK Commanders were armed and not the driver, Moatshe. Insofar as my application form may create another impression it is incorrect.

MR VISSER: Yes and you refer specifically to page 18, the fourth paragraph - Chairperson, of bundle 11, because there you have stated, I'll begin in the middle of the sentence:

&#9;"...upon arrival on the scene I found that the three passengers who were armed with hand grenades and pistols."

You say that that is not correct?

MR STEYN: No, it's not correct.

MR VISSER: Is that how you recollected it when you signed the application form in 1996?

MR STEYN: Yes that is correct.

CHAIRPERSON: Mr Venter, when was this application form signed?

MR VISSER: It's bundle 11, page 18 and if you'll ...[intervention]

MR LAX: In December 1996, sorry, to just put on record that application was signed on 16 December 1996.

MR VISSER: Yes correct, thank you Commissioner and Madame Chairperson, we're referring to the fourth paragraph where the applicant said in that application form all three of them. Well it gives the impression at least that he says all three of them had weapons on them and he's now rectified that by saying Moatshe was not armed with anything.

CHAIRPERSON: Yes and that mistake occurred as a result of him having had sight of Mr Venter's evidence, is that how I understood ...[indistinct].

MR VISSER: I think he must reply to that Chairperson. 

&#9;General, why do you realise today that your mark that you made in your application form is incorrect?

MR STEYN: Chairperson, is this about the ...[intervention]

MR VISSER: The three passengers who were armed instead of two who were armed.

MR STEYN: Later I was informed that the two MK members had hand grenades and pistols in their possession and I myself saw hand grenades in the vehicle.

MR VISSER: Yes, but the question is why did you say in your application form that all three had been armed while today you say that only two were armed?

MR STEYN: I was corrected later and established that not all three had been armed only the two MK commanders.

MR VISSER: But just to defend yourself, did you participate in cleaning up the scene?

MR STEYN: No.

MR VISSER: Who is the person or who are the persons who tidied up the scene?

MR STEYN: Brigadier Loots was in charge of this function along with other members.

MR VISSER: And by cleaning up we mean that the bodies were removed from the vehicle and that the scene was made safe and that there were no explosives or limpet mines which would explode or go off later?

MR STEYN: That is correct.

ADV DE JAGER: Mr Visser, please assist me? The reference where he would have said that all three had weapons is where?

MR VISSER: Bundle 11, page 18. This can be found in the fourth paragraph.

MR LAX: Could I just interpose here just for one second please Mr Visser? I'm just having a difficulty with what's just been said. You see, if one reads that paragraph, it doesn't say "I was informed", he says "I found that these people were there". Now one implies his personal inspection of the actual weapons and the other one is having been told afterwards. Could you just clarify that for us please General?

MR VISSER: Yes point taken Chairperson, I tried to clarify but obviously not sufficiently.

&#9;General the point is and I will repeat this question. In terms of this which you've said in your application form you stated that you saw that the three persons had been armed with hand grenades and pistols. The question is, did you indeed and you also said later today that you saw hand grenades and pistols. Could you please just clear this up because you have also stated that you were informed, that only the two MK commanders were armed. Can you just clear this up for us?

MR STEYN: The fact of the matter is that the moment upon which I looked into the vehicle I did not see weapons with the driver Moatshe. I think that when I submitted my application by saying that the three passengers had been armed with hand grenades was an oversight on my behalf and I did not define it properly by saying that only two persons were armed and that the driver was not armed. Upon later discussion it became clear to me that I could not have seen any weapons on him because he didn't have any weapons according to all the other members who were present on the scene.

ADV DE JAGER: But when you looked into the vehicle, did you see weapons in the vehicle?

MR STEYN: Yes I saw weapons in the vehicle.

ADV DE JAGER: And the three persons were still in the vehicle?

MR STEYN: Yes.

ADV DE JAGER: Did you see where the weapons were situated in the vehicle, did you attend to that?

MR STEYN: What I could see was that hand grenades were on the laps of the two passengers, that's what I can recall.

CHAIRPERSON: But do you recall how many weapons you saw and what kind of weapons were they?

MR STEYN: At that stage as a result of the shooting incident, the three persons who were dead at that stage had fallen over one another and were lying askew in the vehicles so it was very difficult to make out which weapons belonged to who, I could only make out that they were hand grenades. The other staff members later determined precisely who owned what, I simply assumed which was actually a faulty assumption that everyone was armed. That was not correct.

CHAIRPERSON: I think it was a reasonable assumption based on the fact that you saw a vehicle, I mean you saw weapons inside the vehicles wherein three people had died, the only mistake obviously is that in having to read your application to mean that the three dead people were armed, all of them were armed, your assumption was that because there were arms in the vehicle, you simply assumed they were all armed.

MR STEYN: Entirely correct Chairperson.

MR VISSER: According to your estimation, how long after the incident would you have arrived on the scene?

MR STEYN: It was very quickly. Instantaneously, within a little while, not seconds, I held back for a minute so as not to be seen.

MR VISSER: So it was a minute or two, so it was a question of minutes instead of question of hours?

MR STEYN: Yes that is correct.

MR VISSER: General, when you arrived upon the scene, you knew that your instructions had not been observed. Did you then talk to Loots?

MR STEYN: That is correct.

MR VISSER: And what was his explanation? We refer to page 31 paragraph 92, beginning on page 30 paragraph 91 where you said that:

&#9;"The elimination of the infiltrators took place upon the command of Brigadier Loots who I left in command of the scene. When Commissioner Jan Truter and I left this order was in contradiction to my instructions."

And what was this discussion which you had with Brigadier Loots in this relation?

MR STEYN: Chairperson, I spoke to Brigadier Loots and he told me that after I had left the scene he came to the conclusion that it would be too dangerous to attempt to arrest these people. The reasons which he put to me were among others that it was a known fact that MK members who had been interrogated in the past without exception emphasised the fact that infiltrating MK members were very tense and would take the maximum prevention or preparation for an assault should they be encountered or should anybody attempt to arrest them. Furthermore he said that seeing as the infiltrators were MK commanders he had accepted that they would be armed and according to him he already had that information from Colonel Crause.

MR VISSER: Yes but you also had that information, no so?

MR STEYN: Yes that is correct. According to Brigadier Loots should a shooting incident occur our members would have to start shooting at one another because of the way that the roadblock had been constructed and the execution of an arrest or such an attempt would probably lead to the death of injury of some of our members. Brigadier Loots also said that the place which had been selected by Du Preez Smit had been a good selection from the view that there was an existing gate which made it easy to establish a roadblock but that with regard to the aspect of shelter it had not been such a good choice. There was not sufficient shelter and this also influenced his decision and he also said that according to him that some of the members would have been exposed should a shooting incident have occurred.

MR VISSER: According to you observations it was already dark?

MR STEYN: Yes.

MR VISSER: It was approximately 9 o'clock in the evening?

MR STEYN: Yes that is correct.

MR VISSER: But according to your observations from that afternoon, what was your conclusion that you would have reached after hearing Loots' explanation?

MR STEYN: After Brigadier Loots had explained the matter to me I realised that I may not have given sufficient attention to the plan for the arrest seeing as the correctness of what he was saying immediately impressed me. I agreed with him. Chairperson, if I'd had more time to plan the strategy and to reconsider I would probably have come to the conclusion as Brigadier Loots did indeed that elimination was the only way out.

MR VISSER: Can we pause there for a moment, do I understand correctly that Moatshe spoke to Crause, Crause spoke to you and you went to the border post where you received the information from Crause and all of this took place during the course of the day of the 4th May?

MR STEYN: Yes.

MR VISSER: Is it correct for me to say that your departure to the place which Du Preez Smit was instructed to seek you were in radio contact with one another, you arrived upon the scene, is that correct? Or was it still light or was it dark when you arrived on the scene where the roadblock would be constructed?

MR STEYN: I think it was twilight at that stage.

MR VISSER: Late afternoon, would you describe it like that?

MR STEYN: Yes.

MR VISSER: But it was still light?

MR STEYN: Yes I would say that.

MR VISSER: Now when you speak of your experience of the practise of obstructing a vehicle in a roadblock, what would you be able to say to the Committee or perhaps you should first say whether or not the practising of an apprehension of a vehicle was undertaken while you were on the scene?

MR STEYN: After the roadblock had been constructed and it was already twilight because we couldn't exactly construct this roadblock in the middle of the day because the message could go through that there had been a roadblock.

MR VISSER: Where to?

MR STEYN: To Botswana.

MR VISSER: Was it your experience that such messages did indeed go through?

MR STEYN: Yes indeed.

MR VISSER: And was it important to you to keep the roadblock a secret?

MR STEYN: Yes it was important and consequently this roadblock and the practise round surround the roadblock due to the fact that this infiltration would take place in the dark also had to take place in the dark.

MR VISSER: Why, could one not practise the apprehension of the vehicle in daylight even though it would be executed at night time?

MR STEYN: Apart from the fact that if we undertook the practise run during the day, it would become general knowledge, we wanted to keep it a secret because of the situation. The operation was to take place at night and it would be incorrect for them to practise during the day for something which they were going to do at night.

MR VISSER: So in other words the circumstances were not practised under the exact circumstances under which the matter or the incident would take place?

MR STEYN: Yes.

MR VISSER: And you have reconciled yourself with the actions of Brigadier Loots and that is why today you request amnesty. I've said that you have reconciled yourself with his order?

MR STEYN: Yes that is correct.

MR VISSER: That the MK commanders as well as the collaborator was to be eliminated. Tell me, what was your idea about Moatshe, the collaborator, the fact that he had also been eliminated.

MR STEYN: Chairperson, the fact that he had also been eliminated was impossible - it was impossible to launch this action and eliminate two out of three people in a vehicle and not eliminate the third person.

MR VISSER: The suspicion that these people would have been armed was then confirmed as we now know?

MR STEYN: Yes.

MR VISSER: And the two deceased or the MK commanders were later identified and how were they identified, according to what?

MR STEYN: If I recall correctly they were identified according to fingerprints.

MR VISSER: And in paragraph 97 you have further information surrounding these persons. You state that insofar as it is known MK Karl Marx initially or originally came from Soweto and that his correct surname was Ramokopa?

MR STEYN: That is the information which we had at that point.

MR VISSER: And that the third person Moatshe was a Botswanan subject and that according to your information he was responsible for the regular infiltration of ANC members?

MR STEYN: That is correct.

MR VISSER: You would probably would not know but nonetheless in paragraph 98 do you know whether Moatshe had been an informer of the security branch Western Transvaal?

MR STEYN: No, I don't know.

MR VISSER: Just to pause there because perhaps one should repeat certain things for oneself, informers during the struggle were classified as A1, A2, B, C and D, category informers, is that correct?

MR STEYN: Yes.

MR VISSER: How many people would for example been aware of the identity of an A or B informer?

MR STEYN: Probably only the handler and possibly depending upon the circumstances, a second handler.

MR VISSER: Was the rule that an informer's identity was known to his handler and that under certain circumstances due to practical considerations there was an alternative handler for the same informer?

MR STEYN: Yes that is correct.

MR VISSER: Other than this person or these two persons would any other member of the security branch ever know what the identification of an informer was?

MR STEYN: No, it was not supposed to be that way. 

MR VISSER: Informers were indeed identified with numbers?

MR STEYN: That is correct.

MR VISSER: We will hear more about that with the McKenzie matter. Now in paragraph 99 you deal with what we have already discussed, the AK47 and you also refer there that you have referred to it on page 18 of bundle 11?

MR STEYN: That is correct.

MR VISSER: Do you also concur with the remark of Mr Crause and Commissioner Lax that it was very clear due to evidence which we have heard before the Amnesty Committee that some of the members of the security police had Russian weapons on them just in case they could use it should circumstances require it?

MR STEYN: Yes that is correct.

MR VISSER: And that is why you concede that it is possible that there were such weapons and that you support your recollection of having seen an AK47?

MR STEYN: Yes that is correct.

MR VISSER: Very well. If there was such a conspiracy which cannot recall you ask that in either event this Amnesty Committee would grant you amnesty in that case as well as you have stated in paragraph 100?

MR STEYN: That is correct.

MR VISSER: In paragraph 101 you discuss the three passengers, with regard to the two passengers, which has been put into perspective by the Chairperson. Do you want to place that on record?

MR STEYN: Yes.

MR VISSER: And on page 18 of bundle 11 you have also stated and I refer to paragraph 102 where you refer to Moatshe who was regularly responsible for the infiltration of armed ANC members. You have said that you wish to qualify that. Would you qualify that please?

MR STEYN: I would like to state it clearly that I based my information upon information which I received from Colonel Crause. It was not my own information, not my own direct information.

MR VISSER: Yes and Madame Chairperson, please blame this on me, the ...[indistinct] words after "ontvang het, Brigadier Loots in vermoede" is clearly a mistake on my part when I tried to type this and I do apologise.

MR LAX: What was in fact intended to be said there, was that just superfluous?

MR VISSER: It wasn't supposed to be there.

CHAIRPERSON: To be there at all.

MR VISSER: I believe that what happened is that I might have either started - I think more probably I was working on different documents and I was importing from another document and I can't explain it.

ADV DE JAGER: I think it was late at night.

MR VISSER: It was in fact late at night, I can assure you about that.

CHAIRPERSON: ...[inaudible]

MR VISSER: Yes thank you and when we come to McKenzie there's another more serious mistake, also my fault but we'll deal with that then.

&#9;You say in paragraph 103 that a post-mortem inquest was held and you have given the numbers according to the best of your recollection and that this inquest was held at Thabazimbi?

MR STEYN: That is correct.

MR VISSER: And you say that according to your recollection the Magistrate's finding was that the death of the victims was due to gunshot wounds but that nobody could be held directly accountable for their deaths. Did you exercise any influence or control over that inquest?

MR STEYN: I merely saw to it that Brigadier Loots would handle the matter.

MR VISSER: Your knowledge is that the body of Moatshe as well as the red Toyota vehicle was handed over, what happened to it?

MR STEYN: Apart from the fact that the bodies had been handed over at an earlier stage, the bakkie was handed over to the Botswana authorities later.

MR VISSER: You said to the next-of-kin or to the Botswana authorities.

MR STEYN: I can't recall exactly, it was one of the two.

MR VISSER: Were you personally present or is this the recollection of the event?

MR STEYN: No, I was not present, I simply heard later that this is what was done.

MR VISSER: You attempted to obtain documentation from the inquest?

MR STEYN: That is correct.

MR VISSER: And you were informed that it was no longer in existence?

MR STEYN: That is correct.

MR VISSER: It had been destroyed?

MR STEYN: That is correct.

MR VISSER: Do you then confirm the evidence which you have given here today as well as the other evidence which you have confirmed in Exhibit H?

MR STEYN: Yes that is correct.

CHAIRPERSON: Are you through with your examination in chief Mr Visser?

MR VISSER: Yes, thank you Chairperson.

CHAIRPERSON: Thank you.

NO FURTHER QUESTIONS BY MR VISSER

MR LAX: Sorry Mr Visser, just to interpose here, there was something I wasn't clear on that's just been said and I thought while the issue is still warm I could just follow it up?

MR VISSER: Yes certainly.

MR LAX: Did I hear correctly that the bodies of these deceased were handed over to the next-of-kin?

MR VISSER: No, no, only Moatshe. Only Moatshe.

MR LAX: That's what was worrying me. What happened to the bodies of the two MK cadres, does anyone know?

MR VISSER: Could you say General?

MR STEYN: Chairperson, I'm not sure, I doubt if they were handed over to the family members. I have a vague memory that they were buried as paupers, I think I am correct.

MR LAX: One last aspect in that regard was you mention that the person who was known as Karl Marx was later identified as Ramakoba, what about the person known as Kruschev?

MR STEYN: Chairperson, I cannot recall what was his identification, I can really not recall.

MR LAX: But you did that you said through fingerprints and so on? That information might still be available somewhere in the central register.

MR STEYN: It's possible Chairperson.

ADV DE JAGER: But as a Botswana citizen, would we have the fingerprints?

MR VISSER: No, I think Ramakoba was a South African citizen and the other one also was a South African citizen, that is the evidence of all the applicants. Only one person was a Botswanan and that is Mr Moatshe whose body was handed to the Botswana Government and presumably to his family.

MR STEYN: That is correct. It's only Moatshe that was a resident of Botswana.

CHAIRPERSON: Yes, you have no information about the address having been established of the families of Mr Ramakoba, do you know whether that information surfaced during the inquest hearing?

MR STEYN: Chairperson, if I recall correctly one of them and I think it was Ramakoba, was originally from Soweto.

CHAIRPERSON: Yes, the whereabouts, the exact address, were families of Mr Ramakoba ever contacted, did they form part of the inquest hearing?

MR STEYN: Normally it would happen so, Chairperson, but what I would like to say is that later I discovered or by someone maybe Brigadier Loots, that one of their parents had been in Soweto and I suspect it was Ramakoba's parents.

CHAIRPERSON: At what stage did you - do you know when the inquest might have taken place, was it immediately after the incident, we know when the incident occurred?

MR STEYN: Chairperson, I cannot recall and I think if I have to make an estimation, it was not close soon thereafter. I would not say that it was a week or a month or two months later but it was not immediately within a few days or a week.

CHAIRPERSON: Yes and the identity of Karl Marx was made available to those who were investigating this matter?

MR STEYN: That is correct, Chairperson.

CHAIRPERSON: So there is a great possibility that the families were present at the inquest hearing?

MR STEYN: I'm not sure Chairperson.

CHAIRPERSON: We are just trying to establish this information because procedurally this is the information that we should have established before we come to this level. Maybe Ms Lockhat will be in a position to throw more light on this aspect?

MR VISSER: Chairperson, in fact, in fact this information already appears from the application form itself at page 19.

CHAIRPERSON: I'm aware, yes, at page 19, that's why I think Ms Lockhat will be in a position to throw more light on this information because applications coming before us should be properly investigated by our investigative unit and all such information should be placed before the Committee when hearing applications of this nature particularly where on issues of reconciliation it is important to make sure that the victims are informed of an application of this nature, there has been no indication to this Committee that the victims were informed. There has been no indication to the Committee whether any attempts were made to establish the whereabouts of the victims. That is the procedure but we merely wanted your assistance served because we might be in a better position than us to give us this kind of information.

MR STEYN: Chairperson, I do not wish to speak on behalf of Brigadier Loots but I have a vague suspicion that Brigadier Loots might have had contact with at least one of the family members if I recall correctly. I'm not sure of the second one. I'm not sure of the facts but I have a strong suspicion that he did indeed have contact with one of the family members, I think it's Ramakoba but let me say rather it is the person who originated from Soweto. 

ADV DE JAGER: General Steyn, he is seated behind you and he indicates that he agrees with you that he contacted one of the members. I'm just saying this because you did not see him and it is not on the record.

MR STEYN: Thank you.

MR VISSER: Chairperson, if I may just add on this score that we would like to be of more assistance but we live in a new era and yesterday was another country and nowadays ex-policemen don't have the access any more which they had before and unfortunately doors are closed in their faces when they started asking information.

CHAIRPERSON: Yes.

MR VISSER: It's a sad reality but we are bound by that.

CHAIRPERSON: But they still have information that could still assist us.

MR VISSER: Yes and whatever information obviously we give you.

CHAIRPERSON: Yes, thank you Mr Visser. Ms Lockhat?

MS LOCKHAT: Chairperson, in relation to the tracing of the victims I believe our investigative unit was in possession of all this information and they attempted to investigate and attempted to locate the victims. When I received the matter we also wrote to the ANC desk to find out whether, seeing that we have their names, their MK names, that they could probably trace them accordingly and unfortunately we still haven't received any response relating to that, Chairperson.

CHAIRPERSON: Has there been any kind of investigation with regard to whether an inquest was held in respect of this killing?

MS LOCKHAT: Chairperson, I believe they could not trace the inquest reports relating to this incident, Chairperson.

CHAIRPERSON: Were you in fact aware that such an inquest was held?

MS LOCKHAT: Chairperson, reading the documents I saw that they referred, the applicants did refer to an inquest if my memory serves me correctly but whether this has been investigated previously, there were no - because we received these matters from the investigative unit for a hearing so I would assume that they could not trace the necessary documentation, Chairperson. I have also enquired from my investigative unit for all the information in relation to this matter and their response was that this is what we have before us and there are no reports in their possession.

MR VISSER: Chairperson, I wonder if I may be allowed to refer you to something else right now because it is relevant to the investigation or to the enquiries you're making. If you look at Exhibit C that is the affidavit of Loots and if you turn to the end of that exhibit, you will find an extract of Dorm, it's at page 25 I see here, well, it's marked F24 it's obviously from another exhibit but the point I'm trying to make is at F26 you will see two photographs of two people under the caption "These Two were Tigers". The one is referred to as Solomon Nlonzi and the other is referred to as Calvin Kakaza. This is information which was not available to Ms Lockhat and they say here that Calvin - a little down that page - that Calvin, and they mention his "MK name, Karl Marx, Kakaza" So we know Karl Marx according to this news report was in fact Calvin Kakaza. Now it really confuses the issue because it does not accord with what General Steyn has told you.

CHAIRPERSON: No, it is, it's correct.

MR LAX: It's confirmed further down, the next sentence.

CHAIRPERSON: It's confirmed, the second paragraph says both of them were simple young patriots of humble stock, Schoeman's query Ramakoba as the real name of Karl Marx. One definitely would have expected our investigative unit to have at least have made proper investigation, went to Miyabuwa Centre, caroused the records, because the applications had referred to reports of these deaths having appeared in Sitchaba and the Miyabuwa Centre we know is the library of Sitchaba and other related publications of the ANC. So I'm more than startled and extremely disappointed that no such investigations were conducted from the side of the investigative unit. It is very upsetting to have a hearing of this nature where no attempts have been made to advise these victims and in this case the relatives of the deceased of an application of this nature.

MS LOCKHAT: That is indeed correct, Chairperson. What I would do is I'll give all this information to our investigative unit, Chairperson, and see whether we could trace on these new leads that we've got in relation to this article as well.

CHAIRPERSON: These are not new leads Ms Lockhat, this is information that our Committee had as at December 1996 and up to now no investigations whatsoever have been conducted in a matter which involves the elimination of persons whose relatives would definitely have an interest in the proceedings. We are now proceeding with these applications without having made an effort at establishing the whereabouts of the relatives. This definitely to me does not advance reconciliation, it is insensitive and should not be tolerated. I hope such matters will be taken into consideration when applications of this nature are set down for a hearing.

MS LOCKHAT: Thank you Chairperson.

CHAIRPERSON: Do you have any questions to put to General Steyn?

CROSS-EXAMINATION BY MS LOCKHAT: General Steyn, you said that you planned the operation with Loots and the others and that basically these operatives were supposed to be arrested?

MR STEYN: That is correct.

MS LOCKHAT: You say you were in radio contact with Loots once you went to the border post, is that correct?

MR STEYN: That is correct, Chairperson.

MS LOCKHAT: Did you expect Loots to contact you after this huge and drastic change in plan?

MR STEYN: Chairperson, in my evidence in chief I had said that our vehicle was quite a distance from where we were, about 50 metres where Truter and I were concealed in the grass next to the road. I believe that he could have contacted us but the question that I cannot answer to myself today was if our radio was at such a volume that I would have heard him at that stage because time was a problem for us, we expected that those people would pass us at any point in time and therefore we focused our attention at the road so as not to miss this vehicle.

MS LOCKHAT: But surely, General, this was such a major operation, surely you would have been in radio contact and had the volume of your radio on at all times?

MR STEYN: That's possible, Chairperson, I believe that it was on.

MS LOCKHAT: So you're saying it's possible that they attempted to contact you? What are you saying, General?

MR STEYN: Repeat the question please?

MS LOCKHAT: Are you saying that it's possible that Loots had attempted to contact you or what?

MR STEYN: No, I'm not saying it's possible, I am saying that he could have contacted me but I doubt if he did contact me.

MS LOCKAT: Did he expect him to contact you, General?

MR STEYN: No.

MS LOCKAT: So here was a huge change in plan, they were supposed to just arrest these people but in the end they decided to eliminate them. You expect them not to inform you of this? I don't understand that.

MR STEYN: I understand that but in the light of his decision after I left the scene and the reasons advanced by him were acceptable to me that he did not contact me.

CHAIRPERSON: The question is why in your opinion did he not contact you to advise you of the change of plan and of particularly to advise you that he has decided not to go along with your decision.

MR STEYN: Chairperson, if I understand correctly I would like to answer in the following that Loots' decision, he decided that it was the correct decision and he did not deem it necessary to contact me to tell me that he was changing the plan.

MS LOCKAT: Did you think that his decision was the right decision at the end of the day?

MR STEYN: I think so Chairperson, definitely.

MS LOCKAT: General, you said you were following the car, the bakkie, you were at close range just behind the bakkie in a sense with your lights switched off, is that correct?

MR STEYN: That is correct, we drove without lights, how close to the bakkie I could not say, it was within close range but just so that they would not notice us easily.

MS LOCKAT: Were Loots and the others aware of the fact that you were behind these operatives, behind the bakkie?

MR STEYN: That is correct, Chairperson.

MS LOCKAT: Surely they should have also taken into account that it was possible that seeing that your lights were off that shooting at this bakkie would actually possibly shoot at you as well if you were at close - well behind the bakkie?

MR STEYN: That is correct, Chairperson.

MS LOCKAT: So don't you think that at the end of the day it was actually a wrong decision by Captain Loots and ...[indistinct], that he could have shot at you?

MR STEYN: No Chairperson, when we got close to the scene, we held back a little so that they would not shoot at us or rather that we would not be hit if a fight ensued.

MS LOCKAT: Were you aware of the fact that these operatives stopped at the roadblock, they did not open fire?

MR STEYN: I was informed when I arrived at the scene.

MS LOCKAT: Did you expect Captain Loots and the others not to fire or shoot because of this factor and then just attempt to rather arrest them?

MR STEYN: Please repeat, I could not hear.

MS LOCKAT: Were you aware that the operatives stopped at the roadblock, they did not open fire but yet Loots and the others opened fire and eliminated them?

MR STEYN: I was informed at the scene that the vehicle had come to a stop and they did not fire from the vehicle, they did not have a choice, there was a roadblock, they had to stop and that members under the command of Loots did indeed fire at them.

MS LOCKAT: Don't you think that the best thing in this position in your mind ...[intervention]

CHAIRPERSON: ...[inaudible] before proceeding to put another question.

MS LOCKAT: In your mind, General, don't you think it would have been proper that once they stopped at the roadblock they did not open fire, that Loots and other actually would have made the right choice to actually arrest these people?

MR STEYN: Chairperson, if I understand correctly when I arrived at the scene, it was decided that when the vehicle would stop they would start shooting, in other words there would be no time to execute an arrest and in the light of the fact that those persons could throw a hand grenade at them or start shooting first.

CHAIRPERSON: Isn't what is being put to General Steyn inviting pure speculation on your part?

MS LOCKAT: Thank you, Chairperson.

ADV DE JAGER: General Steyn, it would seem that when one wants to steal my vehicle, a hijacker, and he comes with a revolver to me and the argument is if do I have to wait before he shoots?

MR STEYN: That is correct, Chairperson.

ADV DE JAGER: Do you think that I will have a chance to shoot him or would they bury me?

MR STEYN: I think they would bury you.

CHAIRPERSON: In any event a decision had been taken to eliminate or whether they shoot or they don't shoot, if they had an opportunity to shoot them or wouldn't have had an opportunity to shoot is really academic. The decision was very specific to shoot, not because of anything but to shoot because insurgents were in the car, whether they were armed or whether they were going to shoot first was really not a material issue?

MR STEYN: Correct Chairperson.

MR DU PLESSIS: Chairperson, I'm sorry, I wasn't here this morning when proceedings started. I represent Colonel Venter's interest in the proceedings and I also represent one of the applicants, Mr Smith. Is it possible that I may address one question to General Steyn please?

CHAIRPERSON: You will do so once Ms Lockhat is through Mr Du Plessis.

MR DU PLESSIS: Oh, I thought she was finished, I'm sorry.

CHAIRPERSON: No, we simply interjected just to clear one or two issues because of the way she was putting questions to General Steyn.

MS LOCKAT: Chairperson, I have no further questions, thank you.

NO FURTHER QUESTIONS BY MS LOCKAT

CHAIRPERSON: Mr du Plessis, I think you are a prophet. 

MR DU PLESSIS: I think I know Ms Lockhat well, Chairperson. Chairperson, I only have one question.

&#9;General, I was not here when Mr Crause gave evidence but I was informed that he testified that Colonel Venter was under the impression that Moatshe was an informant and that would seem a wrong assumption now. Would you agree with that evidence that it is possible that Colonel Venter was under the wrong impression with regards to Moatshe?

MR STEYN: I do not recall Colonel Crause’s evidence exactly with that aspect but I would agree with such an idea that Colonel Venter was under the impression that the person was an informant.

MR DU PLESSIS: But you say it's possible?

MR STEYN: Yes.

CHAIRPERSON: Thank you Mr du Plessis.

&#9;General Steyn you are excused.

MR STEYN: Thank you.

MR VISSER: Thank you Chairperson, I don't have any - well I have one question in re-examination.

CHAIRPERSON: I haven't asked you Mr Visser whether you should re-examine?

MR VISSER: Just one Chairperson, I think which might be relevant.

CHAIRPERSON: Is it a question flowing from questions put to General Steyn?

MR VISSER: Yes, about the distance that they followed the car in front of them.

CHAIRPERSON: You may re-examine.

RE-EXAMINATION BY MR VISSER: Was it a tarred road or a gravel road?

MR STEYN: It was a gravel road.

MR VISSER: Was it wet or dry?

MR STEYN: It was dry and there was dust.

CHAIRPERSON: Was this a public road if it was gravel? Was this a public road which was used frequently by people who were coming to Botswana or going to South Africa?

MR STEYN: Correct Chairperson.

MR VISSER: Chairperson, is it convenient for you to take the adjournment now?

CHAIRPERSON: Yes Mr Visser, I think it's convenient to take a lunch adjournment. I don't think it would be proper to start with an applicant who might be interrupted after about five, ten minutes, to enable the public definitely not the Committee, it can do without lunch and counsel to break for lunch. So we will afford counsel an opportunity to break for lunch, particularly the applicants. We will take an adjournment for an hour.

MR VISSER: Thank you Chairperson.

NO FURTHER QUESTIONS BY MR VISSER

WITNESS EXCUSED

COMMITTEE ADJOURNS

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

NAME:&#9;&#9;&#9;WICKUS JOHANNES LOOTS

APPLICATION NO:&#9;AM4149/96

______________________________________________________CHAIRPERSON: Where are we now?

MR VISSER: Chairperson, we've now reached Brigadier Wickus Loots, Exhibit C, he is ready to take the oath, he will give his evidence in Afrikaans.

WICKUS JOHANNES LOOTS: (sworn states)

EXAMINATION BY MR VISSER: Mr Loots, you have already previously given evidence in this matter, is that correct?

MR LOOTS: That is correct, Chairperson.

MR VISSER: I refer to it as a case I would have seen, should have said in the Nietverdiendt incident and that evidence of yours you want to repeat it here. For the benefit of Commissioner Lax your introduction except for your personal circumstances is for all practical reasons identical to that of which was already put forward this morning by Mr Crause, is that correct?

MR LOOTS: That is correct, Chairperson.

MR VISSER: Then we commence with the incident for which we appear here today in Exhibit C. Page 27, paragraph 67. Just to save us some time we know already that on the 4th May there was a telephone call to General Steyn and that the two of you left for Derdepoort border post?

MR LOOTS: That is correct, Chairperson.

MR VISSER: And you received information from Crause there which he had received from the person called Andries Moatshe, is that correct?

MR LOOTS: That is correct, Chairperson.

MR VISSER: And this entailed the fact that two armed MK members would be transferred into or transported into South Africa and it would then entail that Crause went to the Swartklip Mine and after he had dropped his person off and he would let Crause know so that Crause can act against these persons. Steyn had also given evidence that he was not satisfied with this plan because of the reasons which he advanced. Do you agree with those?

MR LOOTS: That is correct, Chairperson.

MR VISSER: And it was decided a roadblock would be set up closer to the border?

MR LOOTS: That is correct, Chairperson.

MR VISSER: Before I forget, you have made an affidavit that served before the original Amnesty Committee which is found in bundle 2I on pages 130 to 133, is that correct?

MR LOOTS: That is correct, Chairperson.

MR VISSER: We will eventually refer to that. I would like you to focus on the circumstances from the time that you arrived at the place where the roadblock was set up. Is it correct that General Steyn told you and your men that the insurgents had to be apprehended?

MR LOOTS: That is correct, Chairperson.

MR VISSER: Very well, you knew from the information from Moatshe that they would arrive in a red Toyota van?

MR LOOTS: That is correct, Chairperson.

MR VISSER: We can then continue on page 28 or rather on page 29, those facts speak for themselves, do you confirm those?

MR LOOTS: Yes I do, Chairperson.

MR VISSER: And then we arrive at paragraph 77 where Colonel Steyn or the then Colonel Steyn told you to arrest them, this is where the roadblock was set up?

MR LOOTS: That is correct.

MR VISSER: Can you continue with paragraph 78 to inform us as to that part of the evidence?

MR LOOTS: Chairperson, I gave instruction to Colonel du Preez Smit by means of the radio to find a suitable place where we could stop the vehicle after the MK members had been picked up. Lieutenant Smit later took us to a point where the Marukal bend is and the Dwaalboom Roads met each other. A steel gate, it was a narrow road in the past but there was a gate hanging onto a pole there that if one would put it over the road it would only close three-quarters of the road and the remaining part of the road was blocked with branches and stones. If I could take you to paragraph 80 you had referred to a generator where two members of counter-insurgence unit had manned this generator, it was their generator?

MR LOOTS: That is correct, Chairperson.

MR VISSER: And according to your recollection it was yourself that was there, Steyn, Jan Truter, Crause, Du Preez Smit, Venter, who was already given evidence, Van Zyl, Marais, Mr Smith and who is represented by my learned friend Mr du Plessis and possibly other members who you cannot recall but later recall one person who was also there. Who was this?

MR LOOTS: It was Captain Wehrmann.

MR VISSER: Where is he?

MR LOOTS: He is deceased Chairperson.

MR VISSER: He was also at the scene?

MR LOOTS: That is correct.

MR VISSER: And then you refer in paragraph 82 on page 30 to a Lieutenant Colonel Mike Truter and what was he?

MR LOOTS: He was an explosives expert for the area Rustenburg.

MR VISSER: He was not at the scene as I understand you during the incident but he arrived at a later stage?

MR LOOTS: That is correct.

MR VISSER: How did it come about that he arrived there?

MR LOOTS: After such an incident it is usually the function of demolitions expert to clear up such an area.

MR VISSER: He was not there at the incident because the idea was to apprehend these persons?

MR LOOTS: That is correct, Chairperson.

MR VISSER: And in paragraph 83 if you could read that?

MR LOOTS: After deliberation General Steyn decided that we would divide into two groups, that is East and West of the gate that we had placed over the road, to wait for these MK members and where we would attempt to arrest them. Commissaris Jan Truter and he then departed to monitor the movements of the MK members from the Botswana border as a senior member who was at the scene had in the light of the following circumstances, the manner in which General Steyn had decided, discussed again with Colonel Crause, Senior Superintendent Smit and Colonel Venter and he was then a Lieutenant and Lieutenant Wehrmann, I had discussed it with them and in the light of arrested MK members, Chairperson, in my time I had questioned plus minus 50 of them and without exception I had reiterated the fact that infiltrating MK members as well as APLA members were very tense, that they would make maximum preparations for the smallest incident that might happen as to protect themselves seeing that the infiltrating members who were commanders I accepted that they would be armed and Colonel Crause was also informed by Moatshe that they would be armed.

&#9;If shooting would break out then members would be firing on each other from East to West and this could lead to the death or injury of some of our members. The place which was chosen by Colonel Smit was a good choice because of the gate but it was difficult or because of the reason that there was no cover for the members, there was no cover at all in the immediate vicinity where members could conceal themselves. Time aspect was also important in case of crossfire. The members would be exposed. 

MR VISSER: In fairness to Smit the place was chosen, in other words if a car would arrive around the bend he would have seen the gate and he would be able to turn around or make some preparations.

MR LOOTS: We had one instance, Chairperson, of a vehicle that arrived there and there was just one choice and it had to stop.

MR VISSER: In paragraph 85 you mention the exercises, just tell us of the exercises that you had?

MR LOOTS: The incident according to the information that we had that they would infiltrate around 9 o'clock and therefore with a light delivery vehicle we used to stop before the gate and switch on the lights and then some of the younger members, Van Zyl and Marais and Nieuwenhuis would jump on the back of the vehicle and practised how they would possibly execute the arrest and indeed, accept for the fact that we were East and West of the road and that we did not know who would be where inside the vehicle. I realised that it was half and half an exercise that could not be executed.

MR VISSER: What was the viewpoint of the junior officers?

MR LOOTS: I called them aside and told them listen people, my viewpoint was Chairperson that I never expected of anybody else to do something that I would not do myself and I put it to them pertinently that I did not in the light of the fact that according to the information that armed commanders would be there to execute that instruction. They agreed with me and some of the younger members voiced their opinions and said that it would be dangerous. 

MR VISSER: This was a general feeling when you started with the practice runs, that you decided that this plan could not be executed, you just gave an instruction that if this was the situation, if the bakkie appeared and it stopped you would fire on it immediately to stop the possibility that the members of yours would be shot at?

MR LOOTS: Some of the members had then moved and three of them went to the front of the gate.

MR VISSER: And you say on page 32, paragraph 86, at approximately 9 o'clock you received a radio report from Steyn that the bakkie was on it's way?

MR LOOTS: That is correct, Chairperson.

MR VISSER: Before we get there, we know that Steyn and Truter had a radio in their vehicle and we know that you had radios available at the scene, is that correct?

MR LOOTS: That is correct, Chairperson.

MR VISSER: A question might arise that when you decided to change the plan and not to follow Steyn's orders did you think of contacting him and the radio and telling him or asking permission for your amendment of the plan?

MR LOOTS: Chairperson, we did not know how far they were behind the bakkie of the persons who would climb through the gate or through the fence. A further aspect ...[intervention]

MR VISSER: Sorry Brigadier why do you say that?

CHAIRPERSON: Has he understood your question Mr Visser?

MR VISSER: Yes I think so Chairperson, thank you.

&#9;What is the relevancy thereof as to how far the persons would be from the bakkie or rather how far they would be from Steyn's vehicle?

MR LOOTS: Can I explain it in this manner, I did not know, the vehicle with which the insurgents would travel was at a certain point and I did not know how far or how close General Steyn's vehicle would be to this vehicle and if I had contacted him by radio then the insurgents would have heard that there's a radio conversation and that would have thrown a spanner in the works. 

MR VISSER: Excuse me, we are still at the point where I asked you to tell the Committee why you did not contact Steyn if you then did make the radio contact with him would you have told him that I would assume that I have changed the plan. I think an arrest cannot be executed, we must eliminate them, did you think of doing that?

MR LOOTS: If I had radio contact with him I would have informed him of the amendment of the plan.

MR VISSER: Actually Crause said that the radios that you used were not limited to your vehicles, is it true that it would broadcast, this was a general channel that other persons also used? Well the bakkie was on it's way and what happened then?

MR LOOTS: My instruction to the men was that as soon as the bakkie stops, persons in charge of the generator should switch on the lights and immediately thereafter we would fire on the insurgents.

MR VISSER: And that is what happened?

MR LOOTS: That is what happened, Chairperson.

MR VISSER: Do you know how many shots were fired?

MR LOOTS: Many shots were fired, Chairperson.

MR VISSER: Did you fire yourself?

MR LOOTS: No I did not.

MR VISSER: After the incident Steyn and Truter arrived at the scene?

MR LOOTS: That is correct, Chairperson.

MR VISSER: Do you have an idea as to how long after the incident?

MR LOOTS: It was a few minutes Chairperson.

MR VISSER: Are you an demolitions expert?

MR LOOTS: Yes I did complete a course in explosives, That is correct.

MR VISSER: And is it true that the scene was cleared up afterwards?

MR LOOTS: That is correct, Chairperson.

MR VISSER: Who did this?

MR LOOTS: It was myself and Colonel Mike Truter.

MR VISSER: And you say he arrived afterwards?

MR LOOTS: At that stage there was the investigation under way of a PAC infiltration and that is why Truter was in the area.

MR VISSER: But he was not at the scene?

MR LOOTS: No he was not.

MR VISSER: What did you find according to your memory with regard to weapons in this vehicle?

MR LOOTS: Chairperson, I was in front of the gate, in other words I was in front of the vehicle to the left. I was to the left of Colonel Venter and Warrant Officer Smit and immediately after the shooting incident I moved around to the left front door of the bakkie and it was clear to me then that there were hand grenades in the vehicle in between or on the lap of the passenger on the left hand side. There was two hand grenades in a bag that was open, that was clear.

MR VISSER: I think somebody referred to it as a shaving bag and there were two hand grenades in there, on whose lap?

MR LOOTS: On the passenger left, that was Kruschev, he was later identified as Kruschev. I can also mention, Chairperson, that it was defensive hand grenades that was already armed and by that I mean usually when a safety pin is put in it is open and when you arm it you bend it, you close it, in other words you just had to pull it out.

MR VISSER: Continue please?

MR LOOTS: In total we found four, both members had two defensive hand grenades and they were also in possession of a Makarov pistol with a round in the barrel, it was with the safety on and half cocked.

MR VISSER: What does half cocked mean.

MR LOOTS: I'm not a weapons expert, Chairperson, but it would seem that if you take the safety off you fire immediately. Immediately.

MR VISSER: From your inspection was your impression that these persons were ready to defend themselves against any possible arrest?

MR LOOTS: Yes Chairperson, no doubt.

MR VISSER: You have indicated while you were giving evidence that the pistols were - you indicated under your left arm, what do you mean be that?

MR LOOTS: We called it windbreakers at that stage, it was the month of May, it was just on the left side, that's where they had the pistols.

MR VISSER: So from what you saw of the vehicle you saw 6 hand grenades, 4 defensive hand grenades and 2 offensive hand grenades and 2 Makarov pistols and if we could pause here did you later that evening also see other weapons at the scene?

MR LOOTS: Chairperson, I repeat, I was the first person and this is usually the instruction that members who were not experienced in explosives had to leave the scene. I don't know but initially I saw these two hand grenades on his lap and Colonel Mike Truter approached because he would drag such a person from the car in case some of them could explode, you do not injure yourself and when I approached the vehicle there was an AK47 in the vehicle.

MR VISSER: Where exactly in the vehicle?

MR LOOTS: It was in between the legs of the left hand side passenger in front, Chairperson.

MR VISSER: Was it with the butt facing downwards and the barrel sticking up?

MR LOOTS: That is correct. And that was not part of the weapons which those people had arrived with?

MR VISSER: You can say this because you were the first person to arrive at the bakkie and you only noticed the hand grenades and the pistols?

MR LOOTS: That is correct, Chairperson.

MR VISSER: What was the plan according to your knowledge that weapons would be planted on these insurgents?

MR LOOTS: Not from my own knowledge Chairperson.

MR VISSER: Did you give any instruction to anybody that weapons should be planted on these persons?

MR LOOTS: Definitely not, Chairperson.

MR VISSER: Was there any reason why weapons had to be planted?

MR LOOTS: Chairperson, the initial plan was to arrest the persons but as I have explained we changed the plan but there was no such plan to plant weapons on them.

MR VISSER: Was there a reason to do it because they were in possession of their own weapons?

MR LOOTS: The information that they were MK commanders was that I had no doubt that they would be armed.

MR VISSER: But you knew they would be armed. Afterwards, was there another reason to plant the weapon afterwards?

MR LOOTS: No Chairperson.

MR VISSER: But you can recall then in your statement, in your affidavit, before the original Committee in bundle 2I, in paragraph 4.3 you referred to the version of Mr Venter?

MR LOOTS: That is correct.

MR VISSER: And you say that:

&#9;"in particular I note that Roelof Venter in his version mentions weapons which were planted or were to be planted on the terrorists. From this aspect and that is the planning, I can only mention that there was indeed an AK47 gun but I cannot remember how it arrived on the scene."

Is that what you are referring to today in your evidence?

MR LOOTS: That is correct.

ADV DE JAGER: Please assist me, Mr Visser, this is in bundle 2I?

MR VISSER: 2I on page 131 and you'll see Commissioner it's 4.3, if you will just look at the middle sentence and the next sentence says:

&#9;"From this aspect I can mention that there was indeed an AK47 gun."

That is what was maintained originally in 1997 when he received notice of Section 4 in terms of the Amnesty application of Roelof Venter.

MR VISSER: Well Mr Loots perhaps we should ...[intervention]

CHAIRPERSON: Mr Visser, so his evidence would accord with what appears at paragraph 91 in the middle, that would accord with what he evidenced then, that there was indeed an AK47 that he noticed, here appearing in his present applications?

MR VISSER: Oh yes, this witness has no doubt that there was an AK47 and he remembers it because he saw the hand grenades and pistols initially and thereafter when they cleared the area, if that's the right term to use, then he saw the AK47. That's why he remembers it.

&#9;And you say that on your own knowledge you do not know where the firearm came from or what happened to it but you would accept that it would have been removed for some or other reason later?

MR LOOTS: Yes that is possible.

MR VISSER: Chairperson, Du Preez Smit might shed some more light on this AK47 into his evidence.

&#9;Is it correct that you made an affidavit under oath which was served in the post-mortem inquest into the deaths of these three persons before the magistrate in Thabazimbi? Did you say anything about the AK47 in that affidavit?

MR LOOTS: No, I remained silent about it.

MR VISSER: Why did you do that?

MR LOOTS: Chairperson, the fact is that that weapon was definitely not part of the weapons with which those persons had travelled.

MR VISSER: So you were not prepared to say that under oath?

MR LOOTS: No.

MR VISSER: You refer in paragraph 93 to the post-mortem inquest numbers, 1983 1,2 and 3 and what the findings of the magistrate were?

MR LOOTS: That is correct.

MR VISSER: In your application form you have referred and that's bundle 11, I think you may have mine, I seem to have lost my bundle 11, Chairperson. I'm not certain of the page number but you refer to a report in Mayabuwa or Sitchaba. We know that that was the report which you traced and comes out Dawn, is that correct?

MR LOOTS: I can only say that we obtained this report only seven or eight days before.

MR VISSER: We have already referred to it, so you were aware of it?

MR LOOTS: Yes, we were aware of it shortly after the incident but we didn't keep any copies of it and only later did we manage to trace it.

MR VISSER: And that report maintains that there was a shooting incident between these persons ...[intervention]

CHAIRPERSON: That's page 5 Mr Visser.

MR VISSER: Thank you Chairperson, thank you.

&#9;It maintains that there was a shooting incident during which policemen were killed is that correct?

MR LOOTS: Yes that is correct. Actually soldiers, if I have it correctly, the reference was to soldiers.

MR VISSER: That's on page F26 of the first paragraph, the last sentence it says, Chairperson:

&#9;"It is with this attitude of mind that we will revisit the example and deeds of two fearless tigers who fell in battle on 4th May in the Western Transvaal during which they killed 4 racist soldiers on the spot."

That didn't really happen?

MR LOOTS: No.

CHAIRPERSON: Can you just - 27 are you not reading from page 27?

MR LOOTS: 26.

CHAIRPERSON: 26?

MR VISSER: Yes, it's the first ...[intervention]

ADV DE JAGER: Towards the end of that paragraph.

MR VISSER: I'm sorry, the first reference was to 26 and then the next one is in the first, second, third paragraph, the second last line I think is the one Commissioner de Jager is referring to.

&#9;"A long battle ensued but since the enemy was by far superior in number and arms"

CHAIRPERSON: Is that still on page 26?

MR VISSER: That's 27. The first, second, fourth paragraph, second last sentence.

CHAIRPERSON: I have located it Mr Visser.

MR VISSER: Thank you Chairperson and it says:

&#9;"A long battle ensued but since the enemy was by far superior in number and arms, the two tigers were overpowered, they died heroically taking with them four of the enemy."

Anyway, ...[intervention]

CHAIRPERSON: You obviously are not making anything of it.

MR VISSER: No, no, no, for as far as it may be considered to be a contradiction of the evidence, we simply refer to it and say that that is not what happened. We take it no further than that at all.

&#9;You are aware that the MK members were identified by means of fingerprints?

MR LOOTS: Yes that is correct.

MR VISSER: And during the investigation of Steyn it came to light that contact was made with some of the next-of-kin and you meant to indicate that you did make contact with one of the next-of-kin. Can you inform us about that?

MR LOOTS: I succeeded in contacting the Ramakoba family, if I recall correctly, they lived in Diepkloof and that is where I traced them.

MR VISSER: And what did you do once you had traced them?

MR LOOTS: I showed a recent photograph of him to them and they positively identified him as their son.

MR VISSER: I'm sorry.

CHAIRPERSON: When was this ...[indistinct]

MR LOOTS: That was approximately three to four months after the incident or two to three months, Chairperson.

MR VISSER: With regard to the post-mortem inquest, was that a formal enquiry in which evidence was led or is it one of those investigations that was finished off by means of affidavits?

MR LOOTS: No it was informal by means of affidavits.

MR VISSER: And it was your affidavit along with the autopsy report which was placed before the magistrate?

MR LOOTS: Yes that is correct.

MR VISSER: I refer to paragraph 97.

MR LOOTS: The body of Moatshe, there were certain prerequisites, his body was placed in a lead coffin and handed over to his next-of-kin or the Botswana authority. With regard to his vehicle, I'm not entirely sure what happened but it was handed over to his next-of-kin.

MR VISSER: Were you present with either of these events, with the handing over of Moatshe?

MR LOOTS: Yes.

MR VISSER: Because as I understand according to our consultation I don't know whether or not it was next-of-kin or the Botswana authority, it may have been the Botswana authority as well but this is quite some time ago so I can't recall everything quite clearly.

MR VISSER: Thank you Chairperson, that is the evidence from Mr Loots.

NO FURTHER QUESTIONS BY MR VISSER

CHAIRPERSON: Does that conclude your evidence in chief Mr Visser?

MR VISSER: Indeed it does, thank you Chairperson.

CHAIRPERSON: Thank you. Mr Du Plessis?

CROSS-EXAMINATION BY MR DU PLESSIS: Thank you Chairperson, just one or two short questions.

&#9;Brigadier Loots, Colonel Venter testified that he was under the impression that Moatshe was an informer. Would you agree with previous evidence that there is a possibility that Colonel Venter may well have thought so?

MR LOOTS: I think that there was a possibility.

MR DU PLESSIS: Colonel Venter also testified that weapons were taken along to plant on the members should it become necessary. Do you know of that evidence?

MR LOOTS: I have been informed about that through his amnesty application and because he lived in Louis Trichardt at that stage we met in Rustenburg and we asked him about this case and he couldn't tell us who or what, he couldn't give us a positive answer regarding who gave the order and so forth. 

MR DU PLESSIS: Yes, but let's just look at his evidence. His evidence was so that it was done like that and now you have given evidence that an AK47 came from somewhere. Do you have any other explanations which you could offer us with regards to the AK47? Is it possible that this had to do with Colonel Venter's evidence with regard to the planting of weapons?

MR LOOTS: There were so many infiltrations and incidents during which there was contact with terrorists and during which weapons were possessed. In 1981 with the Piet Pogaai incident there were numerous containers filled with pistols, hand grenades and AK's which were handed over.

ADV DE JAGER: I don't know if you understand the question, it's very simple. Venter says that members had weapons which they wanted to plant. Later you found a weapon that had been planted?

MR LOOTS: That is correct.

ADV DE JAGER: So it would appear that Venter is correct when he says that somebody had a weapon or weapons which they wanted to plant?

MR LOOTS: I will accept that, Chairperson.

MR DU PLESSIS: Thank you Advocate de Jager. I have no further questions. Chairperson, I'm sorry.

NO FURTHER QUESTIONS BY MR DU PLESSIS

CHAIRPERSON: Thank you. Ms Lockhat?

MS LOCKAT: No questions Chairperson.

CHAIRPERSON: Mr Lax do you have any questions to put?

MR LAX: Thank you Chairperson.

&#9;Brigadier, you indicated that one of the reasons why you were concerned about making radio contact was that this was a shared radio channel in the sense that it was of general use. Did I understand you correctly?

MR LOOTS: Yes that is correct.

MR LAX: You see, what puzzles me about that answer was a piece of evidence that only came to light during your testimony which puts a different slant on the previous evidence of this kind and that is that for example the instruction to locate a suitable place for an ambush was given over the radio?

MR LOOTS: That is correct.

MR LAX: Well then everybody listening to that channel would have known that there was going to be an ambush at some point in that time because the instruction given was given clearly over the radio which then in turn makes that explanation absolutely of no relevance at all?

MR LOOTS: I will concede that. If I might just explain with regard to the Botswana border where the vehicle was parked upon which or with which the two persons would cross illegally in relation to Steyn's vehicle and the distance between the vehicles. We were not certain about the time and if at that stage of the evening we'd entered into radio contact the possibility may have existed that this entire operation could have fallen through as a result of that, that the persons coming from Botswana may have heard the discussion. That is the only reasonable explanation that I can offer.

MR LAX: Look I hear that but of course if General Steyn, who is a very experienced policeman from his record, it's pretty clear, if he had parked in a place where that possibility existed he would have switched his radio off. He wouldn't have left it on because I know those radios, there's constant communication on those channels, everyone who is using it is busy contacting each other about something or other.

MR LOOTS: That is one of the reasons why radio communication at that stage was almost a zero as a possibility

MR LAX: You see the point is this and I don't want to belabour it, either the idea of getting hold of him occurred to you or it didn't occur to you, it's really as simple as that and if it occurred to you, you would have either tried to get hold of him or you would have decided it's not worth getting hold of him in which case it becomes an irrelevant issue. Do you agree?

MR LOOTS: I would have remained with my decision as we decided later to act.

MR LAX: I have no doubt of that, the issue is whether you would have reported that decision to General Steyn, that's really the issue.

MR LOOTS: If I could have I would have but it was impossible.

MR LAX: The fact is though that you didn't even try.

MR LOOTS: Everything happened so quickly with all these arrangements, that I didn't even know exactly where he was.

CHAIRPERSON: But surely that's not according to the evidence we've already heard?

MR LOOTS: No but what I mean is the specific point where he was located, if his radio had been switched off I wouldn't know where he was.

MR LAX: The point is and I want to repeat my point again, it didn't matter whether he knew where he was, he didn't try and get hold of him at all?

MR LOOTS: No we didn't.

CHAIRPERSON: But is it not your evidence that you did not have any radio contact, you didn't have a radio. Was it not your evidence?

MR LOOTS: No, the radios were definitely available.

MR LAX: It was the evidence of an earlier witness Chairperson, who said he wasn't near a radio at the time. There might have been radio contact.

MS LOCKAT: The applicant was Crause.

MR LAX: That's right. This question of this AK47 puzzles me somewhat, you told us that it was common practice that after an incident of this nature, everyone would leave the scene except those whose job it would be to make the place safe. Is that correct, did I hear you correctly in that regard?

MR LOOTS: That is correct.

MR LAX: And yet many people clearly didn't leave the scene because lots of the people went and looked at the vehicle and they saw the firearms and they saw a whole lot of things before doing that?

MR LOOTS: Yes that is correct, because it was very, very traumatic and it's one of the cases that has been the most difficult for me to handle. The fact that both windows had been shot out contributes to this, for somebody to put something in through the window was very easy. I don't wish to accuse my subordinates of anything whatsoever but I'm just trying to place the true facts before this Committee. We have no reason to lie. 

ADV DE JAGER: The fact is that you were certain that there wasn't an AK47 when you arrived on the scene and you were there first?

MR LOOTS: That is correct.

ADV DE JAGER: Or at least when you arrived at the bakkie?

MR LOOTS: Yes, I would have seen it very clearly, it was on the left hand side between the man's legs.

ADV DE JAGER: And when you arrived there again it was there?

MR LOOTS: Yes.

ADV DE JAGER: So it definitely wasn't placed there by one of the deceased, it was placed there by one of your men?

MR LOOTS: That's my suspicion.

ADV DE JAGER: Well it couldn't have been one of the passengers it had to be somebody else.

MR LAX: Well you see I'm getting to the point in a slightly more subtle and slow way and really you are telling us that this was quite a traumatic event, you were quite shocked by what had happened, people didn't leave the scene as one would expect and in fact within a few minutes of the shooting stopping, General Steyn and Mr Truter arrived on the scene, is that correct?

MR LOOTS: That is correct.

MR LAX: And you would have been involved in a discussion with him about what had happened?

MR LOOTS: That is correct.

MR LAX: So there would have been a great deal going on that you wouldn't even seen or noticed while that was happening?

MR LOOTS: That is correct.

MR LAX: Now you seem to be unsure about a number of issues from just my perception of your testimony. Your memory is not a hundred percent perfect and what I'm going to ask you is this, are you a hundred percent sure that you might have missed that AK47 being there when you first looked in?

MR LOOTS: Chairperson, the AK or the two hand grenades lay very clearly between the legs of the left passenger and the AK which I saw later on was definitely not there.

MR LAX: Now just another issue that again puzzles me completely about this, is I'm very familiar with what should or shouldn't be done in this sort of situation, having been trained extensively in roadblocks and ambushes and things of that nature, to put a firearm between that persons legs where there was a hand grenade sitting there was looking for trouble in the most serious, you'd agree with me, that could have been very easily booby trapped, they could have had it there, in his dying moments that person might have done something, there was numerous occasions where people who'd been shot at in that sort of way have somehow been able to leave a booby trap and in dealing with it, people have been maimed and injured and even killed. As an explosives expert you'd be familiar with that?

MR LOOTS: Chairperson, all that I can say is that this incident took place very quickly. General Steyn asked me later on whether I changed my mind or not because as you know I couldn't inform him before the time and what happened there I cannot explain to you from my own knowledge. I would like to be very honest with the Committee and say that there was definitely an AK47 in that bakkie which was not there when I looked in the first time. I don't wish to place an incident out of context and say that people who infiltrated had more weapons that what they really had in their possession.

MR LAX: You see the other possibility that immediately springs to mind is that none of these people were armed and that in fact this issue of the AK47 is simply a way of explaining something that was planted there that everyone forgot about that somehow came out in Mr Venter's evidence?

MR VISSER: Sorry, that's an unfair question, Chairperson. Venter never spoke of an AK47.

MR LAX: You're quite correct, Venter spoke about weapons being planted.

CHAIRPERSON: Then you went further to say weapons were found with the insurgents. He did concede to that. Shouldn't you be springing to your client's defence Mr Visser because you must remember that evidence by Mr Venter?

MR VISSER: I'm not sure that I'm following the line of questioning now, I thought the point was being made that because you now say there was an AK47, this fits in with the evidence of Venter which seems to indicate that they had no weapons at all and all of them, the hand grenades and the pistols and everything was planted on them, I thought that was the question.

CHAIRPERSON: No but I think Mr Lax was taking it further than that. Doesn't there exist the possibility that there were no weapons at all?

MR VISSER: Yes.

CHAIRPERSON: Which were found with the insurgents?

MR VISSER: That's right.

CHAIRPERSON: Weapons that we are now being advised were found with the insurgents are the weapons that were planted just like an AK47 was planted?

MR VISSER: Yes.

CHAIRPERSON: I thought you would come to your client's defence and say Mr Venter doesn't go that far, in fact Mr Venter said that inasmuch it was the intention to plant weapons, in this instance they did discover weapons after they had killed the insurgents.

MR VISSER: Yes I assumed perhaps and I think correctly I would have assumed that that's not what Mr Lax meant. If I misunderstood it then well obviously I should have come to his defence. The point is that what Venter said in his evidence was that they were given weapons to take to the scene to plant if necessary, that he goes not further than that, but I didn't think for a moment that Mr Lax was deviating from that evidence. The only thing that I objected to, if it is an objection, it's not really an objection but to clarify, was that Sidney Venter didn't speak of an AK47 and that was part of the question that was put and I thought that was perhaps a little bit misleading.

CHAIRPERSON: You may proceed Mr Lax.

MR LAX: Thanks Chairperson, I confirm I'm not implying that - I'm not going as far as the Chairperson's implying I am although of course that is another possibility that the whole thing is a fabrication but there's no evidence of that at that stage. My only other concern Brigadier is this, in spite of the fact that we have been pointed out to some passages in Mr Venter's evidence where he gives the impression that there was a change of plan. The other portions of his evidence and maybe the later portions were efforts to explain the earlier parts of his evidence, but it's clear as you will recall from the questions I put to an earlier witness, that in an early part of his testimony he places General Steyn on the scene and he implied that it was the intention from the beginning was to eliminate people. Now ...[intervention]

CHAIRPERSON: May I for purposes of clarity find out in what respect is it alleged that Mr Venter places General Steyn at the scene? Was it at the scene of the shooting?

MR LAX: No. No, no. At the scene of the roadblock prior to it at a point in which a decision is taken to eliminate.

CHAIRPERSON: Yes.

MR LAX: And that is in the beginning of his testimony in that annexure that we have here. If you like I'll give you the page reference. 

MR VISSER: Chairperson, we would particularly be interested to see the part that he says that the intention was to always eliminate and never to arrest.

CHAIRPERSON: Yes because there the portion where he makes it patently clear that General Steyn's instructions was to arrest and not to eliminate and that's a page reference that you continuously draw attention to.

MR LAX: Yes, it's 871 I think. If I could just help you, I know the other passages later that you've referred us to already but under this section, this paragraph which has a sort of quasi heading in parenthesis or rather in quotations "nature and particulars" he says:

&#9;"Captain Crause and myself were under the command of Colonel Steyn the commanding officer of Western Transvaal and currently General Steyn. We discussed the matter with Colonel Steyn and Brigadier Loots and then Colonel Loots was also in the area. We discussed this matter, we decided that we would ambush them to intercept these trained terrorists."

Now ambushing is not a roadblock. Ambushing implies an attack and to that extent that may have been clarified in the later evidence but certainly when I originally read that portion that was an impression that I got, however wrongly or rightly.

CHAIRPERSON: I think it was clarified though Mr Lax, you do not concede?

CHAIRPERSON: Yes okay, I'll leave the issue, Chairperson.

CHAIRPERSON: That he just jumbles everything as he was giving his evidence. He was not clear.

MR VISSER: With great respect, this is translated evidence, it's not even in his mother tongue, with respect.

MR LAX: I'm going to leave that point and move on to - the one aspect that again concerns me is that there is no mention expect in your testimony and I think one other person of this AK47 in anyone else's testimony. Why was it necessary to hide that AK47 or to not disclose it in any way whatsoever at the time?

MR LOOTS: Chairperson, the only explanation that I can offer is that within the security branch the rule was need to know and after so many years of involvement in South West and in the current Zimbabwe it was so that members not only of the police but also of the Defence Force came into possession of Makarovs and Tokarevs and AK's and not everybody always knew about it. Although at certain security branches it was so that it was officially available for the simple reason that should you find something like this you practice the use of it so that you can familiarise yourself with the usage of such a weapon and for that reason I could offer the only reasonable explanation and that is that someone was in possession of that AK and placed it there in order to protect me as the person who had given the order to shoot but I made sure that those hand grenades were there and upon further investigation I saw the AK and Makarov pistols.

MR LAX: You see, as a senior officer that was in fact an attempt to defeat the ends of justice by one of your members.

MR LOOTS: That is so.

MR LAX: And you did nothing about it? You did nothing about it.

MR LOOTS: I don't understand your question.

MR LAX: You didn't do anything about that attempt to defeat the ends of justice?

MR LOOTS: No.

ADV DE JAGER: But in fact you prevented that attempt to succeed by stating the truth?

MR LOOTS: That is so. I do not wish to create any wrong impressions for this Committee, we have decided to tell the truth, the full truth. 

MR LAX: There was just one other aspect I wanted you to clear up for me, you were asked about Truter being on the scene and you gave an answer which I found a bit puzzling, you said he wasn't on the scene because he was busy with another operation, a PAC operation. Do you remember you didn't ...[intervention]

ADV DE JAGER: He didn't say he was busy with another one, he said they expected or they suspected that there might be another one that he was in the vicinity.

MR LOOTS: And for that reason the people were in the vicinity.

MR LAX: But in fact he was part of this whole process, he even in fact went with General Steyn to keep an eye on the vehicle.

MR LOOTS: There were two Truters, Chairperson. The one was ...[intervention]

MR LAX: Thank you, that explains it for me.

CHAIRPERSON: General - Captain Loots, I just wanted to clear an issue which was raised by my colleague with regard to the evidence that was given by Mr Venter which is in your favour. I think at the time when Mr Venter was giving evidence he just put everything together, the paragraph, that is the page that you've referred to which is 861 which would suggest that - would could suggest that General Steyn was present when the decision to eliminate the insurgents was taken must be read in conjunction with the application of Mr Venter wherein it is quite clear that General Steyn was not present when that decision was taken and that appears on page 14C of your own application which is bundle 11 and that's the second paragraph wherein it states quite clearly that the General had given a decision that the insurgents were to be intercepted.

MR LOOTS: That is correct.

CHAIRPERSON: Then he goes on to indicate that there was then a later decision taken and he then mentions the people who were present and the name of General Steyn does not appear amongst the people stated by Mr Venter in his application.

MR LOOTS: That is absolutely correct, Madame Chair.

CHAIRPERSON: Yes, there is just one aspect that I wanted to clear with you and that is with regard to the authority that you had to take a decision that you did and that is to eliminate the insurgents. You already had been given a decision by General Steyn who was your superior. Did you have any authority to counter a decision given by a superior we found discussing the problems that you had identified with him and to proceed on your own to take a different position which was counter the decision that he had given you?

MR LOOTS: Chairperson, I have comprehension for what you say, I can repeat that to change that decision was one of the most difficult of my life and all I can add was it was either I or Crause or my other juniors or the enemy. There was no other solution. That is the only explanation that I can tender to you. It was not pleasant.

CHAIRPERSON: Yes I can appreciate that but the pertinent question is did you believe that you had the right to take the decision that you did taking into account that a superior officer had already put you in command and had given you an order that you had to carry?

MR LOOTS: Chairperson, in my heart and in my soul I am convinced that General Steyn would not have expected of us to commit suicide, suicide in the sense that later he explained that this happened very quickly and by means of reevaluation we came to another decision. I can only say that it was very difficult.

CHAIRPERSON: Would you therefore say that you bona fide believe that by your appointment as a commander which appointment was effected by General Steyn, that appointment gave you some measure of authority to take a decision that you did and that was to eliminate the insurgents?

MR LOOTS: Can I just illustrate that I did this after I deliberated with all the men, with all the senior men first, and then a man like Van Zyl who still has to give evidence, that he protested that it was expected of him to catch people under these circumstances knowing that they were armed insurgents.

CHAIRPERSON: Yes I understand that. I'm probably not being pointed in how I'm putting this question to you. You are appointed by General Steyn to be in command, is that not so?

MR LOOTS: That is correct.

CHAIRPERSON: Now did you believe that as a commander part of your duty would be to evaluate the efficacy of the operation that you had been given by General Steyn to carry out and to decide on a different plan if you thought the operation which was to intercept the insurgents would not be successfully carried out? Did you believe you had that authority because whether you discussed this with other officers, these are junior officers, it is neither here nor there, did you believe that you had authority as a commander to take a decision to eliminate?

MR LOOTS: This was part of my police duties at that stage given the atmosphere that reigned in this country. Derdepoort I can just mention, the 1st November 1978 a farmer was murdered there, we've never found his body yet and the 19th January is Alti Mosarewa was shot at Derdepoort. Colonel Ras is here, these are the people who were almost killed there. In 1982 my colleague was shot, 25 shots were fired at him, ...[intervention].

ADV DE JAGER: I think that you and the Honourable Chairperson are speaking past each other. She puts it to you that General Steyn gave the instruction to you. If you receive an instruction and you see for some or other reason that it would not work, do you have the capacity to amend this instruction according to what you think is the best under the circumstances?

MR LOOTS: According to my conscience yes.

ADV DE JAGER: So you do have a discretion there to amend the plan.

MR LOOTS: Yes.

CHAIRPERSON: So would I therefore be correct, sir, that you reasonably believed then that you had such authority to take the decision that you did?

MR LOOTS: That is what I believed, Chairperson.

CHAIRPERSON: Yes and that decision you would have taken whether you had consulted with other junior officers or not?

MR LOOTS: That is correct.

CHAIRPERSON: That certainly couldn't have enabled you to have such authority?

MR LOOTS: That is correct.

CHAIRPERSON: It has taken me quite some time to get you to where I wanted you to get to, Mr Loots.

MR LOOTS: Sorry Chairperson.

CHAIRPERSON: Mr Visser, do you wish to re-examine? I hope you wont?

MR VISSER: I do have a question Chairperson.

CHAIRPERSON: I hope it wont be too many questions, I will confine you to one question.

RE-EXAMINATION BY MR VISSER: It will not be as many questions as the witness has received Madame Chair.

&#9;Commissioner Lax put it to you that you did not have a problem to tell Du Preez Smit or to leave a message that he had to find a place and he spoke of a place for an ambush. What exactly did you ask of Du Preez Smit to do, what kind of a place did he ask you to find?

MR LOOTS: To find a suitable place where we could intercept the persons who came into the country.

MR VISSER: To do what.

MR LOOTS: To arrest them.

MR VISSER: At that stage when you spoke to Du Preez Smit what was the plan, what would you do with these insurgents, to eliminate them?

MR LOOTS: No to question them.

MR VISSER: To what?

MR LOOTS: To arrest them and to question them.

NO FURTHER QUESTIONS BY MR VISSER

CHAIRPERSON: Thank you. Before you are excused Captain Loots, are you in a position to give an indication to this Committee of how long the shooting lasted?&#9;&#9;&#9;

MR LOOTS: Not more than a minute, a few seconds, it was very quick.

CHAIRPERSON: And did each of your officers report to you how many rounds of ammunition they had each used in the shooting?

MR LOOTS: We counted 34 holes in the vehicle, Chairperson.

CHAIRPERSON: Where they armed with their official firearms?

MR LOOTS: Yes Chairperson.

CHAIRPERSON: To your knowledge and recollection were they all armed in R1 rifles?

MR LOOTS: Yes.

CHAIRPERSON: Thank you. You are excused.

MR LOOTS: Thank you.

WITNESS EXCUSED

MR VISSER: Chairperson, you did mention to me that you would appreciate it if we could adjourn a little early, I'm not certain Chairperson whether you wanted to adjourn earlier than 4 o'clock. I should have asked you. We're certainly not going to finish today, not at this rate so whenever, if you wish to adjourn, we can continue tomorrow. We'll finish during the course of the morning.

CHAIRPERSON: ...[inaudible]

MR VISSER: So we can continue? Yes well I hope I didn't give you any cause of complaint so far, Chairperson, but if I may ask you this ...[inaudible]

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

NAME:&#9;CHRISTOFFEL JOHANNES DU PREEZ SMIT

APPLICATION NO:&#9;AM4386/96

______________________________________________________

CHRISTOFFEL JOHANNES DU PREEZ SMIT: (sworn states)

EXAMINATION BY MR VISSER: Mr Smit, your application appears on page 26 to 31 of bundle 11 and you apply for amnesty for your involvement in the Silent Valley incident. Chairperson, you might find in your Exhibit I that there are two first pages. The reason for that is for some reason the computer refused to print on the first one and we didn't pick it up until after the papers were reproduced and it simply refers to the numbering of the paragraphs.

&#9;Mr Smit in your affidavit, Exhibit I you've requested the Committee to consider various submissions and evidence which has been made in the past with regard to your application?

MR DU PREEZ SMIT: That is correct.

MR VISSER: You have also given your personal background and particulars with regard to your career and so forth until page 5, is that correct?

MR DU PREEZ SMIT: Yes that is correct.

MR VISSER: I would just like to pause with you, at the time of the incident in 1983 you were a Lieutenant?

MR DU PREEZ SMIT: Yes that is correct.

MR VISSER: And later you were promoted to branch commander of Zeerust?

MR DU PREEZ SMIT: Yes.

MR VISSER: And later you were promoted again?

MR DU PREEZ SMIT: Yes that is correct.

MR VISSER: Could you tell the Committee to what?

MR DU PREEZ SMIT: I was the provincial commander of internal security with the former security branch.

MR VISSER: As with the other witnesses who have given evidence here and I assume that you were present when Mr Crause gave evidence this morning?

MR DU PREEZ SMIT: That is correct.

MR VISSER: With regard to the rest of your affidavit up until page 21 your evidence is in essence the same as what he said and the same as what appears in his affidavit and you reconcile yourself with that?

MR DU PREEZ SMIT: That is correct.

MR VISSER: And you also confirm what appears in your affidavit in this regard?

MR DU PREEZ SMIT: Yes that is correct.

MR VISSER: You also apologise for your weak recollection in paragraph 66 and so forth on page 22 and then we come to the Silent Valley incident on page 23. From paragraph 70 onwards could you inform us regarding what you remember about this incident as well as your share in this incident?

MR DU PREEZ SMIT: On 4th May 1983 I was still a lieutenant, I went with the then Captain Crause to Derdepoort in an official vehicle, we had information that certain PAC operatives wanted to infiltrate. On the way there Colonel Crause heard a message over the radio that there was a person at Derdepoort border post who wanted to see him. We went to the border post and Crause and Venter spoke to the man, I was not present during the discussion. After the discussion, Colonel Crause told me that the man had told him that two trained MK members were on the other side of the border and that they were going to infiltrate the R.S.A. that night. Colonel Crause then contacted the regional headquarters with regard to the matter.

MR VISSER: Is that Colonel Steyn?

MR DU PREEZ SMIT: Yes, he was the commander at that stage.

I moved around on the roads in the vicinity with the idea of establishing the infiltration route of the PAC's then contacted Brigadier Loots and he gave me an order to look for a suitable place for a roadblock.

MR VISSER: Not for an ambush?

MR DU PREEZ SMIT: No, for a roadblock. I then identified a place which was the road coming from Derdepoort which had a T-junction where it joined another road, very close to the T-junction there was a gate about which there has been evidence?

MR VISSER: Yes and this gate was just after a bend in the road?

MR DU PREEZ SMIT: That's correct. I informed Brigadier Loots about this and that evening we gathered at that place. General Steyn gave the instruction that the men would be arrested and in co-operation with him we established a plan as to how the arrest would take place. He and Commissioner Truter then left thereafter. 

MR VISSER: The members who were present you have listed in paragraph 78 and if you refer to all the members it was Steyn, Loots, Crause, Venter, Van Zyl, Marais, Jan Truter and W C Smith as well as yourself?

MR DU PREEZ SMIT: Yes, there may have been other people there who I cannot recall.

MR VISSER: Well one of the persons was Captain Wehrmann.

MR DU PREEZ SMIT: That is correct.

MR VISSER: And Wehrmann has passed away?

MR DU PREEZ SMIT: That is correct.

MR VISSER: Continue with 79?

MR DU PREEZ SMIT: After General Steyn had departed we did a practice run as has been testified to earlier. It was obvious that people would be injured especially if hand grenades were to be used to assault us. After a discussion among the officers who were present on the scene along with Brigadier Loots who was then in command it was decided that we would eliminate the people, we would shoot them dead when they stopped at the roadblock. All the persons who were on the eastern side of the road moved over to the western side of the road. The only shelter which was available at that stage for them and this was a gravel road and as the road was formed there was a small embankment and that was the only shelter which people could take and they lay on or behind that embankment.

MR VISSER: In other words you would agree with the set up which Brigadier Loots gave this morning as to why he decided to change the plan and disobey the order to arrest?

MR DU PREEZ SMIT: That is correct. As the vehicle approached us we became aware thereof and the vehicle slowed down at the T-junction, went round the bend and stopped at the gate. We immediately opened fire on the vehicle, I fired shots myself, I cannot say how many shots were fired. This lasted for a few seconds after which the gunshots ended. We were approximately two metres away from the vehicle and if a hand grenade had been thrown out it would definitely have either killed or injured us. 

&#9;After the fire had ceased we went to inspect the vehicle and I saw the hand grenade on the lap of the left passenger. After that we left the vehicle so that it could be cleared by demolitions experts. 

MR VISSER: You spoke of hand grenades, could you please refer to paragraph 88. Where were these hand grenades?

MR DU PREEZ SMIT: The hand grenade which I saw was on the passenger, on the left hand side of the bakkie. After the bodies had been removed I also saw pistols on the persons who had been seated in the middle and on the left. There were no weapons to be found on the driver of the bakkie. 

&#9;After the scene had been cleared and by that we mean that bodies had been removed from the vehicle and that the vehicle had been made safe by the experts. The bodies were taken to the mortuary.

MR VISSER: Can you tell us something about the removal of the bodies, with which vehicles were they transported, can you remember?

MR DU PREEZ SMIT: No, I can't recall.

MR VISSER: So if there is evidence later to the effect that the bodies were loaded onto a bakkie and were removed as such from the scene you would accept this as the correct evidence?

MR DU PREEZ SMIT: Yes that is correct.

MR VISSER: And you also referred to a Sitchaba publication which we knew was a publication of Dawn and this is attached to Brigadier Loots' affidavit?

MR DU PREEZ SMIT: Yes that is correct.

MR VISSER: And you also became aware of that after the time?

MR DU PREEZ SMIT: That is correct.

MR VISSER: Did you investigate the weapons which were found on the bodies?

MR DU PREEZ SMIT: No.

MR VISSER: Did you give any orders or did you receive any orders to take weapons to the scene to plant on these persons?

MR DU PREEZ SMIT: No.

MR VISSER: Did you yourself plant a weapon on anyone of these persons?

MR DU PREEZ SMIT: No.

MR VISSER: You informed me about an incident regarding a telephone call with regard to Russian firearms which you received later when you were the divisional commander?

MR DU PREEZ SMIT: That is correct, that was at Potchefstroom.

MR VISSER: Can you tell the Committee who the person was who contacted you and what the content of that discussion was?

MR DU PREEZ SMIT: I was transferred from Zeerust to Potchefstroom and Hans Wehrmann was appointed of the commander of the security branch at Zeerust.

MR VISSER: Please go a little bit slower?

MR DU PREEZ SMIT: I beg your pardon.

MR LAX: Please repeat the person who became your successor?

MR DU PREEZ SMIT: Captain Hans Wehrmann, the deceased Hans Wehrmann.

MR VISSER: If I'm not mistaken W-e-h-r-m-a-n-n.

MR DU PREEZ SMIT: While I was in Potchefstroom I received a telephone call from him and he informed me that there were three AKs in a safe in the security branch in Zeerust. I contacted the particular division at head office and they sent somebody to retrieve the weapons from there.

MR VISSER: Why do you refer us to those three AKs?

MR DU PREEZ SMIT: Because AKs have been mentioned in previous evidence which has been delivered here and also because the name of the deceased, Hans Wehrmann has emerged.

MR VISSER: And you are simply stating that there may be a connection?

MR DU PREEZ SMIT: Yes.

MR VISSER: You say in paragraph 91 that the bodies were later identified, those are the bodies of the two passengers, by means of fingerprints?

MR DU PREEZ SMIT: Yes that is correct.

MR VISSER: Were you aware that Moatshe had been an informer in the Western Transvaal?

MR DU PREEZ SMIT: No.

MR VISSER: Chairperson, that concludes the evidence in chief, thank you.

CHAIRPERSON: Before you do so, you made reference to a telephone call having been received from Mr Wehrmann about the AK47.

MR VISSER: About 3 AK47s?

CHAIRPERSON: Yes, about 3 AK47s. Then you left the matter there so we are still in the dark as to in what context this is being referred to, whether Mr Smit is saying you went to Potchefstroom, collected the 3 AK47s, that the 3 AK47s at all material times under his care whilst he was ...[intervention]

MR VISSER: No, no, Madame Chairperson.

CHAIRPERSON: Yes?

MR VISSER: In the interest of full disclosure what Du Preez Smit is saying is that as far as AKs in the Western Transvaal are concerned, what he can offer as evidence is that he received a telephone call from Wehrmann, that's his evidence, who asked him "what do we do with the 3 AK47s here in the gun room at Zeerust?" Smit then arranged with the quartermaster I think it was in Pretoria for those AKs to be transported to Pretoria to be destroyed. Now he is not taking it any further than that, he can't put it as high as saying that Wehrmann knew anything about the AKs at the Silent Valley incident, he doesn't put it that high, all that he says is that there might be a connection. Wehrmann was there and there was mention of AK47s. We can't take it any further but we thought that in the interest of full disclosure we'll tell you about it.

CHAIRPERSON: I don't think how it assists us?

MR VISSER: Well, it may not, but still it's something he told me and I thought I should convey it to you.

MR LAX: May I just interpose for one second? You're telling us about this phone call. What did Wehrmann say to you when he phoned you? Did he say this was presumably now that he'd become commander of the unit in your place once you'd been moved to Potch? What did he say, did he say - well just tell us?

MR DU PREEZ SMIT: I can't remember his precise words, it could have been that he had an inspection but he saw the weapons there, he said that he had the AKs there and wanted to know what to do with it. I told him to leave it in my hands and that I would arrange for these weapons to be retrieved. 

MR LAX: It seems to me from the way you've testified that he discovered these AK47s and he wanted to know what to do with them while having an inspection? It seems not an unfair assumption that he probably didn't know about the existence before because if he didn't he wouldn't have bothered to phone you?

MR DU PREEZ SMIT: I can't respond to that but I must mention that we did have AKs and that we did undertake shooting exercises with these weapons, we were trained in the use of AKs so if this was the first time that he discovered the AKs there it's impossible for me to answer.

ADV DE JAGER: But when you were at Zeerust the AKs were there?

MR DU PREEZ SMIT: That is correct.

CHAIRPERSON: Weren't there AK47s everywhere and the police were using them in order to make some of the operations look like they were operations of the ANC? Isn't that common cause Mr Visser, that's the evidence that we have heard throughout our hearings ever since I've been here that's the evidence that one can now accept without having to introduce this but you are conducting the matter, we don't want to interfere. That concludes your evidence in chief is it not?

MR VISSER: Yes Chairperson.

CHAIRPERSON: Yes, thank you very much Mr Visser.

NO FURTHER QUESTIONS BY MR VISSER

CHAIRPERSON: Mr du Plessis, do you have any questions to put to Mr Smit?

CROSS-EXAMINATION BY MR DU PLESSIS: Thank you Chairperson, just one or two.

&#9;Mr Smit you've heard that Colonel Venter gave evidence that Moatshe had been an informer. Is it possible that Colonel Venter at that stage could have been under the impression that Moatshe was an informer?

MR DU PREEZ SMIT: He may have been under that impression.

MR DU PLESSIS: Very well and then I'd like to ask you there has been evidence regarding the one AK47 that was found with one of the passengers of the vehicle. As I understand your evidence you were not aware thereof?

MR DU PREEZ SMIT: No, I was not aware of it.

CHAIRPERSON: Thank you Mr du Plessis.

NO FURTHER QUESTIONS BY MR DU PLESSIS

CHAIRPERSON: Ms Lockhat?

CROSS-EXAMINATION BY MS LOCKHAT: Just a few questions Chairperson.

&#9;Is it correct that you went with Mr Crause, you were in the car when you received the radio transmission that there was someone at the border to meet with Crause. Did Crause inform you what that conversation entailed?

MR DU PREEZ SMIT: I only heard over the radio that someone said that there was a person at the border post who wanted to speak to him. I was not present with their meeting. Afterwards Captain Crause told me that this person had informed them that there were two trained MK members who were going to infiltrate the R.S.A.

MS LOCKAT: Just your impression, I forgot that the radio was - that you could actually hear it. Did you form an impression that maybe this Moatshe was an informer of Crause's?

MR DU PREEZ SMIT: I couldn't draw that inference, Chairperson.

MS LOCKAT: So was the conversation very brief or long did they basically speak for?

MR DU PREEZ SMIT: The radio report was simply that there was a man at the border post who wished to speak to him and that was all.

MS LOCKAT: And when you got to the border post you were not in the same vicinity as them, where were you at the time?

MR DU PREEZ SMIT: I was not present during the discussion.

MS LOCKAT: So where were you at the time?

MR DU PREEZ SMIT: I departed as I've already testified and continued with my other duties.

MS LOCKAT: You were under the impression that these operatives were basically going to be arrested, is that correct?

MR DU PREEZ SMIT: That is correct.

MS LOCKAT: Is it normal procedure for persons to arm themselves with extra weapons to plant this on people that were going to be arrested?

MR DU PREEZ SMIT: Not as far as I am aware but it may have been so.

MS LOCKAT: Tell me when Loots informed you that the operation - were you part of the discussion as to the elimination of the operatives?

MR DU PREEZ SMIT: That is correct.

MS LOCKAT: What was your opinion, did you think it was a good idea?

MR DU PREEZ SMIT: That is correct.

MS LOCKAT: Why did you think so?

MR DU PREEZ SMIT: Because the vicinity did not lend itself to an arrest. As I have explained the section that was available to us was minimal.

CHAIRPERSON: But on that point you chose the spot?

MR DU PREEZ SMIT: Chairperson, yes that's correct, it was the best place that I could find given the circumstances and the time at my disposal.

CHAIRPERSON: Now when you chose that spot did you know where the time of choosing that spot that it would present difficulties?

MR DU PREEZ SMIT: Not for the arrest Chairperson.

CHAIRPERSON: You only realised that it would or not for the arrest you said?

MR DU PREEZ SMIT: That is correct.

CHAIRPERSON: So if you had effected an arrest the spot would have been appropriate, is that what you're saying?

MR DU PREEZ SMIT: At that stage I thought that it would be appropriate.

CHAIRPERSON: Was it normal practice for your unit to have a practice run when you were to effect an arrest on insurgents?

MR DU PREEZ SMIT: Chairperson there were inexperienced persons and I think that the purpose was to prepare them for such a situation if they had not yet encountered such a situation previously.

CHAIRPERSON: Yes so it wasn't normal practice?

MR DU PREEZ SMIT: That is correct.

CHAIRPERSON: Proceed Ms Lockhat?

MS LOCKAT: You were aware that General Steyn was in charge of this operation?

MR DU PREEZ SMIT: That is correct.

CHAIRPERSON: That is not so, which operation are you referring to?

MS LOCKAT: To the arrest, Chairperson.

CHAIRPERSON: Okay.

MS LOCKAT: Is that correct?

MR DU PREEZ SMIT: That is so.

MS LOCKAT: At the stage it was planned to eliminate these people. Did it occur to you to inform General Steyn?

MR DU PREEZ SMIT: Chairperson, Brigadier Loots was for all practical purposes in command there and we would only have followed his instructions and executed whichever orders he gave.

MS LOCKAT: Was it only according to your knowledge the one AK that was found at the scene of the incident?

MR DU PREEZ SMIT: I have no knowledge of the AK which was found on the scene.

MS LOCKAT: And Mr Wehrmann, is that correct, that's his name?

MR DU PREEZ SMIT: Wehrmann.

MS LOCKAT: When he informed you about these three additional weapons that were found did he tell you which incident, what did he tell you?

MR DU PREEZ SMIT: He simply informed me that there was three AKs in the safe and we then arranged or I arranged for these AKs to be removed.

MS LOCKAT: Did you think that these AKs were found at the scene of the incident there?

MR DU PREEZ SMIT: No Chairperson.

CHAIRPERSON: When were you informed by Mr Wehrmann?

MR DU PREEZ SMIT: It would have been approximately during the early 90's, perhaps '92, '93.

ADV DE JAGER: It almost seven to ten years after the incident?

MR DU PREEZ SMIT&#9;: That is correct.

MS LOCKAT: Thank you Chairperson, no further questions.

NO FURTHER QUESTIONS BY MS LOCKHAT

CHAIRPERSON: Thank you. Mr Visser, procedurally I should allow you to re-examine but maybe it's better to do so if after the members of my Committee have been accorded an opportunity to put questions to Mr Smit?

MR VISSER: Yes absolutely Chairperson.

CHAIRPERSON: Yes, thank you. Mr Lax?

MR LAX: Just one issue Chairperson. Senior Superintendent, you said something about AK47s being used for practice or for you to be in a position to know how to handle them. Those would have been properly issued AK47s I would imagine, would that be correct?

MR DU PREEZ SMIT: Chairperson yes, it was supposed to be that way but there could have been cases where there were AKs present which had not been formerly or officially issued.

MR LAX: You see we've heard evidence in many many hearings during the course of the whole Commission's existence of numerous members of the police who - and other instances - who kept their own firearms of Soviet origin for a whole range of purposes. They even kept home-made firearms, sometimes they'd want to plant them on people, sometimes they'd want to use them to make an incident look like it was carried out in a counter-intelligence sort of way, in other words to provide a false flag operation, if we could put it in that sense and so what I'm asking you in a sense is, is the distinction between bona fide training with such weapons which you would have borne knowledge of such weapons, and the different kind of use of such weapons where people using them for what may have been an unofficially sanctioned purposes but which were tolerated in a sense, do you bear any knowledge of that?

MR DU PREEZ SMIT: That is correct.

MR LAX: And you've already testified that to the best of your knowledge there was no such practice on that day of this incident?

MR DU PREEZ SMIT: That is correct, Chairperson.

CHAIRPERSON: Thank you Mr Lax. Mr De Jager, do you have any questions to put to Mr Smit?

ADV DE JAGER: No questions.

CHAIRPERSON: Mr Visser do you have any re-examination?

MR VISSER: None thank you Chairperson, except that I again neglected to refer you to the fact that also this witness made an affidavit, bundle 2I, page 133. It doesn't say much but I should have drawn your attention. Thank you Chairperson, may the witness be excused?

CHAIRPERSON: Yes, Mr Smit you are excused.

MR DU PREEZ SMIT: Thank you Chairperson.

WITNESS EXCUSED

NAME:&#9;&#9;&#9;DANIEL JOHANNES NIEUWENHUIS

APPLICATION NO:&#9;AM4395/9?

______________________________________________________

DANIEL JOHANNES NIEUWENHUIS: (sworn states)

EXAMINATION BY MR VISSER: This witness did not make an affidavit Chairperson.

CHAIRPERSON: I made a note of that when I was going through bundle 11 and I couldn't locate anything, any application by this applicant.

MR VISSER: Oh, bundle 11 there isn't ...[intervention]

MR LAX: Sorry, there is an application, page 74 but no affidavit, you're quite correct.

CHAIRPERSON: Yes.

MR VISSER: But no affidavit in the previous hearing in the Cronje hearings before the original Amnesty Committee as well I tried to say but his present application is before you in bundle 11 at page 74 to 80.

ADV DE JAGER: And you've also got the affidavit Exhibit J?

CHAIRPERSON: Yes.

MR VISSER: That is the affidavit which we now hand in as his evidence Madame Chairperson and I wish to refer him to it directly if I may?

ADV DE JAGER: Can he confirm everything in Exhibit K?

MR VISSER: Well I'm going to ask him that now.

CHAIRPERSON: Yes. I think what I meant, my note now reflects that there was no actual detail with regard to the incident itself.

MR VISSER: Yes indeed. Yes that is correct, yes.

CHAIRPERSON: Yes.

MR VISSER: Mr Nieuwenhuis, you made an affidavit which was compiled for you with regard to consultations which was held with you regarding aspects that your attention has been fixed upon and this is contained within Exhibit J, is that correct?

MR NIEUWENHUIS: That is correct.

MR VISSER: Do you confirm that according to the best of your knowledge the content of this exhibit is true and correct?

MR NIEUWENHUIS: That is correct.

MR VISSER: If we could move to page 20 paragraph 72 where you deal with the Silent Valley incident, could you say if you refer more pertinently to page 21, paragraph 73. This person, Andries Moatshe, on the date that this incident took place did you have any knowledge of him?

MR NIEUWENHUIS: No I didn't, I didn't know about him.

MR VISSER: Were you aware that he was an informer of the security branch in the Western Transvaal?

MR NIEUWENHUIS: I was not aware of anything like that.

MR VISSER: You were not informed about much on that day if I understand you correctly Mr Nieuwenhuis?

MR NIEUWENHUIS: That is correct.

MR VISSER: How long were you connected to the security branch on the 4th May when this incident took place?

MR NIEUWENHUIS: In 1977 I began my service at the security branch in Zeerust.

MR VISSER: Just a moment please? 

&#9;If we might just continue then, you have referred in your affidavit to the compilation of Du Preez Smit's application, what was said to you that day before the incident regarding what was to take place or what was about to happen? That's paragraph 73.

MR NIEUWENHUIS: I was told to go to a certain point where I was to assist in arresting ANC infiltrators. 

MR VISSER: You then went to this point?

MR NIEUWENHUIS: That is correct.

MR VISSER: Did anybody accompany you?

MR NIEUWENHUIS: I can't remember precisely whether I went alone in my vehicle or whether I went with others.

MR VISSER: Before you received the order what were you busy with?

MR NIEUWENHUIS: I was busy with field work in the vicinity and there was information that PAC members would enter the country and we were busy with that investigation. 

MR VISSER: And who worked with you on that investigation?

Was it Marais and other members?

MR NIEUWENHUIS: Yes that is correct.

MR VISSER: In paragraph 76 you have referred to the people that you recall being there, is that correct?

MR NIEUWENHUIS: Yes that is correct.

MR VISSER: And in 77 you recall that you were informed that armed MK members would enter the country in a red Toyota bakkie, you were told to go to the point at the Mariko bend and you said that at Silent Valley approximately 20 kilometres from the border you assumed your positions at a junction and you were told to divide into two groups on either sides of the gate and to wait for these MK insurgents?

MR NIEUWENHUIS: That is correct.

MR VISSER: What exactly did the operation involve as you have explained in paragraph 79?

MR NIEUWENHUIS: The operation involved that we were to arrest these people and my specific instruction in this regard was along with two of my colleagues, Marais and Van Zyl, respectively that Marais had to run in the direction of the left hand side of the bakkies and that I was to be on the right hand side of the bakkie and that Van Zyl was to jump on the back of the bakkie and in so doing we were to arrest these people.

MR VISSER: What about the windows?

MR NIEUWENHUIS: That is correct, the instruction in this relation was that the windows of the vehicle were to be hit out with the guns and that the passengers were to be detained.

ADV DE JAGER: When you say hit out, could you just be a bit more specific? Could you just say whether or not you were supposed to hit the left window out?

MR NIEUWENHUIS: I was supposed to hit the right hand window of the vehicle out.

MR VISSER: You say in paragraph 80 that Steyn and Truter then departed in '81 you say there were a few practice runs. What became clear after that?

MR NIEUWENHUIS: What I saw while we were practising was that it was going to be very problematic as a result of the fact that it was at night and that if I was to fail to smash the window upon my first attempt I would not be able to see into the vehicle and if I opened the door of the vehicle I would not be able to see what the people inside were doing.

MR VISSER: And was this a problem for you?

MR NIEUWENHUIS: Yes.

MR VISSER: What was the problem?

MR NIEUWENHUIS: That we would be injured if these people were to open fire on us and further consequence would have been that they would be some of my own people on either side of the vehicle who could injured or killed.

MR VISSER: Did you express this opinion to anybody else who was present there?

MR NIEUWENHUIS: That is correct.

MR VISSER: Did you tell them that you were not satisfied with the situation?

MR NIEUWENHUIS: That is correct.

MR VISSER: There was then a discussion as we have heard from Brigadier Loots and from Colonel Crause and the instruction was then given by Loots that shots would be fired, that the people had to move over to the western side of the road and that as soon as the vehicle stopped you would open fire immediately on the passengers. There was a generator and you took your positions alongside the road. Do you agree with the description of the shelter that was available there as given by Du Preez Smit?

MR NIEUWENHUIS: Yes that is correct.

MR VISSER: The vehicle arrived at approximately 9 o'clock that night, the generator was switched on and you opened fire on the vehicle?

MR NIEUWENHUIS: That is correct.

MR VISSER: Did you fire?

MR NIEUWENHUIS: Yes I did.

MR VISSER: Do you know how many shots you fired?

MR NIEUWENHUIS: I cannot give the exact number but I did fire quite a few shots.

MR VISSER: Which may have hit the passengers?

MR NIEUWENHUIS: Yes that is correct.

MR VISSER: We know that there were three passengers in the bakkie, did you investigate or I beg your pardon, did you have any knowledge that weapons would be planted on them?

MR NIEUWENHUIS: I have no knowledge of that?

MR VISSER: Did you plant any weapons on these persons?

MR NIEUWENHUIS: No I didn't.

MR VISSER: Did you look into the vehicle?

MR NIEUWENHUIS: I did.

MR VISSER: What did you see regarding weapons?

MR NIEUWENHUIS: I saw a pistol in the vehicle.

MR VISSER: Where was this pistol?

MR NIEUWENHUIS: I cannot say with certainty. I also saw hand grenades within the vehicle.

MR VISSER: After the scene had been cleared what happened to the bodies of the deceased?

MR NIEUWENHUIS: Personally, I assisted in loading the bodies onto the back of the police bakkie in which they were transported away.

MR VISSER: You heard about the post-mortem inquest but you yourself have no knowledge thereof?

MR NIEUWENHUIS: That is correct.

MR VISSER: And you agree that these persons were later identified as the people mentioned in '89, MK Karl Marx and Kruschev and that there was one other person who was a Botswana citizen and his name was Andries Moatshe?

MR NIEUWENHUIS: That is correct.

MR VISSER: That concludes the evidence in chief, thank you Chairperson.

CHAIRPERSON: Thank you Mr Visser.

NO FURTHER QUESTIONS BY MR VISSER

CHAIRPERSON: Mr du Plessis do you have any questions to put?

MR DU PLESSIS: I have no questions.

CHAIRPERSON: Thank you. Ms Lockhat we come to you?

CROSS-EXAMINATION BY MS LOCKHAT: Mr Smit, can you tell me who informed you that you should be part of this operation?

CHAIRPERSON: It's Mr Nieuwenhuis.

MS LOCKAT: Thank you Chairperson, Mr Nieuwenhuis?

MR NIEUWENHUIS: Could you repeat your question please?

MS LOCKAT: Who informed you that you were to be part of this operation?

MR NIEUWENHUIS: I cannot recall.

MS LOCKAT: Who were you with, were you with people at the time?

MR NIEUWENHUIS: That is correct, I was with Mr Marais and others in the environment.

MS LOCKAT: Can you remember who the others were?

MR NIEUWENHUIS: No precisely.

MS LOCKAT: So you were informed that you were to be part of an arrest, that you were going to arrest people, is that correct?

MR NIEUWENHUIS: That is correct.

MS LOCKAT: Weren't you surprised when they informed you that in fact you were no longer going to arrest people but you were actually going to eliminate people? How did you ...[intervention]

MR VISSER: Well that's a totally unfair question in the light of the evidence of this witness, with great respect. He says that he complained about it.

CHAIRPERSON: Yes, he personally registered his objection.

MR VISSER: Yes.

MS LOCKAT: I'll withdraw that question Chairperson.

CHAIRPERSON: It's also quite evident in his affidavit.

MS LOCKAT: Tell me, the persons that were with you were also informed that they would only be part of this arrest, did they have any weapons to plant on these persons?

MR NIEUWENHUIS: I have no knowledge of any weapons which may have been planted on any persons whatsoever.

MS LOCKAT: Thank you Chairperson, no further questions.

NO FURTHER QUESTIONS BY MS LOCKHAT

MR LAX: Just one question Chairperson. Did you assist with the removal of the bodies from the vehicle?

MR NIEUWENHUIS: I can recall that I loaded one or more of the persons physically onto the police vehicle.

MR LAX: The question was did you remove them from the vehicle in which they had been shot?

MR NIEUWENHUIS: No I didn't.

MR LAX: Thank you Chairperson, no questions then.

CHAIRPERSON: Mr De Jager?

ADV DE JAGER: No questions.

CHAIRPERSON: Mr Nieuwenhuis, you have evidenced that you personally registered your objection to the plan because of the dangers it presented to you. Did it ever occur to you to suggest that the whole plan should be abandoned?

MR NIEUWENHUIS: No Chairperson.

CHAIRPERSON: Had it occurred to you, would it have made any difference who were in command?

MR NIEUWENHUIS: I wouldn't say that.

CHAIRPERSON: You were a junior officer in any event is that not so?

MR NIEUWENHUIS: That is correct.

CHAIRPERSON: You were a junior officer to Captain Loots?

MR NIEUWENHUIS: Yes by far, that was correct.

CHAIRPERSON: You objected in your capacity as a person who was going to be used in the operation and whose life would have been in danger.

MR NIEUWENHUIS: Indeed it was so, I wouldn't say I was afraid but my life would have been endangered.

CHAIRPERSON: And that in your opinion was not intended to suggest that you did not want to obey the instructions given by General Steyn?

MR NIEUWENHUIS: That is correct.

CHAIRPERSON: Mr Visser, do you have any re-examination flowing from what I've said?

MR VISSER: I have no re-examination, thank you Chairperson. May this witness be excused as well?

CHAIRPERSON: You may be excused Mr Nieuwenhuis.

MR NIEUWENHUIS: Thank you.

WITNESS EXCUSED

 

 

 

 

 

 

&#9;&#9;&#9;&#9;&#9;&#9;&#9;&#9;&#9;&#9;

NAME:&#9;&#9;&#9;WILLIAM CLAAS CECIL SMITH

APPLICATION NO:&#9;AM5469/97

______________________________________________________

MR VISSER: Chairperson, if you want to adjourn early, now is the time, it's seven minutes to four.

CHAIRPERSON: We'll proceed with the applications who you represent Mr Visser.

MR VISSER: Chairperson, I may mention that my client Mr Smith is available and I don't have any further - I have two witnesses to go but they're not presently available.

ADV DE JAGER: It looks as if there is somebody who is putting on a tie at the back and it would appear that he wants to give evidence. 

MR VISSER: Perhaps Mr Marais who has just arrived here from the Little Karoo and he has been travelling since 7 o'clock this morning, he cannot give evidence because his evidence and his statement have not yet been cleared with him. That will only be done this evening so he might as well take the tie off.

CHAIRPERSON: You did indicate before we commenced of the problem that you had with Mr Marais, he hasn't deposed to the affidavit that we intend to hand up. We will then proceed with the applicant Mr Smith who is being represented by Mr Du Plessis.

MR DU PLESSIS: Thank you Chairperson.

WILLIAM CLAAS CECIL SMITH: (sworn states)

EXAMINATION BY MR DU PLESSIS: Chairperson, you will find his application in bundle 11 from page 38.

&#9;Mr Smith, will you please page to page 78? Page 38.

Chairperson, it doesn't seem that Mr Smith has the copies of the pages that I want to refer him to. Oh sorry, he has got it. 

&#9;Mr Smith, could you please look at page 38, your personal particulars are given there as well as your background. On page 44 we have your general background as well as your political motive right up until the end of page 62. Do you confirm the correctness thereof?

MR SMITH: That is correct.

MR DU PLESSIS: And you have heard the evidence of the previous witnesses and persons who were commanders during the relevant incident. Do you confirm the evidence with regard to your political motive?

MR SMITH: I confirm that.

MR DU PLESSIS: Your evidence is on page 64 of the bundle where you begin with the nature and particulars and I would just like to take you through this very briefly. In paragraph 1 you say that you were stationed at the Thabazimbi security branch. What was your rank at that stage?

MR SMITH: I was a Warrant Officer.

MR DU PLESSIS: And you were under the command of Colonel Venter?

MR SMITH: That is correct.

MR DU PLESSIS: And you were called in to assist with an operation, you went to a determined place and you found members of the security branch there and you were under the command of Wickus Loots?

MR SMITH: That is correct.

MR DU PLESSIS: The following paragraph, would you please read this to the Committee?

MR SMITH:&#9; " At late afternoon the senior members decided that an ambush would be set for the insurgents. All the present members were given specific tasks in relation to the ambush for example to cordon off the roads in the immediate vicinity and to form part of the ambush itself which would be set up at the T-junction. I was part of the latter mentioned group."

MR DU PLESSIS: Did you have contact with the other applicants who have given evidence here before you compiled this version of yours?

MR SMITH: No I didn't.

MR DU PLESSIS: And you have heard evidence here today regarding the practice run which took place during the preparation for the events. Can you recall that?

MR SMITH: Yes I recall that.

MR DU PLESSIS: Is this in line with the evidence which has been given about it before the Committee by the other witnesses?

MR SMITH: Yes that is correct.

MR DU PLESSIS: And then you say that you and the other members were armed with official firearms, you said that you had an R1 gun and that you were under the command of Lieutenant Venter and that you had to take position in the main road into which the vehicle would turn?

MR SMITH: Initially we were positioned on both sides of the road and then we moved over to one side.

MR DU PLESSIS: You say that the information came through that the terrorists would be armed, was it specifically that they were armed or that they would be armed?

MR SMITH: No, the information which was given was that the terrorists were armed.

MR DU PLESSIS: And then you say that there would be an attempt to apprehend the group and to arrest them but if they should resist fire would be opened on the vehicle?

MR SMITH: That is correct.

MR DU PLESSIS: Could we just pause there for a moment? Evidence has been given by other applicants in the matter that at a given stage a change of plan took place and that certain of the other persons who have given evidence here stated that it would have been dangerous to attempt to arrest the persons. You've heard that evidence?

MR SMITH: I have.

MR DU PLESSIS: Will you tell the Committee what your approach was with regard to that evidence?

MR SMITH: It is as it was put to the Committee this morning, the plan was amended to the effect that fire would be opened immediately on the vehicle as soon as the light of the generator was switched on.

MR DU PLESSIS: The reason why I'm asking you is because you don't state it pertinently on the final paragraph of page 64 that the plan was indeed changed. Is this something which has peaked your recollection during the course of the day?

MR SMITH: That is correct.

MR DU PLESSIS: You said that the order to fire would be given by one of the senior members on the scene ...[intervention].

CHAIRPERSON: May I interpose there Mr Du Plessis, before you proceed further? Were you present when the other members of the police registered their objection to the plan?

MR SMITH: I was.

CHAIRPERSON: And were you present when they gave reasons why they objected to the plan and gave the basic and primary reason that it posed inherent dangers to their lives?

MR SMITH: That is correct, I was present and that was one of the reasons why it was too dangerous to arrest them.

CHAIRPERSON: Did that apply to you?

MR SMITH: It did.

CHAIRPERSON: Thank you.

MR DU PLESSIS: Thank you Chairperson. You say at the top of page 65 that you do not recall who would have given the order. Can you read the next paragraph before the Committee, the second paragraph on page 65?

MR SMITH:"An obstacle was placed in the road and a generator 

&#9;&#9;was set up which would provide the light which was 

&#9;&#9;necessary for the arrest because it was already 

&#9;&#9;beginning to get dark. It was late and already dark 

&#9;&#9;when the vehicle approached the ambush. The 

&#9;&#9;members took in their positions as allocated to them 

&#9;&#9;and the generator lights were switched on when the 

&#9;&#9;vehicle approached the obstacle. The vehicle stopped 

&#9;&#9;suddenly and I heard someone shout the command 

&#9;&#9;"fire". I cannot recall exactly who it was but it must 

&#9;&#9;have been one of the senior members in command. 

&#9;&#9;All the members including myself began to fire at the 

&#9;&#9;vehicle."

MR DU PLESSIS: Very well, can you just pause there, can you recall specifically that someone called out "fire"? You recall that specifically?

MR SMITH: I recall that it would have been that way, I cannot say specifically that there was such a command perhaps as the lights were switched on, the command to fire was issued.

MR DU PLESSIS: You say that you fired at the front of the vehicle and that you fired between 15 and 20 rounds?

MR SMITH: That is correct.

MR DU PLESSIS: After the command to cease fire had been shouted out, you moved closer and you saw that the vehicle had been hit in the crossfire and that all three passengers had been killed?

MR SMITH: That is correct.

MR DU PLESSIS: Did you do any other inspection or closer inspection of the vehicle?

MR SMITH: I myself did not move closer, there was the problem that the area surrounding the vehicle was dangerous. Later I heard about the pistols and the hand grenades which were found in the vehicle and I later saw a photo which was in the post-mortem dossier in which the weapons were clearly visible.

MR DU PLESSIS: Can you remember anything about an AK47?

MR SMITH: No.

MR DU PLESSIS: On page 66 you say that the scene was examined and cleared by other members of the security branch and that you were no involved in that. You say that you then departed?

MR SMITH: Yes that is correct. The other members who helped with the cordoning off of the road were taken away by me.

MR DU PLESSIS: You say that you do not know or you did not have any knowledge that weapons would be planted on the bodies. Under whose command were you?

MR SMITH: I was under the command of Venter who was the branch commander.

MR DU PLESSIS: Did you have any choice in your execution of duties?

MR SMITH: No, I would have obeyed orders.

MR DU PLESSIS: Did you have any financial gain from these events?

MR SMITH: No.

MR DU PLESSIS: Can you please turn to page 68? To page 70. You give a further explanation of your political motivation, do you confirm the correctness thereof?

MR SMITH: Yes I do.

MR DU PLESSIS: I have no further questions, Chairperson.

NO FURTHER QUESTIONS BY MR DU PLESSIS

CHAIRPERSON: Thank you Mr du Plessis. Before I give an opportunity to Mr Visser, I just wanted to clear one issue.

In your viva voce and in your written application you have continuously referred to the fact that you were under the command of Lieutenant Venter?

MR SMITH: Chairperson that's correct, Venter was my immediate branch commander. At the scene I was under the command of the senior officer there who would be Brigadier Loots.

CHAIRPERSON: But that is not suggested by what is contained in your original application or what you've just stated in your viva voce?

MR SMITH: My immediate commander, I was stationed at Thabazimbi, my immediate commander was Colonel Venter. At the scene, if I took part in an operation with other members I would be under command of the senior member at the scene the same as Colonel Venter would be under the command of the Brigadier.

CHAIRPERSON: Thank you. Mr Visser do you have any questions to put?

CROSS-EXAMINATION BY MR VISSER: Thank you Chairperson. 

&#9;I want to join up with what the Honourable Chairperson has asked you and you have cleared up that at the scene you and other officers would come under the command of the most senior officer, is that your evidence? The question I would like to ask is as to what you have said on page 64 that you were under the command of Colonel Wickus Loots. Now we know that the then Colonel Steyn was the divisional Commissioner of the Western Transvaal and at some stage he was at the scene for a short while when you were under the command of Wickus Loots. To which stage do you refer?

MR SMITH: Chairperson, that would be in the absence of the General.

MR VISSER: I just wanted to get clarity as to that and where you refer in your amnesty application to a ambush and that initially the idea was to ambush these persons and murder them or did you mean anything else?

MR SMITH: I would say that an ambush would be an obstacle.

MR VISSER: Would you say that you mean by ambush you mean a roadblock?

MR SMITH: Yes an obstacle, a roadblock.

MR VISSER: To cut a long story short Mr Smith, please tell me if I'm incorrect but I make the inference that after your memory has been refreshed, you agree with whatever the other applicants have said here today?

MR SMITH: That is correct, Chairperson.

NO FURTHER QUESTIONS BY MR VISSER&#9;&#9;&#9;

CHAIRPERSON: Mr Smith, flowing from what has been put to you by Mr Visser and my initial enquiry which is just causing me some problems, in your application specifically at paragraph 35 and the second paragraph from the bottom. If one reads that paragraph ...[intervention]

MR VISSER: Chairperson, which paragraph are you referring to, I beg your pardon?

CHAIRPERSON: I'm referring to the second paragraph from the bottom.

ADV DE JAGER: Page 35 of your application.

CHAIRPERSON: That would be page 64, paragraph 35. Oh no, I think yes it is paragraph 35.

MR LAX: 9a(iv) is the paragraph.

CHAIRPERSON: The second paragraph from the bottom.

CHAIRPERSON: Correct. Do you see that?

MR LAX: I starts with the words "ek en die ander lede was bewapen", do you see where that?

MR SMITH: I see that.

CHAIRPERSON: Yes now if one reads what is contained in that paragraph, one gets an impression that you were put in command, I mean you were put under the command of Lieutenant Venter at the scene where the operation was planned. Do you read it the way I do, if not can you give us an explanation?

MR SMITH: Chairperson, the easiest manner to explain this is I think where I say I was under the command of Lieutenant Venter and I was told to take a position in the road where the vehicle would turn meaning that I took up a position with Lieutenant Venter in the roadblock itself, the position was next to Lieutenant Venter.

CHAIRPERSON: So that does no - you did not want to suggest that you were under his command?

MR SMITH: No, I was placed next to him, everyone of us was pointed out to positions where I was placed, where Lieutenant Venter was placed as well, he was next to me and therefore he was my senior.

CHAIRPERSON: And who put you with Lieutenant Venter, do you remember the name of the official who suggested that you must be with him?

MR SMITH: No Chairperson, I don't recall but it was part of the preparations made at the scene, I cannot recall specifically who said who must stand where, it was just part of the preparations.

CHAIRPERSON: But with your better recollection now, you are almost positive if not ...[indistinct] sure that the person who was in command of this operation was Captain Loots?

MR SMITH: Chairperson, Brigadier Loots, he was the senior officer at the scene at that time.

CHAIRPERSON: And that we should read what appears on the same page and that's the second paragraph from the top. That even though Captain Loots was in command of seven officials as that is suggested by that paragraph, he was appointed commander of that operation by General Steyn. You would agree with that evidence?

MR SMITH: I agree Chairperson, that's correct.

CHAIRPERSON: Thank you. Ms Lockhat?

MS LOCKAT: No questions Chairperson.

CHAIRPERSON: Thank you. You are excused Mr Smith.

MR DU PLESSIS: Thank you Chairperson.

WITNESS EXCUSED

CHAIRPERSON: I want to believe Mr du Plessis that there wouldn't have been anything for you to re-examine on?

MR DU PLESSIS: No there was nothing that I wanted to ask, Chairperson. Thank you.

CHAIRPERSON: Thank you. Is that all for today?

MR VISSER: From our side Chairperson yes.

CHAIRPERSON: We'll then adjourn and reconvene tomorrow at 9.30. Can I also, Ms Lockhat, suggest that Mr Thabede be advised to be here at about 10.30 instead of 9.30.

MS LOCKAT: I've done that Chairperson.

CHAIRPERSON: May I find out from the legal representatives 

involved in this matter whether they will be in a position to address us immediately after concluding evidence in respect of this incident?

MR VISSER: Chairperson, Visser on record, if you're not going to expect anything in writing?

CHAIRPERSON: No, we don't want anything in writing.

MR VISSER: Then clearly there's no problem with addressing you.

CHAIRPERSON: We would appreciate that.

ADV DE JAGER: I think you've already furnished us with that.

MR VISSER: I mean in connection with this particular incident, I just won’t have time to go and do that.

CHAIRPERSON: We don't think it's a matter that would require reading heads, we would think it's sufficient for you to give us oral argument.

MS LOCKAT: Chairperson, just one other issue, I just want to place on record that in connection with the victims relating to this matter I've furnished our investigative unit Fanie Malapo here in Johannesburg with the information that we obtained and I've enquired and instructed them to make the necessary enquiries relating to the victims in this matter, Chairperson, and he will get back to me tomorrow.

CHAIRPERSON: Did you convey the urgency of the matter?

MS LOCKAT: I have indeed Chairperson and his instructions were that he'll get back to me tomorrow on this issue so that he can investigate it.

CHAIRPERSON: Did you convey the dissatisfaction expressed by the Committee in which this investigation was conducted?

MS LOCKAT: I have indeed Chairperson.

CHAIRPERSON: Yes, thank you.

MR VISSER: Chairperson, before you rise on a matter of information it would be helpful to know how you see the programme for tomorrow. You gave instructions that someone else, I didn't hear who it was has to be here at 10.30. Is there going to be an application interposed after the Silent Valley matter.

CHAIRPERSON: Yes, after you've presented your argument.

MR VISSER: Oh, after presenting it and you that's going to be finished by half past ten?

CHAIRPERSON: Well I'm being very optimistic Mr Visser, if one does become optimistic.

MR VISSER: We can probably accommodate you.

CHAIRPERSON: Yes I think what I wanted to convey across is not to have Mr Thabede here at 9.30.

MR VISSER: To listen to our argument.

CHAIRPERSON: To listen to your argument which I am saying would not find interesting but to rather have him here safely at 10.30. 

MR VISSER: Yes. Yes.

CHAIRPERSON: If your argument obviously proceeds until lunch time then that will be so.

MR VISSER: So be it, yes. As far as the McKenzie squad is concerned, would it be prudent to warn them to be hear by lunch time? It would seem to be a reasonable estimate?

CHAIRPERSON: I would like to believe that if you are able to conclude your argument by tea time, the Thabede matter is capable of being concluded by lunch time.

MR VISSER: Yes.

CHAIRPERSON: It really would depend on when you conclude your argument.

MR VISSER: Yes, which again in turn would depend on when we finish with the two witnesses although they're the last two and really they should go very briefly. 

CHAIRPERSON: We are completely in your hands.

MR VISSER: Yes but we might set our sights on 11 o'clock, yes Chairperson.

CHAIRPERSON: I think lunch time probably would be more ...[intervention]

MR VISSER: I can tell now I'm going to have very little to say to you in argument. You've heard the evidence and really I'm not going to repeat it.

CHAIRPERSON: I wish I could believe that Mr Visser.

MR VISSER: Well, we'll see what happened tomorrow.

CHAIRPERSON: Thank you.

COMMITTEE ADJOURNS

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

